Moderate anti-exceptionalism and earthborn logic

In this paper we put forward and defend a view of the nature of logic that we call moderate anti-exceptionalism. In the first part of the paper we focus on the problem of genuine logical validity and consequence. We make use of examples from current debates to show that attempts to pinpoint the one and only authentic logic inevitably either yield irrefutable (and hence methodologically idle) theories or lead to dead ends. We then outline a thoroughly naturalist account of logical consequence as grounded in rules implicit in human linguistic practices (and thus immune to Quinean criticism of basing logic on explicit conventions). We insist that there are only two existing kinds of language: natural languages, and artificial languages that have been forged by us. There is thus no room for a "genuine" language (independent of us) and hence for "genuine" logic. We conclude that though logical theories are established—and are liable to criticism—in a similar fashion as those of the sciences, and in this sense logic is not exceptional, to fulfill its mission logic must lay a claim to normative authority over our argumentation and reasoning, which makes its methodology somewhat special. Logical theory is not meant to provide just an explanation, the standards it establishes serve also as a tool, providing for a reinforcement of our rational communication.