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After the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 2013, same-sex partners of U.S. citizens became eligible for spousal visas. Since then, the United States has seen a rapid rise in same-sex, mixed-citizenship couples. However, this effect varies greatly depending on the lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) policy context of the noncitizen's country of origin. Using waves 2008–2019 of the American Community Survey, this study employs a triple-difference design to examine how the policy environment of the origin country moderates the effect of the end of DOMA on incidence of mixed-citizenship, same-sex couples in the United States. Quasi-Poisson models with two-way fixed effects show that, after 2013, individuals in mixed-citizenship, same-sex couples coming from countries with progressive LGB policies saw a more than 60% increase in incidence relative to those in different-sex or same-citizenship couples. Meanwhile, those from countries with regressive laws experienced no significant increase. These results are corroborated by analyses of individual policies. We argue that the country-of-origin policy context affects and is affected by local norms and attitudes as well as individuals' material circumstances. This nexus of factors leaves a lasting impact on immigrants that shapes migration decisions, union formation, and responses to policy shifts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1996, the Defense of Marriage Act passed through Congress and was signed into law by President Bill Clinton. The Defense of Marriage Act effectively banned same-sex couples from receiving federal benefits that were otherwise available to heterosexual couples. In 2004, the first legal same-sex marriages were peformed in the United States of America in the state of Massachusetts. These marriages allowed the now-married couples to access state tax benefts previously unavailable to them. However, because of section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, which defined marringe as a union between one man and one woman, those newly married couples could not access the same tax benefits on the federal level. This forced same-sex married couples to file individually on their federal tax returns, even though they could now file jointly On their state tax returns. Because of this, same-sex couples paid collectively almost $57 million more in taxes than they otherwise would bave if they had been permitted to file as married on federal tax returns. This overpayment in taxes can appropriately be referred to as the "Rainbow Tax.". In recent years, there have been three legislative attempts to remedy this over-payment. All three bave been headed by Senator Elizabeth Warren of the state of Massachusetts, the state most affected by the inequity. First, the Refund Equality Act of 2017, then the PRIDE Act of 2019, and most recently the Refund Equality Act of 2021-none of these attempts at remedying this inequality have been successful. This Comment centers on the responsibility of the Internal Revenue Service and the U.S. government to refund the overpayment of taxes to the affected taxpayers and addresses three key issues of the repayment process: the statute of limitations on amending tax returns, the burden of proof in these cases, and calculating interest on these returns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Queer and transgender Americans have secured substantial federal protections in the past decade, from United States v. Windsor's takedown of the Defense of Marriage Act to Obergefell v. Hodges's guarantee of marriage equality to Bostock v. Clayton's affirmation of the inclusion of queer and transgender identity in Title VII protections. Other recent developments, including new state-level laws protecting the rights of trans/nonbinary individuals, as well as a federal embrace of third gender markers on United States passports, have expanded foundational protections. Although mainstream acceptance of queer and trans identities has grown substantially in the past several decades, the Supreme Court's 2022 Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health decision highlights the precarity of these protections. Yet queer and trans people continue to confront regressive homophobic and transphobic laws and policies as well as an epidemic of private and public violence and discrimination throughout the United States. Despite these protections, queer and trans noncitizens confront a very different regime than the one their United States citizen counterparts face. Recent developments have opened doors to queer and transgender noncitizens, such as access to marriage-based immigration; yet these avenues primarily benefit gay cisgender individuals, who can align with the mandates of a cisheterosexist immigration regime, while continuing to exclude those who are less able--or less willing--to assimilate into the cisheteronormative American ideal. This Article examines how the expansion of cisheteronormatively anchored rights leaves out queer and trans noncitizens along two axes: access to immigration benefits and access to identity. After reviewing these two axes along which queer and trans noncitizens experience disparate treatment, the Article concludes that assimilationist advocacy strategies for rights of queer and trans persons have led to disparities between queer and trans noncitizens and citizens. This Article further posits that reimagining systems to center the needs of queer and trans noncitizens reveals the liberatory possibilities of the abolition of state regulation of gender and sexuality, leading to a safer and more equitable landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports that on December 13, 2022, the U.S. President Joe Biden signed the Respect for Marriage Act into law in a public ceremony held on the White House lawn featuring performances by the Gay Men's Chorus of Washington, D.C, Sam Smith, and Cyndi Lauper. Topics include examines this new law supersedes in part the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).

The article focuses on decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the case Goodridge v. Department of Public Health on social movement theory in the field of communication. It mentions rhetoric of social change and also offer some refinement of social movement theory and advisory opinion on providing civil unions but not marriage to sexual minorities. It also mentions heterosexual-only federal definition of marriage in the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 (DOMA).

