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Abstract Vaccine hesitancy was a major challenge during the COVID-19 pandemic. A common but sometimes ineffective intervention to reduce vaccine hesitancy involves providing information on vaccine effectiveness, side effects, and related probabilities. Could biased processing of this information contribute to vaccine refusal? We examined the information inspection of 1200 U.S. participants with anti-vaccination, neutral, or pro-vaccination attitudes before they stated their willingness to accept eight different COVID-19 vaccines. All participants—particularly those who were anti-vaccination—frequently ignored some of the information. This deliberate ignorance, especially toward probabilities of extreme side effects, was a stronger predictor of vaccine refusal than typically investigated demographic variables. Computational modeling suggested that vaccine refusals among anti-vaccination participants were driven by ignoring even inspected information. In the neutral and pro-vaccination groups, vaccine refusal was driven by distorted processing of side effects and their probabilities. Our findings highlight the necessity for interventions tailored to individual information-processing tendencies.

Models of heuristics are often predicated on the desideratum that they should possess no free parameters. As a result, heuristic implementations are usually deterministic and do not allow for any choice errors, as the latter would require a parameter to regulate the magnitude of errors. We discuss the implications of this in light of research that highlights the evidence supporting stochastic choice and its dependence on preferential strength. We argue that, in principle, the existing models of deterministic heuristics should, and can, be quite easily modified to stochastic counterparts through the addition of an error mechanism. This requires a single free parameter in the error mechanism, whilst otherwise retaining the parameter-free cognitive processes in the deterministic component of existing heuristics. We present various types of error mechanisms applicable to heuristics and discuss their comparative virtues and drawbacks, paying particular attention to their impact on model comparisons between heuristics and parameter-rich models.

Abstract Risk preference is an important construct for understanding individual differences in risk taking throughout the behavioral sciences. An active stream of research has focused on better understanding risk preference through its connection to other psychological constructs, in particular, cognitive abilities. Here, we examine two large-scale multimethod data sets and demonstrate that the method used to measure risk preference is an important moderator. In self-report measures, we found small but consistent positive correlations between working memory capacity/numeracy, facets of cognitive abilities, and risk tolerance. In behavioral measures, we found, on average, no correlation and large intermethod heterogeneity. This heterogeneity can be explained by the choice architecture that is created in behavioral methods—in particular, the relation between risk and reward and the impact of decision error in a task. Consequently, investigating how risk preference relates to psychological constructs such as cognitive abilities require a profound understanding of the choice architecture in measurements of risk preference and in the real world.

BackgroundAlthough transparency is crucial for building public trust, public health communication during the COVID-19 pandemic was often nontransparent.MethodsIn a cross-sectional online study with COVID-19 vaccine-hesitant German residents (N = 763), we explored the impact of COVID-19 public health communication on the attitudes of vaccine-hesitant individuals toward vaccines as well as their perceptions of incomprehensible and incomplete information. We also investigated whether specific formats of public health messaging were perceived as more trustworthy.ResultsOf the 763 participants, 90 (11.8%) said they had become more open-minded toward vaccines in general, 408 (53.5%) reported no change, and 265 (34.7%) said they had become more skeptical as a result of public health communication on COVID-19 vaccines. These subgroups differed in how incomprehensible they found public health communication and whether they thought information had been missing. Participants’ ranking of trustworthy public health messaging did not provide clear-cut results: the fully transparent message, which reported the benefit and harms in terms of absolute risk, and the nontransparent message, which reported only the benefit in terms of relative risk were both considered equally trustworthy (p = 0.848).DiscussionIncreased skepticism about vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic may have partly been fueled by subpar public health communication. Given the importance of public trust for coping with future health crises, public health communicators should ensure that their messaging is clear and transparent.

This Comment piece summarises current challenges regarding routine vaccine uptake in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and provides recommendations on how to increase uptake. To implement these recommendations, the article points to evidence-based resources that can support health-care workers, policy makers and communicators.

