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European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2021 6(2), 955-965, European Forum Insight of 9 October 2021, I. Premessa. - II. La proposta di riformulazione dei criteri CILFIT. - III. Analisi delle tre condizioni proposte dall'Avvocato Generale Bobek. - IV. Alcune considerazioni critiche. - V. Conclusioni: analogie e dissimilitudini con la procedura consultiva ai sensi del Protocollo n. 16 alla CEDU., In its opinion of 15th April 2021 in case C-561/19, Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi (ECLI:EU:C:2021:291) AG Bobek proposed to revise the CILFIT criteria which famously concern the duty of the National courts of last instance to request a preliminary ruling. After a brief analysis on the controversial relationship between discretion and duty to request a preliminary ruling, this Insight focuses critically on the three cumulative conditions under which, according to AG Bobek, national judges of last instance have a duty to refer and, in particular, on the condition concerning the existence of a general issue of interpretation of EU law. In the last section, the Insight argues that this condition would downgrade the binding effect of a preliminary ruling and would make it similar to the advisory opinions envisaged by Protocol n. 16 to the European Convention of Human Rights.

European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(1), 265-274, I. Introduction. - II. Context: two preliminary references and the need to prove relevance. - III. The Advocate General opinion. - IV. The nature and scope of art. 267 TFEU. - IV.1. The uniformity of EU law. - IV.2. The tension between power and obligation. - IV.3. CILFIT confirmed and tweaked. - IV.4. A new requirement: giving reasons. - IV.5. The obligation to refer where a matter is raised late in proceedings. - V. Conclusion., A significant judgment of the Grand Chamber of the CJEU was handed down in case C-561/19 Consorzio Italian Management e Catania Multiservizi and Catania Multiservizi ECLI:ECLI:EU:C:2021:799 (CIM) in October 2021 on the scope of discretion of national courts of last resort when deciding to make a preliminary reference under art. 267 TFEU. Despite the invitation of the Advocate General, the Court shored up the (almost) 40-year-old CILFIT (case 283/81 CILFIT v Ministero della Sanità ECLI:EU:C:1982:335) test, giving clarification as to the aims of art. 267 TFEU and setting down an obligation to give reasons when not referring as a means of containing national court discretion by increasing transparency. The Court, by retaining the CILFIT test while tweaking it and adding a requirement to give reasons for refusal to refer, chose partnership and judicial cooperation with national apex courts while increasing transparency for decision-making thereby favouring the existing vision of the relationship with courts of last resort as one of direct cooperation.

European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2020 5(2), 745-754, I. Introduction. - II. Evolving legal questions surrounding Art. 267 TFEU. - III. Stocktaking: the procedure under pressure? - IV. Contributing to the academic debate. - V. Overview of the Special Section. - V.1. Factors and motives to refer. - V.2. Quality of Court of Justice answers and dialogue. - V.3. Implementation of Court of Justice judgments., The most important procedure of EU law is the preliminary ruling procedure. Academic scrutiny by way of a Special Section is pertinent for three reasons. Firstly, there are still many out-standing legal and practical questions with respect to Art. 267 TFEU as illustrated by the continuous flow of new judgments of the Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights. Secondly, there are growing allegations that (some) national court judges are dissatisfied with the procedure, their interaction with the Court of Justice and the resulting answers. Thirdly, there has been little (empirical) research into the effective functioning of the procedure and its application by national courts. The Articles of this Special Section examine - often in an empirical way on the basis of interviews or questionnaires - why national courts refer (or not), what they think of their interaction with the Court of Justice and whether and how they implement the answers of the Court of Justice.