The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Windsor, which has overturned the federal treatment of same-sex couples as single in states which recognize such marriages, affects a number of tax and financial planning topics. While it may seem that the issue has been put to rest by the Supreme Court, this is only the beginning for planners. This article addresses those items most likely to affect the clients of financial professionals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gay couples face unique challenges to achieving financial goals due largely to the lack of legal recognition as couples in most states and at the federal level. This article seeks to inform the advisor what these challenges are and how insurance can be part of the solutions, and offers additional guidance in how to work with gay couples and families. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the marriage equality debate particularly the 2004 constitutional amendment by Ohio of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 2004 rejecting state recognition of same-sex marriage. Topics covered include the debate being less about marriage than it was about social status, the belief by traditional family value advocates that normalizing gay people and their relationships would counter-normalize traditionalists who believe that marriage was an abomination.

The article explores the possible effects of the amendment by some U.S. states of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and their constitutions to limit marriage to one man and one woman precluding same-sex couples from marrying. Topics covered include the implications of the marriage amendments for individuals who are in committed relationships but never marry and the failure of amendments limiting non-marital benefits to specify which benefits are not available for the unmarried.

How do legal changes affect discourse concerning family forms? The concept of the family is conventionally assumed to be stable and unchanging; yet, the idea of family is continuously defined and redefined by the law. I analyze the nature of media framing before and after federal legislative changes, specifically the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (1996) and Windsor v. United States (2013). I investigate 156 articles about same-sex marriage legislation published in The New York Times. Results show that legislative events and court decisions influence the framing of family and family forms. DOMA influenced the discourse surrounding family composition by strictly defining the family unit, centering it on a heteronormative framework of one man and one woman. Windsor affected the discourse concerning the role of children by shifting the focus away from LGBT parents as unfit or dangerous to children and toward a structural and societal assessment of discrimination. Both DOMA and Windsor affected public discourse about morality. These findings support the idea that legal changes affect conceptions of the family and reveal how these conceptions can change in the broader public imagination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Americans routinely petition their legislators for moral redress, drawing the US Congress into cultural debates about who we are as a people and what behaviors and social relationships are compatible with that shared identity. By engaging moral issues, Congress affirms one set of values over another, and legislative behavior is informed by cultural proxies such as religion, ideology, and partisanship. The institution falls short, however, when it comes to crafting lasting, comprehensive policy outputs in this domain. This is because moral issues do not lend themselves to compromise, whereas Congress is structured to seek compromise. The difficulties are exacerbated by party polarization driven by religious and ideological sorting. The upshot is that policymakers are often unable to build the broad coalitions necessary provide policy solutions. Assuming institutional arrangements and levels of polarization remain intact, and barring massive shifts in public opinion or developments in the courts, gridlock on moral issues will likely be the norm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on laws governing same-sex marriage in the U.S. Topics discussed include the U.S. Supreme Court case Pavan v. Smith on benefits of marriage, and the use of biological distinctions in equal-protection sex discrimination jurisprudence; enactment of Defense of Marriage Act for governing marriage in the country; and the U.S. Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges on same.

A new brand of plaintiff has come to federal court. In cases involving the Affordable Care Act, the Defense of Marriage Act, and partisan gerrymandering, government institutions have brought suit to redress "institutional injuries"--that is, claims of harm to their constitutional powers or duties. Jurists and scholars are increasingly enthusiastic about these lawsuits, arguing (for example) that the Senate should have standing to protect its power to ratify treaties; that the House of Representatives may sue to preserve its role in the appropriations process; and that the President may go to court to vindicate his Article II prerogatives. This Article contends, however, that government standing to assert "institutional injuries" rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of our constitutional scheme. The provisions of our structural Constitution are not designed for the benefit of institutions. Instead, the Constitution divides power between the federal government and the States and among the branches of the federal government for the benefit of the entire public. Government institutions have no greater interest in their official powers than any other member of society. Moreover, as this Article demonstrates, denying government [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Obergefell v. Hodges was a historic victory for progressive constitutional law, the Supreme Court's glorification of marriage created widespread anxiety among progressive family law scholars. Yet, the critics have still not explained why this marriage rhetoric arouses such moral indignation. Some critics predict Obergefells rhetoric will shape family and constitutional law in ways that harm nonmarital families, but these forecasts rely on weak doctrinal arguments and cynical speculation about judicial behavior. Others argue Obergefells rhetoric was gratuitously insulting. Is that as deep as the objection goes? Obergefells glorification of marriage is wrong, not because it was harmful or hurtful, but because its rhetoric denies the equal dignity of citizens in nonmarital families. For a state to treat all citizens as equals, officials must justify the law with reasons that all can accept as reasonable, even if mistaken. That is why Obergefell could justifiably ignore religious objections to same-sex marriage. If marriage law rests on the idea that different-sex relationships are more valuable, then it treats gay and lesbian persons as second-class citizens who enjoy full legal rights only if they adopt someone else's vision of the good life. Unfortunately, Obergefell commits a similar sin. The Court glorifies marriage as a secular ideal for family life and authorizes states to encourage marriage as an ideal family form. People in nonmarital families cannot accept this as a reasonable basis for law. Obergefells glorification of marriage violates the ideal of public reason in a way that denigrates nonmarital families and contradicts the opinion's own legal commitment to equal dignity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an interview with professor Patricia Cain from Santa Clara University. Topics discussed, include how she got involvement into tax, how she became an activist in tax, issues related to estate planning and teaching wills in the '70s, the government's response to tax planning, enactment of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) by the federal government and administrative or a judicial remedy to marriage tax penalty.

