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The transmission of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) between food-producing animals (poultry, cattle and pigs) during short journeys ( 8 h) directed to other farms or to the slaughterhouse lairage (directly or with intermediate stops at assembly centres or control posts, mainly transported by road) was assessed. Among the identified risk factors contributing to the probability of transmission of antimicrobial-resistant bacteria (ARB) and antimicrobial resistance genes (ARGs), the ones considered more important are the resistance status (presence of ARB/ARGs) of the animals pre-transport, increased faecal shedding, hygiene of the areas and vehicles, exposure to other animals carrying and/or shedding ARB/ARGs (especially between animals of different AMR loads and/or ARB/ARG types), exposure to contaminated lairage areas and duration of transport. There are nevertheless no data whereby differences between journeys shorter or longer than 8 h can be assessed. Strategies that would reduce the probability of AMR transmission, for all animal categories include minimising the duration of transport, proper cleaning and disinfection, appropriate transport planning, organising the transport in relation to AMR criteria (transport logistics), improving animal health and welfare and/or biosecurity immediately prior to and during transport, ensuring the thermal comfort of the animals and animal segregation. Most of the aforementioned measures have similar validity if applied at lairage, assembly centres and control posts. Data gaps relating to the risk factors and the effectiveness of mitigation measures have been identified, with consequent research needs in both the short and longer term listed. Quantification of the impact of animal transportation compared to the contribution of other stages of the food-production chain, and the interplay of duration with all risk factors on the transmission of ARB/ARGs during transport and journey breaks, were identified as urgent research needs. info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

The qualified presumption of safety (QPS) was developed to provide a harmonised generic pre‐evaluation procedure to support safety risk assessments of biological agents performed by EFSA's Scientific Panels. The identity, body of knowledge, safety concerns and antimicrobial resistance of valid taxonomic units were assessed. Safety concerns identified for a taxonomic unit are, where possible and reasonable in number, reflected by ‘qualifications’ which should be assessed at the strain level by the EFSA's Scientific Panels. During the current assessment, no new information was found that would change the previously recommended QPS taxonomic units and their qualifications. The Panel clarified that the qualification ‘for production purpose only’ implies the absence of viable cells of the production organism in the final product and can also be applied for food and feed products based on microbial biomass. Between September 2017 and March 2018, the QPS notification list was updated with 46 microorganisms from applications for market authorisation. From these, 28 biological agents already had QPS status, 15 were excluded of the QPS exercise from the previous QPS mandate (10 filamentous fungi and one bacteriophage) or from further evaluations within the current mandate (two notifications of Streptomyces spp. and one of Escherichia coli), and one was excluded where confirmatory data for the risk assessment of a plant protection product (PPP) was requested (Pseudomonas sp.). Three taxonomic units were (re)evaluated: Paracoccus carotinifaciens and Paenibacillus lentus had been previously evaluated in 2008 and 2014, respectively, and were now re‐evaluated within this mandate, and Yarrowia lipolytica, which was evaluated for the first time. P. carotinifaciens and P. lentus cannot be granted QPS status due to lack of scientific knowledge. Y. lipolytica is recommended for QPS status, but only for production purpose.

The blaESBL and blaAmpC genes are spread by plasmid-mediated integrons, insertion sequences, and transposons, some of which are homologous in food animals and humans. Cephalosporin usage in animal production is an important risk factor; restricting such use would be an effective control option

Under current European hygiene legislation, food businesses are obliged to develop and implement food safety management systems (FSMS) including prerequisite programme (PRP) activities and hazard analysis and critical control point principles. This requirement is especially challenging for small food retail establishments, where a lack of expertise and other resources may limit the development and implementation of effective FSMS. In this opinion, a simplified approach to food safety management is developed and presented based on a fundamental understanding of processing stages (flow diagram) and the activities contributing to increased occurrence of the hazards (biological, chemical (including allergens) or physical) that may occur. The need to understand and apply hazard or risk ranking within the hazard analysis is removed and control is achieved using PRP activities as recently described in the European Commission Notice 2016/C278, but with the addition of a PRP activity covering 'product information and customer awareness'. Where required, critical limits, monitoring and record keeping are also included. Examples of the simplified approach are presented for five types of retail establishments: butcher, grocery, bakery, fish and ice cream shop. (C) 2017 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.

EFSA was requested to assess the safety of a broad range of biological agents in the context of notifications for market authorisation as sources of food and feed additives, enzymes and plant protection products. The qualified presumption of safety (QPS) assessment was developed to provide a harmonised generic pre‐assessment to support safety risk assessments performed by EFSA's Scientific Panels. The safety of unambiguously defined biological agents (at the highest taxonomic unit appropriate for the purpose for which an application is intended) and the completeness of the body of knowledge were assessed. Safety concerns identified for a taxonomic unit are, where possible and reasonable in number, reflected as ‘qualifications’ in connection with a recommendation for a QPS status. A total of 57 biological agents were notified to EFSA between the end of April 2016 and the beginning of September 2016. From these, 34 biological agents already had a QPS status and did not require further evaluation, and 10 were not included in the evaluation as they are filamentous fungi or enterococci, biological groups which have been excluded from QPS evaluation since 2014. Three notifications for Streptomyces violaceoruber, one for Streptomyces albus, one for Bacillus circulans and four for Escherichia coli were not evaluated for QPS status because these species were recently assessed and considered not suitable for QPS status. Therefore, only four notifications related to three taxonomic units were evaluated for QPS status. Of these, Arthrobacter ramosus and Pseudomonas fluorescens are not recommended for the QPS list. Bacillus smithii is recommended for the QPS status., This publication is linked to the following EFSA Journal article: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/j.efsa.2017.4664/full, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/j.efsa.2017.e15031/full

