Search

Farmed Atlantic salmon often suffer from sea-lice infestations, which are commonly controlled by the use of a variety of medicines, and the fate of these medicines has implications for the health of the marine environment around fish farms. The Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) is responsible for monitoring and protecting the quality of Scottish coastal waters and for regulating discharges which may affect water quality, including releases of medicines from fish farms. We review the utility of established biological effects measurements (biomarkers and bioassays) for monitoring the effects of these medicines. The specificity and suitability of biological effects techniques to the mode of toxic action, metabolism, and environmental fate of the medicines are considered. It is concluded that scope-for-growth measurements in wild and deployed mussels (Mytilus edulis) and lugworm (Arenicola marina) bioassays, in combination with a suite of biomarker techniques, offer the best possibilities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Coronary artery disease (CAD) is a major cause of death in Canada and the United States. Single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) myocardial perfusion imaging (MPI) is a useful diagnostic test in the management of patients with CAD. The widely used SPECT MPI agents, 99mTc sestamibi and 99mTc tetrofosmin, exhibit less than ideal pharmacokinetic properties with decreasing uptake with higher flows. 123I has a similar energy as 99mTc, an ideal half life, and is readily available from cyclotrons. The objective of this study was to develop an 123I labeled MPI agent based on rotenone, a mitochondrial complex I inhibitor, as an alternative to currently available SPECT MPI agents. Methods: 123I-CMICE-013 was synthesized by radiolabeling rotenone with 123I in trifluoroacetic acid (TFA) with iodogen as the oxidizing agent at 60°C for 45min, followed by RP-HPLC purification. The product was formulated in 5% EtOH in 10mM NaOAc pH 6.5. The inactive analog 127I-CMICE-013 was isolated and characterized by NMR and mass spectrometry, and the structure determined. Micro-SPECT imaging studies were carried out in normal and infarcted rats. Biodistribution studies were performed in normal rats at 2h (n =6) and 24h (n =8) post injection (p.i.). Results: 123I-CMICE-013 was isolated with >95% radiochemical purity and high specific activity (14.8–111GBq/μmol; 400–3000mCi/μmol). Structural analysis showed that rotenone was iodinated at 7′-position, with removal of the 6′,7′-double bond, and addition of a hydroxy group at 6′-position. MicroSPECT images in normal rats demonstrated homogeneous and sustained myocardial uptake with minimal interference from lung and liver. Absent myocardial perfusion was clearly identified in rats with permanent left coronary artery ligation and ischemia-reperfusion injury. In vivo biodistribution studies in normal rats at 2h p.i. showed significant myocardial uptake (2.01±0.48%ID/g) and high heart to liver (2.98±0.93), heart to lung (4.11±1.04) and heart to blood (8.37±3.97) ratios. At 24h p.i., the majority of 123I-CMICE-013 was cleared from tissues, and a significant amount of tracer was found in the thyroid, indicating in vivo deiodination of the tracer. Conclusion: 123I-CMICE-013 is a promising new radiotracer for SPECT MPI with high myocardial uptake, very good target to background ratios and favorable biodistribution characteristics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One apparent feature of mental time travel is the ability to recursively embed temporal perspectives across different times: humans can remember how we anticipated the future and anticipate how we will remember the past. This recursive structure of mental time travel might be formalized in terms of a 'grammar' that is reflective of but more general than linguistic notions of absolute and relative tense. Here, I provide a foundation for this grammatical framework, emphasizing a bounded (rather than unbounded) recursive function that supports mental time travel to a limited temporal depth and to actual and possible scenarios. Anticipated counterfactual thinking, for instance, entails three levels of mental time travel to a possible scenario ('in the future, I will reflect on how my past self could have taken a different future action') and is centrally implicated in complex human decision-making. This perspective calls for further research into the mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny of recursive mental time travel, and revives the question of links with other recursive forms of thinking such as theory of mind. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

