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This work has a double objective: to present Kant’s general conception of Aristotle’s Formal Logic and to critically analyze his conception of form and matter in the formal sciences in general. Indeed, two problems are focused here: what is Kant’s concept of Aristotelian Logic? What is Kant’s conception of the form and content of the formal sciences – Logic and Mathematics? As for the first problem, the hypothesis defended is that Kant critically conceives Aristotelian Logic through at least six main characteristics, inherited from the ancient and scholastic tradition, namely formal science, canon, propaedeutics, cathartic, art and organon. As for the second problem, it will be argued that Kant conceives form and content differently in the formal sciences in a double sense: both in the comparison between Aristotle’s Formal Logic and his own Transcendental Logic and in the comparison between these two Logics and the Mathematics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This essay addresses the general systematic question underlying any project of 'formalization' of Hegel's dialectic-speculative logic, namely, the question concerning the peculiar concept of logical 'form' and the connected type of 'formalism' at stake in a logic that is, programmatically and innovatively within the historical tradition, a 'dialectic-speculative' logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article addresses how Immanuel Kant, Theodor Adorno, and Alain Badiou can come surprisingly close, provided we invoke Marx's value form at the centre of commodity exchange. We will argue for a complementary elaboration to the 'capitalist schematisation' (Christian Lotz via Alfred Sohn-Rethel), while at the same time probing into the material basis of Badiou's transcendental organization—investigating whether the transcendental regime of appearing is always already a product of a determinate mode of production. We will be guided by two premises: (1) The pure conceptual unfolding understood as an inner-logical consequently produces the non-conceptual, an external result, immanent to such unfolding, hence real abstraction, which retroactively imposes itself on understanding as a conceptual abstraction. (2) The inversion of objective/subjective into objective-subjective synthesis, which is both real and social. Overall, the article seeks to scrutinize an alternative social synthesis through a Badiou-inspired reconstruction of Marx's value form and posed as a potential category of social synthesis that entails the real abstraction, namely money with commodities, alongside the object labour in a single, unified structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on re-evaluating Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic by initially highlighting its seemingly negative function within the Critique of Pure Reason as a mere regulative form for cognition and experience. The Dialectic, however, does not only have such a negative-regulative function but also its very own positive and founding character for cognition that even is present in the supposedly most immediate forms of intuition. In exploring this positive side of the Transcendental Dialectic it becomes clear that it manifests itself as a bridge between the so-called theoretical and practical reason inasmuch as it fills in their gap within Kant’s philosophy. From the practical side, the Dialectic is manifest as an action full of purposiveness, maxims, and imperatives within cognition, from a theoretical side it assumes the form of syllogistic inference, which is the adequate and acting theoretical form of practical reason. Therefore, the unity of reason is shown in presenting its inner gap as a dialectical misunderstanding that Kant not only highlights in the Transcendental Dialectic but also tends to leave unsolved mostly. Nevertheless, the Dialectic can be shown as the a priori synthetic act of unifying reason, if investigated in the context of Kant’s complete critical endeavour.

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The article focuses on act of will is embodied in a process of relationship agreement, according to which willing becomes the principle of power. It mentions need to express the experience of a transcendent reality, the mystical language transgresses the limits of ordinary language and intuition of the absolute is perceived as the final unity in which all diversity ceases. It also mentions seed of divinity hidden in the soul, the mystic German relies on religious tradition.

