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This Essay explores how universities bound by the First Amendment can constitutionally proscribe doxxing--the malicious publication of personally identifying information. As campus controversies have fueled targeted harassment campaigns against students, staff, and faculty, responses from university administrators have been limited. To defend members of their educational community from threats to their safety, wellbeing, and reputation, schools should follow the lead of states experimenting with prohibitions on doxxing. Doing so, however, will require carefully working through various legal and practical problems, which this Essay surveys and offers initial responses to, in an effort to outline how the 'public quads' of the United States may remain spaces for robust inquiry and free expression., Table of Contents Introduction I. The Problems of Doxxing A. The State(s) of Doxxing Prohibitions B. University Approaches to Doxxing II. Free Speech: Online and On Campus A. Doxxing as [...]

Soon after Hamas's attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023, and Israel's military response in Gaza, a global spotlight focused on university members' and leaders' conduct and statements regarding those events. Intense debate ensued about what academic freedom means when university members' political protest and speech are alleged to constitute forms of discrimination, harassment, and bullying of other members of the university. The debate revealed widespread uncertainty about the relationship between universities' policies and attitudes on academic freedom on the one hand and universities' disciplinary rules on the other hand. The aftermath also raised questions about the proper role of universities in speaking on world events. Every day, universities receive complaints from their members about other members' violations of university policies. Those complaints are often investigated and adjudicated within a university's disciplinary system. This Essay consists of a fictitious disciplinary proceeding within a hypothetical university's complaint adjudication process. We present a written determination by adjudicators at a fictitious school, Newgarth University, who must decide whether to discipline students accused of policy violations during political protest. Our goal is to present examples of common intellectual positions in the terrain of academic freedom, discrimination, and university discipline. We hope that by making visible the most common intellectual approaches to navigating the intersection of political protest, academic freedom, discrimination, and university discipline, readers may better understand the legal terrain., Table of Contents Introduction I. Background II. Facts A. The Yard B. The Classroom Building 1. Noise in the hallway 2. Class interruption C. The University Administration Building D. The [...]

After students at Stanford Law School disrupted a Federalist Society event featuring Judge Kyle Duncan in March 2023, then-Dean Jenny Martinez issued a lengthy statement recognizing that 'offensive, vulgar, or provocative' expression at campus events is 'perhaps constitutionally protected' but argued 'it is within our educational mandate to address with students the norms of the legal profession.' This Essay takes seriously Dean Martinez's appeal to professional norms and broadly examines whether and when the regulation of law students' 'unprofessional' speech would be consistent with the First Amendment. This inquiry is particularly timely because the ABA has adopted a new accreditation standard requiring law schools to have policies protecting academic freedom and free expression. In assessing the permissibility of regulating law student speech for 'professionalism,' this Essay will consider not just the regulation of student expression at campus events, which was the focus of the Martinez Memo, but also the full range of situations in which students might engage in unprofessional expression--from the classroom to social media. This Essay considers this question from multiple angles, from the Court's case law deferring to universities' educational decisions, to cases specifically relating to student speech. This Essay argues that the further away the university's decisions are from its core teaching functions, the less likely the Court is to be deferential to the school. This means the authority of law schools to regulate student speech can be placed on a spectrum, with the most authority in the classroom context and the least authority outside of school. In addition, this Essay examines the lower court decisions holding that professional schools have special authority to regulate the speech of their students that demonstrates a lack of fitness for the profession. This Essay contends that this professionalism doctrine is deeply troubling, but if courts recognize it in the law school setting, they should limit its application to narrow circumstances. Specifically, it is essential for the school to identify a specific professionalism standard that would, in fact, support the speech regulation, and that standard must itself be constitutional. In order to protect vigorous advocacy, rules regulating the speech of attorneys are generally constitutional only when they regulate speech directly connected to the practice of law and not when they are used to protect the 'dignity' and reputation of lawyers and the legal profession. This Essay concludes with suggestions about how law schools can teach their students about professionalism and civility in the practice of law consistent with the analysis in the Essay. With respect to student-invited speakers, law schools should think hard about how such speakers contribute to the academic mission of the school. Law schools that want to receive deference to their regulation of student speech at events should consider new policies that connect these events more directly with the academic enterprise of the school., Table of Contents Introduction I. Academic Freedom, Institutional Deference, and the First Amendment A. Teaching Civility and Professionalism B. Academic Freedom and Institutional Deference C. From Tinker to Mahanoy D. [...]

