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This article illuminates a correlation between Tibet's national identity and technological peripheralization through three intertwined tales involving Chinese, British and Tibetan radio stations in Lhasa between 1934 and 1950. Instead of a political backwater, Tibet was crucial to the competition between an expansionist British Empire and a growingly nationalistic Republic of China in the Himalayas throughout the first half of the twentieth century. As Britain and China monopolized the radio to substantiate their respective political ambitions, Tibet was compelled to adopt an image of geographical remoteness and technological underdevelopment. Upon breaking the foreign monopoly, the Tibetan government managed to appropriate this image for the propagation of its definitions of Tibetan state and national identities. Both the radio and the lack thereof in Tibet, therefore, became key to the Chinese, British and Tibetan governments' efforts in furthering their respective portrayals of the Tibetan state and nation, as well as Tibet's position in relation to its neighbours and the rest of the world. In addition to illustrating the interaction of power and technology in the creation of peripheral regions and competing identities, the history of radio in Tibet also reveals the essential roles played by the individuals who oversaw the radio's daily operations in such processes. Refusing to remain mere extensions of the state that they represented or the machine that they operated, these agents and technicians actively pursued their individual objectives, sometimes against the interests of their employers, shaping Tibet's modern political landscape in unexpected yet significant ways [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the political leaders who influenced Tibet's relations with the Mongols and the Manchus in the early 18th century, or more precisely from 1696 to 1721. Charismatic political leaders such as the Tibetan Sde srid, the Dzungar leader Dga' ldan Khan, and Manchu emperor Kangxi played significant roles in influencing the Tibetan Buddhist political order in Asia, which gradually changed the power dynamics of international relations in Central Asia. These political and religious phenomena also shaped the network of diplomatic relations between Tibet, the Mongols, and the Manchus. This article seeks to demonstrate that the political relations between the leaders of Tibet, Mongols, and Qing during the early 18th century greatly differed in their understanding of the religio-political constellations. However, they chose to communicate and negotiate with each other in terms of Tibetan Buddhist terminology and values, which was meaningful to all parties concerned. Tibetan lamas thus became the main mediators and diplomats in these three countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the politics of time are an important dimension of Chinese state discourse about Tibet, it remains insufficiently explored in theoretical and practical terms. This article examines the written and visual discourses of Tibetan temporality across Chinese state media in the post-2008 era. It analyses how these media discourses attempt to construct a 'regime of temporality' in order to manage public opinion about Tibet and consolidate Chinese rule over the region. While the expansion of online technologies has allowed the state to consolidate its discourses about Tibet's place within the People's Republic of China (PRC), they have also provided Tibetans a limited but valuable space to challenge these official representations through counter readings of Tibet's past, present and future. In doing so, this article contributes new insights on the production of state power over Tibet, online media practices in China, and the disruptive potential of social media as sites of Tibetan counter discourses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Qing Empire maintained a reciprocal relationship with Tibet for more than a century after acquiring it in the 1720s. The Manchu court granted Tibet a high degree of autonomy while Tibetan leaders obtained a strong ally to defend them from foreign invasion by compromising part of their authority. The mutually beneficial relationship, however, ended in the 1900s when the Manchu court adopted predatory policies to tighten its control over Tibet to resist British and Russian expansionism. This article explores the often-overlooked impact of Meiji Japan, and aims to reveal its role in setting the intellectual framework for the Qing Empire's new Tibet policy. I argue that Japanese knowledge of imperialism and Tibet promoted an imperialist worldview, which conceptualised the Tibetan frontier as a colony that needed to be exploited, civilised and nationalised. Through an in-depth discussion of discourses on Tibet produced by Japanese elites, Chinese students in Meiji Japan, and Chinese elites in China, as well as policy proposals drafted by Chinese officials, I demonstrate that Japanese knowledge shaped Chinese perceptions of Tibet and was translated into the Qing Empire's new Tibet policy. Ultimately, the article aims to reveal a specific mechanism of imperialism, which attempted to convert China into its accomplice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyses two authoritative texts and a map from the Ming and Qing eras to examine the political relationship between China and Tibet in the Ming period. It finds that in these documents Tibet was not classified as being a part of the realm governed by the Ming Empire. This casts doubt on the claim advanced by the People's Republic of China that Tibet has been a part of China 'since antiquity'. An important conclusion of this study is that, when taking recourse to historical texts to justify or refute territorial claims, the structure and content of the text as a whole, and not just isolated phrases or formulations, should be taken into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an introduction to a special collection of five articles showcasing the work of rising scholars in the geography and anthropology of Tibetan regions in China (Eveline Washul, Andrew Grant, Tsering Bum, Huatse Gyal and Duojie Zhaxi, published in Critical Asian Studies 50: 4 and Critical Asian Studies 51: 1). It contextualizes the authors' contributions in the recent promotion of planned urbanization in Tibetan regions as the key to achieving the "Chinese Dream" under President Xi Jinping. The paper calls attention to these authors' focus on Tibetan experiences of new urbanization policies and practices, as well as their less-appreciated entanglement with shifting education priorities. Providing brief summaries of each author's case study and arguments, it points to the ways in which all five articles address the relationship between space and subjectivity, as well as the issue of constrained agency (versus simple notions of "choice"), in statist urbanization processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tibetan pastoralists have been subject to large-scale state-led development policies over the past three decades. The provisioning of institutionalized state schooling, in particular, has all along been part and parcel of these development projects, including urbanization and resettlement initiatives. However, for a variety of reasons, the promotion of schooling in Tibetan pastoral areas has been a challenge since the first Maoist efforts in 1950s. By focusing on a case study of a Buddhist monk's persistent effort to build a primary school in his home village in the eastern region of Tibet in 1990, and on how Tibetan villagers' views of him and his school project have changed over time, this paper examines the nexus of relationships between schooling, and social and cultural changes in pastoral Tibet. I also aim to relate Tibetan pastoralists' shifting values of schooling to the larger social and political context, particularly the ubiquitous Chinese xiangmu (project) economy and Tibetan pastoralists' ever-increasing dependence on the state. This paper argues that although state schooling is highly contested, it has been one of the driving forces of social change in Tibetan pastoral areas today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the ways in which housing projects in the northeastern Tibetan region of Amdo (Qinghai) produce governable citizens through rural reconstruction projects. Since the beginning of the "Construction of the New Socialist Countryside" project in 2005, the Chinese state has made great efforts to improve the living standards of rural populations, with a particular focus on the construction of "comfortable" and modern housing. This paper examines the housing subsidy projects that were launched in Amdo in 2009. Drawing on qualitative data, including participant observation and interviews, the paper examines the ways in which Tibetan villagers seek to achieve their versions of modernity through these projects. It analyzes how housing projects have encouraged villagers to become more avid market consumers by cultivating and increasing their desires for material improvement. In doing so, these projects have increased income disparities among households in the same village. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the possibility of political representation in government in exile and its impact on the dilemmas of transnational politics. Topics discussed include the parliamentary elections in Tibetan diaspora, the intervention of exiles in homeland affairs and the role of exiles in establishing independent states and international recognition.