European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2020 5(2), 825-849, I. Introduction. - II. Research design and literature overview. - III. Legal explanations. - III.1. A stricter application of Cilfit by the Supreme Court. - III.2. The Court of Appeal: a de facto court of final appeal applying Cilfit. - IV. A generational change in knowledge and mentality. - V. Increased (EU law) litigations and requests to refer. - VI. No negative feedback loops: general satisfaction with Court of Justice answers. - VI.1. General satisfaction and inspiration. - VI.2. Very few deficient Court of Justice judgments: exceptions proving the rule. - VII. Concluding remarks., Ireland has always had a mixed relationship with the EU. It is one of the few EU Member States in which the people rejected EU constitutional changes. Until the EU enlargement of 2004, Ireland had the lowest rate of preliminary references to the Court of Justice across all EU Member States. The latter has changed in recent years. Irish courts have been at the forefront with important references in sensitive areas (Court of Justice: judgment of 27 November 2012, case C-370/12, Pringle; case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland [GC]; judgment of 6 October 2015, case C-362/14, Schrems [GC]; judgment of 25 July 2018, case C-216/18 PPU, Celmer [GC]). While only 44 cases where referred in its first 30 years of membership (1973-2003), 45 references were made in the six years between 2013-2018. This Article explains this marked change from what seems an island mentality to enthusiastic engagement with the Court of Justice. Why have Irish courts become more active interlocutors of the Court of Justice? What are their motives to refer (or not)? This question is studied on the basis of a legal-empirical research consisting of interviews with Irish judges and a systematic analysis of all decisions (not) to refer since 2013. This Article attributes the increase in references to the arrival of new judges with more knowledge about EU law and a more positive attitude towards referring. Other factors are the previous positive experiences with the Court of Justice that have stimulated (other) judges to refer. Legal considerations also played a role. Not only the Supreme Court, but also the High Court and the Court of Appeal have rather faithfully applied Cilfit (Court of Justice, judgment of 6 October 1982, case 283/81, v. Ministero della Sanità).

Līguma par Eiropas Savienības darbību 267.panta trešajā daļā ir noteikts Eiropas Savienības dalībvalstu pēdējo instanču tiesu pienākums vērsties Eiropas Savienības tiesā pēc prejudiciāla nolēmuma, ja lietā nepieciešama Eiropas Savienības tiesību interpretācija. Atkāpes no šī pienākuma Eiropas Savienības tiesa noteikusi CILFIT spriedumā. Vislielāko uzmanību sev pievērsusi tieši šajā spriedumā adaptētā Acte clair doktrīna, kas tiesām atļauj nevērsties Eiropas Savienības tiesā, ja Eiropas Savienības tiesību piemērošana ir tik acīmredzama, ka tā neatstāj vietu nekādām saprātīgām šaubām. Jau no doktrīnas ieviešanas brīža Eiropas Savienības tiesībās tā juristu vidū ir izpelnījusies kritiku par tās praktisko pielietojumu Eiropas Savienības dalībvalstu tiesās. Pētnieciskajā darbā analizēta šī kritika un tās pamatotība, Acte clair doktrīnas attīstība un pašreizējā izpratne, ņemot vērā Eiropas Savienības tiesas pēdējo gadu tiesu praksi, kā arī Latvijas Augstākās tiesas prakses analīze Acte clair doktrīnas piemērošanā. Šī darba rezultātā tiks sniegts vērtējums Acte clair doktrīnas piemērojamībai mūsdienās, aktuālajai Eiropas Savienības Tiesas judikatūrai attiecībā uz Acte clair doktrīnu, kā arī Latvijas Republikas Augstākās tiesas un Satversmes tiesas praksei Acte clair doktrīnas piemērošanā un interpretācijā., Article 267(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states that national court against whose judgment there is no higher appeal must refer a question to the European Court of Justice when a question on the interpretation of European law arises. European Court of Justice established deviations from this obligation in the CILFIT judgment. The Acte clair doctrine, adapted in this judgment, which allows courts not to seek preliminary ruling from European Court of Justice if the application of European Union law is so obvious that it leaves no room for any reasonable doubt, has received most attention. Ever since its introduction into European law, the doctrine has been criticized by lawyers for its practical application in the courts of the Member States of the European Union. This research analyzes these criticisms and their validity, the development and current understanding of the Acte clair doctrine, considering the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in recent years, as well as the analysis of the practice of the Supreme Court of Latvia in applying the Acte clair doctrine. As a result of this work, I will evaluate the applicability of the Acte clair doctrine in this day and age, current case law of the European Court of Justice regarding the Acte clair doctrine, as well as the case law of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Latvia and the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia in the application and interpretation of the Acte clair doctrine.

