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This study examines the ideological transformation of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), successor to the League of Communists of Serbia, during Serbia’s transition to capitalism. A distinctive feature of the Serbian case is that reformed communists retained power until the arrival of the right-liberal opposition in 2000. The ideological analysis is based on two closely related concepts: democratic socialism and social democracy. The study demonstrates the reasons behind the SPS's choice in favor of democratic socialism and examines how the party shifted rightward compared to its original ideological stance. The factor of European integration played a significant role in the alignment of the SPS with the neoliberal consensus, generally shaping the behavior and ideological positions of domestic actors in potential candidate countries. The article analyzes the SPS programs from 1990, 1992, and 2010. According to the latest program, the SPS now occupies the position of a typical center-left European party.

During the 1980s of 20th century, socialist Yugoslavia faced various social problems, which disintegrated the fragile tissue of Tito's state-political legacy. In the early 1990s, when the unstoppable phase of dissolution of this country began, national-chauvinist quasi-elites surfaced, with the aim of realizing their great-nation ambitions in a period of general unrest. Although in this whirlwind of social events the possibility of military intervention by the JNA was used as an indispensable threat factor, the behind-the-scenes political agreements of republican leaders were often much more effective in achieving certain goals. Sometimes conducted in public, and sometimes secretly, such negotiations violated the authority of state bodies and made their existence meaningless. In this context, one can certainly observe the most famous separate negotiations from the beginning of the 1990s on the territory of the disintegrating Yugoslavia, conducted between Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman. Although due to the lack of transcripts we have no insight into the details of these talks, many close associates of the Serbian and Croatian presidents, as well as participants in various political sessions, clearly indicate the presence of a high degree of mutual agreement on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, today, three decades after Karadjordjev and Tikves, there is a reasonable suspicion that it was just a double political game of Slobodan Milosevic, who entered into such talks with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, not to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina with him but to confront him with the Bosniaks and thus weaken the front against Serbian hegemony in Yugoslavia. In this paper, the author sought to shed light on these events through statements by Tudjman and Milosevic, and addresses by their close associates and participants in numerous political talks, and thus help to take a more relevant view of Bosnia and Herzegovina's positioning in Serbian and Croatian politics in the early 1990s. year of the 20th century.

Slobodan Milošević, bivši predsednik Savezne Republike Jugoslavije i Republike Srbije, predat je organima Haškog tribunala 28. juna 2001. godine. On je helikopterom Resora državne bezbednosti prebačen iz Beograda do Tuzle, gde je u pratnji predstavnika tribunala produžio za Hag. U članku se opisuju aktivnosti Vojske Jugoslavije, odnosno Ratnog vazduhoplovstva i protivvazdušne odbrane tokom popodneva tog dana, koje su mogle da imaju svrhu da spreče Miloševićevo izručenje. Osnovu članka čini neobjavljena originalna dokumentacija Vojske Jugoslavije i drugih institucija, u koju je autor po službenoj dužnosti imao uvid, kao i objavljena sećanja aktera tog događaja.

The concept of vampirism in the tradition of peasant culture is an inversion of social norms by individuals or groups, which the community recognizes as responsible for social problems and crises. “Vampire” as a social institution has a role in resolving the crisis, but also manifests power of the collective and the desirable model of worldview. However, the experience of field research imposes a perspective that does not perceive the “vampire” as a rigid institution, but also an adaptable tool of social or political communication. By analyzing two cases (performances) of “murder of a political vampire” (Josip Broz Tito and Slobodan Milosevic), as a performance of political communication, I try to point out the crucial importance of understanding the context, position and motivation of actors in dialogue. The focus of the analysis is on “vampires”, the signifier of the aberrant, who uses vampire symbolism as a means of spreading political information but also achieving political goals.