Copyright of Tópicos is the property of Asociacion Revista de Filosofia de Santa Fe and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article substantiates the need to create a pure egology in order to analyze the structures of consciousness. The relevance of egological research is to form the foundation for disparate cognitive sciences. On the basis of the historical and philosophical approach, the idea of transcendental logic is considered and it is concluded that it is essentially correlated with the analysis of consciousness. Transcendental logic takes into account the pure content of human thinking, which is not reduced to an empirical composition. Results. 1. The question of the dual nature of logic was first raised by the ancient Stoics, who included in it a section devoted to the analysis of impressions and the formulation of criteria for knowledge. 2. The idea of transcendental logic is presented in its expanded form in the works of Kant, who divided it into analytics and dialectics. In the analytical section, Kant is confronted with a paradox — with the division of the pure I into two parts: active subject and passive object. The identity of these parts does not give any knowledge of how the pure I exist in itself. As a result of the transcendental analysis, a distinction is introduced between the pure and the empirical subject. 3. Hegel’s critical reinterpretation of the idea of transcendental logic leads to a new division, in which it corresponds to an objective logic that takes into account the content of knowledge and its origin. 4. The connection between logic and egology was found in Husserl’s later works, most systematically in “Formal and Transcendental Logic”. Transcendental logic is a subjectively oriented study that clarifies the constitutive activity of pure consciousness. The scientific novelty of the research consists in the fact that the pure I as a subject of egology contains and produces objective logical formations. Formal logic is concerned with inference and proof, being a demonstrative rather than descriptive discipline. This lack of formal logic can only be eliminated by transcendental logic, which directly addresses the experience of pure consciousness. It should be used to study the subjective structures that underlie theoretical reason. Thanks to the experience of egology, there is a real opportunity in the future to solve the question of reason in its relevance and live performance, in which objective formations find their source.

Copyright of Logos: Anales del Seminario de Metafísica (1575-6866) is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Criticism of cognition at the Marburg school of neo-Kantism: Hermann Cohen’s approach to Platonic idealism in the perspective of Kant’s transcendental logic The article is an attempt to characterize Platonic idealism as interpreted by Hermann Cohen – founder and the same time a leading representative of Marburg school of Neo-Kantism. The course of analysis includes Cohen’s theses put forward in the epistemological work PlatonsIdeenlehre und die Mathematik. The postulates to which Cohen refers connect the reflection on classical idealism and the status of the Platonic idea with logical-mathematical reflection and the problem of sichere Hypothesis as a certain hypothesis. Defining the role of mathematics: arithmetic and geometry, becomes indispensable in understanding the idealism of both Plato and Kant. Both emphasize the importance of thought, logic of pure thinking, criticism as a path and character-shaping. The argumentation presented in the article, rooted in the historical and philosophical analyzes of the problem, in the summary is also an attempt to define the meaning of Platonic and Neo-Kantian idealism for contemporary scientific and philosophical issuesThe article is an attempt to characterize Platonic idealism as interpreted by Hermann Cohen – founder and the same time a leading representative of Marburg school of neo-Kantism. The course of analysis includes Cohen’s theses put forward in the epistemological work Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik. The postulates to which Cohen refers connect the reflection on classical idealism and the status of the Platonic idea with logical-mathematical reflection and the problem of sichere Hypothesis as a certain hypothesis. Defining the role of mathematics: arithmetic and geometry, becomes indispensable in understanding the idealism of both Plato and Kant. Both emphasize the importance of thought, logic of pure thinking, criticism as a path and character-shaping. The argumentation presented in the article, rooted in the historical and philosophical analyzes of the problem, in the summary is also an attempt to define the meaning of Platonic and Neo-Kantian idealism for contemporary scientific and philosophical issues.