Because of the government speech doctrine, public school curriculum restrictions like 'Don't Say Gay' mandates and bans on teaching critical race theory may escape free speech review. This exemplifies 'First Amendment capture.' The term 'capture' comes from 'agency capture,' which occurs when regulated entities effectively gain control over the agency meant to oversee them. First Amendment capture occurs when speech becomes controlled by the government when the Free Speech Clause should be regulating the government. Generally, laws that censor content trigger strict scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause. Curriculum bans, however, may trigger no scrutiny at all. Under the government speech doctrine, government speech is not subject to any free speech scrutiny. Teachers will struggle to challenge restrictions about what they may teach in the classroom because their speech 'pursuant to official duties' is considered government speech. Likewise, students may not be able to challenge these restrictions on what they are allowed to learn if curricular decisions are deemed government speech--a possibility given unclear rules for evaluating censorship of public school curriculum. Although some lower courts have interpreted Supreme Court precedent to find that curriculum decisions violate the Free Speech Clause if motivated by political or partisan reasons rather than legitimate pedagogical ones, others have concluded that the Free Speech Clause does not apply because curriculum decisions represent government speech. This Essay argues that the government speech doctrine overreaches in at least two ways. First, it classifies as 'government speech' speech that might actually be mixed speech--that is, speech with both government and private speakers. Second, it classifies as 'government speech' streams of speech that the audience has as much a stake in, if not more, than the speaker. The Free Speech Clause, after all, protects the free flow of speech, not just speakers. In both cases, the Essay concludes, the speech should undergo some level of Free Speech Clause review., Table of Contents Introduction I. The Curriculum Bans A. 'Don't Say Gay' Laws B. Critical Race Theory Bans II. Existing Free Speech Doctrine A. Teacher Claims 1. The pre-government speech [...]

I. Introduction II. Background A. Critical Race Theory (CRT) 1. CRT Past and Present 2. State and Federal Efforts to Regulate CRT B. Iowa's CRT Ban 1. Legislative History 2. [...], In 2019, Critical Race Theory (CRT) moved from the pages of law journals to the front page of the newspaper and became the centerpiece of a partisan political battle over the classroom. In response, several states have passed laws to ban CRT from the classroom. Iowa's CRT ban directly regulates speech about race in K-12 classrooms and one Iowa university has used it to limit speech about race in college classrooms. This Article argues that this kind of viewpoint discriminatory law would usually be facially unconstitutional. However, Iowa's CRT law regulates public school teachers and college professors, who exist in a First Amendment twilight zone created by the Supreme Court's employee speech jurisprudence. Even though teachers and professors are having their speech abridged, they cannot get into court on a First Amendment Theory. To fill in this gap, Courts faced with Iowa's CRT ban should clarify the protections for professors engaged in teaching and research and recognize a student's right to receive information. These solutions would put a stop to the current rash of politically motivated tinkering with the K-12 and University curriculum and allow the education system to grapple honestly with past injustice.

I. INTRODUCTION The internet offers infinite possibilities, but also new threats and pitfalls for science and academic freedom. On the one hand, the World Wide Web, for the first time, [...], While in the early days of the internet, there was great enthusiasm about the wealth of new possibilities for science, in recent years, awareness about the darker sides of digital technologies has been rising. It is known today that the leading academic publishers have tapped into the data analytics business. The resulting massive collection of user traces not only threatens privacy rights but also increases concerns about the consolidation of the oligopoly in the global academic publishing industry and large-scale corporate influence on science. This paper explores the consequences of this development for the constitutional protection of science. It argues that while classic accounts of constitutionalism are not entirely blind to constitutional challenges transcending the state-individual relationship, they struggle to capture the subtle yet systemic risks that the science system faces in the digital age. Societal constitutionalism is not only a useful lens to better understand these threats, but also to respond to them, providing valuable lessons for debates about digital constitutionalism and the effective protection of fundamental rights in the digital age. Keywords: Academic Freedom, Open Access, Surveillance, Digital Constitutionalism, Fundamental Rights Theory.

INTRODUCTION 786 I. BAKKE'S LAW: THE FIRST AMENDMENT MEETS EQUAL PROTECTION 789 A. BAKKE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE DIVERSITY RATIONALE 790 B. POST-BAKKE DECISIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE [...], Debates over affirmative action in higher education generally focus on equality interests under the Fourteenth Amendment but ignore liberty interests under the First Amendment. That tendency persists, even though the academic freedom to enroll a diverse student body has allowed colleges and universities to defend race-conscious admissions programs against legal challenges for decades. Today, the rise of formalism in judicial interpretation poses new perils for these programs. Justice Powell's seminal decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke was a pragmatic compromise that used diversity to temper the polarized debate over equality that sharply divided the Court. In contrast to Justice Powell's emphasis on the unique nature of higher education, formalist approaches rely on the plain meaning of a statute or constitutional provision. Shorn of context and values, textual interpretation leaves the Justices susceptible to risks of false equivalencies and missed analogies. False equivalencies treat categories as the same when they are in fact different, while missed analogies treat categories as different when they are the same. Both dangers can infect affirmative action jurisprudence. Under the First Amendment, the Justices have failed to recognize the importance of both sectarian organizations and institutions of higher education in preserving the conditions for robust discourse. As a result, the Court has grown increasingly deferential to religious freedom but more skeptical of the autonomy of colleges and universities to weigh race in admissions. That missed analogy in turn is compounded by a false equivalency, one that inheres in formal colorblindness. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Justices have treated all considerations of race as similarly pernicious, equating acts that discriminate against historically underrepresented groups with those that seek to include them. Taken together, declining deference for colleges and universities and an entrenched commitment to a colorblind Constitution could spell the end for affirmative action. Despite these failings of formalism, however, I will show that these programs can still survive exacting judicial scrutiny.

