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Central to the particularist project, one that has become the consensus in the philosophy of conspiracy theory theory, is the claim that a general dismissal of these things called `conspiracy theories' is unsustainable. That is, if we want to say a conspiracy theory is suspicious such that we should not believe it, then we have to engage in at least some investigation of it. Particularists have detailed just why a general attitude of skepticism towards conspiracy theories is implausible; they have, in effect, created the case against generalism. The case for particularism, then, has largely been about challenging and rebutting generalist arguments. But what of the bigger picture? If particularists argue that we should not assume conspiracy theories are mad, bad, or dangerous but, rather, investigate them, then how should we go about that investigation? In this paper I describe (some) of the preliminary concerns the particularist (and the generalist) needs to account for when developing an ethics of investigation into these things called `conspiracy theories.' Whilst this paper does not provide a framework for the investigation of conspiracy theories, it provides the framework for such a framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction to this special issue of Inquiry looks at recent work in the philosophy of conspiracy theory theory. Looking at two related worries expressed in the wider conspiracy theory theory (the academic study of conspiracy theories) – the Problem of Conspiracy Theories and the Problem of Conspiracy Theorists – this special issue argues that recent work in the philosophy of conspiracy theories is getting all the more closer to not just an epistemic understanding of what, if anything, is wrong with belief in conspiracy theories, but also a framework for both investigating conspiracy theories and understanding how we should talk about the beliefs of conspiracy theorists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper is devoted to the problem of describing reality in the language of mathematics and logic in connection with intellectual intuition. The question raised is how the basic requirements of mathematical theory and logic will change if some of the multiverse models of modern physics are taken as the basis. Mathematics is considered in the context of various historical approaches. It is shown that some of the well-known requirements of a formal theory (such as consistency) may begin to play a different role if the multiverse hypothesis is accepted. In the framework of theories based on the idea of multiple worlds, the logical consequence, the natural law of Duns Scotus, the law of excluded middle, and other well-known facts of classical logic which in some cases cause controversy due to their intuitive unacceptability are resolved. The paper discusses an approach based on paraconsistent logics: such logics can be considered the first to correspond to multiverse theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In conspiracy theory philosophy the primary debate has been epistemic, but the concern is now also shifting to the ethical and political implications of taking conspiracy theories seriously. This shift is epitomized in the work of Quassim Cassam, whose focus has moved away from the epistemic faults of the theories and theorists to the political function of conspiracy theories. This function, he argues, is to ‘express and promote an ideology’, specifically, racist, antisemitic, and extremist ideology. In this essay, I will challenge two of Cassam’s assumptions. First, I will disagree with his claim that racist conspiracy theories ought to be treated dismissively as a class. This is due in part to the difficulties in defining racist conspiracy theories and due in part to what I call the Conspiracy Theory Location Problem, which is the challenge of identifying what constitutes ‘the theory’. In response, I suggest we need to be even more particularistic about ‘instances’ of a theory. Second, I disagree that the only function of conspiracy theories is to promote racist ideology. Instead, I argue that there exists a class of antiracist conspiracy theories that resist white supremacy by uncovering racist conspiracies and challenging racist institutions, systems, and ideologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on commemorating the prolific philosopher Nicholas Rescher, emphasizing his commitment to pluralism as a unifying theme in his extensive body of work. Pluralism, defined as the integration of divergent perspectives to seek truth, guided Rescher's advocacy for a relatively free market economy alongside a limited welfare state, while rejecting rigid ideological systems.