Little thought has been given to the possibility that China's repressive Tibet policy could be driven largely by its fear of external forces, as opposed to the government's authoritarian nature. This article tries to explain why it was only in 1994 that Chinese authorities seriously and systematically strengthened religious control in Tibet. This had been put in place during the 1987-89 protests but never effectively enforced. The key is the Chinese leaders' perception of external threats in the post-Tiananmen era, which prompted Chinese authorities to believe that instead of being mostly an ethnic nuisance, Tibetan separatism-utilizing Tibetan Buddhism as a "weapon"-had become a "tool" wielded by "hostile Western forces" seeking ultimately to break up China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Tibetan government's arrival at the horizon of democracy is viewed as another stone solidifying the foundation of Tibetan freedom movement. In 2011, His Holiness the Dalai Lama devolved all his political power and restricted himself to be the spiritual head only. In the wake of this development, in 2011, first direct elections were conducted for the post of Prime Minister and the Members of Parliament of Tibetan Government-in-Exile. Recently concluded elections in April-May 2016 were only second elections of this type. This short note looks into the governance structure and functioning of the Tibetan Government-in-exile and reviews the recently concluded Tibetan general elections with a view that how through these democratic political processes the exiled community has transplanted, institutionalized and democratized its government structures to establish a state-like polity in a stateless and territory-less exile. This study is based on field observation undertaken in Dharamshala. Interviews were conducted with Tibetan government officials, journalists and members of Tibetan electorate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a study of the textbooks composed and released by the Tibetan Government-in-Exile for the Central School for Tibetans in India. By examining the textbooks on Social Studies and history, it looks at how the Tibetan Government-in-Exile engages with various external and internal ‘others’ in the process of constructing knowledge of the Tibetan nation, and at how it represents Tibetan life to those who were born in exile. It is contended that schooling and power are interrelated, and textbook curricula represent a way in which national power dominates the selection and representation of public knowledge. The article concludes by suggesting that the limits applied by their refugee status to the Tibetans in India has sometimes turned into the energy/force of empowerment, which not only permits flexibility in the shaping of a national identity but creates spaces for negotiating the multiple boundaries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Beginning in the early eighteenth century, a bifurcated structure of authority in the Kham region of ethnographic Tibet frustrated attempts by both the Lhasa and Beijing governments to assert their unquestioned control over a myriad polities in the borderlands between Sichuan and Tibet. A tenuous accommodation of this structure persisted from the early eighteenth century until the first two decades of the twentieth century when powerful globalizing norms—territoriality and sovereignty—transformed both the understanding and expectations of territorial rule held by Qing and, later, Republican Chinese officials. Absolutist conceptions of these norms prompted an ambitious endeavour to shatter the bifurcated structure and undermine the Dalai Lama's spiritual influence on Kham society. Infrontier imperialism is used to analyse the incomplete implementation of resulting acculturative and incorporative policies, inflected by these two norms, which challenged the monasteries’ indirect influence on the lay rulers of Kham, initiating a struggle for authority that persists to this day. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Lhasa riots in 2008 re-captured the world's attention on the Tibet problem. As China continues to grow as a rising power, it raises a concern over whether the perception of a rising China will affect how American people think about the Tibet problem. In this article, the authors apply public opinion data to evaluate this question. The results show that the perception of China's hard power or soft power has little influence on Americans' view of the Tibet problem, while factors of political values and China's policy stance matter greatly. Our findings suggest that the huge difference in political values between the PRC and the US makes it tough for both sides to agree on a resolution to the Tibet problem. In the long term, China needs to improve its human rights record and present itself as a responsible great power to win over the hearts of foreign publics rather than conduct a public relations campaign according to its own imagination. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

