Legislative Coalitions and Lawmaking in a Multiparty Presidential Democracy.

This paper addresses a central issue in multiparty presidential systems: the functioning of legislative coalitions and the dynamics of legislative conflict. Since electoral competition has elements of both positive-sum (increase in common support) and zero-sum (exact division of the support) qualities, lawmaking in coalitional systems present unique challenges that may be absent in two-party systems. Using unique legislative data from Brazil, we examine how coalition management and unity affect legislative delay and obstructionism. We find that: (1) coalition management is pivotal for effective governance with respect to both faster legislative approval and less obstructionism; (2) the effect of coalition management depends on coalition size, i.e., it is particularly important when the coalition is small, but its positive effect diminishes as the coalition enlarges; and (3) opposition unity and government-opposition ideological divide impede the legislative process, but their effects are not as large as the effects of coalition management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]