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement) accepted in Paris on December 14, 1995 was signed by: for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović, for the Republic of Croatia dr. Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. There are good reasons why the international community has demanded that these people be signatories to the Dayton Peace Agreement. Namely, after unsuccessful attempts to establish an agreement on constitutional solutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, starting with Cutileiro's plan (cantonization of Bosnia and Herzegovina on ethnic grounds), on which talks in Sarajevo began in February 1992, until the conference in London on 26 and On August 27, 1992, it was obvious that the positions of the Serb and Croat sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina were being harmonized with the positions of Belgrade and Zagreb, that is, the policies previously agreed and agreed upon on the Milosevic-Tudjman route. Three delegations participated in the conference in London. On behalf of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government were President Alija Izetbegović, Minister of Foreign Affairs Haris Silajdžić, Ejup Ganić and General Sefer Halilović. The Bosnian Serb delegation included Radovan Karadzic, RS President Momcilo Krajisnik, RS Vice President and VRS General Ratko Mladic, who were in direct consultations with Belgrade throughout the negotiations. Representatives of Bosnian Croats were the President of HZ HB Mate Boban, then the Prime Minister of Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mile Akmadžić (although he was a member of the Government of Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina, he participated as a member of the Croatian delegation) and General Milivoj Petković. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman also took part in the negotiations and was the unofficial but de facto head of the Croatian delegation. Following the London Conference and the failure of the previous negotiations, the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia was expanded to include the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, chaired by Cyrus Vance (US diplomat on behalf of the UN) and Lord David Owen (on behalf of the EC / U). a new era of peace negotiations. Vance-Owen's plan foresaw the decentralization of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the existing borders with a constitutional order based on federal principles contained in a number of constitutive elements - regions (ten cantons formed on ethnic principles) and with the Sarajevo district where the central government would be located. This plan, after the refusal of the Serbian Assembly from Pale to ratify it, was definitely rejected. This was followed by the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan (Constitutional Agreement on the Alliance of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina) which offered a confederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina composed of three republics made up of ethnicity, but this plan also proved unacceptable. The Contact Group's plan followed the establishment of the Washington Agreement, which established the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in March 1994. This plan provided for the preservation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a union within its internationally recognized borders, and territorial division according to the percentage of territory (51:49). The Serbian leadership in Pale also refused to accept this proposal. The international community had to look for new solutions. The Contact Group's plan was a step towards negotiations that will result in the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. However, it is important to note that all the plans offered led to the discovery of hidden policies created by the eastern and western neighbors of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, all the proposed proposals for "peace plans", which the international community tried to impose in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were based on constitutional devastation and territorial division, thus accepting armed conquests and occupation of the area with the ultimate goal of destroying its territorial integrity and statehood. sovereignty, which made it obvious that the international community was not ready to protect the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state guaranteed by international law, which was especially denied by the introduction of an arms embargo, which prevented it from protecting its own sovereignty and territorial integrity. What was the role of the signatories of the Dayton Agreement in the preparation and execution of bilateral aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim of implementing plans for the partition of Bosnia and the realization of large-scale projects, and whether it determined their position as signatories to the General Framework Agreement? and the topic of trials of international courts with the aim of establishing, proving and convicting committed crimes. What is the significance of the signatories in the establishment and preservation of peace, and whether large-scale projects and plans for their implementation ended with the signing of the Dayton Agreement are questions whose answers are still being sought 25 years after the signing of the agreement. Namely, Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), before the signing of the Dayton Agreement, appeared before the ICTY as an indictee for crimes committed in the Republics of the former Yugoslavia - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo. The trial was not terminated due to the death of the accused, but the Trial Chamber rendered a decision on the motion for acquittal (Interim Judgment of the Hague Tribunal of 16 June 2004), which established his responsibility for genocide committed in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Franjo Tudjman, the then President of the Republic of Croatia, was identified as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise in a verdict handed down for crimes committed by the Croatian Army (HV) and the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) against the civilian population of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Case IT-04-74 Prlić etc). In its appeal verdict against the Bosnian six, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that there was an international armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the state of occupation, but also confirmed the existence of a Croatian joint criminal enterprise aimed at "ethnic cleansing" certain areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia's Franjo Tudjman as one of the participants in this JCE. Thus, persons who found themselves in court proceedings and were held responsible for the consequences of the policies they implemented, the commission of crimes and joint criminal enterprises realized in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, became signatories of the Dayton Peace Agreement and guarantors of peace.