What Western academic literature described as ethnic or cultural Tibet in fact implies something composite and processually constructed: Tibet then often appears as a typical example for explanations of collective identity (and ethnicity). Such approaches increasingly are applied in present-day anthropology and historical studies, highlighting the historical conditions and the politically, socially and ideationally constructed features of identity. In Tibet, identity-building was strongly related to the spread of Buddhism. The new religion was introduced in the time of the Tibetan Empire (seventh to ninth century), but it was only its later spread (from the eleventh century) that led to the effective, all-embracing establishment of Buddhism in the Highlands. It was interlinked with regionally different forms of political manifestations—the founding of Buddhist kingdoms at the periphery and the emergence of monastic hegemonies in the central regions. These developments correlated with processes of conversion, which in its narrative model is described as an act of conquest, taming and civilizing the physical universe and which in theory actually never ends. Apart from considering current anthropological discussions of the phenomenon of religious conversion, this paper will include a comparative view of the history of Christianization in early medieval Europe (especially in Western Europe—the Frankish kingdom and the barbarian zones North of the Rhine and the Danube, fifth to tenth century). Inter alia this also raises questions about the initial social forces and interests promoting the new religion's adoption, and to what extent formal similarities with the Tibetan case are ascertainable in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 12 and 13 August 2014, China organized a conference titled, ‘Forum on the Development of Tibet’ in Lhasa. Out of the 100 or so participants, about 40 were international participants from about 30 countries. This article materialized out of an interest to probe a few inter-related questions such as what is the point of holding another Forum on development of Tibet when the ‘Tibet work forums’ are already doing that since 1980? Why are there international participants in it? What is the significance of the Forum in the Chinese government’s overall approach to the Tibet question? Interestingly, the conference did not have a dedicated website or it’s like where one could access information about it. On its conclusion, a document ‘Lhasa Consensus’ was brought out, which failed to provide any sense of the conference’s proceedings. Instead, it emphasized Chinese achievements in Tibet and denounced the Dalai Lama and international media for being biased. Outside China, the Forum attracted attention less for its stated agenda but more for its possible objectives. In effect, the organisers lost an opportunity to chart a new discourse on Tibet’s development sans politics. The Forum ultimately seems to be part of Beijing’s attempt at gaining lost ground on international propaganda on Tibet. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the political history and status of Tibet, China and the anti-Chinese riots that broke out in Lhasa in September 1987.

