Search

The summary judgment procedure in South African law provides for a speedy judgment in favour of a deserving plaintiff where it can be shown that the defendant does not have a triable defence. In 2019 the Rules Board made certain drastic amendments to the procedure of summary judgment in the high court. In this article the historical development of the procedure of summary judgment will be discussed, and the new amendments to rule 32 of the Uniform Rules of Court critically evaluated. It will be argued that the amendments to rule 32 were unnecessary and that it may diminish the right to access to justice in civil disputes. It will, however, also be argued that there are some merits in the critique raised by the Rules Board in relation to rule 32 and that the Rules Board missed a golden opportunity to overhaul the entire summary judgment procedure in a more sensible manner and in line with the core constitutional values of s 34 of the Constitution. It will be argued that rule 32 should be replaced in its entirety by a new, more streamlined procedure, and some recommendations for legal reform will be made in this regard.

Civil proceedings involve a complex procedure with various interlocutory applications before the matter is set for trial. Some of the interlocutory applications, namely applications to enter judgment in default, to strike out pleading and for summary judgment, may result in the plaintiff obtaining early judgment or disposal of the case without a full trial. Interestingly, these applications require a different burden of proof for the plaintiff to satisfy. This article seeks to explore the burden of proof necessitated in those applications in order to evaluate the likelihood of the plaintiff obtaining judgment without trial. In achieving this objective, the process of civil proceedings in Malaysia is briefly explained. This is followed by an analysis on the burden of proof required in the said applications. It is observed that although judgment in defaults or summary judgment may be entered against the defendant upon the plaintiff’s satisfaction of mere procedural requirements, it is equally ‘easy’ for the defendant to set aside or oppose such judgment or application. A conclusion can be derived that civil procedure in Malaysia allows the defendant a sufficient right or opportunity to have ‘his day in court’ by placing a low threshold for him set aside judgment in default or oppose summary judgment application. Further, it is also observed that a stringent burden of proof is needed for the plaintiff to be able to strike out the defendant’s defence and enter judgment on his behalf. This is, arguably crucial so as to cloth the defendant with the right to a fair trial which includes the right to be heard and present their cases sufficiently.

The article analyzes tasks of simplified proceedings. The forms of simplified proceedings are considered as "summary proceedings" (England), "plea bargaining" (USA), "conditional refusal to initiate criminal prosecution", "criminal order" (France), "expedited proceedings"(Germany). The ways of implementation in domestic legislation have been developed and proposed based on the results of studying models of simplified legal proceedings. SUMMARY One of serious problems for each state is to ensure the promptness of criminal proceedings regardless of legal system in which it operates. Attention has recently been drawn to the need of introduction of simplified procedure among the ways to increase efficiency. Discussion at the XII UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (El Salvador, Brazil, April 12-19, 2010) about the concept of simplified (accelerated) criminal justice showed that improving the fight against crime in modern conditions requires taking into account a wide range of factors. Issues negatively affecting its condition included ineffective and protracted investigations, limited use of pretrial detention clauses, ineffective case management, limited resources from prosecutors and judiciary and their insufficient use. According to the UN, summary proceedings are simplified procedure that expedites court proceedings in order to make criminal justice system more efficient and minimize costs. In general, summary judgment is used in lower courts, usually for less serious criminal offenses, and is an expedited procedure in which certain formal procedures are not required or simplified.

