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This article examines whether the online context affects tournament theory incentive mechanisms. It investigates the impact of prize structure on player performance in eSports under online and offline conditions. Using a quasi-experimental approach with data from the Counter-Strike Global Offensive eSports scene, the study finds that high prize distributions increase individual output in both settings, but the incentive effect is weaker in online events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on tournament theory, we argue that when environmental goals are incorporated into the cadre evaluation system, compared to officials who are close to retirement (i.e., retiring officials), non-retiring officials may exert more effort to foster risky green innovation. Based on a sample of publicly traded firms from heavily polluting industries in China between 2008 and 2016, we hypothesize and find that confronted with severe environmental pollution, firms in provinces with non-retiring governors have higher green innovation performance than those in provinces with retiring governors. Moreover, we find that this effect is stronger for firms in provinces whose governors have higher promotion anticipation, for local state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and for politically connected firms. Our study identifies the political incentives of government officials as an important antecedent of corporate green innovation and highlights the value of establishing a "green" cadre evaluation system to promote sustainable development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this research is to examine whether and how enterprises adjust their corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities in response to top executives' local tournament incentives. The findings provide evidence to support the claim that local compensation gaps encourage top executives to reduce their CSR performance; furthermore, they indicate that this reduction is accomplished mainly through the CSR categories of diversity, community, the environment and product. The enforceability of noncompete agreements (NCAs) is examined, and the negative relationship between local compensation gaps and CSR is documented to be weaker in states that feature stronger enforcement of NCAs, which constrains labour mobility and imposes turnover costs. The findings of this research are robust to concerns regarding endogeneity and reverse causality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tournament theory analyzes labor market outcomes where rewards are distributed on the basis of relative rank. An important factor in these outcomes is the likely return to additional effort. Using National Basketball Association game event data across two seasons, we estimate each team's game player portfolio and find that teams who were in contention to win the draft lottery reduce their portfolio's return differential during the 2017–2018 season but not for the 2018–2019 season. We attribute the change to the reduction in the probability of obtaining a higher pick for the 2019 draft. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the effectiveness of tournament theory based on the age gap between the CEO and the top management team (TMT) in Korean firms. While tournament incentives encourage managers to work harder to improve their performance, their effects may differ on executives' sociological and psychological characteristics. Under Confucian culture, where seniority is highly valued and there is great respect for a senior person, we expect that the effectiveness of tournament theory would differ based on the age gap between the CEO and TMT. Using firms listed on the Korean stock market from 2013 to 2020, we document a significant and positive relationship between the CEO and TMT pay gap and firm performance only when the CEO is older than the average executive in the TMT. Furthermore, we find a significant positive relationship between the pay gap and firm performance only when the CEOs is older than the oldest executives. In addition, we find that the incentive effect of the pay gap between the CEO and TMT exists in horizontal culture firms, even when the CEO is younger than the average age of executives in the TMT. Our findings suggest that, in the presence of an age hierarchy, older executives who feel uncomfortable inhibit collaboration among the TMT, thereby impacting the tournament incentive effect. These observations underscore the importance of social factors in designing executive compensation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Technology Economics is the property of Chinese Society of Technology Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

While expert rating is still a dominant approach for selecting winners in contests for creative works, a few crowdsourcing platforms have recently used “crowd voting” for winner selection – that is, let users of the crowdsourcing community publicly vote for contest winners. We investigate how a contest’s reliance on crowd voting for winner selection, defined as the percentage of crowd-voted prizes to the total prize sum (in dollar amounts), affects contest participation. Drawing upon expectancy theory and tournament theory, we develop a theoretical understanding of this relationship. Using a novel dataset of contests employing both crowd voting and expert rating, we find that a contest’s reliance on crowd voting is positively associated with participation. Specifically, every 10% increase in the crowd-voting reliance can boost users’ odds of participation by about 7%. Moreover, crowd voting is more appealing to users whose expertise is not high and whose status in the crowdsourcing community is high. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this study is to examine the experiences of sport employees to assess tournament conditions and resulting employee outcomes as well as suggestions to overcome detrimental tournament conditions. Securing a job within the sport industry is fiercely competitive, and the work environment is often harsh. Examining employee experiences within these competitive conditions can help organizations identify necessary tournament adjustments in order to maximize employee output and performance. We collected data from employees working within intercollegiate athletic departments (n = 1724). We utilized an imposed interpretive approach to learn about their working experiences in intercollegiate athletics and interpreted the data through a tournament theory lens. Due to a combination of industry passion and pressure of aspiring applicants willing to take their position, they embraced the opportunity to compete in the tournament. Participants expressed limited motivation beyond reaching middle management, creating concerns about tournament conditions. This study extends literature in organizational behavior and tournament theory by providing insight into the intended/unintended consequences of work and life within a "tournament" setting. Our findings reveal tournament condition concerns raised by the participants, increasing the possibility of employees' willingness to trade off pay benefits in order to secure other, desirable benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study asks whether bookmakers alter the closing betting odds on European football matches due to potential variation in team incentives to exert effort to win games based on position in the standings. Effort is a multidimensional concept and teams have many ways to alter effort supplied in a match. For example, the players included or left out of the starting 11, the tactics used in a specific match, substitutions made during a match, and other factors under team control, can be interpreted as changes in effort supplied. OLS models explaining observed variation in betting odds are estimated for roughly 25,000 regular season football games in 8 top European domestic leagues from 2000–2001 through 2018–2019. Regression results indicate bookmakers alter betting odds on matches involving clubs in the middle of the domestic league standings that have no chance of qualifying for the Champions/Europa Leagues or being relegated. In other words, bookmakers and bettors believe these teams will not put forth maximum effort to compete in and win these matches. We find similar results for teams already assured of relegation and teams that already clinched the league championship. Overall, the research contributes to literature analyzing the impact of incentives in sporting contests. As the world of professional sport and sports gambling become increasingly interconnected and integrated, the results of the study present opportunities not only for collaboration between the parties but also an increased understanding on the role league design has on individual match outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the incentive effects of increased prize differentials and productivity spillovers from substitute coworkers within the context of esports. A direct behavioral measure called "actions per minute (APM)" is utilized to gauge Dota 2 players' on-field exertion of effort dedicated to winning the game. The results based on empirical analysis support the incentive effects of the convex prize structure of esports tournaments on eliciting effort. Further investigation indicates that the incentive effects of high-stakes esports tournaments are more a result of the size of total prize than the relative prize distribution. It is also found that players who serve subordinate roles are more likely to engage in shirking behavior in the presence of teammates with similar roles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: With the advent of the knowledge economy, physical assets have given way to human capital as an important strategic resource for companies. The company's workforce is considered to be one of the most important intangible resources and assets of the company that have a direct impact on the process of value creation for the company. On the other hand, managers, especially CEOs, play an important role in running a company. Therefore, the present study investigates the relationship between CEO power and firm labor productivity. Methods: A sample of 104 firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange during 2011-2018 was selected and the research hypotheses were tested using multivariate regression models based on panel data technique. Results: The results of this study showed a positive relationship between CEO power and labor productivity. In other words, according to tournament theory, firms with stronger CEOs are associated with increased labor productivity. The results also showed that CEO power is positively correlated with labor efficiency and negatively related to labor cost, meaning that more powerful CEOs increase labor efficiency and reduce labor costs. In addition, the results of supplementary analysis showed that the research results are not sensitive to changes in estimation methods and are robust. Conclusion: According to tournament theory, strong CEOs are recognized as the best workforce and receive more rewards for their performance than other employees. Therefore, a significant difference in the amount of payment can motivate the lower-level workforce and help them in their efforts and better performance to obtain career advancement, and this will increase the productivity of the company's workforce.