One of the most ancient and widely used forms of cognitive offloading is the outsourcing of cognitive operations onto other humans. Here, we explore whether humans preferentially seek out and use information from more competent compared with less competent others in an ongoing cognitive task. Participants (N = 120) completed a novel computerised visuospatial working memory task where each trial required them to remember either one, five, or ten target locations and recall them after a brief delay. Next, participants watched two virtual people compete in a distinct memory game, where one performed relatively well, demonstrating a stronger memory, and the other performed relatively poorly, demonstrating a weaker memory. Finally, participants completed the initial memory task again, but this time, either the strong-memory person or the weak-memory person was available to help with recall on each trial. Our results showed that, through observation and without direct instruction, participants acquired beliefs about the virtual people's cognitive proficiencies and could readily draw upon these beliefs to inform offloading decisions. Participants were typically more likely to ask for help from the strong-memory person, and this tendency was independent from other factors known to drive cognitive offloading more generally, like task difficulty, unaided cognitive ability, and metacognitive confidence., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

Recent research has provided compelling evidence that children experience the negative counterfactual emotion of regret, by manipulating the presence of a counterfactual action that would have led to participants receiving a better outcome. However, it remains unclear if children similarly experience regret's positive counterpart, relief. The current study examined children's negative and positive counterfactual emotions in a novel gain-or-loss context. Four- to 9-year-old children ( N  = 136) were presented with two opaque boxes concealing information that would lead to a gain or loss of stickers, respectively. Half of the children chose between two keys that matched each box, whereas the other half were compelled to select one box because only one of the two keys matched. After seeing inside the alternative, non-chosen box, children were significantly more likely to report a change in emotion when they could have opened that box than when they could not have. The effects were similar for children who lost stickers and won stickers, and neither effect varied with age. These findings suggest that children may become capable of experiencing regret and relief around the same time, although their expression of these counterfactual emotions may vary with actual and counterfactual gains and losses.

Previous research has suggested that infants are able to distinguish between possible and impossible events and make basic probabilistic inferences. However, much of this research has focused on children's intuitions about past events for which the outcome is already determined but unknown. Here, we investigated children's ability to use probabilistic information to guide their choices and actively shape future events. In two experiments, we examined whether children could successfully direct a marble through a series of tubes, selecting between routes where success was possible, impossible, or guaranteed (i.e., 50% vs. 0%, or 50% vs. 100%; Experiment 1), and routes where success was mutually possible but probabilistically distinct (e.g., 33% vs. 50%; Experiment 2). In total, we tested 136 two- to five-year-old children (76 males), recruited predominantly through a museum in Brisbane, Australia. In Experiment 1, we found that while younger children typically did not perform above chance, the vast majority of 4- and 5-year-olds consistently distinguished between possible and impossible or guaranteed outcomes. In Experiment 2, children of all ages had greater difficulty with distinguishing between two possible outcomes with different likelihoods than between possible and impossible/guaranteed outcomes, although some individual 4- and 5-year-olds demonstrated competence when making both distinctions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

When making moral judgments of past actions, adults often think counterfactually about what could have been done differently. Considerable evidence suggests that counterfactual thinking emerges around age 6, but it remains unknown how this development influences children's moral judgments. Across two studies, Australian children aged 4-9 (N = 236, 142 Females) were told stories about two characters who had a choice that led to a good or bad outcome, and two characters who had no choice over a good or bad outcome. Results showed that 4- and 5-year-olds' moral judgments were influenced only by the actual outcome. From age 6, children's moral judgments were also influenced by the counterfactual choices that had been available to the characters., (© 2023 The Authors. Child Development published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Society for Research in Child Development.)

