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This Article addresses the operation and effect of the reversible-error doctrine under the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure when applied to the review of non-constitutional trial court errors. In particular, this Article reviews the history of Indiana's standards for reversible error under the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure and demonstrates that the Indiana Supreme Court adopted the probable-impact test to enable the court on appeal to assess whether it can say with confidence that the error more likely than not affected the outcome of the trial court proceeding. Specifically, this Article reviews the history leading up to the adoption of Indiana Appellate Rule 66(A), the text of that Rule, how the Indiana Supreme Court applied the probable-impact test in the seven years following the court's adoption of the Rule, and how later opinions from the court have clarified the probable-impact test. However, some variance in the application of the probable-impact test has both persisted and re-emerged, and this Article identifies those deviations in the case law. This Article then concludes with advice for practitioners to tailor their arguments around the probable-impact test. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses whether the U.S. Supreme Court (USSC) created a legal right without a remedy, focusing on whether a court's erroneous granting of a Batson objection based on the USSC's ruling in the racial discrimination during jury selection case Batson v. United States (Batson v. Kentucky) can ever constitute reversible error. The U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause and American constitutional violations are mentioned, along with U.S. evidence laws and a harmless error doctrine.

Purpose. Some criminal trials turn on evaluations of credibility of the complainant and the accused. When credibility is based on how a witness testifies, an evaluation of one party should not influence an evaluation of the other party. If credibility evaluations are bidirectional, fundamental principles of criminal law may be offended. Methods. Six hundred and thirty seven undergraduates read a vignette that described a sexual assault (SA) or a motor vehicle accident (MVA). Karen, the complainant in the SA case and bystander witness in the MVA case, was described as 5, 13, or 20 years old. The vignette was a summary of the police investigation and, in three conditions, the trial. Trial information was manipulated in one of three ways: no information concerning how Karen testified, Karen's testimony was described positively (pro-prosecution), or described negatively (anti-prosecution). Participants then rated the perceived credibility of Karen and the accused (Bob) and the probability that Bob was guilty. Results. Karen was viewed more positively in the pro-prosecution condition and more negatively in the anti-prosecution. When Karen was judged to be less credible, Bob was rated as more credible and less likely to be guilty. When Karen was seen as more credible, Bob was viewed as more likely to be guilty. Conclusions. This bidirectional effect that the manner in which the prosecution witness testified affected perceptions of the accused and probability of guilt, in certain circumstances, may compromise fundamental principles of criminal law and be a reversible error. We offer possible solutions for future empirical testing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses whether the testimony regarding the common practices of drug dealers is admissible in the court. It explores the rules regarding what is admissible, whether inadmissible testimony is always reversible error, who can testify, and alternatives to having a witness testify concerning the common practices of drug dealers. It cites some cases in which the defendants raised defenses and claims of innocence that a drug crime investigating officer could refute.

The article discusses a court case where the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not commit a reversible error during an evidentiary hearing and affirmed the district court's judgment. It cites an evidentiary hearing by the district court to determine the admissibility of L. L., the nine-year old niece of the defendant's girlfriend, out-of-court statements. The North Dakota Supreme court found L. L.'s testimony sufficient to establish sexual contact and sustain a conviction of gross sexual imposition.

The article discusses a court case wherein the team leader of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Henrietta Browning argues with the court's refusal on her request for pretext instruction in an employment discrimination case. The Ninth Circuit court cited the Cassino case and held that the refusal to give a pretext in the case filed by Browning is not reversible error. Moreover, the district court says that essential elements provided by Browning had to prove in order to prevail her verdict.

Examines the decision in the case "Cargill Inc. v. Commodity Credit Corp." which involved the United States government as a party. Cargill's intent to recover losses from its storage of surplus wheat and corn; Commodity's reasons for the deterioration of Cargill's grain; Granting by the district court of Cargill's demand for a jury trial on the counterclaim; Question of negligence and due care; Question of due process, which calls for a weighing of the interest of the individual in an unimpaired constitutional jury right against the interest of the government.