This study explores the relationship between the compensation gap within the top management team (TMT) and corporate performance. We focus on how the fairness preference of the TMT moderates this relationship. The existing researches on the relationship between the compensation gap within the TMT and corporate performance are inconclusive. The reason may be that the traditional tournament theory is based on the hypothesis of self-interest preference of homo economicus. In the research, the fairness preference theory is added to the traditional tournament model, and a more realistic tournament model considering fairness preference is constructed. Based on the analysis of the theoretical model and the empirical regression analysis of the panel data of 733 non-financial A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2014 to 2020, we draw the following main conclusions: (1) There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the TMT compensation gap and the corporate performance. Within the optimal compensation gap, there is a significant positive correlation. The larger the compensation gap, the better the corporate performance will be. When the optimal compensation gap is exceeded, there is a significant negative correlation. The larger the compensation gap, the worse the corporate performance will be. (2) The fairness preference of the TMT will weaken the correlation between the TMT compensation gap and corporate performance.Within the optimal compensation gap, the fairness preference will weaken the positive relationship between them, and when it exceeds the optimal compensation gap, the fairness preference will also weaken the negative relationship between them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study introduces vertical pay dispersion, a prevailing equity issue in discussions of organizations and society, to public management research. Bridging tournament and equity theory with the publicness debate, the study analyses the role of publicness dimensions —ownership, funding, and control— for manager-to-worker pay ratios of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The results show that, for a unique five-year data set, ownership publicness partly affects vertical pay dispersion, and the effects are moderated by city and SOE size. The study enhances the understanding of vertical pay dispersion in the public sector and offers a research agenda regarding the determinants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the effect of the pay gap on banks and compares the effectiveness of the tournament theory in Islamic banks (IB) and conventional banks (CB). This study expands the pay gap indicators used in previous studies by using three indicators: board of directors’ pay gap, commissioners’ pay gap and employees’ pay gap. The sample is 23 banks, observed from 2009 to 2019, which results in 239 bank-years. The test results show that we have not found a relationship between a pay gap and bank performance. However, the subsample test, which involves separating Islamic banks and conventional banks, reports different findings. The tournament theory is effectively applied to the employee payroll system and shows a large employee pay gap will improve the performance of IBs and CBs. However, the effect of tournaments on IBs is greater than it is on CBs. The tournament theory is not effectively applied to the salary system for the boards of commissioners. However, the large pay gap for board of directors of CBs causes communication, coordination and collaboration problems between the board of directors and further reduces bank performance. However, in IBs, the pay gap of board of directors has no effect on bank performance. We recommend that banks should provide different salaries for employees at the various different levels. However, we do not recommend that banks create a large pay gap for board of directors because this will lead to poorer performance.

We investigate whether social capital influences tournament incentives and income differences between the chief executive officer (CEO) and median worker. We find that firms headquartered in US counties with stronger norms of cooperation or social capital have lower tournament and income differences. Firm value is higher when compensation is consistent with local norms. The results hold for alternative measures of social capital, instrumental variables, and quasi‐experiments related to the legalization of marijuana and firm headquarter relocation. These findings suggest that local social norms influence income differences and firm performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two key groups central to improving firm performance are the top management team (TMT) and the board of directors. Executives undertake strategic actions, whereas board members fulfill their resource provision and monitoring roles. Drawing on tournament theory and equity theory, we propose that high pay dispersion among outside directors and the TMT is positively associated with strategic risk, whereas high (low) TMT pay dispersion and low (high) outside director pay dispersion are positively associated with firm performance. Our predictor is the unexplained component of horizontal pay dispersion, or the residual of pay dispersion resulting from regressing pay on observable firm, industry, period, and individual characteristics. Our results highlight the importance of unexplained pay dispersion for TMTs, but not for boards of directors, in improving firm performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vertical pay dispersion (VPD), a hierarchical pay structure used to motivate employees, has traditionally been studied separately from high‐performance work systems (HPWSs). As a component of HPWSs, incentive‐based compensation schemes focus on employee‐ or team‐level incentives. However, the influence of the simultaneous utilization of VPD and HPWS on performance remains understudied. This study addresses the question of whether these approaches to managing human capital serve as complements or substitutes to one another. VPD and HPWS are argued to substitute for one another with respect to motivation‐ and skill‐enhancing practices. The opposite notion is true in regard to opportunity‐enhancing HPWSs, which serve to amplify the effectiveness of VPD. In a multisource, longitudinal sample of South Korean firms, the hypothesized predictions are supported. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We develop a model the organizer choice between team and individual tournament and suggest a model of rank-order tournaments between teams. • We use eSports (video games) data to test tournaments theory in individual and team competitions. • There is a difference between motivation of groups and individuals. • Our study provides insights on the optimal reward structure, which should maximize effort of contestant. Tournament theory has been supported by many pieces of empirical research in different fields. However, tournament theory literature focuses largely on the incentives of individual competitors. In our paper we develop a model the organizer choice between team and individual tournament and suggest a model of rank-order tournaments between teams. We test its implications using eSports (competitive video gaming) data. We show that both team and individual results follow tournament theory, however, there is a difference between the motivation of groups and individuals. Our study provides insights on the optimal reward structure, which should maximize effort of contestants, and, in the case of sports tournaments, entertainment value of the events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research on professional football offer conflicting results regarding the impact of wage dispersion on team performance. However, the existing intra-league heterogeneity among clubs is overlooked and could be the reason for the diverging outcomes. The aim of this paper is to reanalyze this relationship having the clubs' size as moderator. Payroll – which captures the financial strength – is used as proxy of club size. Ordinary Least Squares regressions with season and league fixed effects are employed. Dispersion is measured by three indexes for robustness check. The outputs confirm the quadratic relationship between wage dispersion and performance, but adding that identical levels of dispersion have different impact on football clubs according to their financial strength. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current study investigates whether tournament incentives motivate chief executive officer(s) (CEOs) to be socially responsible. Furthermore, it explores the role of sub-national institutional contingencies [i.e., state-owned enterprises (SOE) vs. non-SOEs, foreign-owned entities (FOE) vs. non-FOEs, cross-listed vs. non-cross-listed, developed region] in CEO tournament incentives and the corporate social responsibility performance (CSRP) relationship. Data were collected from all A-shared companies listed in the stock exchanges of China from 2014 to 2019. The study uses the baseline methodology of ordinary least squares (OLS) and cluster OLS regression. Moreover, firm-fixed effects regression, two-stage least squares regression, and propensity score matching deal with the endogeneity problem and check the robustness of the results. The results provide reliable evidence that tournament incentives motivate CEOs to be more socially responsible. On the other hand, sub-national institutional contingencies positively affect the association between CEO tournament incentives and CSRP. The findings have important implications for companies and regulators who wish to enhance CSP by providing incentives to top managers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tournament theory posits that there are situations where winning matters a lot and, as a result, agent rewards are not proportional to performance. According to tournament theorists, the large pay differentials that exist between organizational levels are intended to motivate agents to exert greater effort in an attempt to win the prize. Although a large corpus of literature on tournaments has emerged over time, little is known about the social dynamics involved in tournaments. This article addresses this gap through a historical narrative concerning how Allied forces in World War II competed to capture Adolf Hitler’s famed Bavarian reception house, known to the world as the Eagle’s Nest.

The current study investigates whether tournament incentives motivate chief executive officer(s) (CEOs) to be socially responsible. Furthermore, it explores the role of sub-national institutional contingencies [i.e., state-owned enterprises (SOE) vs. non-SOEs, foreign-owned entities (FOE) vs. non-FOEs, cross-listed vs. non-cross-listed, developed region] in CEO tournament incentives and the corporate social responsibility performance (CSRP) relationship. Data were collected from all A-shared companies listed in the stock exchanges of China from 2014 to 2019. The study uses the baseline methodology of ordinary least squares (OLS) and cluster OLS regression. Moreover, firm-fixed effects regression, two-stage least squares regression, and propensity score matching deal with the endogeneity problem and check the robustness of the results. The results provide reliable evidence that tournament incentives motivate CEOs to be more socially responsible. On the other hand, sub-national institutional contingencies positively affect the association between CEO tournament incentives and CSRP. The findings have important implications for companies and regulators who wish to enhance CSP by providing incentives to top managers.

