Different forms of religious understanding and different religious discourses have emerged in the history of Islamic thought. Religious discourses have sometimes become a claim to truth and salvation and have turned into a discourse that excludes other groups. Exclusive discourse not only prevents the expression and development of thought but also harms the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. The problem of exclusion within the religion cannot be attributed to one single sect. At the same time, discourse is shaped according to context and interlocutor relations in a historical period. For this reason, the exclusionary discourse within religion should be dealt with by limiting it in terms of history and relationality. One of the main differentiations in Islamic thought has been manifested in the form of raʾy and āthār/ḥadīth traditions. Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth, who opposed raʾy in the early period, also took a stand against theoretical theology when the systematic theology began to be built. This article deals with the conceptual framework of the exclusionary discourse in the refutation/raddiyya literature written in the 3rd/9th century by Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth, which is known for its opposition to raʾy and kalām. The article aims to identify the concepts embodied in the exclusionary discourse of Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth and to clarify the place and meaning of these concepts in the discourse. Through conceptual analysis, it is aimed to reveal the nature of the boundaries drawn by Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth against its opponents. In this way, it will also be possible to obtain clues about the thought codes of Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth. The main sources of this study include the refutations of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, Bukhārī (d. 256/870), Ibn Kutayba (d. 276/889), and Abū Saʿīd ʿUthmān al-Dārimī (d. 280/894). The exclusionary concepts determined in the refutation texts are categorized under two headings as religious-sectarian level and descriptive level. The way in which each of the exclusionary concepts is associated with their addressees has been discussed in terms of the subject in which the concept is used, its grounds, and justifications. This research is expected to make a modest contribution to understanding and solving the problem of exclusion in Islamic thought. Two points should be emphasized about the method of the article. One of them is that Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth is considered as a mindset. Another is that the refutations as the main sources of this study have been handled as a part of the religious discourse of Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth. Some of the prominent mentality features of Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth include traditionalism, literalism, and dogmatism. Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth took the narrations as a basis and define the reason in religious matters as a perception tool within the limits of the narrations. It can be said that all these principles provide a basis for exclusionary discourse to a certain extent. Exclusionary concepts at the religious-sectarian level are Jaḥmiyya, Qadariyya, Muʿaṭṭila, Zanādiqa, Majūsiyya, Mulhid, and Mushabbiha. The exclusionary concepts at the qualification level are bidʿa, raʾy, qıyās, nażar, hawā, zaygh, ḍalāla, kufr, and shirk. Jaḥmiyya and Qadariyya were used because of some opinions of the names they were associated with and because they were killed by the state. Muʿaṭṭila and Mushabbiha were also used in a critical way about the Muʿtazila's understanding of divine attributes with a claim saying that they could not properly recognize the God they believed in. The names of groups such as Zanādiqa, Majūsiyya, and Melāhida, with whom Muʿtazila struggled at the theological level, were used for Muʿtazila with the purpose to identify them as a non-religious group. Raʾy, qıyās, and nażar are positioned opposite the narration by Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth and used in an exclusionary sense by being identified with hawā and zaygh. While these concepts point to methodological differences, bidʿa, ḍalāla, kufr, and shirk have been exclusionary concepts in which the claim of ḥāqīqa and hidāya has come to the fore. It can be said that by reducing the raʾy, qıyās, and nażar to hawā, Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth tried to eliminate the possibility of producing rational knowledge in religious matters. The existence of Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth as a mentality/mindset today, the fact that there is a network of relations between the phenomenon of Salafism and Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth in terms of intellectual principles, although it is not possible to talk about a common identity between them, and the existence of groups that refer to the accumulations of Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth refers to the present aspect of the study to the extent of scientific, religious, legal, and social manifestations of exclusionary concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]