Abstract Background Long-term prescriptions of strong opioids for chronic noncancer pain—which are not supported by scientific evidence—suggest miscalibrated risk perceptions among those who prescribe, dispense, and take opioids. Because risk perceptions and behaviors can differ depending on whether people learn about risks through description or experience, we investigated the effects of descriptive versus simulated-experience educative formats on physicians’ risk perceptions of strong opioids and their prescription behavior for managing chronic noncancer pain. Methods Three hundred general practitioners and 300 pain specialists in Germany—enrolled separately in two independent exploratory randomized controlled online trials—were randomly assigned to either a descriptive format (fact box) or a simulated-experience format (interactive simulation). Primary endpoints Objective risk perception (numerical estimates of opioids’ benefits and harms), actual prescriptions of seven therapy options for managing chronic pain. Secondary endpoint Implementation of intended prescriptions of seven therapy options for managing chronic pain. Results Both formats improved the proportion of correct numerical estimates of strong opioids’ benefits and harms immediately after intervention, with no notable differences between formats. Compared to description, simulated experience led to significantly lower reported actual prescription rates for strong and/or weak opioids, and was more effective at increasing prescription rates for non-drug-based therapies (e.g., means of opioid reduction) from baseline to follow-up for both general practitioners and pain specialists. Simulated experience also resulted in a higher implementation of intended behavior for some drug-based and non-drug-based therapies. Conclusions The two formats, which recruit different cognitive processes, may serve different risk-communication goals: If the goal is to improve exact risk perception, descriptive and simulated-experience formats are likely to be equally suitable. If, however, the goal is to boost less risky prescription habits, simulated experience may be the better choice. Trial registration DRKS00020358 (German Clinical Trials Register, first registration: 07/01/2020).

Abstract People routinely rely on experts’ advice to guide their decisions. However, experts are known to make inconsistent judgments when judging the same case twice. Previous research on expert inconsistency has largely focused on individual or situational factors; here we focus directly on the cases themselves. First, using a theoretical model, we study how within-expert inconsistency and confidence are related to how strongly experts agree on a case. Second, we empirically test the model’s predictions in two real-world datasets with a diagnostic ground truth from follow-up research: diagnosticians rating the same mammograms or images of the lower spine twice. Our modeling and empirical analyses converge on the same novel results: The more experts disagree in their initial decisions about a case (i.e., as consensus decreases), the less confident individual experts are in their initial decision—despite not knowing the level of consensus—and the more likely they are to judge that same case differently when facing it again months later, regardless of whether the expert consensus is correct. Our results suggest the following advice when faced with two conflicting decisions from a single expert: In the absence of more predictive cues, choose the more confident decision.

When judging the average value of sample stimuli (e.g., numbers) people tend to either over- or underweight extreme sample values, depending on task context. In a context of overweighting, recent work has shown that extreme sample values were overly represented also in neural signals, in terms of an anti-compressed geometry of number samples in multivariate electroencephalography (EEG) patterns. Here, we asked whether neural representational geometries may also reflect a relative underweighting of extreme values (i.e., compression) which has been observed behaviorally in a great variety of tasks. We used a simple experimental manipulation (instructions to average a single-stream or to compare dual-streams of samples) to induce compression or anti-compression in behavior when participants judged rapid number sequences. Model-based representational similarity analysis (RSA) replicated the previous finding of neural anti-compression in the dual-stream task, but failed to provide evidence for neural compression in the single-stream task, despite the evidence for compression in behavior. Instead, the results indicated enhanced neural processing of extreme values in either task, regardless of whether extremes were over- or underweighted in subsequent behavioral choice. We further observed more general differences in the neural representation of the sample information between the two tasks. Together, our results indicate a mismatch between sample-level EEG geometries and behavior, which raises new questions about the origin of common psychometric distortions, such as diminishing sensitivity for larger values.

Abstract The COVID-19 pandemic has seen one of the first large-scale uses of digital contact tracing to track a chain of infection and contain the spread of a virus. The new technology has posed challenges both for governments aiming at high and effective uptake and for citizens weighing its benefits (e.g., protecting others’ health) against the potential risks (e.g., loss of data privacy). Our cross-sectional survey with repeated measures across four samples in Germany ( $$N = 4357$$ N = 4357 ) focused on psychological factors contributing to the public adoption of digital contact tracing. We found that public acceptance of privacy-encroaching measures (e.g., granting the government emergency access to people’s medical records or location tracking data) decreased over the course of the pandemic. Intentions to use contact tracing apps—hypothetical ones or the Corona-Warn-App launched in Germany in June 2020—were high. Users and non-users of the Corona-Warn-App differed in their assessment of its risks and benefits, in their knowledge of the underlying technology, and in their reasons to download or not to download the app. Trust in the app’s perceived security and belief in its effectiveness emerged as psychological factors playing a key role in its adoption. We incorporate our findings into a behavioral framework for digital contact tracing and provide policy recommendations.