The study examined the presence and nature of a relationship between 13 early childhood educators' mental state language (MSL) and 77 preschool children's (3- to 5 years) Theory of Mind (ToM). Educator language samples were elicited during two naturalistic group-time contexts, wordless picture book storytelling and an instructional building task. MSL was coded according to a comprehensive scheme that captures facets of MSL content and quality. To account for well-established determinants of ToM, a range of child- and family-level factors were also measured. Results indicated no significant relationship between educator MSL during group level instruction and children's ToM in the preschool setting. Although these findings challenge the assumption that educators' MSL is important for children's ToM development, important future directions are discussed., (© 2023 The Authors. British Journal of Developmental Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Psychological Society.)

A cardinal feature of adult cognition is the awareness of our own cognitive struggles and the capacity to draw upon this awareness to offload internal demand into the environment. In this preregistered study conducted in Australia, we investigated whether 3-8-year-olds ( N = 72, 36 male, 36 female, mostly White) could self-initiate such an external metacognitive strategy and transfer it across contexts. Children watched as an experimenter demonstrated how to mark the location of a hidden prize, thus helping them successfully retrieve that prize in the future. Children were then given the opportunity to spontaneously adopt an external marking strategy across six test trials. Children who did so at least once were then introduced to a conceptually similar but structurally distinct transfer task. Although most 3-year-olds deployed the demonstrated strategy in the initial test phase, none of them modified that strategy to solve the transfer task. By contrast, many children aged 4 years and older spontaneously devised more than one previously unseen reminder-setting strategy across the six transfer trials, with this tendency increasing with age. From age 6, children deployed effective external strategies on most trials, with the number, combination, and order of unique strategies used varying widely both within and across the older age groups. These results demonstrate young children's remarkable flexibility in the transferral of external strategies across contexts and point to pronounced individual differences in the strategies children devise. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Antimicrobial peptides (AMPs) represent a potential solution to the growing problem of antimicrobial resistance, yet their identification through wet-lab experiments is a costly and time-consuming process. Accurate computational predictions would allow rapid in silico screening of candidate AMPs, thereby accelerating the discovery process. Kernel methods are a class of machine learning algorithms that utilise a kernel function to transform input data into a new representation. When appropriately normalised, the kernel function can be regarded as a notion of similarity between instances. However, many expressive notions of similarity are not valid kernel functions, meaning they cannot be used with standard kernel methods such as the support-vector machine (SVM). The Kreĭn-SVM represents generalisation of the standard SVM that admits a much larger class of similarity functions. In this study, we propose and develop Kreĭn-SVM models for AMP classification and prediction by employing the Levenshtein distance and local alignment score as sequence similarity functions. Utilising two datasets from the literature, each containing more than 3000 peptides, we train models to predict general antimicrobial activity. Our best models achieve an AUC of 0.967 and 0.863 on the test sets of each respective dataset, outperforming the in-house and literature baselines in both cases. We also curate a dataset of experimentally validated peptides, measured against Staphylococcus aureus and Pseudomonas aeruginosa , in order to evaluate the applicability of our methodology in predicting microbe-specific activity. In this case, our best models achieve an AUC of 0.982 and 0.891, respectively. Models to predict both general and microbe-specific activities are made available as web applications., Competing Interests: A. B. is an employee and shareholder in GSK., (This journal is © The Royal Society of Chemistry.)