The article examines the historical context of 21st-century ethnic conflicts in China. Particular focus is given to China's historical outer peripheries, Tibet and Xinjiang. According to the author, ethnic tensions have been exacerbated by misguided government policies. Details on the system of autonomous regions developed in the mid-20th century are presented. Political autonomy, religion, migration, and government economic assistance are also discussed.

The article discusses the McMahon Line, commonly known as the Indo-Tibetan border, and the status of the Indian region Monyul. Topics discussed include the inclusion of Monyul within the McMahon Line, demarcation of the Indo-Tibetan boundary between Monyul and Assam, and the Tibetan government in China.

The aim of this essay is to examine the ways in which Beijing perceives the issues of Tibet and Xinjiang differently in the context of its geostrategic thinking in international politics today. In doing so, this essay will provide a deeper understanding of Beijing's different geostrategic sensibilities of Tibet and Xinjiang in regard to rising China's national security interests in Central and South Asia. This essay argues that, although Beijing publicly sees the Tibet and Xinjiang problems as issues of securing Chinese sovereignty, geostrategically Beijing alludes to a subtle difference in its perception of the two regions: (i) the Tibet problem is a practical, domestic issue to be handled by Beijing's paternalistic engagement of modernization, and is a symbolic issue regarding how to manage rising China's benign image abroad while harshly oppressing any separatist voices in Tibet; and (ii) in Beijing's geostrategic thinking, Xinjiang's security importance seems to be defined in terms of energy security for China's economic growth, which is integral to social stability and the Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy, as well as the transnational Islamic terrorist movement interlinked with Uyghur separatism in Xinjiang. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article traces the Muslim and Chinese records to find evidence whether Tibet was an independent state or was part of China. Description of Tibetan culture, its isolation and relations with traders, are given. The Perso-Arabic records do not give details of the Tibetan society but highlights the Yamanis conquest, the beauty of the area, and its deer musk are given. The conclusion that the Muslim records implies that Tibet was an independent country is given.

The article offers information on the operations of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Tibet and the relationship between foreign policy and intelligence. Topics discussed include the essay "Clandestine Human Intelligence," by John MacGaffin on the covert operations by intelligence community (IC), and the failure of the Mustang project in Tibet in terms of money and manpower.

This article investigates Chinese warlord authority in the east of the Kham Tibetan region between 1911 and 1949. The colonial government established by the Qing Empire in Kham during the five years before the end of dynastic rule relied on central government funding. With the fragmentation of the Chinese state in the Republican period, Chinese regimes in Kham were forced to raise more revenue locally and reduce expenditure. Responding to these challenges shaped the nature of Chinese authority in Kham. The late Qing colonial government had paid Tibetans who provided livestock and labor for transport as part of the 'u-lag corvée. Republican-era governors lacked the resources to do the same. They struggled to develop other ways of controlling the corvée, and attempted to create alternative state transport organizations. Changes in the sources of county government revenue also had important effects on Chinese officials' approach to what they considered to be “wasteland.” [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article discusses China's hegemony over Tibet from Deng Xiaoping's era to Hu Jintao's administration. Chinese hegemony over Tibet was done through force and coercion to curb the rise of the Tibetan people against the government of China. In addition, they also hegemonized the Tibetans by means of persuasion that was by implementing development policies to gain acceptance among Tibetans. Although the persuasion strategy was taken by introducing modernization approach, this move, however, was rejected by the people of Tibet because it slowly marginalizes their position as indigenous Tibetans. This marginalization is due to the action of the Chinese government in bringing the ethnic Hans into Tibetan areas to meet the needs of skilled manpower that cannot be accommodated by the local Tibets. The influx of ethnic Hans into Tibet resulted in the destruction of identity, language, religion and culture of Tibet. In addition, the Tibetan people are also denied their rights in the economic and administration spheres, thus causing them to play a lesser role in determining the future of their region. Therefore, the people of Tibet represented by their Buddhist monks staged a protest by burning themselves. This prompted the international community to pressure the Chinese government to respect human rights. Despite international pressure, in the final analysis, this article found that the two leaders stood firm and warned other countries not to get involve by interfering in the internal affairs of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how displaced Tibetans demarcate and characterize the Tibetan demos in the process of building a democratic community and a government-in-exile. In this democracy-in-exile, defining the demos is not only a means of representing a people, but also a means of regaining a lost homeland. Two specific instances of the construction of a transnational exile demos are investigated: citizenship and political representation. The Tibetan Government-in-Exile's formalized idea of citizenship builds upon ideals of equal and loyal members who form a single unit bounded by a common cause. This also constitutes the foundation for Tibetan citizens' political representation in the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile. The parliament's definition of the demos enhances regional and religious adherence as essentials for determining who the Tibetan people are. The article refers to problems regarding how this construct, which defines who is included into the demos, inevitably means that some are excluded as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes historical Chinese and Tibetan documents in order to assess various perspectives and consequences of the British invasion of Tibet in 1904 under colonel Francis Younghusband, focusing on the invasion's effect on Chinese attitudes towards Tibet. The documents illustrate the Tibetan government's communication with China and Tibet's disregard of Chinese authority due to a lack of support during the invasion. The Buddhist structure of the Tibetan government is discussed and Tibet's motivation to defend Buddhism from foreign religion is described. Relations between China's Qing dynasty and Tibet are highlighted and it is concluded that the documents analyzed suggest China's lack of resistance to the invasion was used to strategically assert power in Tibet.