Objective: With the advent of the knowledge economy, physical assets have given way to human capital as an important strategic resource for companies. The company's workforce is considered to be one of the most important intangible resources and assets of the company that have a direct impact on the process of value creation for the company. On the other hand, managers, especially CEOs, play an important role in running a company. Therefore, the present study investigates the relationship between CEO power and firm labor productivity. Methods: A sample of 104 firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange during 2011- 2018 was selected and the research hypotheses were tested using multivariate regression models based on panel data technique. Results: The results of this study showed a positive relationship between CEO power and labor productivity. In other words, according to tournament theory, firms with stronger CEOs are associated with increased labor productivity. The results also showed that CEO power is positively correlated with labor efficiency and negatively related to labor cost, meaning that more powerful CEOs increase labor efficiency and reduce labor costs. In addition, the results of supplementary analysis showed that the research results are not sensitive to changes in estimation methods and are robust. Conclusion: According to tournament theory, strong CEOs are recognized as the best workforce and receive more rewards for their performance than other employees. Therefore, a significant difference in the amount of payment can motivate the lower-level workforce and help them in their efforts and better performance to obtain career advancement, and this will increase the productivity of the company's workforce. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the issues of players’ heterogeneity in individual efforts and winning probability in the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) games. ATP players’ personal characteristics and performance from 2011 to 2013 are collected. The results show that a negative impact of the matchup’s heterogeneity on the intensity of the game is found. The evidence thus indicates that the two players play harder when the heterogeneity is smaller. Evidence also indicate that the pecuniary incentive in tournaments is supported, and appearance of a superstar makes his opponent exert less effort. In the odds ratio analysis for the players’ heterogeneity, a rank differential increases a favorite player with 1.004% winning percentage in ATP matches. Younger, lower BMI, experienced, and right-hand players are more likely to win.

The authors examine factors influencing the executive pay multiple (executive-employee pay disparity) and its effects on performance. Using unique data from Korea, where all publicly listed firms are required to provide detailed information on average employee pay in their annual reports, they find that a substantial portion of cross-sectional variation in the executive pay multiple is explained by the firm’s economic and political characteristics. Results also indicate that the executive pay multiple has a statistically significant negative relation with subsequent operating and stock return performance. A two-stage approach, however, reveals that the performance effects of the executive pay multiple are likely to be influenced more by deviations from the expected executive pay multiple, estimated using the first-stage determinant model, than by the absolute pay multiple per se. The study sheds light on recent debates regarding the usefulness of executive pay multiple disclosure. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We explore the linkage between vertical pay dispersion, a critical aspect of bank compensation scheme, and the frequency and severity (total monetary loss) of operational risk. Using operational risk events panel data from Chinese domestic commercial banks, we find that vertical pay dispersion positively impacts both the frequency and total loss severity of operational risk events, and such impacts increase marginal effects via quantile regression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is still an ongoing debate regarding the firm performance implications of pay gaps between top executives and subordinate employees. This study integrates relative deprivation theory and tournament theory to investigate the potential nonlinear effects of pay gaps. We expect that at low levels of pay inequality, increased inequality hurts firm productivity, while at higher levels of pay inequality, increased inequality helps firm productivity. Our study of Chinese firms confirms that pay gaps have an approximately U-shaped relationship with firm performance. This nonlinear relationship is weaker in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than in non-SOEs, suggesting that state ownership is an important moderator in the association. Overall, this study explains previous mixed findings regarding consequences of pay gaps with meaningful implications for policymakers and entrepreneurs in China and other economies with similar cultural and institutional backgrounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tourism Tribune / Lvyou Xuekan is the property of Tourism Institute of Beijing Union University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Tournament-like promotion systems are the default in audit firms, which are generally internally owned professional partnerships. While awarding promotions in a contest-like fashion stimulates contestants' motivation and productivity, it may also upset an organizations' ethical climate and trigger ethically adverse behaviors. Since nearly all research on promotion tournaments in management has been conducted in public firms, little is known about how these incentive systems operate in professional partnerships. In this study, we analyze how the perception of the two controllable design parameters of promotion tournaments—the relative pay spread between winners and losers and tournament breadth in terms of the number of contestants that compete for a prize—affects audit firm behavior. Survey results provide evidence that the tournament's perceived breadth prompts adverse behavior, as it does in public firms. Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, the perceived pay spread has no significant effect on adverse behavior, but triggers desirable behaviors instead. Our study suggests that promotion tournaments indeed provide powerful incentives, but also that understanding the unintended consequences of these incentives on organizational ethical climates and behavior requires tournament theory to be contextualized when it is applied in new settings like internally owned professional partnerships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study tests the implications of tournament theory using data on 100 U.K. stock market companies, covering over 500 individual executives, in the late 1990s. Our results provide some evidence consistent with the operation of tournament mechanisms within the U.K. business context. Firstly, we find a convex relationship between executive pay and organizational level, and secondly, that the gap between CEO pay and other board executives (i.e., tournament prize) is positively related to the number of participants in the tournament. However, we also show that the variation in executive team pay has little role in determining company performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores the relationship between executive-employee compensation gap (EECG) and environmental performance, an ignored theoretical gap both in the field of consequences of executive compensation and the field of antecedents of environmental performance, by choosing the panel data consisting of 2320 firm-year observations in Chinese listed manufacturing companies during the period from 2011 to 2013 as the research sample. Empirical analysis based on multiple regression analysis adopting the method of OLS by applying SPSS19.0 provides a critical new finding: EECG has a negative effect on environmental performance, which holds robust with the change of the measures and the change of empirical models. Further investigation on EECG’s effect mechanism on environmental performance suggests that it is the short-termism and utilitarianism derived from extra EECG that can-do harm to environmental performance.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the management model of women’s professional tennis by using the theoretical framework of the tournament theory. Indeed, this sport is particularly appropriate to study the effects of financial incentives on women’s performance in the context of competitive elimination tournament. Moreover, we take into account the direct opposition between players by building two relative performance indicators. Empirical tests are conducted, by using Ordinary Least Squares method, on the whole tournaments played by the 30 best women’s tennis players, over the 2011 season. Interesting implication found is that one tournament theory principle, the incentive effect, is confirmed. In other words, an undistributed prize structure between tournament rounds increases the player performance. However, the other consequence of the tournament theory, the participative effect, is rejected because the monetary gains distributed by the tournament’s organizer (either the premium earned or the total dollar endowment) do not induce better player performance.

This article addresses the issues of players' heterogeneity in individual efforts and winning probability in the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) games. ATP players' personal characteristics and performance from 2011 to 2013 are collected. The results show that a negative impact of the matchup's heterogeneity on the intensity of the game is found. The evidence thus indicates that the two players play harder when the heterogeneity is smaller. Evidence also indicate that the pecuniary incentive in tournaments is supported, and appearance of a superstar makes his opponent exert less effort. In the odds ratio analysis for the players' heterogeneity, a rank differential increases a favorite player with 1.004% winning percentage in ATP matches. Younger, lower BMI, experienced, and right-hand players are more likely to win. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It may be surprising that one of the most popular compensation schemes in business is so open to being hacked --- to having managers cheat to win. We explore tournament theory to detail its vulnerabilities to various forms of cheating unilateral and multilateral. We identify who is most likely to be involved and under what conditions. We describe the costs to the victims, to the firm, and to society. We outline the possible strategic effects --- in terms of firm performance. And, we discuss possible ways to address these vulnerabilities to the schemes we rely on to motivate managers to put in the right efforts, to take the right risks, and to lead the right way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the joint impact of trait competitiveness (i.e., the enjoyment of interpersonal competition and the desire to win and be better than others) and competitive psychological climate (i.e., the degree to which employees perceive organizational rewards as contingent upon comparisons of their performance against that of their peers) on objective and subjective career success. Based on tournament and person–environment fit theory, we