Adults often reason about what might have happened had they chosen an alternative course of action in the past, which can elicit the counterfactual emotion of regret. It is unclear whether young children's emotions are similarly impacted by counterfactual thinking about past possibilities. In this study, 4- to 9-year-old children ( N = 160) opened one of two boxes, which concealed small and large prizes, respectively. Some children had the means to open either box, whereas other children only had the means to open one box. After seeing that the prize they did not obtain was larger than the one they did obtain, children were significantly more likely to report a negative change in emotion when the non-obtained prize had been a straightforward counterfactual possibility than when it had not. This shows that even young children experience counterfactual emotions following choices, which may ultimately drive them to make better choices in the future. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Humans possess the remarkable capacity to imagine possible worlds and to demarcate possibilities and impossibilities in reasoning. We can think about what might happen in the future and consider what the present would look like had the past turned out differently. We reason about cause and effect, weigh up alternative courses of action and regret our mistakes. In this theme issue, leading experts from across the life sciences provide ground-breaking insights into the proximate questions of how thinking about possibilities works and develops, and the ultimate questions of its adaptive functions and evolutionary history. Together, the contributions delineate neurophysiological, cognitive and social mechanisms involved in mentally simulating possible states of reality; and point to conceptual changes in the understanding of singular and multiple possibilities during human development. The contributions also demonstrate how thinking about possibilities can augment learning, decision-making and judgement, and highlight aspects of the capacity that appear to be shared with non-human animals and aspects that may be uniquely human. Throughout the issue, it becomes clear that many developmental milestones achieved during childhood, and many of the most significant evolutionary and cultural triumphs of the human species, can only be understood with reference to increasingly complex reasoning about possibilities. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

The use of machine learning methods for the prediction of reaction yield is an emerging area. We demonstrate the applicability of support vector regression (SVR) for predicting reaction yields, using combinatorial data. Molecular descriptors used in regression tasks related to chemical reactivity have often been based on time-consuming, computationally demanding quantum chemical calculations, usually density functional theory. Structure-based descriptors (molecular fingerprints and molecular graphs) are quicker and easier to calculate and are applicable to any molecule. In this study, SVR models built on structure-based descriptors were compared to models built on quantum chemical descriptors. The models were evaluated along the dimension of each reaction component in a set of Buchwald-Hartwig amination reactions. The structure-based SVR models outperformed the quantum chemical SVR models, along the dimension of each reaction component. The applicability of the models was assessed with respect to similarity to training. Prospective predictions of unseen Buchwald-Hartwig reactions are presented for synthetic assessment, to validate the generalizability of the models, with particular interest along the aryl halide dimension.

Metacognition plays an essential role in adults' cognitive offloading decisions. Despite possessing basic metacognitive capacities, however, preschool-aged children often fail to offload effectively. Here, we introduced 3- to 5-year-olds to a novel search task in which they were unlikely to perform optimally across trials without setting external reminders about the location of a target. Children watched as an experimenter first hid a target in one of three identical opaque containers. The containers were then shuffled out of view before children had to guess where the target was hidden. In the test phase, children could perform perfectly by simply placing a marker in a transparent jar attached to the target container prior to shuffling, and then later selecting the marked container. Children of all ages used this external strategy above chance levels if they had seen it demonstrated to them, but only the 4- and 5-year-olds independently devised the strategy to improve their future performance. These results suggest that, when necessary for optimal performance, even 4- and 5-year-olds can use metacognitive knowledge about their own future uncertainty to deploy effective external solutions., (© 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

Ninety-seven children aged 4-11 (49 males, 48 females, mostly White) were given the opportunity to improve their problem-solving performance by devising and implementing a novel cognitive offloading strategy. Across two phases, they searched for hidden rewards using maps that were either aligned or misaligned with the search space. In the second phase, maps were presented on rotatable turntables, thus allowing children to manually align all maps and alleviate mental rotation demand. From age six onwards, children showed strong evidence of both mentally rotating misaligned maps in phase 1 and manually aligning them in phase 2. Older children used this form of cognitive offloading more frequently, which substantially improved performance and eliminated the individual differences observed in phase 1., (© 2021 The Authors. Child Development © 2021 Society for Research in Child Development.)

Ferrigno et al. (2021) claim to provide evidence that monkeys can reason through the disjunctive syllogism (given A or B, not A, therefore B) and conclude that monkeys therefore understand logical "or" relations. Yet their data fail to provide evidence that the baboons they tested understood the exclusive "or" relations in the experimental task. For two mutually exclusive possibilities-A or B-the monkeys appeared to infer that B was true when A was shown to be false, but they failed to infer that B was false when A was shown to be true. In our own research, we recently found an identical response pattern in 2.5- to 4-year-old children, whereas 5-year-olds demonstrated that they could make both inferences. The monkeys' and younger children's responses are instead consistent with an incorrect understanding of A and B as having an inclusive "or" relation. Only the older children provided compelling evidence of representing the exclusive "or" relation between A and B.

