Search

Objective A significant indicator of a president's commitment to equality in American society can be found in the people appointed to fill senior-level positions within the administration. Method The history of diversity appointments to the cabinet is reviewed with more detailed analysis of cabinet and Executive Office of the President (EOP) appointees since the Carter presidency. Results The pattern of appointments of women and minorities is one of plateaus, with Carter making notable advancements in the appointment of women and African Americans and Obama's initial appointments taking diversity of appointments to a new level. In particular, more women and minorities appointed by Obama have elite connections as defined by Dye. Conclusion Despite greater numbers than in the past, diversity appointments represent desegregation of the cabinet and White House rather than full integration of women and minorities into the upper reaches of the executive branch. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is persistent debate about who most influences the federal appointment process, especially whether the executive branch staffs the federal bureaucracy with individuals loyal to the White House or relies on the process as an accommodation to important political players, especially members of Congress. Yet, people still know little about the role members of Congress play in the process of shaping the prenomination environment. In this article, the authors address this debate by using unique archival data from the Dwight Eisenhower and Gerald Ford Presidential Libraries to identify which legislators contacted the president about a specific nomination or appointment request and under what conditions these requests were successful. The authors find that legislator resources, Senate membership, and those closer ideologically to the president are related both to the number of requests made and to the number of successful appointment or nomination requests granted. The results suggest that the president relies on members of Congress for credible information about staffing administrative positions, but they appoint or nominate individuals that are in their own interest, not necessarily to accommodate Congress. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents an analysis on the issues concerning the prevalence and existence of implicit bias in the selection of jury in the U.S. It explores two problems on jury selection such as judge-dominated voir dire and Batson challenge process. It suggests to increase participation of lawyers in voir dire and eliminate peremptory challenges to address problems on the implicit bias of jury selection. It compares implicit bias and explicit bias and explains the roles of judges and lawyers on implicit bias in the legal system. It discusses the findings from the implicit-bias research initiated by the Implicit Association Test (IAT) dubbed as Project Implicit. It cites several studies in the areas of judicial decision making, shooter bias, and racial biases.

Can the current presidential appointments process be improved? This essay highlights three kinds of problems: inexperienced appointees, a lengthening process, and tedious and adversarial inquiry. While the essay side-steps trying to affect the prerogatives of institutions involved in the tussle over appointments, it concentrates on improving the support of presidential personnel operations and the process of inquiry that nominees face, and it identifies patterns of repetitiveness among the roughly 2,800 details that a nominee must provide in responding to some 295 individual questions in nine categories. The most adversarial and tedious categories of inquiry include identifying personal background, reporting on criminal entanglements, and assaying potential conflicts of interest. Five strategies are identified for better matching the needed experience in the White House to the demands of presidential personnel. These changes would indirectly shorten the nomination and confirmation process, and the author makes three important recommendations for structuring inquiry that could reduce the adversarial burden on nominees by nearly a third. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses various reports published within the issue, including one by Richard W. Waterman on the tactics used to expand the powers of the U.S. presidency, one by Brandice Canes-Wrone on the links between public opinion and U.S. presidential administrative strategies, and one by David Lewis on the competence of U.S. presidential administrative appointees.

This article argues that despite the significant insights offered by prior research, assessments of the efficacy of the administrative presidency to date are both premature and in need of refocusing to comport with the realities of the American political system. In regard to prematurity, assessments must be withheld until four interrelated limitations of prior research are addressed. First, unlike early qualitative research on the topic, most recent research related to the administrative presidency has used neoclassical economics-based or statistically sophisticated research designs that marginalize the implementation processes accompanying these efforts to advance presidential agendas. Second, assessments of the administrative presidency using this approach typically incorporate questionable assumptions. Third, typical criteria for assessing the administrative presidency fail to incorporate the realities of presidential decision making. Finally, most recent research fails to employ methodologies capable of incorporating these realities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses whether a new interpretation of the U.S. Recess Appointments Clause may be warranted by contemporary events. It mentions that while the Advice and Consent Clause requires the advice and consent of the Congress before a president can appoint federal officials, the Recess Appointments Clause grants all power and discretion to the president during the Recess of the Senate. It is concluded that the Recess Appointments Clause has been compromised with the internal mechanisms of the judiciary.