In this paper, I develop an account of linguistic content based on the active inference framework. While ecological and enactive theorists have rightly rejected the notion of content as a basis for cognitive processes, they must recognize the important role that it plays in the social regulation of linguistic interaction. According to an influential theory in philosophy of language, normative inferentialism, an utterance has the content that it has in virtue of its normative status, that is, in virtue of the set of commitments and entitlements that the speaker undertakes by producing this utterance. This normative status is determined by the normative attitudes shared by members of the utterer's linguistic community. I propose here an account of such normative attitudes based on the ecological interpretation of the active inference framework. I explain how social normativity can be understood in that framework as the way in which members of a group shape their social niche to make it more predictable. Finally, I apply this account of social normativity to basic communicative practices, thereby explaining how social normative expectations can emerge to regulate these communicative practices, eventually leading to the institution of the sort of normative statuses constitutive of linguistic content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This review essay critically examines Emily Jones’ Feminist Theory and International Law: Posthuman Perspectives, which develops “posthuman feminism” to diagnose the exclusionary humanism and anthropocentrism of international law. It unpacks key elements of Jones’ approach, her critique of international law’s foundations, and her attempt to move “beyond liberal legalism.” While tensions arise between Jones’ theoretical framework and reform proposals, her insistent bridging of theory and practice demonstrates posthuman feminism’s potential for inspiring creative re-imaginings of legal praxis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emotion of admiration and the semantic theory of natural kinds and direct reference are foundational for Linda Zagzebski's exemplarist moral theory and divine motivation theory. Many have examined difficulties that arise from the central role of admiration, while others have engaged her account of the incarnation. Little attention has been given to her semantic theory or philosophy of language. This essay demonstrates the difficulties and problems that arise from this theory, problems that could be avoided with a sociopractical account of language and exemplarity. One set of problems pertain to the "principle of the division of linguistic labor." Related problems come to light in Zagzebski's attempt to account for radical changes in perceptions of exemplars through social, political, and ethical revolutions. In the end, her semantic theory creates the very epistemological uncertainties that it is meant to forestall. It also fails to account for radical disagreements about exemplars and the role moral exemplars play in sociopolitical and ethical revolutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article serves as an introduction to the special section "Vulnerability: An Interdisciplinary Trialogue," which brings together three researchers who have made important contributions to the field of vulnerability studies from different perspectives and in different disciplines: Elodie Boublil, Kate Brown, and Erinn Gilson. At the outset, the article discusses some characteristic features of the current discourse on vulnerability, in particular the question of why the concept of vulnerability is not only very popular but is also often used in such a diverse and vague manner. In addition to an increased multidisciplinary interest, transdisciplinary conflicts over fundamental epistemological, ontological, and methodological positions are identified as an essential factor; furthermore, the plurality and vagueness of the notion are attributed to an increasing "duplication" of vulnerability as an academic concept on the one hand and as an element of cultural semantics and political discourse on the other. The special section discusses this peculiar mixture of popularity, plurality, and vagueness of the vulnerability concept in an interdisciplinary, reflexive, and critical manner. The introduction outlines key aspects of the three contributions to the trialogue and highlights some convergences and common themes. At the end, the three authors are also briefly introduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present paper, I relate the Dialogical Self Theory with the philosophy of Taoism. For that purpose, I instance the premises of Taoism such as that human being use open ideograms (signs and symbols) that grow constantly in their meaning, that the meaning of life can be only unraveled if the unity of opposites is integrated in one's worldview and that the human being listens to his natural intuition and does not force himself to do things (wuwei = effortless action which has its origins in Laozi's TaoTeChing). When those premises are applied to the Dialogical Self Theory, psychologists can help people to develop a harmonious self because the self is operationalized as an open system that is constantly in flux of meaning. Hidden I-positions might be shifted to the foreground while helping the human being to listen to a multitude of positions and to not act in a rigid fashion. In order for scientists and practitioners to use the insights of what I call the Dialogical Self of Taoistic Dynamics, I propose an open interview guide that could help people to realize their harmonious pluralistic self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite human geography's sophisticated analyses and overwhelming focus on space, time