Neonatal imitation is a cornerstone in many theoretical accounts of human development and social behavior, yet its existence has been debated for the past 40 years. To examine possible explanations for the inconsistent findings in this body of research, we conducted a multilevel meta-analysis synthesizing 336 effect sizes from 33 independent samples of human newborns, reported in 26 articles. The meta-analysis found significant evidence for neonatal imitation ( d = 0.68, 95% CI = [0.39, 0.96], p < .001) but substantial heterogeneity between study estimates. This heterogeneity was not explained by any of 13 methodological moderators identified by previous reviews, but it was associated with researcher affiliation, test of moderators ( QM ) (15) = 57.09, p < .001. There are at least two possible explanations for these results: (a) Neonatal imitation exists and its detection varies as a function of uncaptured methodological factors common to a limited set of studies, and (2) neonatal imitation does not exist and the overall positive result is an artifact of high researcher degrees of freedom.

Aim: To explore patients' experiences of virtual consultations during the COVID-19 Alert Level 4 lockdown in New Zealand., Method: A single-practice retrospective phone survey exploring patients' satisfaction with the phone consultation process during Alert Level 4 lockdown., Results: Of 259 eligible patients, 108 (42%) participated in the survey. Overall satisfaction with phone consultations was high, with a median score 9 out of 10 (95% CI 9-9). Participants were highly likely to recommend phone consultations to others, with a median score of 9 (95% CI 7-9). This was consistent across age groups, ethnicities and socioeconomic groupings. Men were less satisfied with phone consultations than women, with a 2 point (95% CI -3--1) lower median score than women, but they were not less likely to recommend phone consultations. Most participants found phone consultations to be convenient and time-saving and considered not seeing the doctor to be acceptable in the context of the lockdown. Few participants experienced technical difficulties over the phone. Issues of communication and appropriateness of consultations to the medium of the phone were raised., Conclusion: This single-centre study demonstrates the acceptability of phone consults for most patients presenting to general practice during a pandemic. These findings need further exploration in broader general practice settings and non-pandemic contexts., Competing Interests: Nil.