Abstract Understanding how people of different ages decide in competition is a question of theoretical and practical importance. Using an experimental laboratory approach, this research investigates the ability of younger and older adults to think and act strategically with equal or unequal resources. In zero-sum games of resource allocation, younger adults (19–35 years) and older adults (65–81 years) made strategic decisions in competition against opponents of a similar age (Study 1; N = 120) or different age (Study 2; N = 120). The findings highlight people’s ability to make good interpersonal decisions in complex scenarios: Both younger and older adults were aware of their relative strength (in terms of material resources) and allocated their resources adaptively. When competing against opponents of a similar age, people’s gains were in line with game-theoretic predictions. However, younger adults made superior strategic allocations and won more frequently when competing against older adults. Measures of fluid cognitive and numerical abilities correlated with strategic behavior in interpersonal competition.

Abstract Online platforms’ data give advertisers the ability to “microtarget” recipients’ personal vulnerabilities by tailoring different messages for the same thing, such as a product or political candidate. One possible response is to raise awareness for and resilience against such manipulative strategies through psychological inoculation. Two online experiments (total $$N= 828$$ N = 828 ) demonstrated that a short, simple intervention prompting participants to reflect on an attribute of their own personality—by completing a short personality questionnaire—boosted their ability to accurately identify ads that were targeted at them by up to 26 percentage points. Accuracy increased even without personalized feedback, but merely providing a description of the targeted personality dimension did not improve accuracy. We argue that such a “boosting approach,” which here aims to improve people’s competence to detect manipulative strategies themselves, should be part of a policy mix aiming to increase platforms’ transparency and user autonomy.

Abstract People rely on data-driven AI technologies nearly every time they go online, whether they are shopping, scrolling through news feeds, or looking for entertainment. Yet despite their ubiquity, personalization algorithms and the associated large-scale collection of personal data have largely escaped public scrutiny. Policy makers who wish to introduce regulations that respect people’s attitudes towards privacy and algorithmic personalization on the Internet would greatly benefit from knowing how people perceive personalization and personal data collection. To contribute to an empirical foundation for this knowledge, we surveyed public attitudes towards key aspects of algorithmic personalization and people’s data privacy concerns and behavior using representative online samples in Germany (N = 1065), Great Britain (N = 1092), and the United States (N = 1059). Our findings show that people object to the collection and use of sensitive personal information and to the personalization of political campaigning and, in Germany and Great Britain, to the personalization of news sources. Encouragingly, attitudes are independent of political preferences: People across the political spectrum share the same concerns about their data privacy and show similar levels of acceptance regarding personalized digital services and the use of private data for personalization. We also found an acceptability gap: People are more accepting of personalized services than of the collection of personal data and information required for these services. A large majority of respondents rated, on average, personalized services as more acceptable than the collection of personal information or data. The acceptability gap can be observed at both the aggregate and the individual level. Across countries, between 64% and 75% of respondents showed an acceptability gap. Our findings suggest a need for transparent algorithmic personalization that minimizes use of personal data, respects people’s preferences on personalization, is easy to adjust, and does not extend to political advertising.

During the Covid-19 pandemic, people have been exposed to vast amounts of misinformation. This “infodemic” has undermined key behavioural and pharmacological measures to contain the pandemic. In a cross-sectional survey of residents of Germany, we investigated the perceived prevalence of misinformation, the strategies people reported using to discern between true and false information, and individual differences in beliefs in misinformation at three time points from June 2020 to February 2021 (N = 3324). We observed four main results. First, there was an increase in the perceived prevalence of misinformation over time. Second, the most believed false claims included that the virus is no worse than the flu and that the EU has approved dangerous vaccines. Third, belief in misinformation was associated with support for the far-right AfD party; reliance on tabloids, neighbours and social media for information; lower levels of education; and migration background. Fourth, only about half of the respondents reported using strategies such as checking for consistency between different sources to identify misinformation. These results can inform the development of interventions, such as boosting the ability to discern accurate from misleading information, or enriching specific environments (e.g., neighbourhoods with high rates of migration) with accessible and high-quality information.