У статті проаналізовано специфіку діяльності адвоката на стадії відкриття спрощеного позовного провадження у цивільній справі та ускладнень, які унеможливлюють таке відкриття. Наведено характеристику законодавчих норм у вказаній царині. Виведено перелік особливостей діяльності адвоката на стадії відкриття спрощеного позовного провадження у цивільній справі та ускладнень, які унеможливлюють таке відкриття. Охарактеризовано зміст і значення кожної з них. Автор звертає увагу на те, що оскільки позивач має право в позовній заяві заявити клопотання про розгляд справи за правилами спрощеного позовного провадження, адвокат повинен подати таке клопотання вже на цій стадії, адже ігнорування цього права у майбутньому може призвести до того, що судом буде прийнято рішення про розгляд справи у порядку загального позовного провадження. Також зауважено, що дослідники питань, пов’язаних із алгоритмами складання і подання позовних заяв, приходять до висновку, що цінність позовної заяви полягає не у кількості написаного матеріалу, а у тих ідеях, які містяться у ній. Тому, адвокату, як професійному представнику, варто сумлінно та належно складати позовні заяви та низку інших процесуальних документів, оскільки це буде запорукою надання дійсно професійної правничої допомоги. Як відзначає науковець Я.П. Зейкан, у позовному провадженні мають зазначатись звернення позивача та обґрунтування його вимог, а завдання суду полягає у з'ясуванні того, наскільки це звернення відповідає дійсним обставинам справи. Саме тому, позовна заява обов’язково має містити обставини, якими позивач обґрунтовує свої вимоги. Крім того, варто враховувати, що адвокат може подати позовну заяву повторно, після усунення її недоліків. В той самий час, статтею 185 Цивільного процесуального кодексу України також передбачено ряд інших випадків, коли позовна заява може повернутись адвокату, наприклад, у тому випадку, коли заяву подано адвокатом, який не має процесуальної дієздатності, тобто його відносини із особою, інтереси якої він представляє, не оформлені договором про надання правової допомоги. Іншим ускладненням, яке унеможливлює відкриття спрощеного позовного провадження у цивільній справі, є відмова суду у відкритті провадження у справі. Статтею 186 Цивільного процесуального кодексу України передбачено, що суддя відмовляє у відкритті провадження у справі у вичерпному переліку випадків. Ключові слова: адвокат; діяльність адвоката; позов; пред’явлення позову; позовне провадження; спрощене позовне провадження; цивільне судочинство; стадія відкриття провадження.

The article aims to deal with important aspects regarding special instruments used to vindicate fundamental rights and guarantees (called writ of protection). In Brazil, this writ is usually called mandado de segurança. However, there also are other possible tools with similar objectives (not only in Brazil but in all of Iberian America). Despite the variations between the denominations found in different countries, such instruments usually seek similar objectives. As it will be demonstrated, all the species of the writ of protection can be related to an extended concept of jurisdiction and due process of law. In addition to that, these instruments can facilitate the implementation of rights counterbalancing formal inefficiencies and moderating a rigid civil law, as we will see in the present paper. O artigo tem por objetivo tratar de aspectos importantes relativos a instrumentos especiais utilizados para reivindicar direitos fundamentais (denominados writ of protection). No Brasil, esse writ é usualmente conhecido como mandado de segurança. No entanto, também existem outras possíveis ferramentas com objetivos semelhantes (não só no Brasil, mas em toda a América Ibérica). Apesar das variações entre as nomenclaturas encontradas em diferentes países, tais instrumentos costumam buscar objetivos semelhantes. Como restará demonstrado, todas as espécies de writ of protection podem ser relacionadas a um conceito ampliado de jurisdição e de devido processo legal. Além disso, esses instrumentos podem facilitar a implementação de direitos, contrabalançando ineficiências formais e moderando a rigidez da civil law, como veremos no presente trabalho.

The concept of small claims, which is the novelty of Ukraine's civil proceedings, is being explored. For comparison, the legislation and doctrine of civil procedural law of France, Italy, Spain, Germany, Poland and Lithuania were analyzed. In particular, the provisions of the CPC of Ukraine were analyzed, which showed that there is no unity in the definition of insignificant cases and cases of insignificant complexity, and the criterion of the size of the claim price is used for their differentiation. The second criterion for determining minor cases is the categorical nature of the case, that is, the law defines an exhaustive list of cases that should be considered in summary proceedings, as well as those that cannot be heard in such proceedings. The study of the relationship between the rates of court fees and the size of the cost of the claim in cases that can be considered in summary proceedings. This gave rise to the conclusions on the grounds for applying the provisions of the legislation on the subsistence minimum, which increases annually, creating the effect of unstable certainty of insignificant cases, in particular, the limit of such cases during 2017–2019 increased from 176 200 UAH to 192 100 UAH, which is 9.02 %. A comparative study of the law and doctrine of EU law and selected European countries has led to the conclusion that, in most other countries and EU law, the criterion of the limitation of the amount of claims, clearly enshrined in the law, is applied. This gave rise to some conclusions about the criteria for defining minor disputes, in particular, the lack of uniform criteria for determining small cases. The cost of a lawsuit that cannot be exceeded is determined by small disputes in the EU, as well as in Germany and Lithuania, in other countries, specific categories of cases should be determined, which should be considered small under the law (Poland). Based on the comparative study, it was proposed to classify small disputes, in which the main criterion is the price of the claim.