The President and the Senate bargain over the appointment of the Head of a key government department. The operating unit of the department has private information about its operating environment. We model the appointment process as a constrained delegation of policymaking to the operating unit (agency). When the Senate is sufficiently close to the agency the President has to give the agency more authority. On the other hand, given the Senate’s ideal point, when the information is more precise the President can tighten delegation bounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives. This research note explores whether the system of assigning each state equal representation in the U.S. Senate adversely affects racial minorities, groups that often have common political interests. We also project changes in minority representation over the next 20 years using Census data. Methods. We develop a new method of assessing racial bias due to apportionment, which calculates the number of seats lost by groups due to equal representation, a more substantively meaningful statistic than correlational measures. Results. We find that both African Americans and Hispanics are substantially underrepresented due to their greater presence in high-population states as compared to in low-population states. Whereas bias against African Americans appears to be falling, the demographic patterns of Hispanics will make them even more underrepresented in coming years. Conclusions. These findings are especially consequential considering that malapportionment has important public policy implications, including greater per-capita distributive benefits for smaller states. Further, given that the Senate serves as a major veto point in U.S. politics, racial bias due to equal apportionment may have a significant impact on current and future political debates relevant to minority groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I use the Bush Administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) scores—a numerical measure of federal program performance—to analyze the relationship between political appointees and management. I find that federal programs administered by politically appointed bureau chiefs get systematically lower PART evaluations than programs run by bureau chiefs drawn from the civil service. I find that career managers have more direct bureau experience and longer tenures, and these characteristics are significantly related to performance. Political appointees have higher education levels, more private or not-for-profit management experience, and more varied work experience than careerists but these characteristics are uncorrelated with performance. I conclude that reducing the number of appointees or increased sensitivity to appointee selection based upon certain background characteristics could improve federal bureau management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legislators have long recognized that delaying tactics are powerful tools for preventing the passage of laws they deem unsatisfactory Because the U.S. Congress has several deadlines built into its session, when committee chairmen or individual members delay the scheduling of hearings, markups, or executive business meetings, it can have a devastating effect on pending legislation. The tactic of delay is now being used by the Senate Judiciary Committee and individual senators to stall confirmation of the President's judicial nominations. Since 1996, the average length of time between an individual's nomination to serve as a federal judge and the time that he or she is confirmed has increased dramatically. At the same time, some nominations still proceed very quickly through the confirmation process. This article explores the question of why some nominees are subjected to lengthy delays, while others move through the Senate confirmation process in a matter of days. Specifically, it explores the impact of divided government, institutional strength of the President, and the majority party in the Senate, the position to which an individual has been nominated, and a number of nominee-specific variables to assess the impact that these have on the length of time a nominee will wait for confirmation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evaluates the relative impact of five United States presidents' appointments on the Supreme Court by focusing on the group behavior of blocs of presidential appointees. Extent to which such blocs vote cohesively or fragment; Adherence to appointing president's ideological expectations on various issues.

Presents information on a study which examined the impact of John H. Knowles' appointment to the top health post in the United States government on President Richard Nixon's decision-making and administrative style in 1969. Public criticisms faced by Nixon over the Knowles controversy; Problems experienced by Nixon's government in 1969 in relation to the Knowles affair; Profile of Knowles.

Evaluates the domination of the selection of federal court judges by particular groups, by analyzing data tracing the appearance of organized interests at lower court confirmation hearings between 1945-1992 in the United States. Opportunities and incentives for group participation in judicial nominations; Trends in the composition of group representatives at the hearings; Information on the incidence and nature of conflict over nominations at confirmations.

Identifies the essential components of a comprehensive understanding or analysis of the United States federal appointments process. Discussion on the original understanding of the constitutional appointments system; Description on the most significant features of the constitutional structure for making federal appointments; Conclusions.

Presents an update on issues related to physics in the U.S. as of October 1977. Renewal of the U.S. and Union Soviet Socialist Republic Agreement on Cooperation in the Fields of Science and Technology; Highlights of the Conference on Changing Career Opportunities for Physicists; Nomination of George C. Pimentel as deputy director of the National Science Foundation.

For much of this century but most notably for the past 25 years, political career relationships in Washington have been marked by presidential efforts to direct and control the permanent bureaucracy better. The key players in this relationship are the political executives appointed by the president to serve as policy managers in the executive branch and the top career management cadre since 1978, the members of the Senior Executive Service (SES). Political management strategies and additional numbers of appointees are about increased direction and control. Greater flexibility and discretion are about greater trust and mutual respect. There are very significant tensions, and they have not been part of the reinventing debates. Whether the political career relationship is viewed as a partnership or with animosity during the next few years will influence relations not only for the remainder of the Clinton term, but well beyond it. The need to consider the increased use of political managers on effective political career partnerships is particularly pressing in this time of reinventing and forming government. The symbiosis so aptly described by Aberbach, Putnam and is fundamental to effective change.

This research examines important characteristics of presidential appointees and the authority which they have over career managers in the Senior Executive Service (SES). It concludes that very short tenure in one position and frequent lack of preparation for government management create a cadre of political executives which is constantly moving and constantly "learning the ropes. "Despite additional power granted over the SES by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and despite larger numbers of appointees, it is unlikely that the President will achieve greater ability to direct and con- trol the permanent bureaucracy if current trends persist. Further, the impact on the quality of public management is likely to be detrimental. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the politics of presidential appointment and the constraints which make the process difficult. Dealing with the great number of petitions; Getting the advice of family members and old friends; Influence of Congress; Insistence on diversity in appointments; Differences from the process of hiring in the private sector; Assuring that the appointee will pose no problem for the president and do no harm to the national interest.

Questions whether a presidential election about change, such as the one in 1992, actually produces administrative changes at the White House. Similarity of the management and staffing practices of President Bill Clinton to those of the previous administrations; Representation of women and minorities; Vice-president's role; Washington outsider as Chief of Staff.

Addresses the specific factors that have been theorized to influence the tenure among political executives, using data from a 1985 National Academy of Public Administration survey of political appointees. Information on two key factors which negatively impact tenure; Results of the study.

Focuses on the selection of the first U.S. Commissioner for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Conflicting ideas concerning the method of selecting the Commissioner; Labor candidates for the position of the Commissioner; Appointment of Carroll Wright, a labor statistician, as the Commissioner; Developments in the Bureau under the leadership of Wright.