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In this article, I put forward a basic philosophical claim: empirical scientific knowledge, that is, knowledge generated in experimental and observational practices, presupposes real causation. My discussion exploits two core notions from the philosophical analysis of scientific experimentation and observation: the aim of realizing object-apparatus correlations and the required control of the relevant interactions between environment and experimental or observational system. The conclusion is that, without the notion of real causation, acquiring epistemically sound empirical knowledge is impossible. Several empiricist objections to this conclusion are discussed and refuted. As a consequence, empiricism faces an unsolvable dilemma: either it cannot account for empirical knowledge or it should accept the existence of unobservable but real causal interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In China, practice‐oriented views of science can be traced back to antiquity. In ancient times, the Chinese people independently created and developed application‐oriented sciences, but they ignored basic science. In modern times, China learned and introduced Western science and technology as a practical instrument to protect the nation and make it prosperous and powerful. Through technology and production, science has been playing an immediate and major role in the development of socialism since 1949. Since 1978, the Chinese government has always emphasized that science and technology are the primary productive forces. From ancient times to the present, the practice‐oriented views of science are grounded in politics. Science has been the handmaiden of politics since the Qin Dynasty. However, this state of affairs hinders the development of basic science, a science that is not oriented toward immediate application. It also hinders open‐minded, critical reflection on the downsides or limits of science, which could draw on broader (moral, spiritual, or religious) values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I address the question of whether science can and should be seen as a common good. For this purpose, the first section focuses on the notion of (scientific) knowledge and examines its main characteristics. I discuss and assess the core view of analytic epistemology, that knowledge is, basically, justified true belief. On the basis of this analysis, I then develop an alternative, multi-dimensional theory of the nature of (scientific) knowledge. Section 2 reviews and evaluates several answers to the question of what to understand by the notion of a common (or public) good. It discusses both economic and socio-political interpretations of this notion. In Section 3, I develop an alternative account of the common good of scientific knowledge. This knowledge constitutes a common good if it is both non-exhaustible and in the public interest. The two notions are equally important, but in this article, the focus is on the former. For reasons of space, a detailed discussion of the latter is impossible; it will be provided in a forthcoming book. My answer to the question posed in the title of this article builds on the critical discussion of extant views in Sections 1 and 2: some aspects of these views are included in this alternative account, while others are shown to be unhelpful or untenable. The final section discusses some practical implications of this account for the politics of science. The main conclusion is that scientific research should not be privatized through patenting its products. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The main question of this article is given by its title: how inclusive is European philosophy of science? Phrased in this way, the question presupposes that, as a mature discipline, philosophy of science should provide an inclusive account of its subject area. I first provide an explanation of the notion of an inclusive (in contrast to a restricted) philosophy of science. This notion of an inclusive philosophy of science is specified by discussing three general topics that seem to be missing from, or are quite marginal in, restricted philosophy of science. These topics are the philosophy of historical inquiry, the role of technology in science, and the socio-political and moral dimensions of science. On this basis, I address the question whether European philosophy of science qualifies as more inclusive as compared with Anglo-American philosophy of science. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Universities are occupied by management, a regime obsessed with 'accountability' through measurement, increased competition, efficiency, 'excellence', and misconceived economic salvation. Given the occupation's absurd side-effects, we ask ourselves how management has succeeded in taking over our precious universities. An alternative vision for the academic future consists of a public university, more akin to a socially engaged knowledge commons than to a corporation. We suggest some provocative measures to bring about such a university. However, as management seems impervious to cogent arguments, such changes can only happen if academics take action. Hence, we explore several strategies for a renewed university politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thus far, the philosophical study of patenting has primarily focused on sociopolitical, legal, and ethical issues, such as the moral justifiability of patenting living organisms or the nature of (intellectual) property. In addition, however, the theory and practice of patenting entails many important problems that can be fruitfully studied from the perspective of the philosophy of science and technology. The principal aim of this article is to substantiate the latter claim. For this purpose, I first provide a concise review of the main features of the theory and practice of the patenting of scientific and technological inventions. Second, I discuss several philosophical issues implied by these features and explore the possible contributions of the philosophy of science and technology to the clarification, or resolution, of these issues. The seven features discussed are: patents as commercial monopolies on scientific and technological inventions, the contrast between natural and non-natural subject matter, the distinction between inventions and discoveries, the reproducibility of inventions, the question of the sameness of two inventions, the distinction between the invented and the protected object, and the contrast between material objects versus concepts and theories. The article concludes with some observations on the problems and prospects of the philosophical study of the theory and practice of patenting scientific and technological inventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the extensive, recent debates on free will, the pioneering experiments by Benjamin Libet continue to play a significant role. It is often claimed that these experiments demonstrate the illusory nature of freely willed actions. In this article, we provide a detailed analysis and evaluation of Libet’s experiments from a philosophy of science perspective. Our analysis focuses on Libet’s central notion of the “initiation” of freely willed processes by the brain. We examine four interpretations of the notion of initiation: in terms of a cause, a necessary condition, a correlation, and a regular succession. We argue that none of these four interpretations can be supported by the design and results of Libet’s experiments. In addition, we analyze two recent Libet-type experiments. Our general conclusion is that neither Libet’s original experiments nor later Libet-type experiments can justify the claim that allegedly freely willed processes are in fact initiated by the brain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the philosophy of science which was a small discipline before the 1970s. It mentions that Post-Kuhnians claims that philosophy of science needs to attend to the historical practices of the scientists while Naturalists argues that scientific activities needs to be based on the cognitive science results. It adds that the relevance of philosophy of science to broader audience could be increased through more sustained study of general issues.

