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In this paper we put forward and defend a view of the nature of logic that we call moderate anti-exceptionalism. In the first part of the paper we focus on the problem of genuine logical validity and consequence. We make use of examples from current debates to show that attempts to pinpoint the one and only authentic logic inevitably either yield irrefutable (and hence methodologically idle) theories or lead to dead ends. We then outline a thoroughly naturalist account of logical consequence as grounded in rules implicit in human linguistic practices (and thus immune to Quinean criticism of basing logic on explicit conventions). We insist that there are only two existing kinds of language: natural languages, and artificial languages that have been forged by us. There is thus no room for a "genuine" language (independent of us) and hence for "genuine" logic. We conclude that though logical theories are established—and are liable to criticism—in a similar fashion as those of the sciences, and in this sense logic is not exceptional, to fulfill its mission logic must lay a claim to normative authority over our argumentation and reasoning, which makes its methodology somewhat special. Logical theory is not meant to provide just an explanation, the standards it establishes serve also as a tool, providing for a reinforcement of our rational communication.

The paper is a critical reaction to a research paper that appeared in Argumentation. It suggests that Goodman’s delineation of the concept of argument for purposes of disciplines like logic is unsatisfactory in several respects. Identifying arguments as (unstructured) sets of propositions is highly problematic. Moreover, Goodman’s delineation is excessively vague and it may commit us to the claim that sequences of sentences which are commonly treated as expressing arguments do not, in fact, represent arguments.

In his (several times reprinted) article How Wide Is the Gap Between Facts and Values? N. Rescher aspires to clarify the long-lasting discussion on the ‘is-ought’ (‘fact-value’) gap by providing a framework in which the related arguments can be perspicuously articulated. He then argues that even if the logical gap may bereal, the transition from factual premises to value conclusions is smoothly mediated by trivially true value statements. We scrutinize Rescher’s argumentation and show defects in the presented lines of reasoning. In particular, we argue that his tripartite division of statements (factual, evaluative, hybrid), as well as his emphasis on the role of evaluative truisms, introduce serious problems that escape Rescher’s attention. We thus conclude that he failed to achieve his goals.

Philosophers like G.H. von Wright and D. Makinson have pointed to serious challenges regarding the foundations of deontic logic. In this paper, I suggest that to deal successfully with these challenges a reconsideration of the research program of the discipline is useful. Some problems that have troubled this particular field of logical study for decades may disappear or appear more tractable if we view them from the perspective of a language game introduced by D. Lewis involving three characters: the Master, the Slave and the Kibitzer. The adoption of this perspective opens a natural approach to a new layout of the domain of deontic studies. I propose dividing deontic logic into six sub-areas which are distinguished (i) by their focus on the different idioms typical of the individual players, (ii) by conceiving the language game as either being static or as dynamic and (iii) by the aims of the logical inquiry. What kind of insights the proposed perspective provides is illustrated by an analysis of the so-called Ross paradox—a problem that has troubled deontic logic since its origins and, though it was many times pronounced solved, still keeps coming back ‘alive and kicking’.

What do we learn when we find out that an argument is logically incorrect? If logically incorrect means the same as not logically correct, which in turn means not having a valid logical form, it seems that we do not learn anything too useful—an argument which is logically incorrect can still be conclusive. Thus, it seems that it makes sense to fix a stronger interpretation of the term under which a logically incorrect argument is guaranteed to be wrong (and is such for purely logical reasons). In this paper, we show that pinpointing this stronger sense is much trickier than one would expect; but eventually we reach an explication of the notion of (strong) logical incorrectness which we find non-trivial and viable.

The article reflects on Hayek's expositions concerning the nature of rules. It shows that his conception of rules is extremely wide, and that the bond between rules and regularities is too tight. Subsequently an alternative - narrower - delineation of the concept of rule is proposed. In the last part of the paper Hayek's too narrow a conception of normative rules is subjected to criticism and a broader conception is proposed.

The article addresses two closely related questions: What are the criteria of adequacy of logical formalization of natural language arguments, and what gives logic the authority to decide which arguments are good and which are bad? Our point of departure is the criticism of the conception of logical formalization put forth, in a recent paper, by M. Baumgartner and T. Lampert. We argue that their account of formalization as a kind of semantic analysis brings about more problems than it solves. We also argue that the criteria of adequate formalization need not be based on truth conditions associated with logical formulas; in our view, they are better based on structural (inferential) grounds. We then put forward our own version of the criteria. The upshot of the discussion that follows is that the quest for an adequate formalization in a suitable logical language is best conceived of as the search for a Goodmanian reflective equilibrium.

The paper raises doubts concerning tenability of the platonistic conception of linguistic meaning. It gives examples of some problems that philosophers who employ entities from the realm of platonic objects as a kind of unexplained explainer tend to neglect.

This paper is devoted to considerations on beliefs in negative truths and the role they have in constituting our knowledge. The considerations were originally inspired by a defence of epistemic optimism presented by D. Davidson in his influential paper A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [CTTK]1. The objective of Davidson’s argumentation in that paper was to show that “most of the beliefs in our coherent set of beliefs are true”. Reading this quantitative characterisation of epistemic optimism I began to wonder whether the character of negative beliefs does not make the objective (taken rather literally, disregarding much of the context of Davidsonian epistemology) easily, nearly trivially attainable. Basically the same question can be put radically in this form: Do beliefs in negative truths, no matter how manifold they are, really constitute knowledge? This paper can be taken as the first step in an inquiry which should answer this question.