It is well known that the notion of transcendental logic has a prominent role in both Kant's and Husserl's theories of knowledge. The main aim of the present paper is to study the links between formal and transcendental logic in Husserl on the one hand, and the links between general logic and transcendental logic in Kant on the other. There is a debate about the proper relation between transcendental logic and general logic in Kant's philosophy. By means of our definition of transcendental logic, mainly drawn from Husserl's analyses, we will try to offer an appropriate interpretation of Kant's view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at dialectical inferences as they relate to Hegel's modal metaphysics, closely examining the Actuality section of Hegel's Science of Logic and positing a reading of Hegel's modal actualism that engages with two strains of secondary commentary. Responding to commentators, we make the case that Hegel's 'das Logische' avoids presupposing possibility's being prior to actuality insofar as actuality and the derivation of possibility is considered as the in-itselfness of actuality, an implicit inner moment whereby actuality further determines itself. Actuality is immediate yet derived as an identity from the logic of inner and outer. If actuality as immediacy is explicit/outer, then its opposition, its implicitness/innerness, has to be possibility in the logic of modality. In order to conceive of actuality as existence, and particularly as an emerging process, we must already conceive the problem of presupposing an alien form within the logic of actuality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his system of the logical functions of understanding Kant includes modality as the fourth class together with quantity, quality and relation. Kant defines modality briefly, though with the clear indication that modality has to put the judgment in the “relation to the thinking in general”. The present paper will argue that Kant has reached a new definition of modality. However, this can be demonstrated in the logical reconstruction of the system of judgments with the consistent course through the four logical types of judgments included. The specific functions of these judgments are formed on the bases of the logical possibilities of subject, predicate and logical relation. These components are gradually intensified with their inner subdivision and are formed on all other objects in the field of thinking. These general judgmental areas of subject, predicate and relation subdivision constitute the modality in its class. The modality acts through separating and producing the most certain and hardest connection between the judgmental components on the base of modal ground for the object and on the calculation of the whole field of judgment. Modality is realized as the most complex and covered construction of judgment in its own judgmental area. Exactly this general schema of modality is the base for transition to the second analytic in Critique of Pure Reason – the transition as an immediate and inner connection between the Analytic of Concepts and the Analytic of Principles. The schema of modality is generalized and assembled in a new logical formation – the pure transcendental schema with its logical structure and principles. This search has to give the answer to “the most important task” of transcendental logic: how can we build the object of the pure understanding through the logical form of the synthetic judgments a priori. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I consider Kant’s dichotomy between general and transcendental logic in light of a retrospective reconstruction of two approaches originating in 14th century scholasticism that are used to demarcate formal and material consequences. The first approach (e. g., John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen) holds that a consequence is formal if it is valid — because of its form only — for any matter. Since the matter of a consequence is linked to categorematic terms, its formal validity is defined as being invariant under substitutions for such terms. According to the second approach (e. g., Richard Billingham, Robert Fland, Ralph Strode, Richard Lavenham), the validity of a formal consequence stems from the formal understanding of the consequent in the consequence’s antecedent. I put forward the hypothesis that in his logical taxo­nomy, Kant attempted to reconcile the substitutional interpretation of formal consequences and a formal analysis of the transcendental relations of objects of experience. However, if we interpret the limi­tations imposed by transcendental logic on the power of judgement in the spirit of the scholastic ontology of transcendental relations, it would contradict Kant’s critique of dogmatic ontology. Following in Luciano Floridi’s path, I thus propose to consider transcendental logic, not as a system of consequences equipped with ontologically grounded transcendental limitations, but rather as the logic of design. The logic of design has the benefit of enriching traditional logical tools with a series of notions borrowed primarily from computer programming. A conceptual system designer sets out feasibility requirements and defines a system’s functions that make it possible to achieve the desired outcome using available resources. Kant’s project forbids a dogmatic appeal to the transcendental relations and eternal truths of scholasticism. However, the constitutive nature of the rules of transcendental logic in regard to the power of judgement precludes the pluralism of conceptual systems that can be interpreted within possible experience. Thus, the optimisation problem of finding the best conceptual design from all feasible designs is beyond the competence of transcendental logic.

This paper proposes a reading of Kelsen's basic norm based on Kant's regulative ideas. I begin by exposing Kant's conception of the principles of reason. Then I criticize an interpretation of the basic norm along the same lines made by Stanley Paulson. Thirdly I analyze two theses from Hermann Cohen that influenced Kelsen greatly and reinforce my stance on the basic norm. Lastly, I explain how the Kelsenian tenet that the basic norm is the transcendental grounding of the normativity of law can be comprehended based on the role the ideas of reason play in the systematization of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To define the categorial status to confer to the pragmatic universals which are in the background of the formal pragmatics with Jürgen Habermas after the emergence of the designaments that ensures the fundamental pragmatics from Jean-Marc Ferry, this is the overarching goal of this paper. For this purpose, with the apriori of a communication theory basing on ontology of the Lebenswelt that expresses itself through a grammatical ontology, the strictly heuristic point convenes, in turn, the predicaments of the transcendental logic by Immanuel Kant under their grammatical interpretation. It is in this frame that this sedimentation assesses the pragmatic universals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on German philosopher Immanuel Kant's alien logical forms. Topics include, Kant's transcendental idealism implies a radical limitation on ability to represent truths about reality; transcendental idealism seems to imply that there is a large class of ineffable for truths about noumenal reality; and representational limitations should be recognized within Kant's theory of cognition.