in its various guises has certainly not been absent in the literature. The same cannot be said for historical geography, which is particularly interesting as its main concern is purportedly with space and place in and across other times. In response, this paper examines the ontology and epistemology of time in "modern" historical geography since the early 2000s and does so in discussion with recent developments in theory and philosophy of history, specifically the notion of 'new presentism'. An idea which broadly posits that the past and the future do not exist as separate categories but are always projections of specific presents, they exist as the present's own immanent modes. This is achieved by adopting Robert Dodgshon's concept of the 'specious present' in order to (1) affirm, albeit on different epistemological grounds, the partiality, situatedness and contingency of historical geographies as well as the embodied and performative nature of archival labour; (2) offer an accessible conceptual tool in thinking about the role of time in the practice of future historical geography research; and finally (3) suggest that thinking historical geography as a practice in and through the 'specious present' makes questions of ethics, accountability, and politics of knowledge production both central and inevitable, as opposed to just being examples of "good practice" or worse still, being completely sidestepped by virtue of an imagined spatio-temporal distance between the bygone past and the present moment of research. • Examines the ontology and epistemology of time in the subdiscipline of human geography. • Provides an explanation for the field's lack of engagement with time in its investigations. • Offers a onto-epistemic framework for incorporating the specious present in historical-geographical practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Causation has traditionally been an under-theorized topic. Until Hendrickson's work, very little effort had been devoted to creating a compelling theory of causation in intelligence analysis. In line with the recent attempts to integrate intelligence theory with philosophy, this article is intended to contribute to the philosophy of intelligence by defining a dedicated account of causation for it. The Unified Theory for Intelligence Analysis, as this account of causation is named, is intended to integrate into a single account Betts' Normal and Exceptional Theories as well as Hendrickson's target challenges. It is then proved that a pluralistic account of causation that combines both counterfactual and probabilistic accounts of causation is the most successful option. Finally, it is shown that Bayesian tools are the natural manifestation of this Unified Theory, and that Subjective Logic can help refute criticism against Bayesianism in intelligence analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jiří Levý's article Translation as a decision process (1967), one of the earliest contributions to the topic of decision-making in translation, anticipates a model that was proposed more than two decades later: Optimality Theory. This linguistic theory offers a framework for resolving conflicts in grammar by replacing absolute rules with violable constraints whose interaction leads to the selection of an acceptable output. The philosophy of Optimality Theory can be successfully applied to the process of translatorial decision-making, which consists in proposing a set of candidates and selecting the best one by virtue of constraints imposed by the translation strategy adopted. The article shows how such a constraint-based approach can be used in legal translation. A tentative set of constraints (Minimum equivalence, Near-equivalence, Literal, Identity, Functional, Transparent, Neutral) is used to evaluate French translation candidates for an English legal term, applying two different strategies: documentary (source-culture oriented) and instrumental (target-culture oriented). The formalism of Optimality Theory, while mimicking real-life decision-making processes, makes the selection of optimal equivalents more transparent and coherent. However, it is only one of the possible tools that legal translators and translation students have at their disposal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that ensuring artificial intelligence (AI) retains alignment with human values over time is critical yet understudied. Most research focuses on static alignment, neglecting crucial retention dynamics enabling stability during learning and autonomy. This paper elucidates limitations constraining provable retention, arguing key gaps include formalizing dynamics, transparency of advanced systems, participatory scaling, and risks of uncontrolled recursive self‐improvement. I synthesize technical and ethical perspectives into a conceptual framework grounded in control theory and philosophy to analyze dynamics. I argue priorities should shift towards capability modulation, participatory design, and advanced modeling to verify enduring alignment. Overall, I argue that realizing AI safely aligned throughout its lifetime necessitates translating principles into formal methods, demonstrations, and systems integrating technical and humanistic rigor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a contemporary trend to apply the General Theory of Modal Aspects developed by Herman Dooyeweerd to different areas of knowledge. However, such uses do not always pay attention to the complexities of the theory, especially its empirical-transcendental nature and its broader framework in the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea. This article is the outcome of qualitative bibliographic research with a basic, descriptive, and explanatory nature.The research adopted