Prospective memory (PM) tasks that impose strong demands on strategic monitoring decline more in late adulthood relative to tasks dependent on more automatic cue detection processes. This finding has proven robust to numerous manipulations, with one exception: time-based PM. However, conventional time-based tasks may inadvertently present time-related yet still event-based cues. At the same time, prior studies have failed to consider whether time-based age differences vary according to the degree of deliberate strategic processing required to access these cues. In this study, 53 younger and 40 older participants completed three time-based PM conditions in which a response had to be executed when a sand timer completed a cycle. In one condition, this timer could only be accessed by explicit, deliberate monitoring (by pressing a specific key), in a second, it could also be accessed more perfunctorily (simply by altering ones' visual focus)-and in the third, could not be accessed at all (forcing participants to rely solely on internal temporal estimation processes). Negative age differences emerged in both conditions where participants were able to access the timer, but not in the condition where the timer was hidden. These data provide novel evidence of age-related preservation in at least some aspects of the temporal processing required to support time-based PM. They also suggest that younger and older adults can and do engage in monitoring when given this option, but that only the former group may be able to benefit, even when this monitoring can be conducted relatively perfunctorily. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Traditionally, infants have learned how to interact with objects in their environment through direct observations of adults and peers. In recent decades these models have been available over different media, and this has introduced non-human agents to infants' learning environments. Humanoid robots are increasingly portrayed as social agents in on screen, but the degree to which infants are capable of observational learning from screen-based robots is unknown. The current study thus investigated how well 1- to 3-year-olds (N = 230) could imitate on-screen robots relative to on-screen and live humans. Participants exhibited an imitation deficit for robots that varied with age. Furthermore, the well-known video deficit did not replicate as expected, and was weak and transient relative to past research. Together, the findings documented here suggest that infants are learning from media in ways that differ from past generations, but that this new learning is nuanced when novel technologies are involved., (Crown Copyright © 2021. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Robots are an increasingly prevalent presence in children's lives. However, little is known about the ways in which children learn from robots and whether they do so in the same way as they learn from humans. To investigate this, we adapted a previously established imitation paradigm centered on inefficient tool use. Children (3- to 6-year-olds; N = 121) were measured on their acquisition and transmission of normative knowledge modeled by a human or a robot. Children were more likely to adopt use of a normative tool and to transmit this knowledge to another when shown how to do so by the human than when shown how to do so by the robot. Older children (5- and 6-year-olds) were less likely than younger children (3- and 4-year-olds) to select the normative tool. Our findings suggest that preschool children are capable of copying and transmitting normative techniques from both human and robot models, albeit at different rates and dependent on age., (Copyright © 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Children recognise the social value of imitation but do not opt for tools that are 'normative' if they are also dysfunctional. We investigated whether children would replicate a normative method in a tool-learning task if it was instrumentally functional but less efficient than an alternative. Four- to six-year-old children were presented with a sticker-retrieving task and two equally functional tool options that differed in efficiency. The inefficient tool was highlighted as the normative option. Verbal descriptors that established the normative value of the inefficient tool (e.g., 'everybody' uses this) did not motivate children to use it. The majority of children opted for instrumental efficiency over conformity., (© 2021 The British Psychological Society.)

Mody and Carey (2016) investigated children's capacity to reason by the disjunctive syllogism by hiding stickers within two pairs of cups (i.e., there is one sticker in cup A or B, and one in cup C or D) and then showing one cup to be empty. They found that children as young as 3 years of age chose the most likely cup (i.e., not A, therefore choose B; and disregard C and D) and suggested that these children were representing the dependent relationship between A and B by applying the logical operator "or". However, it is possible that children succeeded using simpler strategies, such as avoiding the empty cup and choosing within the manipulated pair. We devised a new version of the task in which a sticker was visibly removed from one of the four cups so that 2.5- to 5-year-old children (N = 100) would fail if they relied on such strategies. We also included a conceptual replication of Mody and Carey's (2016) original condition. Our results replicated their findings and showed that even younger children, 2.5 years of age, could pass above chance levels. Yet, 2.5-, 3- and 4-year-olds failed the new condition. Only 5-year-old children performed above chance in both conditions and so provided compelling evidence of deductive reasoning from the premise "A or B", where "or" is exclusive. We propose that younger children may instead conceive of the relationship between A and B as inclusive "or" across both versions of the task., (Copyright © 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Mobile containers are a keystone human innovation. Ethnographic data indicate that all human groups use containers such as bags, quivers and baskets, ensuring that individuals have important resources at the ready and are prepared for opportunities and threats before they materialize. Although there is speculation surrounding the invention of carrying devices, the current hard archaeological evidence only reaches back some 100,000 years. The dearth of ancient evidence may reflect not only taphonomic processes, but also a lack of attention to these devices. To begin investigating the origins of carrying devices we focus on exploring the basic cognitive processes involved in mobile container use and report an initial study on young children's understanding and deployment of such devices. We gave 3- to 7-year-old children ( N = 106) the opportunity to spontaneously identify and use a basket to increase their own carrying capacity and thereby obtain more resources in the future. Performance improved linearly with age, as did the likelihood of recognizing that adults use mobile carrying devices to increase carrying capacity. We argue that the evolutionary and developmental origins of mobile containers reflect foundational cognitive processes that enable humans to think about their own limits and compensate for them., Competing Interests: The authors report no conflict of interest., (© The Author(s) 2020.)