During the 1980s, socialist Yugoslavia was hit by various social problems, which disintegrated the fragile tissue of Tito's state-political legacy. In the early 1990s, when the unstoppable phase of dissolution of this country began, national-chauvinist pretensions resolved to realize their old great-power ambitions in a period of general disruption surfaced. Although in this whirlwind of social turmoil the method of military force was used as the dominant and indispensable factor, behind the scenes political arrangements were very often much more effective in realizing certain goals. Sometimes conducted in public, and sometimes secretly, such negotiations were most often a typical expression of grand national aspirations. In this context, one can certainly observe one of the most famous separate negotiations in the 1990s on the soil of the disintegrating Yugoslavia, conducted between Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tuđman. Although these talks have not been published to date, many close associates of the Serbian and Croatian presidents, as well as participants in various political sessions, clearly indicate the presence of a high degree of their mutual agreement on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this paper, the author tried to shed light on the separate Serbo-Croatian efforts to divide the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the statements of Tuđman and Milosevic, and the speeches of their close associates and participants in numerous political talks.

The article examines the attempt of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to organise a breakthrough of the sports sanctions imposed on the country on 30 May, 1992. As a result of these sanctions, the country’s athletes were forced to participate in sports competitions without national emblems and flags. The next step was to be a complete ban on the participation of Yugoslav sport organisations in international competitions. In order to break through the international information blockade, the leadership of the FR of Yugoslavia tried to organise a commercial match between Robert Fischer and Boris Spassky, two veteran chess players, who played in the 1972 “Match of the Century.” The conference was organised by Jezdimir Vasiljević, a businessman who combined the cigarette and oil trade with the banking business. The results of this costly adventure were dubious. With the complete domination of huge international media corporations, positive results were almost impossible. However, the episode itself remains a bright page not only in the gloomy history of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, but also in the history of chess.

The author explores the creation of public opinion in Serbia in the late 1980s and the (ab)use of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo on 28 June 1989. As a result of Serbian president Slobodan Milošević’s carefully planned propaganda, a negative image of Albanians as well as a positive perception of Serbian nationalism were enforced. The media and popular culture played a particularly important role in reviving the Kosovo Myth, together with the leading Serbian (academic) institutions and influential intellectuals. Thirty-some years after 1989, the Kosovo Myth is presented in the media in a largely unchanged manner, while for Serbia the Kosovo problem remains unsolved.

Članak rekonstruiše i analizira početnu etapu mirovnih pregovora o Bosni i Hercegovini, vođenih u Ženevi u januaru 1993. godine. Tu je stranama u konfliktu prezentovan prvi kompletan mirovni nacrt koji su izradili kopredsedavajući Međunarodne konferencije o bivšoj Jugoslaviji, Sajrus Vens i Dejvid Oven. Usledio je mučni jednomesečni pregovarački period, rekonstruisan ovde na osnovu dostupne arhivske građe, sudskih spisa, objavljenih dokumenata i memoara učesnika. Analizom deklarativnih pozicija strana u sukobu, interakcija između njihovih delegacija i odnosa unutar njih, zapaža se da su sve strane vodile dvostruku igru. Dok je na hrvatskoj strani prividno postojala spremnost da se plan prihvati, ona ga je opstruisala eskalacijama na terenu. Dok je Beograd savetovao prihvatanje plana, Pale se o te savete oglušivalo, takođe produbljujući sukobe. Sarajevo je odlagalo prihvatanje plana, nadajući se direktnijoj američkoj intervenciji. Takva mogućnost je i nagoveštena nakon januarske inauguracije administracije Bila Klintona, potkopavajući položaj međunarodnih posrednika. Mirovno rešenje je bilo neprihvatljivo glavnim pregovaračima, jer je odstupalo od maksimalističkih ciljeva koje su zacrtali i propagirali. Prihvatanje takvog kompromisa se ne samo kosilo sa njihovom opštom ratnom strategijom, već je ugrožavalo i njihov opstanak na vlasti.

Članak daje pregled aktivnosti Vojske Jugoslavije u događajima oko saveznih izbora 24. septembra 2000, posebno u Crnoj Gori. Potom razmatra pripreme za eventualnu intervenciju i reakciju na širi narodni bunt koji je 5. oktobra 2000. doveo do smene režima Slobodana Miloševića, a zatim prihvatanja novog predsednika Vojislava Koštunice. Iako je izgledalo da će se i u ovoj krizi vojska poslužiti specijalnim, oklopnim i inžinjerijskim snagama radi intervencije (protiv sopstvenih građana), do toga nije došlo. Dokumenta govore da su pripreme vršene i da su samo masovnost opozicionog pokreta i sveopšte nezadovoljstvo stanjem u Srbiji uticali da ne dođe do oružane intervencije. Smirivanje političke situacije i ostanak istovetne komandne garniture na čelu vojske doveo je do pada tenzija. Članak je zasnovan na originalnim dokumentima Vojske Jugoslavije koje je Generalštab Vojske Srbije i Crne Gore dostavio 2003. na traženje tadašnjeg ministra odbrane Borisa Tadića, kao i na zapisnicima sa kolegijuma načelnika Generalštaba Vojske Jugoslavije koji su oslobođeni tajnosti 2006. godine odlukom tadašnjeg načelnika Generalštaba general-potpukovnika Zdravka Ponoša.