Objectives. High opioid prescription rates in the United States and Europe suggest miscalibrated risk perceptions among those who prescribe, dispense, and take opioids. Findings from cognitive decision science suggest that risk perceptions and behaviors can differ depending on whether people learn about risks by experience or description. This study investigated effects of a descriptive versus an experience-based risk education format on pharmacists’ risk perceptions and counseling behavior in the long-term administration of strong opioids to patients with chronic noncancer pain. Methods. In an exploratory, randomized controlled online trial, 300 German pharmacists were randomly assigned to either a descriptive format (fact box) or a simulated experience format (interactive simulation). Primary Outcome Measures. 1) Objective risk perception, 2) subjective risk perception, and 3) intended and 4) actual counseling behavior. Results. Both risk formats significantly improved pharmacists’ objective risk perception, but pharmacists exposed to the fact box estimated the benefit-harm ratio more accurately than those exposed to the simulation. Both formats proved equally effective in adjusting pharmacists’ subjective risk perception toward a better recognition of opioids’ harms; however, pharmacists receiving the simulation showed a greater change in their actual counseling behavior and higher consistency between their intended and actual counseling than pharmacists receiving the fact box. Conclusion. The simulated experience format was less effective than the descriptive format in improving pharmacists’ objective risk perception, equally effective in motivating pharmacists to counsel patients on less risky treatment alternatives and more effective in changing the reported actual counseling behavior. Implications. These exploratory findings provide important insights into the relevance of the description-experience gap for drug safety and raise questions for future research regarding the specific mechanisms at work.

Summary: Decision makers in contexts as diverse as medical, judicial, and political decision making are known to differ substantially in response bias and accuracy, and these differences are a major factor undermining the reliability and fairness of the respective decision systems. Using theoretical modeling and empirical testing across five domains, we show that collective systems based on pooling decisions robustly overcome this important but as of now unresolved problem of experts' heterogeneity. In breast and skin cancer diagnostics and fingerprint analysis, we find that pooling the decisions of five experts reduces the variation in sensitivity among decision makers by 52%, 54%, and 41%, respectively. Similar reductions are achieved for specificity and response bias, and in other domains. Thus, although outcomes in individual decision systems are highly variable and at the mercy of individual decision makers, collective systems based on pooling decrease this variation, thereby promoting reliability, fairness, and possibly even trust.

Background: The pressure on physicians when a patient seeks pain relief and their own desire to be self-effective may lead to the prescription of strong opioids for chronic noncancer pain (CNCP). This study, via physician self-reporting, aims to identify and measure (i) physician adherence to national opioid prescribing guidelines and (ii) physician emotions when a patient seeks a dosage increase of the opioid. Methods: Within a cross-sectional survey—conducted as part of a randomized controlled online intervention trial (ERONA)—600 German physicians were queried on their opioid prescribing behavior (choice and formulation of opioid, indications) for CNCP patients and their emotions to a case vignette describing a patient seeking an opioid dosage increase without signs of objective deterioration. Results: The prescription of strong opioids in this study was not always in accordance with current guidelines. When presented with a scenario in which a patient sought to have their opioid dose increased, some physicians reported negative feelings, such as either pressure (25%), helplessness (25%), anger (23%) or a combination. The risk of non-guideline-compliant prescribing behavior using the example of ultrafast-acting fentanyl for CNCP was increased when negative emotions were present (OR: 1.7; 95%-CI: 1.2–2.6; p = 0.007) or when sublingual buprenorphine was prescribed (OR: 15.4; 95%-CI: 10.1–23.3; p < 0.001). Conclusions: Physicians’ emotional self-awareness represents the first step to identify such direct reactions to patient requests and to ensure a responsible, guideline-based opioid prescription approach for the long-term well-being of the patient.