a survey of bibliographic data as its data collection instrument.The article seeks to demonstrate that the strictly methodological applications of the General Theory of Modal Aspects are limited for the following reasons: (1) terms such as ‘ontology’, ‘transcendental’ and ‘law’ are used without further clarification; (2) the ontic nature of modal aspects, of being meaning, permeates traditional ways of dividing philosophy into subdisciplines; (3) Dooyeweerd's ideas have a high degree of complexity in themselves; and (4) the idea of totality has a double connotation: one temporal (as cosmic coherence), the other as supratemporality. To this end, we have organized the article into four sections. In section 1 we briefly present the applications of the General Theory of Modal Aspects, specifically the work developed in Brazil in the fields of Education and Philosophy of Science. In section 2, we present some principles and assumptions of Dooyeweerd's thought and situate his General Theory of Modal Aspects within the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea. In section 3 we discuss the idea of reality ordered by laws. In the last section, we highlight the boundaries of the methodological approach of this article in relation to the author's broader religious horizon of thought. We conclude by showing that Dooyeweerd's work contains an empirical-transcendental dimension, which concerns a priori totalities that structure reality and can only be known and affirmed through experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cuadernos del Centro de Estudios de Diseño y Comunicación is the property of Cuadernos del Centro de Estudios de Diseno y Comunicacion and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Framing, a prominent communication theory, is often lamented as a fractured paradigm, leading some to offer radical changes to its conceptualization, operationalization, and application. Using a meta-theoretical and computational approach, we analyze three decades of framing research to examine academic silos, specializations, the canon's formation, gender inequalities, authors' origins, countries studied, and methods used in framing research. Instead of silos, our analysis of 5,291 papers and over 170,000 citations identified specializations formed around a core of canonic texts. While framing research has become more diverse over the years, males affiliated with U.S. institutions still predominately author canonical works. Results reject the isolated-silos hypothesis in favor of a view of framing as a bridging networked paradigm, coalescing around core assumptions, definitions, and approaches. These findings contrast with the common fractured-paradigm narrative and challenge calls for radical solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is sometimes argued that ideal theories in political philosophy are a form of ideology. This article examines arguments building on the work of Charles Mills and Raymond Geuss for the claim that ideal theories are cognitively distorting belief systems that have the effect of stabilizing unjust social arrangements. I argue that Mills and Geuss neither succeed in establishing that the content of ideal theories is necessarily cognitively defective in the way characteristic for ideologies, nor can they make plausible which mechanisms ensure the alleged negative effects of the widespread acceptance of ideal theorizing. This does not mean that all hope is lost for the ideology objection, however. By turning to a second Marxian model of ideology, I argue that the ideological character of ideal theories is not so much a matter of their content, but rather of their form. Ideal theories falsely present the normative concepts that they use as semantically practice-independent and thereby block potential challenges from subordinate groups to dominant ideologies. It is therefore not the normative content of ideal theories which proves to be objectionable, but the particular role their concepts play in wider political discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study aims to find out the existential elements in the Selected Characters of The Prologue to the Canterbury Tales by Chaucer. Further, the study analyzes the existential themes of freedom, choices, and bad faith as presented by the existential philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. The Selected characters are Friar, The Summoner, The Wife of Bath, and The Knight. Chaucer's The Prologue to the Canterbury Tales though written in the fourteenth century, has universal appeal. The themes, dilemmas, and conflicts presented through the fourteenth-century characters are for all ages. These characters have traces of being existential characters. Existentialism as a theory or philosophy emphasizes the importance of freedom and choices made by man. Chaucer's character which comprises of different classes, professions, and gender assert their sense of freedom in many ways and hence falls either into the category of being-in-itself or being-for-itself. Existentialism is used as a methodological framework for the textual analysis of the Prologue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I will argue that various scholars of kalām unanimously agree that sense-perception is something beyond the physical processes in the sense organs. There may be something happening in our eyes when we see a red apple, but seeing a red apple is not tantamount to it. We will see that some scholars of kalām argue that sense-perception is akin to being aware or conscious of the object of perception, and, hence, distinct from the physical process in the sense organs. One group will go so far as to accept that sense-perception is not even dependent on any physical processes in the body. Another