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Nationalism in Slobodan Milošević’s Speeches The fall of Yugoslavia showed economic, national, ideological and political problems. Thus, there was a strong rise of hidden nationalisms among nations living on the same territory, such as Slovenian, Croatian, Bosnian, Serbian, Montenegrin and Macedonian from the 1980s. The aim of the article is to show how Slobodan Milošević’s nationalism was rising in his speeches in the period between 1988 (when he came to power) and 1992 (when the new constitution of FRY was adopted). The author analyzed eleven speeches made during the debates in the Serbian Parliament, during sessions of the Socialist Party of Serbia and during meetings with people in such cities as Gazimestan, Belgrade, Novi Sad, Bor and Niš. In his speeches Milošević raised such subjects as the question of Yugoslavia, the question of Serbian nation living on the whole territory of Yugoslavia, the role of Serbia in the creation of Yugoslavia. Additionally, he was blaming “enemies” (such as Slovenia, Croatia, Albanians from Kosovo) for the collapse of Yugoslavia and the war in the 1990s. He was using a language of populism and propaganda to enhance his goals and tried to be emotionally close to his nation.

Transitioning from one system to another might be difficult for one country. That happened with Serbia, which proved that the process of transition and adaptation to liberal values could exhaust the country. In this paper, the author examines political rights, the election process, civil liberties, and the status of the media and civil society during Milosevic's reign and in the post-Milosevic era. The author argues that Serbia has not developed democracy in full capacity yet and that Serbia is an example of semi-consolidated democracy. In this text, the author uses quantitative and, qualitative criteria to examine the situation of democracy in Serbia during the Milosevic era, and in the post-Milosevic era. The main focus was on civil liberties, political rights, media freedom, and civil society. To examine these things, we used primary and secondary sources. The author analyzed the period from 1994 up to 2018/19. The paper structure is the following. In the first part, the author gives basic information about the country's history. The second section outlines political rights, civil liberties, and elections. In the third section, the author examines media freedom and civil society with a focus on the Milosevic era and the post-Milosevic era. In the conclusion section, the author sums up and briefly emphasizes the paper's main findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article places Sreten Ugričić's novel To an Unknown Hero (2010) in the context of his larger writerly and artistic interests, from "language works" that emerged from Conceptual art of the second half of the 20th century to the philosophical novel, and his unique engagement with language that brings together these various literary and artistic sources and interests. No less important for this discussion is the author's claim that this novel represents a pioneering attempt by a major Serbian writer to engage with the topic of war crimes that Slobodan Milošević's regime perpetrated during the 1990s. This novel, the article argues, raises the question of the legacy of these wars in Serbian literature at the beginning of the third millennium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Yugoslavia was a complex political structure made up of six republics and two autonomous provinces, both within Serbia. In early 1989, the situation in Kosovo was complex. In the middle of March 1989, violent demonstrations began in the cities of the autonomous province of Kosovo. The participants in the demonstrations were Kosovo Albanians. The situation in Kosovo wasdiscussed at the sessions of the Presidency of the SFRY. The paper presents the conclusions and measures taken by the Presidency of the SFRY to normalize the situation in Kosovo. When taking measures to eliminate Albanian nationalism and separatism, the Presidency of the SFRY was guided by the Constitution (1974), but also by considering how the measures would affect internal political relations in Yugoslavia and the international position.

The text describes the recollections of General Nikola Ljubicic about his contemporaries and the events in which he had taken part, in the course of several meetings with historian Dr. Venceslav Glišić. It is a significant historical source about Serbian and Yugoslav history from the 1960s to the first half of the 1990s.