The article discusses three topics about China, namely the theory of ideology in ancient China, the politics of reincarnation in Tibet and the Chinese valley of tears. It suggests that Confucianism and legalism, two opposing theories of ideology, share a deep materialist premise during the reign of the Qin king, China's first emperor. The article also comments on the institution of Order Number Five by the Chinese government to manage the reincarnation of living Buddhas in Tebet.

This paper evaluates the Tibet question through the looking glass of Taiwan, by considering four dimensions of comparative dynamics between the two cases of Taiwan and the Tibetan government-in-exile (TGIE) in relation to China: territorial, economic, ethnic and cultural. Of the four, the paper argues, Taiwan has high convergence with China in the economic, ethnic and cultural dimensions, and managed divergence in the territorial dimension. The TGIE, on the other hand, has high divergence with China in all four dimensions: territorial dispute, economic incongruence, ethnic estrangement, and cultural gulf. Further, the TGIE is ideologically and sentimentally charged by this divergence and thrives by exploiting it. It therefore should have few incentives to see the lessons of Taiwan applied in resolving the Tibet question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the history of Buddhism in Tibet through an analysis of the appearance and social perception of the Jowo Śākyamuni Buddha statue in Lhasa, Tibet. The author reflects on the assimilation of Buddhism into Tibetan society, proper ritual action towards the Buddha, and how the decline of the theocratic state can be related to improper ritual action. Emphasis is given to the role of iconography and the statue's crown in historical debates over the assimilation of Buddhism during the Tibetan Empire, the rise of the Gelukpa hegemony, and the destruction of theocracy.

The article presents an analysis of the international relations between India and China as of 2011. Introductory details are given overviewing Indian-Chinese relations since the 1960s, noting persistent tensions over the disputed territorial borders of the Tibetan region and the publicity of political opposition to Chinese actions. The author then asserts that India, particularly its military authority structure, is becoming more cautious about potential Chinese military expansion. Both practical and theoretical elements of Sino-Indian relations are described within this context.

