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This paper addresses a central issue in multiparty presidential systems: the functioning of legislative coalitions and the dynamics of legislative conflict. Since electoral competition has elements of both positive-sum (increase in common support) and zero-sum (exact division of the support) qualities, lawmaking in coalitional systems present unique challenges that may be absent in two-party systems. Using unique legislative data from Brazil, we examine how coalition management and unity affect legislative delay and obstructionism. We find that: (1) coalition management is pivotal for effective governance with respect to both faster legislative approval and less obstructionism; (2) the effect of coalition management depends on coalition size, i.e., it is particularly important when the coalition is small, but its positive effect diminishes as the coalition enlarges; and (3) opposition unity and government-opposition ideological divide impede the legislative process, but their effects are not as large as the effects of coalition management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does vote intention in presidential elections vary according to the economic conditions of a country, especially indicators of the financial market? Does the state of the economy, both its fundamentals as well as capital market, affect variation in candidates' percentage of vote intention in national polls? This paper tests how economic indicators influence vote intention in presidential elections in two emerging markets: Brazil and Mexico. The presidential elections of 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006 in Brazil and 2000 and 2006 in Mexico are analyzed using all poll returns for each electoral period and corresponding economic data. The paper finds that no theory is capable of explaining results throughout the dataset but partisan explanations and Stokes' (2001) categories of alternatives to retrospective voting help elucidate vote intention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What should I do in the next election? How should I behave in order to get success in the following election? Spending most of my time and energy in the internal activities within Congress would increase my chances of reelection? Or, alternatively, answering my constituency demands would build up my next career step? Possibly, those are the first questions that come to a politician?s mind right after his/her successful election? Those questions to a great extent distress politicians because they rarely offer easy or straightforward answers. Depending on politician?s ambition, those questions will have a direct impact on how incumbents will strategically behave during his/her entire term. In other words, politicians? choice of career is guided not only by the incentives of the position pursued, such as a higher stipend or a bigger staff, but also by the electoral viability of that choice. That is, the higher utility of being elected to such position is weighed against the risks and costs one must incur. Therefore, politicians weigh the utility of surviving politically by the probabilities of winning against the possible costs of running. For the second consecutive election for the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, the majority of incumbents (75% in 1998 and 69% in 2002) decided to run for reelection and at least 70% of them in both elections were successful, suggesting thus it would be incorrect to ignore static ambition as the main target among Brazilian legislators. It also raises doubts about the assertion that incumbents use their posts to pursue their post-legislative careers. However, this number also suggests that not all legislators seek reelection, indicating that it is also incorrect to assume all of them are driven by similar motivations. In their attempts at career survival, incumbents may also run for higher offices (Senator, Governor, Vice-governor). Others may run for state level offices (regressive ambition). Other still could run for Mayor in the midterm election. Finally, politicians can just give up of running to electoral position. We have demonstrated elsewhere, specifically for the 1998?s election, that the local performance primarily affects the electoral success of incumbents. However, participation within the Chamber and links with the Executive Branch cannot be totally disregarded, since they do affect incumbents? choice of what career a politician should run. The purpose of the present paper is thus to make a comparative analysis of the determinants of career and success between two consecutive electoral episodes, 1998 and 2002. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the ability of the Brazilian Congress to pass important legislation. We identified as “significant” the issues mentioned in Brazil’s leading newspaper’s front page. We analyze, first, whether the Brazilian Congress was able to act upon those important issues, and second, how quickly it was able to pass them. We investigate the impact of such factors as ideological dispersion of legislators, government-opposition divide, bicameral distance, and types and areas of legislation in question. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is party identification a stable and exogenous determinant of vote choice or is it endogenous to elections, outcomes and political events? We propose to study the stability of partisanship in Brazil, using a unique four-wave panel data set. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it assesses the extent to which Brazilian and Colombian legislatures are populated by career politicians Second, it analyzes the effects of institutional features of the electoral system on the politician’s ability to get reelected. Theories of legislative behavior in the US assume that politicians are careerists and want to get reelected. This assumption has important implications to understand the structure of the legislature (i.e. its degree of institutionalization) as well as the behavior of politicians. Levels of reelection in Latin America vary widely yet few explanations for why this may be the case have been offered. In this paper, we explore the determinants for reelection in two countries characterized by high levels of intraparty competition. We argue that incumbents have better chances on their reelection bids for reasons similar to incumbents to the US congress (i.e. name recognition, access to office perquisites, etc). We also suggest that the chances of electoral success are affected by competition at the district level that arises from the utilization of list-PR and nomination of multiple candidates by each party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the cause and effect of the conventional wisdom about Brazilian parties and mass partisanship. It states the empirical evidence of the partisan identification formed by social relationships as indicated in the previous studies of partisanship-as-social-identity. It also highlights the agreement of political scientists on the conception of mass partisan identification (party ID) for a political party.