Objectives The impact of the quality of discharge communication between physicians and their patients is critical on patients’ health outcomes. Nevertheless, low recall of information given to patients at discharge from emergency departments (EDs) is a well-documented problem. Therefore, we investigated the outcomes and related benefits of two different communication strategies: Physicians were instructed to either use empathy (E) or information structuring (S) skills hypothesizing superior recall by patients in the S group. Methods For the direct comparison of two communication strategies at discharge, physicians were cluster-randomized to an E or a S skills training. Feasibility was measured by training completion rates. Outcomes were measured in patients immediately after discharge, after 7, and 30 days. Primary outcome was patients’ immediate recall of discharge information. Secondary outcomes were feasibility of training implementation, patients’ adherence to recommendations and satisfaction, as well as the patient-physician relationship. Results Of 117 eligible physicians, 80 (68.4%) completed the training. Out of 256 patients randomized to one of the two training groups (E: 146 and S: 119) 196 completed the post-discharge assessment. Patients’ immediate recall of discharge information was superior in patients in the S-group vs. E-group. Patients in the S-group adhered to more recommendations within 30 days (p = .002), and were more likely to recommend the physician to family and friends (p = .021). No differences were found on other assessed outcome domains. Conclusions and practice Implications Immediate recall and subsequent adherence to recommendations were higher in the S group. Feasibility was shown by a 69.6% completion rate of trainings. Thus, trainings of discharge information structuring are feasible and improve patients’ recall, and may therefore improve quality of care in the ED.

Maladaptive risk taking can have severe individual and societal consequences; thus, individual differences are prominent targets for intervention and prevention. Although brain activation has been shown to be associated with individual differences in risk taking, the directionality of the reported brain–behavior associations is less clear. Here, we argue that one aspect contributing to the mixed results is the low convergence between risk-taking measures, especially between the behavioral tasks used to elicit neural functional markers. To address this question, we analyzed within-participant neuroimaging data for two widely used risk-taking tasks collected from the imaging subsample of the Basel–Berlin Risk Study (N = 116 young human adults). Focusing on core brain regions implicated in risk taking (nucleus accumbens, anterior insula, and anterior cingulate cortex), for the two tasks, we examined group-level activation for risky versus safe choices, as well as associations between local functional markers and various risk-related outcomes, including psychometrically derived risk preference factors. While we observed common group-level activation in the two tasks (notably increased nucleus accumbens activation), individual differences analyses support the idea that the presence and directionality of associations between brain activation and risk taking varies as a function of the risk-taking measures used to capture individual differences. Our results have methodological implications for the use of brain markers for intervention or prevention.

Introduction The US opioid crisis and increasing prescription rates in Europe suggest inappropriate risk perceptions and behaviours of people who prescribe, take or advise on opioids: physicians, patients and pharmacists. Findings from cognitive and decision science in areas other than drug safety suggest that people’s risk perception and behaviour can differ depending on whether they learnt about a risk through personal experience or description. Experiencing the risk of overutilising opioids among patients with chronic non-cancer pain in ambulatory care (ERONA) is the first-ever conducted trial that aims at investigating the effects of these two modes of learning on individuals’ risk perception and behaviour in the long-term administration of WHO-III opioids in chronic non-cancer pain.Methods and analysis ERONA—an exploratory, randomised controlled online survey intervention trial with two parallel arms—will examine the opioid-associated risk perception and behaviour of four groups involved in the long-term administration of WHO-III opioids: (1) family physicians, (2) physicians specialised in pain therapy, (3) patients with chronic (≥3 months) non-cancer pain and (4) pharmacists who regularly dispense narcotic substances. Participants will be randomly assigned to one of two online risk education interventions, description based or experiencebased. Both interventions will present the best medical evidence available. Participants will be queried at baseline and after intervention on their risk perception of opioids’ benefit–harm ratio, their medical risk literacy and their current/intended risk behaviour (in terms of prescribing, taking or counselling, depending on study group). A follow-up will occur after 9 months, when participants will be queried on their actual risk behaviour. The study was developed by the authors and will be conducted by the market research institution IPSOS Health.Ethics and dissemination The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development. Results will be disseminated through peer-reviewed journals, conference presentations and social media.Trial registration number DRKS00020358.