From maps sketched in sand to supercomputing software, humans ubiquitously enhance cognitive performance by creating and using artifacts that bear mental load [1-5]. This extension of information processing into the environment has taken center stage in debates about the nature of cognition in humans and other animals [6-9]. How does the human mind acquire such strategies? In two experiments, we investigated the developmental origins of cognitive offloading in 150 children aged between 4 and 11 years. We created a memory task in which children were required to recall the location of hidden targets. In one experiment, participants were provided with a pre-specified cognitive offloading opportunity: an option to mark the target locations with tokens during the hiding period. Even 4-year-old children quickly adopted this external strategy and, in line with a metacognitive account, children across ages offloaded more often when the task was more difficult. In a second experiment, we provided children with the means to devise their own cognitive offloading strategy. Very few younger children spontaneously devised a solution, but by ages 10 and 11, nearly all did so. In a follow-up test phase, a simple prompt greatly increased the rate at which the younger children devised an offloading strategy. These findings suggest that sensitivity to the difficulties of thinking arises early in development and improves throughout the early school years, with children learning to modify the world around them to compensate for their cognitive limits., Competing Interests: Declaration of Interests The authors declare no competing interests., (Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Many animals manipulate their environments in ways that appear to augment cognitive processing. Adult humans show remarkable flexibility in this domain, typically relying on internal cognitive processing when adequate but turning to external support in situations of high internal demand. We use calendars, calculators, navigational aids and other external means to compensate for our natural cognitive shortcomings and achieve otherwise unattainable feats of intelligence. As yet, however, the developmental origins of this fundamental capacity for cognitive offloading remain largely unknown. In two studies, children aged 4-11 years ( n = 258) were given an opportunity to manually rotate a turntable to eliminate the internal demands of mental rotation--to solve the problem in the world rather than in their heads. In study 1, even the youngest children showed a linear relationship between mental rotation demand and likelihood of using the external strategy, paralleling the classic relationship between angle of mental rotation and reaction time. In study 2, children were introduced to a version of the task where manually rotating inverted stimuli was sometimes beneficial to performance and other times redundant. With increasing age, children were significantly more likely to manually rotate the turntable only when it would benefit them. These results show how humans gradually calibrate their cognitive offloading strategies throughout childhood and thereby uncover the developmental origins of this central facet of intelligence.

The influential hypothesis that humans imitate from birth - and that this capacity is foundational to social cognition - is currently being challenged from several angles. Most prominently, the largest and most comprehensive longitudinal study of neonatal imitation to date failed to find evidence that neonates copied any of nine actions at any of four time points (Oostenbroek et al., [2016] Current Biology, 26, 1334-1338). The authors of an alternative and statistically liberal post-hoc analysis of these same data (Meltzoff et al., [2017] Developmental Science, 21, e12609), however, concluded that the infants actually did imitate one of the nine actions: tongue protrusion. In line with the original intentions of this longitudinal study, we here report on whether individual differences in neonatal "imitation" predict later-developing social cognitive behaviours. We measured a variety of social cognitive behaviours in a subset of the original sample of infants (N = 71) during the first 18 months: object-directed imitation, joint attention, synchronous imitation and mirror self-recognition. Results show that, even using the liberal operationalization, individual scores for neonatal "imitation" of tongue protrusion failed to predict any of the later-developing social cognitive behaviours. The average Spearman correlation was close to zero, mean r s  = 0.027, 95% CI [-0.020, 0.075], with all Bonferroni adjusted p values > .999. These results run counter to Meltzoff et al.'s rebuttal, and to the existence of a "like me" mechanism in neonates that is foundational to human social cognition., (© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

This study examined 3-year old children and monkeys' capacities to prepare for immediate future events. In Study 1, children were presented with several tube apparatuses with two exits. When targets were certain to emerge from both, children tended to prepare to catch them by covering each exit. When it was uncertain where targets would emerge, however, they tended to prepare for only one possibility. These results substantiate the claim that simultaneous preparation for mutually exclusive possibilities develops relatively late. Study 2 found no evidence for such a capacity in monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi, Cebus apella, Papio hamadryas) given the same tasks., (© 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.)