The federal courts have their own housekeeping rules in civil litigation: the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under those rules, a plaintiff need not marshal evidence at the pleading stage, just a statement of facts showing her entitlement to relief. Discovery is generally available. Summary judgment only tests whether there are factual disputes necessitating a trial, and the trial court does not weigh any evidence. And there is generally no immediate right to appeal a denial of a dismissal motion. Those rules have governed federal court civil litigation for decades—without much fuss. Until now. Several states have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes to expeditiously dismiss free speech litigation. The acronym “SLAPP” stands for “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.” The most stringent anti-SLAPPs serve strong measures to achieve their ends: an accelerated dismissal motion soon after suit is filed; a complete stay of discovery; all the while, the plaintiff must, at the pleading stage, come forward with evidence to establish her prima facie trial burden; mandatory attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing defendant; and an immediate appeal if a court denies the dismissal motion. By their design and effect, however, anti-SLAPP statutes operate differently than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. So far, the federal appellate courts have split on whether anti-SLAPPs (and their unique early dismissal regimes) can co-exist with the federal rules in diversity jurisdiction cases. The First and Ninth Circuits have embraced anti-SLAPP statutes, while the Second, Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh, and the D.C. Circuits—all have not. The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet weighed-in on this debate. This article adds four ideas to this complex area of law. First, we contend that Shady Grove Ortho. Ass’n v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010) controls the anti-SLAPP applicability question. We contend that, properly understood, Shady Grove leaves no room for most anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court. Second, we delve into the preemption debate: do the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure preempt state civil procedural laws under preemption principles? Analyzing a recent six-justice ruling, we contend the U.S. Supreme Court thinks they do. Third, the article analyzes whether proponents of anti-SLAPPs are correct that the provision of attorney’s fees and the burden-shifting frameworks of anti-SLAPP laws makes them substantive for Erie purposes. We show that those claims are misplaced for most quintessential anti-SLAPPs, critiquing Ninth and Tenth Circuit anti-SLAPP jurisprudence. Finally, using Clifford v. Trump (tweet lawsuit) as a case study, we suggest a framework for principles of comity in inter-circuit splits about anti-SLAPPs.

This Article argues that the current era of U.S. civil procedure is defined by its neoliberalism. The Supreme Court has over the past few decades reinterpreted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in ways that place barriers in the way of citizens seeking to bring civil claims. The major decisions of this new era—in areas as diverse as summary judgment, pleading, class actions, and arbitration—exhibit neoliberal hallmarks. They display neoliberalism’s tendency to naturalize existing market arrangements, its focus on efficiency and obscuring of questions of power, its reduction of citizens to consumers, and its attempt to analyze government through the lens of market-modeled concepts. As the Court’s procedural decisions make it increasingly difficult for citizens to bring claims enforcing regulatory law—including antitrust, antidiscrimination, consumer protection, and worker protection law—the Court’s neoliberal orientation lurks in the background and helps to explain procedure’s modern progression. In order to fully appreciate, critique, and potentially move beyond the current era of U.S. civil procedure, it is important to understand the neoliberal logic that drives it—and the logics and values it obscures and sidelines.

This article, published in the May/June 2021 edition of The Federal Lawyer, examines the jurisprudential and legislative history of copyright fair use in relation to its current status in American copyright law as an "affirmative defense." Fair use as an affirmative defense is relatively ingrained into modern U.S. copyright law, even though the Copyright Act does not use this label. Because fair use is treated as an affirmative defense, defendants wholly bear the burdens of production and persuasion on all four fair-use factors articulated in Section 107 of the Copyright Act. However, this full allocation to the defendant may reflect an imbalance between the rights of copyright holders and the rights of the public. These considerations are especially evident when it comes to summary judgment, which already places the onus on the defendant to eliminate issues of fact, and when it comes to the market harm factor, which requires the defendant to prove the absence of harm to markets that not it, but the plaintiff, owns. The Copyright Act's lack of specificity as to the procedural posture of fair use could support a currently untapped judicial flexibility when it comes to approaching fair use from this standpoint. As this article concludes, a procedural approach that takes into account the parties' relative access to evidence and information could bring copyright protection and copyright exception into better balance, furthering the goal of copyright law to foster creativity.