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Rad je pokušaj analize gazimestanskog govora Miloševića i Tuđmanovog govora na prvom općem saboru HDZ-a. Intencija je pokazati da što se tiče samog govora Miloševića, on nije imao za primarni cilj nasilno razbijanje Jugoslavije, kao ni međurepubličke ratove. S druge strane, rad bi trebao pokazati da Tuđmanov govor, gledajući u cjelini, nije bio proustaški. U tom kontekstu, period koji se analizira završava neposredno uoči prvih višestranačkih parlamentarnih izbora u Hrvatskoj, dakle ne obrađuje dolazak HDZ-a na vlast. Također, apstrahira se od drugih društvenih aktera, bilo u Srbiji, bilo u Hrvatskoj, posebno Srba u Hrvatskoj. Provedena analiza političkih govora nema ni na koji način za cilj relativizaciju uloge dvaju protagonista niti ih abolira od političke odgovornosti za raspad Jugoslavije i nastale ratove. Sagledavanje i analiza njihovih govora izvršena je u kontekstu vremena u kome su održani i svijesno je apstrahiran naknadni razvoj političkih događaja u Jugoslaviji. Naravno, iako govornici nisu mogli pretpostaviti koje će biti krajnje posljedice njihovih govora, sigurno je da su obojica, kao već iskusni političari, mogli pretpostaviti da će oni proizvesti snažni efekt i podignuti tenzije u javnom prostoru.

Slobodan Milošević, a key figure in the Yugoslav conflicts of the nineties, has been the focus of much scholarly analysis. However, we have, chosen to tackle him from the perspective of Operational Code Analysis, which is most commonly used for delving into political beliefs (dubbed "philosophical" and "instrumental" within the methodology) of political leaders. For the analysis of his Operational Code, we have coded his speeches at the Congresses of the Socialist Party of Serbia (whose president he was), which was the ruling party in Serbia during the nineties, his 1989 Kosovo Field speech (from when he rose to prominence), and his 2001 reflection on the Hague Tribunal, as the beginning and end of his political career. Furthermore, and arguably more important, is the novel approach to Operational Code Analysis, wherein it goes from its initial idea of analyzing the "inner" political beliefs of the chosen political subject to the Weltanschauung that they promulgate in practice. This is based on the switch from Platonic idealism towards Aristotle, drawing as well from Sartre, and Speech-Act theory developed by Austin and Searle. The approach has been dubbed "practical political hematology", as it functions similarly to a medical blood screening: it divulges a set of practical political beliefs not unlike the blood screening in relation to the human bodily functions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores antipathy to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) by Serbians, who feel that not just Slobodan Milosevic but the whole country of Serbia is on trial. The author proposes that social identity and self-categorization, as elaborated primarily by Henri Tajfel and John Turner, are intervening mechanisms that help explain this negative social reaction to international criminal law. This pair of social psychological theories are used to argue that it is the belief in a group threat which produces a strong self-categorization as a group member and predicts the function of social identity mechanisms. In the Serbian case, this paper argues that there was far less social identification at the national level, and greater diversity of national political opinion, before the NATO bombing in 1999. However, the NATO bombing constituted an inescapable threat at the national level, creating an atmosphere in which Serbians felt they were all treated alike regardless of their political opinion; this group-level, inescapable threat produced a greater sense of in-group homogeneity and identification. Rather than differentiating themselves primarily against the Milosevic regime, Serbs who were previously dissidents changed their salient out-group and began differentiating themselves primarily against the Western countries participating in the bombing. The significance of notions of rebelliousness and victimhood in the Serbian self-stereotype helped further define an international stance that rejected the kind of post-war solution offered by the ICTY.

Minęło już prawie dziesięć od kiedy w haskim więzieniu znaleziono ciało zmarłego Slobodana Miloševicia. Przed Trybunałem odpowiadał za dopuszczenie się ponad sześćdziesięciu przestępstw, w tym ludobójstwa i zbrodni przeciwko ludzkości. Do dzisiaj istnieje on w pamięci ludzi jako jeden z najsilniejszych serbskich polityków. Natomiast rzadko wspomina się o jego działalności jako bankowca. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przeanalizowanie oraz porównanie dwóch wizerunków S. Miloševicia, zanim zaczął on pełnić najważniejsze funkcje w państwie jugosłowiańskim.