How do legal changes affect discourse concerning family forms? The concept of the family is conventionally assumed to be stable and unchanging; yet, the idea of family is continuously defined and redefined by the law. I analyze the nature of media framing before and after federal legislative changes, specifically the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (1996) and Windsor v. United States (2013). I investigate 156 articles about same-sex marriage legislation published in The New York Times. Results show that legislative events and court decisions influence the framing of family and family forms. DOMA influenced the discourse surrounding family composition by strictly defining the family unit, centering it on a heteronormative framework of one man and one woman. Windsor affected the discourse concerning the role of children by shifting the focus away from LGBT parents as unfit or dangerous to children and toward a structural and societal assessment of discrimination. Both DOMA and Windsor affected public discourse about morality. These findings support the idea that legal changes affect conceptions of the family and reveal how these conceptions can change in the broader public imagination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public law scholarship in the common law tradition often aims at elucidating a connection between law and constitutional values like equality, due process, and the rule of law. However, in their quest to reveal the morality of public law, common lawyers often focus their attention on judicial interpretations of constitutional values to the exclusion of other sources of constitutional jurisprudence. The author argues that the traditional fascination with courts as the primary or exclusive arbiters of constitutional values should be tempered and supplemented by recognizing the valuable contributions of administrative officials who interpret and enforce constitutional norms when exercising statutorily delegated legal authority. By drawing attention to the contributions of the Canadian Human Rights Commission and Tribunal in advancing equality rights, the author argues that recent decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada which recommend judicial deference to reasonable, proportionate, and contextually sensitive administrative decisions concerning human rights, instead of resorting reflexively to correctness review, will serve to strengthen the moral unity of Canadian public law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses sexual politics mentions about decision taken by U.S. supreme Court in Obergefell et al. v. Hodges case for the marriage of same-sex couple. Topics include overturning of Defense of Marriage Act of U.S. for providing assets to dead spouse to its partner without paying tax; book written by Kate Millett focused on legal rights of LGBT people; and criticism of homonationalism made by Jasbir Puar.

The article focuses on the history of tax-exempt status for religious organizations with its relationship to the gay rights movement and the public interests of gay rights in the U.S. Topics discussed include the U.S. Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges regarding the constitutional right to same-sex marriage, the Defense of Marriage Act, and the Narrative Paradigm theory.

This Essay reconsiders the Court's opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges with Justice Ginsburg as its author. As Justice Ginsburg has intimated, her opinion would have been more focused on the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But this Essay suggests that it is not only the Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that would be distinct. Justice Ginsburg's opinion would have been different in three essential ways from the one by Justice Kennedy for the Court: it would have been more doctrinally rigorous; it would have been less sentimental; and it would have jurisprudential integrity, especially with regards to race. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal filed by the "Official Proponents" of California's Proposition 8, which banned same-sex marriage in California. Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion held that initiative sponsors lack Article III standing to defend their ballot measures even when state officials refuse to defend against constitutional challenges. As a result, Hollingsworth provides state officers with the ability to overrule laws that were intended to bypass the government establishment--in effect, an "executive veto" of popularly-enacted initiatives. The Article examines this new "executive veto" in depth. It places Hollingsworth in context, discussing the initiative process in California, and the history of the federal lawsuit challenging Proposition 8. An in-depth discussion of Hollingsworth follows. The particular issue presented by the appellants, their claim to standing based on their status as representatives of the People of California, and the Court's treatment of that issue, is scrutinized. This includes the Court's rejection of California law on the legal status of initiative proponents, and its adoption of the Restatement of Agency as the basis for Article III standing. After concluding that Hollingsworth establishes an "executive veto" over the initiative process, the Article proceeds to examine the potential effect of this in California and the thirty-six other "direct democracy" states. Finally, the authors present a series of "fixes" to Hollingsworth's executive veto. These could assure defense of initiatives in the future, protecting them from the fate that Proposition 8 suffered in Hollingsworth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction and forbade the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Topics discussed include the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the case United States v. Windsor concerning the legality of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA); achievement of marriage equality; and interstate marriage recognition laws.