Qualified immunity is awful. But it’s not just the substantive defense that is a problem. Qualified immunity also comes with a slew of special appellate procedures that add difficulty, expense, and delay to civil-rights litigation. Defendants have a right to immediately appeal from the denial of immunity. And the federal courts have steadily expanded the scope and availability of those appeals, further ensuring that civil-rights litigation will not be quick or easy. There is one seeming exception to the ever-expanding right to appeal from the denial of qualified immunity: Johnson v. Jones’s limit on the scope of appeals from the denial of immunity at summary judgment. Johnson holds that, with rare and narrow exceptions, the courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to second guess the factual basis for the immunity denial. They must instead take the district court’s assessment of the summary-judgment record as given and limit themselves to the core qualified-immunity issues. This limit on the scope of appeals was supposed to simplify and streamline litigation. But defendants flout Johnson’s limits with some regularity. They appeal and—without invoking an exception to Johnson—base their arguments on facts different than those that the district court thought a reasonable jury could find. Courts eventually reject these arguments as barred by Johnson. But at that point, the damage has been done. The defendant has created wholly unnecessary work for plaintiffs and delayed any progress in the suit for a year or more. Should qualified immunity stick around in its current or an altered form, it will be imperative to reform the rules governing qualified-immunity appeals. Foreclosing defendants’ abusive, fact-based qualified-immunity appeals will be a central part of that reform. But in the interim, something must be done. And that something is sanctions. I found few instances in which courts of appeals sanctioned defendants for violating Johnson. That needs to change. These appeals are frivolous. And the defendants who take them should be sanctioned.

Il contributo propone un'analisi del procedimento sommario di cognizione, introdotto dal legislatore italiano con la legge n. 69 del 2009, in una triplice prospettiva: storica, costituzionale e comparata. In particolare, la prima parte del lavoro si sofferma sull'evoluzione che tale procedimento ha avuto nell'ambito della legislazione processuale civile a partire dalle codificazioni di fine '700 e sino ad arrivare alla disciplina corrente. In questo contesto, vengono considerate soprattutto le singole prerogative di ciascuna codificazione esaminata, alla ricerca di profili di novità ovvero di aspetti già presenti in altre legislazioni, eventualmente reperibile anche nel dettato normativo corrente. Nella seconda parte, l’indagine si sofferma su alcune delle principali criticità segnalate dalla migliore dottrina con riguardo al rapporto tra il dettato costituzionale e la disciplina di cui agli articoli 702 bis c.p.c. e seguenti. In questa sezione, si procede, in modo particolare, all'individuazione di quattro apparenti antinomie, potenzialmente idonee, quantomeno prima facie, a pregiudicare la legittimità costituzionale del rito sommario di cognizione. Rispetto a ciascuna di esse, premesso un esame del principio di rango costituzionale oggetto dell’eventuale violazione, si propone, ove effettivamente possibile, un'interpretazione costituzionalmente orientata, segnalando, in difetto, l’esigenza di una riforma del dato normativo. Nella parte conclusiva, il contributo si sofferma sulla disciplina dell’ordinamento inglese, individuato quale riferimento privilegiato, ancorché non esclusivo, dell’analisi comparata, sia sotto il profilo dei principi regolatori della materia sia con riguardo alle specifiche previsioni adottate dal legislatore anglosassone al fine di conseguire una più celere definizione delle controversie in sede civile. L’analisi proposta consentirà allo scrivente di svolgere alcune riflessioni di ordine comparato rispetto alle scelte adottate nel nostro ordinamento, anche nella prospettiva, ove possibile, di un adeguamento di alcune delle disposizioni che regolano il processo civile italiano. The research hereby provided proposes an analysis of the summary judgment procedure, introduced by the Italian legislator in 2009, in three different perspective: historical, constitutional and comparative. In particular, the first part of the work focuses on the evolution of this procedure in the Italian territory, starting from the codifications of the end of the 18th century and up to the current discipline. In this context, the prerogatives of every individual discipline are considered above all in search of profiles of novelty or aspects already present in previous codifications that can be found even in the current legislation. The second part of the analysis investigates some of the most important critics concerning the relationship between the principles of the Italian Constitution and some provisions of the summary judgment procedure provided in articles 702 bis and following of the Code of Civil Procedure. In particular, in this section, four apparent antinomies are identified as potentially suitable to compromise the constitutional legitimacy of this procedure and with regards to each of them, after an examination of the principle potentially violated, the research proposes, where effectively possible, a constitutionally oriented interpretation, pointing out, in default, the need for a reform of the discipline. In its final part, the research focuses on the discipline of the English legal system, identified as a privileged reference of the comparative analysis, both from the point of view of the regulatory principles of the matter and with regard to the specific provisions adopted in order to achieve a faster definition of the disputes in civil courts. The proposed analysis will allow the writer to carry out some comparative reflections with regards to the choices adopted in our legal system, that could possibly result in proposals for the adjustment of some of the provisions governing our civil procedure.