Millions of volunteers take part in clinical trials every year. This is unsurprising, given that clinical trials are often much more lucrative than other types of unskilled work. When clinical trials offer very high pay, however, some people consider them repugnant. To understand why, we asked 1,428 respondents to evaluate a hypothetical medical trial for a new Ebola vaccine offering three different payment amounts. Some respondents (27%) used very high pay (£10,000) as a cue to infer the potential risks the clinical trial posed. These respondents were also concerned that offering £10,000 was coercive- simply too profitable to pass up. Both perceived risk and coercion in high-paying clinical trials shape how people evaluate these trials. This result was robust within and between respondents. The link between risk and repugnance may generalize to other markets in which parties are partially remunerated for the risk they take and contributes to a more complete understanding of why some market transactions appear repugnant.

Worldwide, more than one million people die on the roads each year. A third of these fatal accidents are attributed to speeding, with properties of the individual driver and the environment regarded as key contributing factors. We examine real-world speeding behavior and its interaction with illuminance, an environmental property defined as the luminous flux incident on a surface. Drawing on an analysis of 1.2 million vehicle movements, we show that reduced illuminance levels are associated with increased speeding. This relationship persists when we control for factors known to influence speeding (e.g., fluctuations in traffic volume) and consider proxies of illuminance (e.g., sight distance). Our findings add to a long-standing debate about how the quality of visual conditions affects drivers' speed perception and driving speed. Policy makers can intervene by educating drivers about the inverse illuminance‒speeding relationship and by testing how improved vehicle headlights and smart road lighting can attenuate speeding.

Popular culture reflects whatever piques our imagination. Think of the myriad movies and books that take viewers and readers on an imaginary journey to the past or the future (e.g., Gladiator, The Time Machine). Despite the ubiquity of time travel as a theme in cultural expression, the factors that underlie people’s preferences concerning the direction of time travel have gone unexplored. What determines whether a person would prefer to visit the (certain) past or explore the (uncertain) future? We identified three factors that markedly affect people’s preference for (hypothetical) travel to the past or the future, respectively. Those who think of themselves as courageous, those with a more conservative worldview, and—perhaps counterintuitively—those who are advanced in age prefer to travel into the future. We discuss implications of these initial results.

Popular culture reflects whatever piques our imagination. Think of the myriad movies and books that take viewers and readers on an imaginary journey to the past or the future (e.g., Gladiator, The Time Machine). Despite the ubiquity of time travel as a theme in cultural expression, the factors that underlie people's preferences concerning the direction of time travel have gone unexplored. What determines whether a person would prefer to visit the (certain) past or explore the (uncertain) future? We identified three factors that markedly affect people's preference for (hypothetical) travel to the past or the future, respectively. Those who think of themselves as courageous, those with a more conservative worldview, and---perhaps counterintuitively---those who are advanced in age prefer to travel into the future. We discuss implications of these initial results.

The collective recognition heuristic is a simple forecasting heuristic that bets on the fact that people’s recognition knowledge of names is a proxy for their competitiveness: In sports, it predicts that the better-known team or player wins a game. We present two studies on the predictive power of recognition in forecasting soccer games (World Cup 2006 and UEFA Euro 2008) and analyze previously published results. The performance of the collective recognition heuristic is compared to two benchmarks: predictions based on official rankings and aggregated betting odds. Across three soccer and two tennis tournaments, the predictions based on recognition performed similar to those based on rankings; when compared with betting odds, the heuristic fared reasonably well. Forecasts based on rankings—but not on betting odds—were improved by incorporating collective recognition information. We discuss the use of recognition for forecasting in sports and conclude that aggregating across individual ignorance spawns collective wisdom.

Both normative and many descriptive theories of decision making under risk are based on the notion that outcomes are weighted by their probability, with subsequent maximization of the (subjective) expected outcome. Numerous investigations from psychology, economics, and neuroscience have produced evidence consistent with this notion. However, this research has typically investigated choices involving relatively affect-poor, monetary outcomes. We compared choice in relatively affect-poor, monetary lottery problems with choice in relatively affect-rich medical decision problems. Computational modeling of behavioral data and model-based neuroimaging analyses provide converging evidence for substantial differences in the respective decision mechanisms. Relative to affect-poor choices, affect-rich choices yielded a more strongly curved probability weighting function of cumulative prospect theory, thus signaling that the psychological impact of probabilities is strongly diminished for affect-rich outcomes. Examining task-dependent brain activation, we identified a region-by-condition interaction indicating qualitative differences of activation between affect-rich and affect-poor choices. Moreover, brain activation in regions that were more active during affect-poor choices (e.g., the supramarginal gyrus) correlated with individual trial-by-trial decision weights, indicating that these regions reflect processing of probabilities. Formal reverse inference Neurosynth meta-analyses suggested that whereas affect-poor choices seem to be based on brain mechanisms for calculative processes, affect-rich choices are driven by the representation of outcomes' emotional value and autobiographical memories associated with them. These results provide evidence that the traditional notion of expectation maximization may not apply in the context of outcomes laden with affective responses, and that understanding the brain mechanisms of decision making requires the domain of the decision to be taken into account.