Humans can imagine what happened in the past and what will happen in the future, but also what did not happen and what might happen. We reflect on envisioned events from alternative timelines, while knowing that we only ever live on one timeline. Considering alternative timelines rests on representations of temporal junctures, or points in time at which possible versions of reality diverge. These representations become increasingly sophisticated over childhood, first enabling preparation for mutually exclusive future possibilities and later the experience of counterfactual emotions like regret. By contrast, it remains unclear whether non-human animals represent temporal junctures at all. The emergence of these representations may have been a prime mover in human evolution., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) discuss the possible function of meta-representations in temporal cognition but ultimately take an agnostic stance. Here we outline the fundamental role that we believe meta-representations play. Because humans know that their representations of future events are just representations, they are in a position to compensate for the shortcomings of their own foresight and to prepare for multiple contingencies.

Humans often engage in complex thought about the past, present, and future. They not only think about what did happen, is happening, and will happen, but also what did not happen, is not happening, and will not happen. Here we present an integrated taxonomy of mental time travel and counterfactual thought, in which event representations are assigned categorically distinct temporal locations (i.e., past, present, or future) and subjective propositional values (i.e., affirmed, negated, or uncertain). We review research on children's developing abilities to generate and reason about event representations with these characteristics. We find that children's development typically proceeds in three stages: (1) the capacity to imagine and reflect on affirmed and uncertain past, present, and future outcomes, (2) the capacity to imagine and reflect on counterfactual, negated versions of known past outcomes and present situations, and (3) the capacity to anticipate experiencing counterfactual emotions (i.e., regret and relief) in the future. This protracted developmental trajectory may be a function of increasing executive demands, increasing hierarchical complexity of temporal representations, or both., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

This study examined children's moral concern for robots relative to living and nonliving entities. Children (4-10 years of age, N = 126) watched videos of six different entities having a box placed over them that was subsequently struck by a human hand. Children were subsequently asked to rate the moral worth of each agent relating to physical harm. Children afforded robotic entities less moral concern than living entities but afforded them more moral concern than nonliving entities, and these effects became more pronounced with age. Children's tendency to ascribe mental life to robotic and nonliving entities (but not living entities) predicted moral concern for these entities. However, when asked to make moral judgments relating to giving the agent away, children did not distinguish between nonliving and robotic agents and no age-related changes were identified. Moreover, the tendency to ascribe mental life was predictive of moral concern only for some agents but not others. Overall, the findings suggest that children consider robotic entities to occupy a middle moral ground between living and nonliving entities and that this effect is partly explained by the tendency to ascribe mental life to such agents. They also demonstrate that moral worth is a complex multifaceted concept that does not demonstrate a clear pattern across different ontological categories., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Extensive research has documented that the antisocial behavior of others influences children's perceptions of and behavior toward them. In general, children report liking antisocial agents less, allocate them fewer resources, and are less likely to help them. Despite this, no research to date has explored how antisocial behavior may influence another socially driven behavior-imitation. Moreover, no research has addressed this question cross-culturally. To explore this, children were shown groups behaving prosocially or antisocially and were subsequently given the chance to imitate causally opaque actions (employed to highlight their normative framework) performed by these groups. Children from two cultures in Australia were included in the sample: Brisbane, a medium to large metropolitan city, and Borroloola, a remote indigenous community. Results revealed no impact of prosocial or antisocial behavior on imitative actions in either culture. However, we did identify differences in imitation rates between communities. Specifically, children from Borroloola persisted with imitation at far higher rates than children from Brisbane, highlighting the need for further nuanced research to unpack cross-cultural differences in social learning proclivities., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)