group will accept that sense-perception presupposes that various physical conditions obtain, yet still regard sense-perception as something distinct from the occurrence of those conditions. I am suggesting that these nonreductive theories of sense-perception are the reason why Arabic-Islamic philosophers, starting from the eleventh century CE, consistently reject the Aristotelian-Avicennian theory of sense-perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Johann Gottlieb Fichte's thinking is part of the Sattelzeit, in which the foundation for the modern use of important concepts is laid. The stages of Fichte's philosophy and his various theories of religion and Christianity reflect attempts to determine the function of religion in a modern society. Important is the philosophical foundation of religion, which is transformed from a moral theology based on Kant to a unified theory of the philosophy of mind. Fichte thus offers an alternative to Hegel and Schelling. This alternative has only been taken up in Protestant theology at a small number of points, but all the more intensively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The enchantment of things has been found in the long tradition of Chinese literary narrative. This article explores the three salient ways Chinese people have developed of thinking about and writing about their (imagined) relationship with the things around them, i.e., Bo Wu 博物, Gan Wu 感物, and Guan Wu 观物. In the Bo Wu tradition, people described strange things that may or may not have existed in the actual world, and in doing so, they displayed either their extensive knowledge of these things, or the fertility of their imagination; in the Gan Wu tradition, people tried to express some kind of emotional attachment to things, and conceived of them as being able to feel like humans; and in the Guan Wu tradition, people tried to lose themselves in the contemplation of the world of things. The three Chinese traditions are reconsidered in this article in relation to the relevant Western lines of thought and particularly to emerging thing theory in Western philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This reflective article, moving between social theory and philosophy, focuses on the conception of Bourdian social criticism and its political potential. Starting from some objections to his vision of how criticism works, especially those that affirm that it implies an objectivist notion of cognition and the agency of people, it becomes clear that they are based on an erroneous perception of Bourdieu's idea of the levels at which criticism occurs. His understanding of the semantic struggle that social critique requires and what it implies to change the dominant configuration of the social is then explored. Finally, it is affirmed that this conception of criticism, although far from objectivism, still retains a certain intellectualist inclination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophical discussions on cognition (ranging from computational and representational approaches to the 4E framework), on the one hand, and those on sound and auditory perception, on the other, have hitherto remained apart. In this paper, the author addresses the concept of "auditory cognition". While committing to the conceptual analysis of the latter, the author introduces the discussion of modality-specific approaches. Since the contributions made so far in the domain of the philosophy of sound and auditory perception are prone to favor computational-representational approaches --e.g., the perceptual coherence model (Méndez-Martínez, 2022)--, the exploration of 4E possibilities will lay down a series of questions aimed to encourage future developers from that viewpoint. In that sense, the author explores conceptual entailments and connections between the genealogy of theories within the philosophy of sound and auditory perception, and the hypothesis of the extended cognition (EX). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Er(r)go: Teoria, Literatura, Kultura is the property of Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Slaskiego and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

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Copyright of Praxis Filosófica is the property of Universidad del Valle and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Vicarious responsibility is a notoriously puzzling notion in normative reasoning. In this article we will explore two fundamental issues, which we will call the "explication problem" and the "justification problem". The former issue concerns how vicarious responsibility can plausibly be defined in terms of other normative concepts. The latter issue concerns how ascriptions of vicarious responsibility can be justified. We will address these two problems by combining ideas taken from legal theory and moral philosophy. Our analysis will emphasise the importance of the voluntary involvement of the normative parties considered liable in a relation with other normative parties who causally contributed to a prohibited state-of-affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a response to critics of Sami Pihlström's book, "Toward a Pragmatist Philosophy of the Humanities." Pihlström argues that pragmatism offers a promising framework for understanding the humanities, emphasizing the valued-dependence of human inquiry and proposing a qualified realism. He addresses criticisms regarding the reliance on the philosophy of science and the concept of truth in the humanities, encouraging further exploration of the relationship between philosophy and the humanities. The author also acknowledges the need for interdisciplinary research and clarifies their stance on the study of religion and the Holocaust, condemning Holocaust denialism. [Extracted from the article]