Wang Lixiong published his "Roadmap of Tibetan Independence" on the Internet in November 2008, after a relative easing of tensions following the spring uprising and just after the conclusion of the Beijing Olympic Games. It offers his interpretation of the Tibet issue with a novel analytical approach that he formulated after the Tibetan protests. His original view of the Tibet crisis takes into account its deeper causes and charts a path towards Tibetan independence. "Roadmap" consists of three parts: 1) The March Incident in Tibet is a Watershed, 2) The difficulties of an imperial system of government, and 3) The Road to Tibetan Independence. The first part has been translated into English by Kong Lingxi and disseminated widely on the Internet.(2) It therefore seemed important to publish the second part, which is more relevant to understanding the author's views as it contains a detailed analysis of the nature of bureaucratic institutions and details the system's failings. In order to give a general idea of what Wang's text has to say, a summary of the first part precedes the translation. The third part, not translated here, presents Wang's vision of different scenarios for achieving independence, which he believes can only come about through massive violence and bloodshed. TibetInfoNet reported on 13 June 2009 that Wang was in Dharamsala for a twomonth visit organised by the Association of Tibetan writers.(3) (Lara Maconi, translated by N. Jayaram) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Tibet crisis tainted the success of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The handling of the crisis showed the CCP's rigid denial of genuine dialogue and compromise and adherence to a formula of repression and economic growth. Current leaders are enmeshed in this policy, but a new generation might well seek out policies more in tune with the quest for "harmony" at home and "peaceful rise" on the world scene. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Preliminary assessment of 95 of the 150 or more protests in Tibetan areas in the spring of 2008 suggests that they were far more widespread than during previous unrest, and also that there was greater involvement of laypeople, farmers, nomads, and students than in the past. It argues that the struggle in China and elsewhere over representation of the unrest has been dominated by the question of violence, with little attention paid to policy questions and social issues. This paper outlines the basic concepts that underlie that debate and summarises the historical factors that might have led to protest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on ethnographic research on exiled Tibetan political institutions and practices in India, this paper investigates sovereignty in exile. The Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGiE) remains internationally unrecognised and lacks de jure sovereignty over territory in both Tibet and in exile. However, this exiled administration claims legitimacy as the official representative of the Tibetan population, performs a number of state-like functions in relation to its diasporic ‘citizenry’ and attempts to make its voice heard within the international community. Rejecting arguments that such entities should be viewed merely as discrepant forms of political practice, this paper asserts that the state, sovereignty, and territory can be conceptually disentangled, opening up the theoretical possibility of entities other than territorial states claiming sovereignty. In teasing apart and problematising constituent elements of sovereignty, this paper focuses on three aspects of the TGiE's articulations of sovereignty: its claims to and production of legitimacy, authority and de facto sovereignty; its displaced sovereignty and strategies of territorial governance over non-contiguous spaces in exile; and the mediation of its ambiguous relationship with the host state India through practices of tacit sovereignty. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

With no concrete agreement reached at the conclusion of the eighth round of the Sino-Tibetan dialogue, the Tibetan movement is now at a crossroads. This essay provides an overview of the Sino-Tibetan negotiations and His Holiness the Dalai Lama's tireless effort to search for a peaceful solution in the past half century. It is against such a historical backdrop that the author argues that the Dalai Lama is the key to solving the Tibetan issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an interview with Tsering Shakya. In the interview Shakya discusses issues centering around Tibet. Shakya explains some of the reasons why the Tibetan monks were protesting against China's occupation of Tibet. One of the reasons was the growing tension between the monasteries and the Communist Party. He also comments on Chinese policy following the imposition of martial law from 1989-90.

This article analyzes the rhetoric that the Fifth Dalai Lama Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho (1617-1682) employs to describe various forms of violence. In particular, I explore the justifications he offers or implies for various types of violence to which he seems to grant his approval. I focus on his 1643 Song of the Queen of Spring, written immediately after a broadranging war that culminated in his own ascent to political rule over Tibet. Concentrating on his assessment of Gushri Khan, the Mongolian strongman responsible for installing the Dalai Lama in power, I conclude that the Dalai Lama attempts to legitimize Gushri Khan's violence by representing the khan as a transcendent agent of benefit, a bodhisattva whose own goodness permits him to perform actions that would be condemned if performed by a less exalted actor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the history and Chinese political position of person holding the Tibetan Buddhist religious title Samding Dorje Phagmo. Details are provided about the rights and title of the Samding Dorje Phagmo and about the origin and religious duties of the institution.. The history of the Tibetan-Sino relationship is described and the social status of Tibetan Buddhists in China is explored. The Tibetan woman who serves as Samding Dorje Phagmo acts as head of the Samding monastery and president of the National People's Congress of the Tibet Autonomous Region.

The article presents an analysis of the Indo-China relations which took into account perceptions, problems and potentials. It addresses issues like histories of India's tradition of China-watching and of the 1962 War and debates about Tibet, territory and boundary. The author implied that the Indo-China relations are vital not only for the nations' survival but also for the welfare of its citizens. According to the author, the Indo-China interaction remains to be a norm.

This article reflects on religiosity and the invocation of law in a conversation with the Dalai Lama. According to the author, the Dalai Lama calmly and thoughtfully discussed the central features of a legal framework that could limit his own authority within the Tibetan polity. He indicates that the Dalai Lama seemed to express only a qualified support for the individual who responds to wrongdoing with self-restraint rather than by invoking rights. He adds that the Dalai Lama did agree that it would be best to exercise one's self-discipline and compassion.

Determines the boundaries of Tibet as a problem composed of cultural, historical and political factors. Degree of autonomy; Claims of the Tibetan government to the disputed territories; Inability of the Tibetans, Chinese and British to settle the boundary issue in Simla.