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Jennifer Nagel suggests that Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory of reasoning can shed light on “why we commonly think of perceptually and testimonially supported judgments as justified despite feeling worried, on reflection, that only what is internally available can justify”. While I agree that there is indeed a natural path (or paths) from the argumentative theory to this asymmetry, and instability, in our epistemic judgments, I am not sure that it is quite the one that Nagel identifies. Having registered some reservations about Nagel’s account, I make an alternative suggestion as to how the argumentative theory might help to explain the naturalness of the relevant judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

By Reid's own account, 'That the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious' (FP#7), has a special place among the First Principles of Contingent Truths. Some have found that claim puzzling, but it is not. Contrary to what's usually assumed, certain FPs preceding FP#7 do not already assert the better part of what FP#7 explicitly states. FP#7 is needed because there is nothing epistemological in the FPs that precede it; and its special place among the FPs is a straightforward consequence of its being both perfectly general and distinctively epistemological. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By Reid's own account, ‘That the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious’ (FP#7), has a special place among the First Principles of Contingent Truths. Some have found that claim puzzling, but it is not. Contrary to what's usually assumed, certain FPs preceding FP#7 do not already assert the better part of what FP#7 explicitly states. FP#7 is needed because there is nothing epistemological in the FPs that precede it; and its special place among the FPs is a straightforward consequence of its being both perfectly general and distinctively epistemological. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this article, the author discusses the article "Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys," by Keith DeRose. He is critical that the author seeks to respond on the claim of Jonathan Schaffer and Joshua Knobe (S&K) that the results in experimental philosophy (X-Phi) cast doubt on the intuitions related to epistemic contextualism (EC). Also investigated is the book by DeRose, titled "The Case for Contextualism."

The article focuses on fallibilism, epistemic possibility and concessive knowledge attributions (CKA). The author mentions that if knowing requires believing on evidence that entails what is believed, then they have hardly any knowledge at all. It stresses that the near-universal acceptance of fallibilism in epistemology is because denying that one can know on the basis of non-entailing evidence seems not an option if they are to preserve the very strong appearance that they do know many things. It mentions how author Jason Stanley defended fallibilism against the Lewisian worry that openly fallibilistic speech is incoherent.

The article presents a philosophical exploration into the meaning and semantic purposes of the vocabulary of declared knowledge. The interaction between the foundations of epistemology and the practicalities of linguistic communication is discussed. Challenges within the grounds of assertion, motivation and intention are reflected upon.

Abstract: This article compares the ability to track individuals lacking mental states with the ability to track intentional agents. It explains why reference to individuals raises the problem of explaining how cognitive agents track unique individuals and in what sense reference is based on procedures of perceptual-motor and epistemic tracking. We suggest applying the notion of singular-files from theories in perception and semantics to the problem of tracking intentional agents. In order to elucidate the nature of agent-files, three views of the relation between object- and agent-tracking are distinguished: the Independence, Deflationary and Organism-Dependence Views. The correct view is argued to be the latter, which states that perceptual and epistemic tracking of a unique human organism requires tracking both its spatio-temporal object-properties and its agent-properties. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This article discusses the significance of the core claim of the Relevant Alternatives (RA) theorists. The RA theory is somewhat unsatisfactory, but their core claim is entirely the product of responsiveness requirement, together with fallibilism about knowledge. Philosophers argue because they do believe that their knowledge may be erroneous. Moreover, a lot of philosophers reject the responsiveness requirement on knowing because they disagree if it is enough to convert belief into knowledge.

Discusses the philosophical views of Thomas Reid on evidence. Definition of evidence according to Reid; Notion on self-evidence; Role of evidence on Reid's epistemology.

Discusses the controversy over how exactly we should conceive of the context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions. Incontrovertible claim that knowledge attributions are somehow 'context-sensitive'; Invariance of the truth conditions of knowledge-attributing sentences depending on context; Considerable advantage of contextualism over invariantism.

Comments on the linguistic concepts of philosopher Donald Davidson. Use of the appeal of convention in explaining linguistic interactions; Nature of linguistic convention; Definitions of language; Factors affecting the interpretation of a speaker's utterance; Logical relationship between utterances; Non-literal use of speech.

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on topics including dual component theory, color sensations and moral thought and theory.

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on topics including the views of philosopher Thomas Reid about perception, epistemology, and moral thought and theory, dual component theory, and Reid's first principles of contingent truths.

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses the papers and Author-Meets-Critics sessions presented at the 2013 meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association in San Francisco, California and lists the members of the 2012-2013 Program Committee who chose the papers for presentation.