Although Hobbes presents his political philosophy as an original theory and without conceptual debts with tradition, a study on his solid humanist training, up to 1630, shows that some theoretical considerations of the Greek and Roman authors are present, although with the cloak of language scientist, in key concepts of the modern philosopher. This article deals with the appropriations that Hobbes has made of two classic historians: Tacitus and Thucydides. The first will show Hobbes how to build a new political configuration, the empire, emerged from civil wars; while the second, how is human nature when man does not recognize a power greater than himself. In these two classical authors, then, the reasons for political order and disorder are presented respectively, a knowledge that will be taken up with interest by the modern philosopher. These appropriations, on the one hand, allow establishing a doctrinal affiliation between Hobbes and these classical authors; and, on the other hand, rethinking the link between tradition and modernity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The book "Psychotherapy of the situation in gestalt therapy: A field-oriented approach" edited by Margherita Spagnuolo Lobb and Pietro Andrea Cavaleri offers a fresh perspective on Gestalt theory and philosophy. Divided into two parts, the book analyzes key issues of our time and provides case studies on psychopathological situations in the clinical field of human relations. It emphasizes the need for a new community perspective in practice, particularly in our post-pandemic world. The book also explores the history of Gestalt therapy and its evolution, while providing specific tools and examples for translating theory into practice. [Extracted from the article]

What happens when intuition becomes algorithmic? This article explores how approaching intuition as recursively trained sheds light on what is at stake affectively, politically, and ethically in the entanglements of sensorial, cognitive, computational and corporate processes and (infra)structures that characterise algorithmic life. Bringing affect theory and speculative philosophies to bear on computational histories and cultures, I tease out the continuing implications of post-war efforts to make intuition a measurable and indexable mode of anticipatory knowledge. If digital computing pioneers tended to elide the more ambivalent implications of quantifying intuition, this article asks what computational myths are at play in current accounts of machine learning-enabled sensing, thinking, and speculating and what complexities or chaos are disavowed. I argue that an understanding of more-than-human intuition which grapples meaningfully with the indeterminacy central to digitally mediated social life must recognise that visceral response is recursively trained in multiple ways with diverse, and often contradictory, effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This text was written first in Dutch in 2011. It is an adaptation of my BA thesis for the University of the Arts in Utrecht and I am still very excited that I wrote it in the way that I did, because it was written within an educational context of great creative freedom. This is to say that many of the things I state about language are based on experience working as a writer for stage productions, performance and poetry. I allow myself to play with language, and create my own terminology as I go along; a terminology of my own, based in my own practice – this is what still makes it a valuable text to me and hopefully to others, one I would never be able to produce again in the same way. I had a bigger ability to wonder, and less knowledge, for instance about Mieke Bal's concept of focalization, to lean back on. I continued my studies after writing this, which means that a lot of the theory on language philosophy could have been backed up by a more specified theoretical framework. It is important to keep this in mind while reading this publication. If anything, it is an invitation to take a look anew at the material of a writer: language, vocabulary. I would like to invite you to consider this while reading. This text comes from a source of genuine wonder about words and what they might mean. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the philosophical implications of Béla Tarr's The Turin Horse (2011) by attending to the thematic and aesthetic configuration of its sequence shots. The film's durational images, I suggest, perform a gathering and nihilating of presence whereby the existence of the subject is repeatedly affirmed and questioned. I read this dynamic, over and above figurative and diegetic parameters, as metaphysical. In line with its Nietzschean framing and de-creational structure, and in distinction from the hermetic living that characterises Damnation (1988), Satantango (1994) and Werckmeister Harmonies (2000), I posit the film's catastrophic vision of the end of the world as revelatory. Placing stylistic analysis in dialogue with film theory and the philosophies of Nietzsche and Heidegger, I argue that Tarr's strategies of attention (on the subject) and reversal (of the action and cinematography) puncture narrative chronology, exposing the spatiality and temporality that structure our existence. For this, I align with Heidegger's thinking on metaphysics and the relation between art and truth. I establish the grounds for a compatibility between Heidegger's philosophy and the worthiness of cinema by appealing to the ontological purpose it attributes to certain works of art and technology. The presencing and absencing of The Turin Horse's in turn phenomenal and abyssal sequence shots, I conclude, produces a renewal of ground