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Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions.
- Source :
-
Philosophy & Phenomenological Research . Jan2009, Vol. 78 Issue 1, p123-132. 10p. - Publication Year :
- 2009
-
Abstract
- The article focuses on fallibilism, epistemic possibility and concessive knowledge attributions (CKA). The author mentions that if knowing requires believing on evidence that entails what is believed, then they have hardly any knowledge at all. It stresses that the near-universal acceptance of fallibilism in epistemology is because denying that one can know on the basis of non-entailing evidence seems not an option if they are to preserve the very strong appearance that they do know many things. It mentions how author Jason Stanley defended fallibilism against the Lewisian worry that openly fallibilistic speech is incoherent.
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00318205
- Volume :
- 78
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Philosophy & Phenomenological Research
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 35890802
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00234.x