The topic of the thesis are CILFIT criterions. These criterions were established by the Court of Justice of the European Union as conditions for application of the acte clair doctrine by national courts of last resort. The conditions determine situations in which such a court does not have an obligation under Article 267/3 to bring a matter before the Court of Justice. First of all, thesis describes the historical circumstances, which gave rise to the CILFIT case as well as the facts of that issue. Then it analyses one by one CILFIT criterions and also current procedure of submitting preliminary questions as a whole. As a part of the analysis, it focuses on the practical application of the abovementioned conditions by the courts of the Member States. It targets purely theoretical ideas too. The thesis, further, identifies certain problematic aspects of the CILFIT conditions. Subsequently, some possible solutions are being suggested and their effectiveness and appropriateness are being examined.

Sveriges inträde i EU 1995 har lett till många förändringar i det svenska rättssystemet. Svenska domstolar har därmed fått en ny arbetssituation och nya skyldigheter. Flera förändringar har skett i svensk processrätt, och grundläggande EU-rättsliga principer som de om direkt effekt och EU-rättens företräde framför nationell rätt, har ställt de nationella domstolarna inför flera utmaningar. Den mest grundläggande skyldigheten de svenska domstolarna har gentemot EU är förpliktelsen att inhämta förhandsavgörande från EU-domstolen. Sistainstansrätterna är skyldiga att göra detta närhelst de är osäkra på tolkningen och/eller tillämpningen av en EU-rättslig bestämmelse. Detta är en långtgående förpliktelse som endast har två undantag: det första är i de fall EU-domstolen redan dömt i ett identiskt fall (acte éclairé); det andra är då den nationella domstolen anser att den EU-rättsliga bestämmelsen är tillräckligt klar och tydligt för att den självständigt ska kunna tillämpa den (acte clair). Dessa skyldigheter har lett till ett flertal problem för de svenska domstolarna. Sverige har fått skarp kritik från Kommissionen för sistainstansrätternas obenägenhet att inhämta förhandsavgörande. Huruvida EU borde ta hårdare tag mot medlemsstaternas nationella domstolar eller om kriterierna för när skyldigheten att inhämta förhandsavgörande borde mjukas upp diskuteras flitigt i nuläget. Det finns företeelser som talar för en utveckling åt både det ena och det andra hållet, vilket gör detta till ett väldigt spännande ämne att studera. Since Sweden joined EU in 1995 many things has changed in the Swedish legal order. This has led to several new obligations for the Swedish courts. There have been a number of changes in Swedish law of procedure, and fundamental principles of law set down by EU, like the principle of direct effect of EU law and its precedence over national law, has presented many challenges before the national courts. The most fundamental obligation of the Swedish courts to EU is the duty to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The courts of last instance are obligated to do this in any case where they are insecure of the appropriate application of EU-law. There are only two exceptions to this rule, namely when the ECJ already has ruled in an identical matter (acte éclairé) and in cases where the national court feels that the correct interpretation of the rule of law in question is obvious (acte clair). These obligations have lead to a number of problems for the Swedish courts. The Commission has criticized Sweden because of the national courts of last instance unwillingness to request preliminary rulings. Whether EU should toughen up and take action against the national courts disobedience or if the criteria for when an obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling should get more flexible is constantly discussed at this time. There are several things that speaks for both of these developments and that makes this a very interesting topic to study.