that illuminates questions of human fragility, freedom and emancipation, attuning us to the responsibilities of our being in a shared world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper defends Priorianism, a theory in the philosophy of time which combines three theses: first, that there is a metaphysical distinction between the present time and non-present times; second, that there are temporary propositions, that is, propositions that change in truth-value simpliciter over time; and third, that there is change over time only if there are temporary propositions. Priorianism is accepted by many Presentists, Growing Block Theorists, and Moving Spotlight Theorists. However, it is difficult to defend the view without appealing to premises that those who reject the view find controversial. My aim in this paper is to defend Priorianism in a way that largely avoids appealing to such premises. I do three things: first (Section 1), I describe the component theses of Priorianism and the relations between them. Next (Section 2), I show how Priorians can respond to the argument that the B-theory implies that there are temporary propositions, and therefore satisfies the Priorian condition for there being change over time. Finally (Section 3), I defend the Priorian thesis that there is change over time only if there are temporary propositions against an alternative principle of change defended by Ross Cameron (The Moving Spotlight, 2015). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nothing was more important to Tolstoy than character development. For him, the purpose of life is to grow morally. The purpose of literature — as all art — is to aid that growth. Abstract philosophy and pedantic scholarship are therefore redundant. Indeed, even the psychological novel is a distraction. Moral truths are self‐evident. They are always simple. They are expressed by the humble. They are known by the meek. To become good, all we need to do is peel back the layers of hypocrisy and deceit that have overwrought us. Moral truths are known all over the world, but they are forgotten or covered up. There is nothing like a folktale, a pithy aphorism, or the words of a farm laborer or child to point this out. We may be surprised by what we already know and how deceived we were. All Tolstoy's varied endeavors, his literature, pedagogic theory and philosophy, center on moral conversion and its only legitimate motivation: love. Tolstoy's affront on modern civilization, documented vehemently in his later works sought to teach this lesson. This was a view of character development that had wide ranging impact all over the world, influencing many of the most famous thinkers, educators, and activists of the twentieth century. Tolstoy's stories continue to enthrall and inspire moral transformation. In this article Daniel Moulin explains why. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Inferentialism is a theory in the philosophy of language which claims that the meanings of expressions are constituted by inferential roles or relations. Instead of a traditional model-theoretic semantics, it naturally lends itself to a proof-theoretic semantics, where meaning is understood in terms of inference rules with a proof system. Most work in proof-theoretic semantics has focused on logical constants, with comparatively little work on the semantics of non-logical vocabulary. Drawing on Robert Brandom's notion of material inference and Greg Restall's bilateralist interpretation of the multiple conclusion sequent calculus, I present a proof-theoretic semantics for atomic sentences and their constituent names and predicates. The resulting system has several interesting features: (1) the rules are harmonious and stable; (2) the rules create a structure analogous to familiar model-theoretic semantics; and (3) the semantics is compositional, in that the rules for atomic sentences are determined by those for their constituent names and predicates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This essay starts from a concern that many empirical researchers undermine their rigorous empirical work by coupling it to unclear and inconsistent theory. I suggest this is because we underestimate the difficulty of achieving theoretical clarity and consistency. I illustrate the problem in detail by cataloging common ways we violate clarity and consistency in the articulation of theoretical constructs and relationships and illustrating these violations with examples from unpublished manuscripts. In addition, I draw on the management literature on theory writing as well as on the dual-process theory of cognition and the philosophy of science to identify and unpack three challenges to clear and consistent theory: the taxing cognitive effort required to turn ambiguous, associative intuition into logical arguments; the impossibility of achieving perfect clarity; and the existence of trade-offs between clarity and other valued qualities of theory, particularly generalizability. The implication is that researchers need to invest not just in empirical rigor but also, in theoretical rigor. Funding: The author's research is supported in part by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main objective of this article is to review the phenomenological theory of time in philosophy and the process of symbol formation in developmental psychology in order to explore a first approach to the integration of static-dynamic polarities in the construction of psychological experience. The interpretive hypothesis of the present work corresponds to the fact that in the discrete–continuous dual integration of the phenomenological theory of time with the theory of symbols formation in developmental psychology, the foundations and fundamental pillars of Cultural Semiotic Psychology are found. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Looking at the early work in the philosophy of conspiracy theory theory, I put in context the papers in this special issue on new work on conspiracy theory theory (itself the product of the 1st International Conference on the Philosophy of Conspiracy Theory held in February 2022), showing how this new generation of work not only grew out of, but is itself a novel extension of the first generation of philosophical interest in these things called 'conspiracy theories'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One issue within conspiracy theory theory is whether, or to what extent, our central concept – – should map on to the common, lay sense of the term. Some conspiracy theory theorists insist that we use the term as everyday people use it. So, for example, if the term has a pejorative connotation in everyday parlance, then academic work on the concept should reflect that. Other conspiracy theory theorists take a more revisionist approach, arguing instead that while their use of the theoretical concept should bear some relation to its use in natural language, it need not follow it subserviently. I argue that elements of this debate mirror related debates that were prominent in the philosophy of mind in the 1980s over folk psychology and eliminative materialism (debates that continue today, such as within the philosophy of perception and theories over how to individuate the senses). Then, there was a debate over whether the concepts of commonsense psychology, such as or , should be treated as theoretical posits, and hence open to significant revision or elimination, or whether they were instead the targets of explanation. I will argue that an eliminativist approach to has significant merit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The papers contained in this special issue are evidence that the philosophy of conspiracy theory is undergoing a 'normative turn', with earlier concerns about the epistemological soundness of conspiracy theories now being supplemented by a shift to concerns about discursive and epistemic justice. This is a welcome development. Nonetheless, these normative concerns need to be seen within the context of an ongoing and largely undeclared disagreement between generalists and particularists over just how conspired the world really is. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By a close reading of Salomon Maimon's 1794 Essay on a New Logic or Theory of Thinking, this article shows, first, how Maimon radically criticized his previous metaphysical systems while painstakingly reestablishing Kantian transcendental philosophy on a theory of reflexive cognition. Second, it shows how he employed this theory to ground innovative accounts of both formal and transcendental logic, including a reformulation of Kant's schematism. Third, it shows how he employed it to ground his axiotic philosophy. Specifically, he argued that his reflexive theory of cognition constituted the necessary condition for the theories of Kantian morality, natural rights, works of art, and finally for a metaphysics according to which God creates the world ex nihilo. Maimon's achievement is impressive and unique. It is a theory of the systematic unity of theoretical and axiotic philosophy that rivals other Enlightenment systems and, if anything, anticipates later works of Hans Wagner and Werner Flach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the parliamentary elections in Germany in September 2017, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU), The Greens (Bündnis90/Die Grünen) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) started to negotiate about forming a coalition government. But, surprising to many, the FDP decided to let these coalition talks collapse, and many commentators in Germany found it highly problematic for a political party to refuse to take responsibility in government. Interestingly, the question whether (or: when) democratic parties may legitimately refuse to govern has so far been neglected in political theory and political philosophy. The article develops a general answer by discussing several possible reasons for thinking that it is sometimes wrong to refuse to govern and thereby engages both democratic theory and the recent literature on compromise. The resulting view is that parties have an 'integrity prerogative' that allows them to refuse to govern, except when there is no reasonable and stable alternative government coalition available. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Epistemology has become one of the most important disciplines for the world of knowledge in the twenty-first century, particularly in the field of higher education; but it is not always part of the curricula. For this reason, we analyze its origins and concepts (between theory of knowledge and philosophy of science), as well as its scope, exposing the reasons related to its usefulness inside and outside high tertiary, since the discipline allows to reflect on the knowledge gestated in the sciences with a philosophical perspective, mediating its comparative, critical, and rational approach. It is concluded that the advantages associated with its internalization and dissemination, as well as its gravitating influence for the good shaping, development and understanding of scientific research, allow us to determine that any university institution that dispenses with its contribution would be incomplete or deficient. The work is bibliographic, with descriptive-prescriptive scope, and logical-hermeneutic methodology, developed through analysis aimed at the transformation of our institutions, in line with the epistemologies for peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]