assumed that the positive effects of trait competitiveness on different indicators of objective (i.e., salary, promotions) and subjective (i.e., career satisfaction, internal marketability, and meaningful work) career success are stronger under conditions of a highly competitive psychological climate. Moderated regression analyses using data from a 6‐month time‐lagged study of 340 employees working in diverse occupational fields in their early careers revealed joint effects of the two competition variables. For both objective and subjective career success, the effect of trait competitiveness was strengthened under conditions of a highly competitive psychological climate. We discuss the results by integrating theoretical reasoning from a tournament and person–environment fit perspective on the attainment of career success. Practitioner points: Organizations should be aware that competitive environments, and specifically their related perceptions, are only beneficial for some employees' career success.Within perceived highly competitive organizational contexts, personnel selection and development should consider competitive traits of employees when deciding about hiring and career planning.Career counsellors may consider perceived organizational climates and competitive personal characteristics when objective career success and subjective career success are of topic in the counselling process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Local officials' characteristics play an important role in the development of urban sprawl, which could lead to the land urbanization bubble (LUB). OLS regression model was selected to analysis the relationship between officials' characteristics and LUB. The study finds that: (1) locally promoted officials have significant negative influence on the generation of LUB; (2) the influences of officials tenure and age characteristics on LUB significantly differ showing an inverted-U shape change; and (3)compared with male officials, female officials show more aggressive in generating LUB; and (4) the better economic development the less effective of official characteristics on land urbanization. Thus, the research proposes that (1) the assessment system for local officials must be improved to highlight the responsibilities and accountabilities of officials in sustainable urban development; (2) the influence of official personal characteristics on local administration must be considered at the time of training and promoting local officials; and (3) the formation of local administrative team should not over-emphasize age and gender, because under the effects of cadre tournament, young and/or female district leaders are more likely to seek promotion in short period of time at cost of sustainable and healthy urban development. • Investigating impacts of district leaders' characteristics on land urbanization bubble. • Using the original dataset to analyze relationship between officials' characteristics and land urbanization bubble. • Origin, tenure, age and gender of district leaders influence land urbanization bubble. • Female district leaders adopt aggressive land policies. • China's district official promotion system is urgent to be reformed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notons and motvatons of inter-organisatonal rivalries among employees have to some extent been highlighted by classical theories of management such as tournament theory. However, employees’ and entrepreneurs’ compettons are fundamentally different in patern. Based on the doctrine of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial compettons are essental for a productve economy. Even so, there have been few in-depth holistc atempts to understand the rivalry process among corporate entrepreneurs. During the last three decades, various fragmented studies have been conducted from different standpoints to clarify the process of corporate entrepreneurship (CE). Nevertheless, considerable room remains for developing a model of the rivalry process with respect to entrepreneurial actvites within large and complex organisatons. Hence, the main contributon of the research can be claimed as investgatng and formulatng the rivalry process. For this purpose, a systematc qualitatve grounded theory methodology (GTM) was used. During a fve-month period, corporate entrepreneurs from one of the chief Iranian research insttutes were systematcally interviewed. Based on the research results, in additon to endorsing the existence of such a rivalry process among corporate entrepreneurs, the GTM model extends the literature of CE by examining the previously unaddressed part of the process, i.e., disclosing the corporate entrepreneurs’ implemented strategies, among other blocks of the theory.

The predictions that emerge from tournament theory have been tested in a number of sports-related settings. Since sporting events involving individuals (golf, tennis, running, auto racing) feature rank order tournaments with relatively large payoffs and easily observable outcomes, sports is a natural setting for such tests. In this paper, we test the predictions of tournament theory using a unique race-level data set from NASCAR. Most previous tests of tournament theory using NASCAR data used either season level data or race level data from a few seasons. Our empirical work uses race and driver level NASCAR data for 1114 races over the period 1975−2009. Our results support the predictions of tournament theory: the larger the spread in prizes paid in the race, measured by the standard deviation or interquartile range of prizes paid, the higher the average speed in the race. Our results account for the length of the track, number of entrants, number of caution flags, and unobservable year- and week-level heterogeneity.