Across human cultures, grandparents make a valued contribution to the health of their families and communities. Moreover, evidence is gathering that grandparents have a positive impact on the development of grandchildren in contemporary industrialized societies. A broad range of factors that influence the likelihood grandparents will invest in their grandchildren has been explored by disciplines as diverse as sociology, economics, psychology and evolutionary biology. To progress toward an encompassing framework, this study will include biological relatedness between grandparents and grandchildren, a factor central to some discipline's theoretical frameworks (e.g., evolutionary biology), next to a wide range of other factors in an analysis of grandparental investment in contemporary Europe. This study draws on data collected in the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe from 11 European countries that included 22,967 grandparent-child dyads. Grandparents reported biological relatedness, and grandparental investment was measured as the frequency of informal childcare. Biological and non-biological grandparents differed significantly in a variety of individual, familial and area-level characteristics. Furthermore, many other economic, sociological, and psychological factors also influenced grandparental investment. When they were controlled, biological grandparents, relative to non-biological grandparents, were more likely to invest heavily, looking after their grandchildren almost daily or weekly. Paradoxically, however, they were also more likely to invest nothing at all. We discuss the methodological and theoretical implications of these findings across disciplines.

OBJECTIVE: In an emergency department, discharge communication represents a key step in medical care. The efficiency of this doctor-patient interaction could be hampered by two bounds: The limited time in emergency care and patients’ mind’s limited capacity to encode, store and maintain information. Such limitations are the focus of this study. Specifically, we examine the number of items physicians deem crucial in a discharge communication and the necessary time estimated to present them. METHODS: A vignette of a patient with chest pain was presented to 47 physicians (38 internists, 9 emergency physicians). Physicians were offered a list of 81 items possibly conveyed to patients and asked to select the important ones assuming a discharge interaction of 15 minutes. Additionally, 7 experts estimated the time required to communicate each item. RESULTS: Physicians’ mean clinical experience was 10.1 years. From the list of 81 items, physicians selected, on average, 36 items (Range: 20–57). Experts rated the time necessary to communicate this subset to be 44.5 minutes – almost three times the preset 15 minutes. While emergency physicians, relative to internists, selected an insignificantly lower number of items (31.6 ± 6.2 vs. 37.4 ± 10.2), the time estimated for communicating the information was significantly shorter (36.9 ± 6.3 vs. 46.4 ± 13.5). CONCLUSIONS: Physicians in our study proved to be miscalibrated with regard to the number of items they could realistically discuss in a discharge communication. We conclude that there is an obvious need to train physicians in skills of implementing efficient discharge communication.

Twin-studies suggest that a significant portion of individual differences in the propensity to take risks resides in people's genetic make-up and there is evidence that variability in dopaminergic systems relates to individual differences in risky choice. We examined the link between risk taking in a risk taking task (the Balloon Analogue Risk Task, BART) and a variable number tandem repeat (VNTR) polymorphism in the 3'UTR of the dopamine transporter gene (SLC6A3/DAT1). Behavior in BART is known to be associated with activity in striatal reward-processing regions, and DAT1 is assumed to modulate striatal dopamine levels. We find that carriers of DAT1 alleles, which presumably result in lower striatal dopamine availability, showed more risk taking, relative to carriers of the alleles associated with higher striatal dopamine availability. Our analyses suggest that the mechanism underlying this association is diminished sensitivity to rewards among those who take more risks. Overall, our results support the notion that a behavioral genetic approach can be helpful in uncovering the basis of individual differences in risk taking.