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Slobodan Milošević started a wide political campaign in the late fall of 1987 in order to politically eliminate Ivan Stambolić. Even after the Eighth Session Milošević wanted to send a clear message to all of his adversaries – he is the absolute leader of the Serbian communist party and the Serbian nation. To that end he evoked the necessity of the „unity of socialist forces“ in order for the Serbian society to quickly emerge from a political, economic and moral crisis. At the same time, he was creating an image of himself as a man of action that doesn’t hesitate and does not waste time making „useless“ conversations. Through a well-organized political action, Ivan Stambolić was removed from the most important state function in Serbia, and by doing so Milošević suffocated every opposition inside the Serbian communist party. As a leader, his offer was similar to Tito’s: egalitarianism, a simplified picture of the world and how it works, a new religion (belonging to a class was replaced by belonging to the nation), and – a vision of a common enemy. Dangerous channel was opened for collective venting of frustrations of the people. First among such enemies were „the forces defeated in the Eighth session“ and Serbian „bureaucrats and officials“, then Albanians and politicians from Vojvodina, then the Croats and Slovenians, and finally wider range of threats within and outside Yugoslavia.

The international community has determined it carries the responsibility to protect civilians from atrocity crimes if a state is unable or unwilling to do so. These crimes are often perpetrated in authoritarian regimes where they are legitimized through an exclusionary ideology. A comparative case study of Pol Pot and Milosevic indicates that whether the leader truly believes in the ideology he puts forward or merely uses it instrumentally to manipulate the population, is an important variable, which affects the manner in which third parties can respond effectively to these crimes. While Pol Pot was motivated by his ideological zeal, Milosevic used ideology to create a climate in which mass atrocities could be perpetrated in order to garner further power and prestige. In Max Weber’s terminology, Milosevic was guided by instrumental rationality while Pol Pot acted on the basis of value rationality. This case study compares two crucial moments—Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and NATO’s bombing of Serbia when the crisis in Kosovo escalated—to analyze the responsiveness of the two leaders. It is argued that ideological leaders are less responsive than non-ideological leaders to foreign policy measures targeted to stop or mitigate the occurrence of atrocities.

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The article is scrutinizing stages of disintegration of SFRY, from the crisis which characterized the 80s to erosion heralded with the disintegration of LCY and realignment of political players during 1990. The collision between leaderships of republics, which produced divisions within the state Presidency, as well as collision between the Presidency, Federal Executive Council and the military is traced through the failed attempts to stop the erosion of the security situation in Yugoslavia at thte end of 1990 and beginning of 1991. Through the documents, media sources and the memories of participants, the article analyses activity and mutual raltions of key actors in the period of deepening og Yugoslav crisis in the direction of paralysis and violent disintegration of the state.

Twenty years ago, Slobodan Milošević uttered a sentence which was afterwards repeated in the literature about the Yugoslav tragedy innummerable times. The sentence "Niko ne sme da vas bije" was directed to the Serb demonstrators in Kosovo. In this text, the author analyzes the ways this sentence was translated in factional literature (non-fiction literature: essays, newspaper article, history, biographies etc.) and shows that different versions, apart from being different lexically and semantically, influence the political interpretation and understanding of the Yugoslav conflict. This text poses another, maybe even more important question: are unprecise and wrong translations of Milošević's words a proof of what Georg Johannesen claimed - that faction is fiction. .