The article looks at the decision of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania in the case Commonwealth Department of Health v. Hanes related to the issuing of same-sex marriage licenses against the presumptively constitutional state statutes. It mentions the declaration of the Supreme Court for the unconstitutionality of the U.S. Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) with the legal status of same-sex couples. It also mentions the unconstitutionality of the Marriage Law of Pennsylvania.

The article focuses on legal aspects of Christianity in the U.S., as of October 2015. It states the U.S. Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges related to same-sex marriages in which the court ruled that marriages should be kept away from churches and conservative religious beliefs. It mentions the views of columnist Frank Bruni regarding the need of accepting modernity in religion, and notes pertinence of the Defense of Marriage Act.

The article discusses the differing judicial philosophies of U.S. Supreme Court (USSC) Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy in relation to the court's rulings in the same-same marriage cases Obergefell v. Hodges and United States v. Windsor. The legal rights of gay couples are examined, along with the court's determination that Section 3 of the U.S. Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional. Dissenting opinions and

Something surprising happened in the 2013 marriage equality cases that did not involve striking down the Defense of Marriage Act. The Supreme Court discovered standing doctrine's state action problem. In standing doctrine, as elsewhere, the law distinguishes private from governmental action. There are, simply put, different standing rules for state actors than for private litigants. How should the law sort state actors from private litigants for the purposes of standing? In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Court held that Article III limits government standing to common law agents who owe fiduciary duties to the state. The Perry Court's apparent concern was the risk of abuse of the power to stand for the government in federal court. This Article critiques the Court's newfound agency rule, offering an alternative way to address standing's state action problem. The reasons for limiting who may stand for the government in court have to do with keeping government power constitutionally accountable, not with Article III's case or controversy requirement. This constitutional accountability principle sounds in due process and the separation of powers. Abuse of the power of government standing offends constitutional principles that protect life, liberty, and property against arbitrary enforcement. These principles cannot be applied mechanically because due process also supports a right to one's day in court and a system of remedies to right wrongs. Focusing upon constitutional accountability provides a framework for identifying when standing presents a constitutionally troublesome risk of abuse of government power and determining who may exercise that power under what circumstances. Constitutional accountability presumptively requires public control over government standing. This presumption may be overcome where private law, procedural controls, or auxiliary mechanisms are adequate to ensure private litigants do not abuse their power to stand for the government. The adequacy of these constraints on enforcement discretion in any particular case depends upon the government interest at stake. Thus, the solution to standing's state action problem varies with different government interests and the limits in place to reduce the risk of abuse of the power of government standing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the U.S. legislative framework concerning same-sex marriages; discusses the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act that precluded government from affording recognition to such marriages; and report the U.S. Supreme Court decision in case 'United States v. Windsor.'

The article examine decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the marriage equality cases that shaped voter identity in the country such as 'United States v. Windsor' that challenges the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act and 'Shelby County v. Holder' related to the Voting Rights Act.

In 2013, the Supreme Court changed the lives of thousands of same-sex couples in America by declaring the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) unconstitutional in United States v. Windsor. This decision allowed same-sex spouses to receive the same marriage-based immigration benefits under federal law that "traditional marriages" had long received. Although this holding is a victory for binational same-sex couples, bias still exists in the practices U.S. Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) uses to evaluate the legitimacy of marriages. This bias manifests itself in the proof USCIS requires to show a relationship is bona fide, proof that often assumes couples conform to a traditional American family archetype. Although theoretically same-sex couples should now have equal immigration rights, this bias may disadvantage same-sex couples in achieving the same federal benefits that the Windsor Court expressly allowed. This Note will examine the USCIS's current spousal visa requirements and marriage fraud review process in light of the practical realities many same-sex couples face. Specifically, this Note will argue that these requirements should be amended to recognize that historic, systemic barriers and global prejudice may hinder same-sex couples from showing that their relationships are bona fide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]