INTRODUCTION In 2007, a man used a firearm to claim thirty-three lives on the campus of Virginia Tech, a public university. (1) The next year, the Supreme Court of the [...], TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 1048 I. Interpreting the Second Amendment 1050 A. The Seminal Cases: Heller and McDonald 1050 B. Public Carry: The "Circuit Split" 1053 1. Circuits Declaring an Individual Right to Public Carry 1053 2. Circuits Assuming an Individual Right to Public Carry 1054 II. The Constitutional Right to Carry Firearms on Campus 1056 A. Heller Did Not Intend "Schools" to Include College Campuses 1056 B. Public Universities Are Not "Sensitive Places" 1058 1. Heller and the Home as a Non-Sensitive Place 1059 2. First Amendment Rights 1061 C. Federal Case Law Suggests Absolute Gun Bans on Campus Are Unconstitutional 1064 1. The Tiers of Scrutiny Do Not Apply to Absolute Bans 1065 2. Absolute Firearms Bans on Campus Fail Heller's Historical Method 1068 III. How Can States and Public Universities Regulate Firearms? 1072 A. Likely Permissible Regulations Under Heller 1072 B. Likely Permissible Regulations Under Intermediate Scrutiny 1073 Conclusion 1076

I INTRODUCTION In May 2019, Associate Professor Gerd Schroder-Turk, an academic staff member at Murdoch University and a staff representative on the Senate at the University, made statements on the [...], The recent case of Schroder-Turk v Murdoch University has thrown up questions in relation to the extent to which an academic is allowed to criticise the university at which they are employed. What freedom, if any, does an academic have to criticise the practices of their Australian university? Are there any limits to this freedom? Are these limits appropriate? These questions in turn raise questions as to the existence and nature of any right that an academic has to exercise academic freedom in Australia and the extent to which this right may provide an academic with more protection to criticise their university employer than they may have otherwise had and whether this may have unintended, detrimental consequences. Does this right to academic freedom allow academics to criticise their institution whether or not they have a reasonable basis for doing so and if so, should this be the case? This article explores these questions with particular reference to the effect of the Model Code for the Protection of Free Speech and Academic Freedom recommended by former High Court of Australia Chief Justice Robert French and proposes some amendments to this Code.

The United States is a world leader in biomedical clinical research. America's existing human subject research regulations structure affords sizable protections for the ethical treatment of research volunteers. Early initiatives such as the Belmont Report were specific to federally funded research. Over the past several decades guidelines such as the Belmont Report, along with more stringent policies, have been applied to non-federally funded research and research in the social sciences, and have branched out over areas, which many argue, they were not initially intended. Institutional review boards were codified to protect human subjects, an ethical and noble concern, but arguably these regulations were hastened both in response to a highly publicized research experiment and political considerations. This article explores the creation of the American IRB system through the lens of John Kingdom Multiple Streams Theory and examines critical viewpoints surrounding a longstanding inquisition over whether human subject research regulations are safeguards or censorship. Keywords: Institutional review board, federal regulations, public policy, human subject research, academic freedom, Introduction In 2010 the United States government spent over $16.5 billion dollars on human subject research conducted at institutions of higher education and other non-governmental institutions (AAUP, 2013). Over 55,000 [...]

This paper begins with an elaboration of the terms in the title, for which I claim accuracy, though no comfort. Academic freedom is defined for all members of the academic [...]

THIS ARTICLE REVIEWS RECENT LITIGATION INVOLVING postsecondary institutions, faculty, staff, and students as well as other organizations closely associated with higher education. In 2009, there were 291 reported cases, a [...]

Introduction I. Supreme Court University Speech Jurisprudence A. Early Cases B. Later Cases: The Forum Analysis C. The Hazelwood Decision II. Subsequent Applications of Hazelwood to College Student Speech A. [...]

I. INTRODUCTION Deb Mayer taught a multi-age fourth, fifth, and sixth grade classroom in a college town in the middle of Indiana. (2) Using the magazine, Time for Kids, Ms. [...], Public education is a unique societal institution because education, although it is supposed to transmit widely accepted cultural norms and values to children, is a process through which the child develops as an individual and grows into a mature and discerning adult. (1)