Jovan Rašković, the popular founding president of Croatia's Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka, SDS), is widely viewed as representing a "missed opportunity" for peace in Croatia in 1990-1991, a moderate advocate of "cultural autonomy" and equality within Croatia who was undermined by the aggressive politics of Slobodan Milošević's Serbia, which supported instead the territorial and separatist ideas of Milan Babić. This support is considered a key component of Milošević's intervention in Croatia and is often viewed as decisive in foreclosing opportunities for a peaceful settlement of Croat -- Serb relations. This article challenges this interpretation, arguing that the SDS's politics were premised from the start on the notion that the Serbs in Croatia were a "sovereign nation" with the right to self-determination up to secession. If Croatia remained in a Yugoslav federation, this meant that Serbs could opt for a wide variety of rights within Croatia, including forms of territorial autonomy. In the event of Yugoslavia's disintegration or transformation into a confederation, the Serbian minority could secede from Croatia. The differences between Rašković and Babić have been considerably overstated, and some of the SDS's more moderate rhetoric fundamentally misunderstood. It was Rašković, not Babić or Milošević, who founded the territorial and separatist politics of the Serbian Democratic Party in Croatia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades The Ministry for State Security (STASI) in the German Democratic Republic attentively observed Tito's home and foreign policy in Yugoslavia, as they perceived it as a socialist experiment that could prove harmful to the Soviet-type orthodoxy, on which their own totalitarian regime was based as well. The attention did not lessen even after Tito's death and in the context of the 1980s, the question whether Yugoslavia was capable of surviving with its economic and ethnical problems was quite noticeable. The STASI analysts based their reports on their own observations as well as on the information they received from the East and agents infi ltrated in Western political, military and espionage spheres, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany. The study of the STASI documents, therefore, off ers a global insight into the Yugoslav reality through the lenses of both blocs and shows that its complexity was never truly understood by neither side. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In The First Yugoslavia period, founded in the name of the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom after the World War I and received the name of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia when King Alexander I disbanded the parliament and suspended the constitution, King Alexander I's efforts about centralization the structure of the Kingdom and establish the Serb domination over other nations in the Kingdom was took place. In turn, it brought tensions and conflicts to the Kingdom while especially the Croats in favor of a federative structure. In the World War II period, First Yugoslavia liberated from the Fascist invasion consisting of Germany, İtaly and Crotia and Socialist Yugoslavia (Second Yugoslavia) was established under the leadership of Tito. The experience of First and Second Yugoslavia showed that the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious structure of Yugoslavia threaten the unity of this land. However, Tito managed to protect the unity of Yugoslavia through His policy and discourse which prevent domination of any nation of the Federation and His connective emphasis on the "Yugoslav Citizenship". At the end of the 1980s, during Milosevic period, He provoked Serbian nationalism through His policy and discourse and this situation escalated ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia. In this study, dissolution process of the Yugoslavia was described historically with analysing policy, attitude and discourse of Tito and Milosevic about Yugoslavia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Croatia's successful bid for independence was one of the defining moments of the immediate post-Cold War period. Nevertheless, the means that Croatia used to obtain independence remains relatively unexamined by academics. This article focuses on the early period of Croatia's bid for secession, and specifically the role that Yugoslavia's policy of Total National Defence played in facilitating its independence. Unlike in Slovenia, where the legacies of Total National Defence facilitated Slovenia's bid for secession, in Croatia the decision of its political leaders meant that the country largely neglected its positive legacies, resulting in a protracted four-year struggle. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The international community has determined it carries the responsibility to protect civilians from atrocity crimes if a state is unable or unwilling to do so. These crimes are often perpetrated in authoritarian regimes where they are legitimized through an exclusionary ideology. A comparative case study of Pol Pot and Milosevic indicates that whether the leader truly believes in the ideology he puts forward or merely uses it instrumentally to manipulate the population, is an important variable, which affects the manner in which third parties can respond effectively to these crimes. While Pol Pot was motivated by his ideological zeal, Milosevic used ideology to create a climate in which mass atrocities could be perpetrated in order to garner further power and prestige. In Max Weber's terminology, Milosevic was guided by instrumental rationality while Pol Pot acted on the basis of value rationality. This case study compares two crucial moments-- Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and NATO's bombing of Serbia when the crisis in Kosovo escalated--to analyze the responsiveness of the two leaders. It is argued that ideological leaders are less responsive than non-ideological leaders to foreign policy measures targeted to stop or mitigate the occurrence of atrocities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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We call "An­ti-bu­re­a­uc­ra­tic re­vo­lu­tion" the clash wit­hin the So­ci­a­list Com­mit­tee of Ser­bia, which to­ok pla­ce in the pe­riod bet­we­en 1987.and 1989, with the bro­a­dest po­li­ti­cal mo­bi­li­za­tion of ci­ti­zens, and the re­sult of which was con­sti­tu­ti­o­nal re­for­ma­tion of Ser­bia. Du­ring the ‘80s of the 20th cen­tury, the Ser­bian Com­mu­nist le­a­der­ship had, mo­re or less ex­pli­citly, dis­pu­ted (qu­e­sti­o­ned) the le­gal-po­li­ti­cal and eco­no­mic or­der in Ser­bia and Yugo­sla­via, which was esta­blis­hed by the 1974. Con­sti­tu­tion. When it ca­me to exe­cu­ting (ca­rrying out) the con­sti­tu­ti­o­nal chan­ges and esta­blis­hing the sta­te unity, Slo­bo­dan Mi­lo­še­vić and Ivan Stam­bo­lić had ba­sed the­ir rhe­to­ric on si­mi­lar, and of­ten the sa­me at­ti­tu­des and ar­gu­ments.