Background Patients labeled as penicillin allergic are more likely to receive second line non-β-lactam antibiotics, experience higher rates of treatment failure, and incur higher antibiotic costs. Fear of litigation has been identified as a reason clinicians avoid using β-lactams in a patient with a penicillin allergy. The systematic review objective is to describe medical negligence and malpractice cases in which known penicillin allergy patients received a β-lactam and experienced an adverse reaction. Methods Lexis-Nexus and Google Scholar were used to identify relevant legal cases. Variables collected from each case included date of publication, legal jurisdiction, date of injury, plaintiff and defendant demographics, health care setting, plaintiff clinical outcome, and legal outcome. Results Twenty-seven unique cases met inclusion criteria. The earliest case was published in 1959 and the most recent in 2013. The highest number of cases filed (n = 7) occurred in the most recent 10 year segment, from 2005 to 2015. Eighteen cases involved the receipt of a penicillin-based antibiotic; of these cases with a known legal outcome, the plaintiff (patient) prevailed or settled in 3 cases and defendants (providers) prevailed in 7 cases. Seven cases involved the receipt of a cephalosporin; of these cases with a known legal outcome, the plaintiff settled with physicians prior to trial in 1 case and defendants prevailed in 3 cases. Two cases involved the receipt of a carbapenem. Defendants prevailed in 1 case and the legal outcome of the other case is unknown. In cases where the defense successfully moved for summary judgment, judges cited a lack of scientific evidence demonstrating that a cephalosporin or carbapenem were contraindicated for a patient with a penicillin allergy. Conclusion The cases with published legal outcomes found limited professional liability and identify clear precedence for clinicians who prescribed cephalosporins or carbapenems to a patient with a known penicillin allergy. These results should decrease litigation fears of providers and risk managers within healthcare systems. Disclosures All authors: No reported disclosures.

One of the mind’s most fundamental tasks is interpreting incoming data and weighing the value of new evidence. Across a wide variety of contexts, we show that when summarizing evidence, people exhibit a binary bias: a tendency to impose categorical distinctions on continuous data. Evidence is compressed into discrete bins, and the difference between categories forms the summary judgment. The binary bias distorts belief formation—such that when people aggregate conflicting scientific reports, they attend to valence and inaccurately weight the extremity of the evidence. The same effect occurs when people interpret popular forms of data visualization, and it cannot be explained by other statistical features of the stimuli. This effect is not confined to explicit statistical estimates; it also influences how people use data to make health, financial, and public-policy decisions. These studies ( N = 1,851) support a new framework for understanding information integration across a wide variety of contexts.

Cardiothoracic surgery is one of the more highly litigated medical specialties. The incidence and outcomes of federal cases related to cardiac surgery have not been previously explored.A legal research service was queried for cardiac surgery-related terms. Citations and related documents were reviewed for relevance and case details. Inclusion criteria were federal district court cases involving cardiac operations. Exclusion criteria were rulings on solely procedural matters. Associations were explored using the Fisher exact test.Of 354 unique citations from 1956 to 2017, 19.2% (n = 68) met criteria. The highest number of cases (25% [n = 17]) were litigated in the Third Circuit. Operations involved coronary artery bypass grafting in 33.8% (n = 23), valves in 32.4% (n = 22), and congenital operations in 19.1% (n = 13). Litigation was prompted by media reporting in 10.3% (n = 7) and involved neurologic injury in 17.6% (n = 12), death in 33.8% (n = 23), and informed consent issues in 29.4% (n = 20). Findings were summary judgment for the defendant in 45.6% (n = 31), partial summary judgment in 17.6% (n = 12), dismissal in 27.9% (n = 19), and ruling for the plaintiff in 7.4% (n = 5). Of the rulings for the plaintiffs, damages had a median dollar amount of $591,300 (interquartile range, $214,2673.50 to $5,807,687.00]. In Fisher's exact test analysis, neurologic injury was significantly associated with ruling for the plaintiff (p0.01); death, surgeon defendant, surgical decision-making/conduct, and adult cardiac case type were not associated.Federal cardiac malpractice court cases are rare. Rulings in favor of the plaintiff, although also rare, are associated with neurologic injury. A comprehensive picture of cardiac surgery-related litigation will require advances in data abstraction techniques and codification.