Hepatitis E virus (HEV) is an important infection in humans in EU/EEA countries, and over the last 10 years more than 21,000 acute clinical cases with 28 fatalities have been notified with an overall 10‐fold increase in reported HEV cases; the majority (80%) of cases were reported from France, Germany and the UK. However, as infection in humans is not notifiable in all Member States, and surveillance differs between countries, the number of reported cases is not comparable and the true number of cases would probably be higher. Food‐borne transmission of HEV appears to be a major route in Europe; pigs and wild boars are the main source of HEV. Outbreaks and sporadic cases have been identified in immune‐competent persons as well as in recognised risk groups such as those with pre‐existing liver damage, immunosuppressive illness or receiving immunosuppressive treatments. The opinion reviews current methods for the detection, identification, characterisation and tracing of HEV in food‐producing animals and foods, reviews literature on HEV reservoirs and food‐borne pathways, examines information on the epidemiology of HEV and its occurrence and persistence in foods, and investigates possible control measures along the food chain. Presently, the only efficient control option for HEV infection from consumption of meat, liver and products derived from animal reservoirs is sufficient heat treatment. The development of validated quantitative and qualitative detection methods, including infectivity assays and consensus molecular typing protocols, is required for the development of quantitative microbial risk assessments and efficient control measures. More research on the epidemiology and control of HEV in pig herds is required in order to minimise the proportion of pigs that remain viraemic or carry high levels of virus in intestinal contents at the time of slaughter. Consumption of raw pig, wild boar and deer meat products should be avoided.

Surrey Archaeological Collections, 78, 176-177

Source at http://dx.doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2017.4667 In April and May of 2016, Norway confirmed two cases of chronic wasting disease (CWD) in a wild reindeer and a wild moose, respectively. In the light of this emerging issue, the European Commission requested EFSA to recommend surveillance activities and, if necessary, additional animal health risk-based measures to prevent the introduction of the disease and the spread into/within the EU, specifically Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland and Sweden, and considering seven wild, semidomesticated and farmed cervid species (Eurasian tundra reindeer, Finnish (Eurasian) forest reindeer, moose, roe deer, white-tailed deer, red deer and fallow deer). It was also asked to assess any new evidence on possible public health risks related to CWD. A 3-year surveillance system is proposed, differing for farmed and wild or semidomesticated cervids, with a two-stage sampling programme at the farm/geographically based population unit level (random sampling) and individual level (convenience sampling targeting high-risk animals). The current derogations of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1918 present a risk of introduction of CWD into the EU. Measures to prevent the spread of CWD within the EU are dependent upon the assumption that the disease is already present; this is currently unknown. The measures listed are intended to contain (limit the geographic extent of a focus) and/or to control (actively stabilise/reduce infection rates in an affected herd or population) the disease where it occurs. With regard to the zoonotic potential, the human species barrier for CWD prions does not appear to be absolute. These prions are present in the skeletal muscle and other edible tissues, so humans may consume infected material in enzootic areas. Epidemiological investigations carried out to date make no association between the occurrence of sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease in humans and exposure to CWD prions.

Sixty bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) cases of Classical or unknown type (BARB‐60 cases) were born after the date of entry into force of the EU total feed ban on 1 January 2001. The European Commission has requested EFSA to provide a scientific opinion on the most likely origin(s) of these BARB‐60 cases; whether feeding with material contaminated with the BSE agent can be excluded as the origin of any of these cases and, if so, whether there is enough scientific evidence to conclude that such cases had a spontaneous origin. The source of infection cannot be ascertained at the individual level for any BSE case, including these BARB‐60 cases, so uncertainty remains high about the origin of disease in each of these animals, but when compared with other biologically plausible sources of infection (maternal, environmental, genetic, iatrogenic), feed‐borne exposure is the most likely. This exposure was apparently excluded for only one of these BARB‐60 cases. However, there is considerable uncertainty associated with the data collected through the field investigation of these cases, due to a time span of several years between the potential exposure of the animal and the confirmation of disease, recall difficulty, and the general paucity of documented objective evidence available in the farms at the time of the investigation. Thus, feeding with material contaminated with the BSE agent cannot be excluded as the origin of any of the BARB‐60 cases, nor is it possible to definitively attribute feed as the cause of any of the BARB‐60 cases. A case of disease is classified as spontaneous by a process of elimination, excluding all other definable possibilities; with regard to the BARB‐60 cases, it is not possible to conclude that any of them had a spontaneous origin.