This paper proposes a framework for a critical philosophy of technology by discussing its practical, theoretical, empirical, normative and political dimensions. I put forward a general account of technology, which includes both similarities and dissimilarities to Andrew Feenberg's instrumentalization theory. This account characterizes a technology as a "(type of) artefactual, functional system with a certain degree of stability and reproducibility". A discussion of how such technologies may be realized discloses five different levels at which alternative choices might be made. On this basis, I argue that a critical philosophy of technology should analyse and assess the choices that have, and have not, been made in actual practice, and contribute to social experiments that aim at more democratic and more desirable alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the claims that concepts both structure the world and abstract from it. Relationship between concepts and the world; Views of Herman Koningsveld on the formation of concepts; Implications of the theory of extensible concepts, abstraction and nonlocals.

Physicalism claims that the ontology of the world coincides with the ontology of physics. My paper offers a discussion and assessment of this claim. First, I explain why physicalism implies a straightforward ontological reductionism; hence, on an ontological reading, 'non-reductive physicalism' is a contradiction in terms. Second, I argue that, without further specification, the content of 'the ontology of physics' is completely undefined. Since this content is usually taken for granted in the philosophy of psychology and the philosophy of mind, the notion of physicalism has no positively determinable meaning. Third, by taking into account the full particulars of how observations of physical phenomena are realized in practice, I question the claim that reductive physicalism is confirmed by the cognitive achievements of connectionist networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the framework for observation in relation to neurophysiological reductionism. Conceptual analysis of observation by Hanson; Role of human agency in the relation of observational processes; Critical analysis of connectionist network; Evaluation of Churchland's interpretation account on observation.

Determines the relationship between philosophy and history of science. Relative autonomy of philosophy from history in the three alternative paradigms of philosopher Thomas Kuhn; Similarity between styles of reasoning and paradigms; Disadvantage of using Whiggism as a central notion for the philosophy of science.

Examines the feasibility to develop a plausible realist epistemology and ontology for experimental science. Interplay between developments in the dimensions of experimental action and production; Reference of scientific knowledge to elements of human-independent reality; Differentiation between three types of reproducibility.

This article presents a brief response to the replies by Vicky Singleton and Brian Wynne. The author will base what he has to say on the original papers and his response to them, take account of the replies by Singleton and Wynne, and summarizes his main conclusions from the exchange. The two replies to the author's original response to the Special Issue of Social Studies of Science on "The Politics of SSK" carry on the debate in rather different ways. Hence, the author discusses them separately in this paper.

The topic of neutrality versus commitment within the sociology of scientific knowledge was the direct cause of the Special Issue of the journal "Social Studies of Science." The set of papers as a whole embraces many aspects of the theme under discussion. In this brief Response, the author will focus on two central questions. The first is whether science and technology studies (STS) accounts should stick to descriptive analyses of the politics of science and technology, or whether they should also engage in normative criticisms, assessments or recommendations. It is concluded that a certain type of STS normativity is legitimate, and may constitute a specific contribution to political debates on science and technology. The second question concerns the realism-relativism issue. It is argued that this issue continues to integrate descriptively adequate and normatively engaged accounts of science and technology.

The article discusses normative reflexions on constructivist approaches to science and technology. Systematic and fundamental thinking on normative, or normatively relevant, questions is virtually absent in the highly influential constructivist studies of science and technology. The article after reviewing and assessing the role of normativity and reflexivity, in so far as it has been acknowledged within constructivism, presents a number of normative reflexions. Three general approaches--social constructivism, ethnography and actor-network theory--are analyzed in detail. The main themes of these analytical and critical reflexions are: missing issues, locality, relativism, the winner's perspective, and technoscientific success. It turns out that constructivist views concerning these themes have a number of normatively questionable consequences. These consequences can be avoided if certain constructivist assumptions, which are empirically unwarranted or unnecessary anyway, are rejected. Instead, some constructive alternatives are proposed for a social study of science and technology that is both empirically adequate and normatively satisfactory. These alternatives concern the significance of non-local patterns. They do not imply a return to the often simplistic, universal schemes that have been put forward so many times by philosophers of science and technology.

The paper starts with an analysis of similarities and differences between experimentation and technological production. It is argued that both imply an active intervention in nature and society, but that the cognitive and social aspects of experiment and technology may display considerable differences. The theoretical analysis is illustrated by means of examples taken, in particular, from the technology of nuclear energy production. Next, it is shown that, from the viewpoint of this paper, the technology conception prevailing in public debates on technology and in technology policy is inadequate; again, the case of nuclear energy serves as an example. Finally, it is concluded that scientific or technological knowledge and social power are intrinsically connected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses various papers published within the issue, including one by Andrew Feenberg on the critical theory of technology to the rational critique of rationality, and another one by Philip Brey on technological construction of social power.