This article empirically studies current claims that patent assertion entities (PAEs), sometimes referred to as ‘patent trolls’ or non-practicing entities (NPEs), behave badly in litigation by bringing frivolous patent infringement suits and seeking nuisance fee settlements. The study explores these claims by examining the relationship between the type of patentee-plaintiffs and litigation outcomes (e.g., settlement, grant of summary judgment, trial, and procedural dispositions), while taking into account, among other factors, the technology of the patents being asserted and the identity of the lawyers and judges. The study finds significant heterogeneity among different patent holder entity types. Individual inventors, failed operating companies, patent holding companies, and large patent aggregators each have distinct litigation strategies largely consistent with their economic posture and incentives. These PAEs appear to litigate differently from each other and from operating companies. Accordingly, to the extent any patent policy reform targets specific patent plaintiff types, such reforms should go beyond the practicing entity versus non-practicing entity distinction and understand how the proposed legislation would impact more granular and meaningful categories of patent owners.

A pair of high school athletes appealed a motion for summary judgment from a District Court in Ohio, alleging that their football coach violated Title IX and intentionally inflicted emotional distress

Heffernan v. City of Paterson, Mayor Jose Torres, Police Chief James Wittig, and Police Director Michael Walker modified and expanded constitutional tort law by (a) authorizing suits against public officials, employees, and municipalities for unconstitutionally retaliating against personnel on the mistaken belief that they engaged in constitutionally protected speech and (b) allowing such suits to proceed even when those personnel deny having exercised First Amendment rights. Heffernan also affords procedural protection to public employees disciplined for what was incorrectly considered protected speech. The implications for public personnel administration are (a) potentially greater difficulty for personnelists and managers to receive qualified immunity in summary judgments, (b) potential liability for a new type of constitutional tort with uncertain boundaries, and (c) and, unexpectedly, judicial intrusion into personnel administration by judges’ second-guessing the reasonableness of managerial actions based on erroneous assessments of the constitutionality of employees’ speech. Consequently, public personnelists and managers should closely follow Heffernan’s progeny to protect rights and avoid suits.

This article has as object of study the stabilization of the summary judgment of urgency Institute, and as an analytical perspective the theory of fundamental rights. We intend to investigate the material fundamentality of this Institute having as theoretical premise the dual nature of the principle of justice access as a right and a fundamental guarantee. In this research line, we understand the summary judgment of urgency Institute and its stabilization as a tool of the fundamental right of access to justice and as a content derived from the fundamental guarantee of access to justice that assures it. The material fundamentality of the Institute, however, can only be sustained if the stability of a protection given under the summary cognition, doesn’t offend, in its genesis, the audi alteram partem principle., O presente artigo tem como objeto de estudo o instituto processual de estabilização da tutela antecipada de urgência e como perspectiva de análise a teoria dos direitos fundamentais. Pretende-se investigar a fundamentalidade material do instituto tomando como premissa teórica a dupla natureza do princípio do acesso à justiça enquanto direito e garantia fundamental. Nessa linha de pesquisa, defende-se a tutela antecipada de urgência e sua estabilização como regra instrumental do direito fundamental de acesso à justiça e como conteúdo assecuratório derivado da garantia fundamental de acesso à justiça. Defende-se, contudo, que a fundamentalidade material do instituto somente poderá ser sustentada se a estabilidade de uma tutela proferida no âmbito da cognição sumária não ofender, em sua gênese, o direito fundamental ao contraditório.