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We introduce the Category Abstraction Learning (CAL) model, a cognitive framework formally describing category learning built on similarity-based generalization, dissimilarity-based abstraction, two attention learning mechanisms, error-driven knowledge structuring, and stimulus memorization. Our hypotheses draw on an array of empirical and theoretical insights connecting reinforcement and category learning. The key novelty of the model is its explanation of how rules are learned from scratch based on three central assumptions. (a) Category rules emerge from two processes of stimulus generalization (similarity) and its direct inverse (category contrast) on independent dimensions. (b) Two attention mechanisms guide learning by focusing on rules, or on the contexts in which they produce errors. (c) Knowing about these contexts inhibits executing the rule, without correcting it, and consequently leads to applying partial rules in different situations. The model is designed to capture both systematic and individual differences in a broad range of learning paradigms. We illustrate the model's explanatory scope by simulating several benchmarks, including the classic Six Problems, the 5-4 problem, and linear separability. Beyond the common approach of predicting average response probabilities, we also propose explanations for more recently studied phenomena that challenge existing learning accounts, regarding task instructions, individual differences in rule extrapolation in three different tasks, individual attention shifts to stimulus features during learning, and other phenomena. We discuss CAL's relation to different models, and its potential to measure the cognitive processes regarding attention, abstraction, error detection, and memorization from multiple psychological perspectives. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

How do we decide what to say to ensure our meanings will be understood? The Rational Speech Act model (RSA, Frank & Goodman, 2012) asserts that speakers plan what to say by comparing the informativity of words in a particular context. We present the first example of an RSA model of sentence level (who-did-what-to-whom) meanings. In these contexts, the set of possible messages must be abstracted from entities in common ground (people and objects) to possible events (Jane eats the apple, Marco peels the banana), with each word contributing unique semantic content. How do speakers accomplish the transformation from context to compositional, informative messages? In a communication game, participants described transitive events (e.g. Jane pets the dog), with only two words, in contexts where two words either were or were not enough to uniquely identify an event. Adults chose utterances matching the predictions of the RSA even when there was no possible fully 'successful' utterance. Thus we show that adults’ communicative behavior can be described by a model that accommodates informativity in context, beyond the set of possible entities in common ground. This study provides the first evidence that adults' language production is affected, at the level of argument structure, by the graded informativity of possible utterances in context, and suggests that full- blown natural speech may result from speakers who model and adapt to the listener’s needs.

How do our valuation systems change to homeostatically correct undesirable psychological or physiological states, such as those caused by hunger? There is evidence that hunger increases discounting for food rewards, biasing choices towards smaller but sooner food reward over larger but later reward. However, it is not understood how hunger modulates delay discounting for non-food items. We outline and quantitatively evaluate six possible models of how our valuation systems modulate discounting of various commodities in the face of the undesirable state of being hungry. With a repeated-measures design, an experimental hunger manipulation, and quantitative modeling, we find strong evidence that hunger causes large increases in delay discounting for food, with an approximately 25% spillover effect to non-food commodities. The results provide evidence that in the face of hunger, our valuation systems increase discounting for commodities, which cannot achieve a desired state change as well as for those commodities that can. Given that strong delay discounting can cause negative outcomes in many non-food (consumer, investment, medical, or inter-personal) domains, the present findings suggest caution may be necessary when making decisions involving non-food outcomes while hungry.

By definition, individuals with absolute pitch (AP) can categorize an isolated musical note with near perfect accuracy without a reference pitch. This definition implies a uniformity of performance across people; however, in reality AP is a complex, multidimensional ability, shaped by both early and recent auditory experiences. In the present study we assess how individual differences in working memory, musical expertise, and language background relate to the accuracy with which an AP possessor can identify an isolated musical note. In a standard test of AP ability, all AP participants performed virtually perfectly. When tested on more challenging notes, drawn from less frequently experienced timbres and octave ranges, we found that working memory positively related to note categorization performance, though only among individuals who reported a tonal language background. This interaction between tonal language and working memory, however, may have been partly grounded by differences in musical expertise reported between tonal and non-tonal language. Supporting this possibility, in a follow-up analysis we observed a general interaction between working memory performance and musical expertise across all participants. Taken together, these results highlight the complexity of AP categorization when considered as an auditory skill rather than a native talent. The observation that working memory may be an important component of auditory processing in AP when the to-be-judged sounds are less easily categorized is consistent with recent theoretical accounts of how working memory and expertise relate to auditory recognition more broadly.

Events that conform to our expectations, i.e, are congruent with our world knowledge or schemas, are better remembered than unrelated events. Yet events that conflict with schemas can also be remembered better. We examined this apparent paradox in four experiments, in which schemas were established by training ordinal relationships between randomly-paired objects, while episodic memory was tested for the number of objects on each trial. Better memory was found for both congruent and incongruent trials, relative to unrelated trials, producing memory performance that was a “U-shaped” function of congruency. Furthermore, the incongruency advantage, but not congruency advantage, emerged even if the information probed by the memory test was irrelevant to the schema, while the congruency advantage, but not incongruency advantage, also emerged after initial encoding. Schemas therefore augment episodic memory in multiple ways, depending on the match between novel and existing information.

Although euphemisms are intended to put a more positive spin on the words they replace, some euphemisms are ineffective. Our study examined the effectiveness of a popular euphemism for persons with disabilities, special needs. Most style guides prescribe against using the euphemism special needs and recommend instead using the non-euphemized term disability; disability advocates argue adamantly against the euphemism special needs, which they find offensive. In contrast, many parents of children with disabilities prefer to use special needs rather than disability. But no empirical study has examined whether special needs is more or less positive than the term it replaces. Therefore, we gathered a sample of adult participants from the general population (N = 530) and created a set of vignettes that allowed us to measure how positively children, college students, and middle-age adults are viewed when they are described as having special needs, having a disability, having a certain disability (e.g., is blind, has Down syndrome), or with no label at all. We predicted and observed that persons are viewed more negatively when described as having special needs than when described as having a disability or having a certain disability, indicating that special needs is an ineffective euphemism. Even for members of the general population who have a personal connection to disability (e.g., as parents of children with disabilities), the euphemism special needs is no more effective than the non euphemized term disability. We also collected free associations to the terms special needs and disability and found that special needs is associated with more negativity; special needs conjures up more associations with developmental disabilities (such as intellectual disability) whereas disability is associated with a more inclusive set of disabilities; and special needs evokes more unanswered questions. These findings recommend against using the euphemism special needs.

This paper investigates how cognition facilitates the adoption of new words through a study of the large-scale Reddit corpus, which contains written, threaded conversations conducted over the internet. Parameters for the cognitive architecture are estimated. Using ACT-R's account of declarative memory, the activation of memory chunks representing words is traced and compared to usage statistics sampled from a year of data. Potential values for decay and retrieval threshold are identified according to model fit and growth rates of word adoption. The resulting estimate for the decay parameter, d, is 0.22, and the estimate for the retrieval threshold parameter, rt, lies between 3.4 and 4.5.

[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported in Vol 115(6) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2018-63189-002). In the article, the original supplemental material has been revised to include a clarifying note to the Tests of model fit over larger sample (Samples C-G) section and post-peer review analyses added to the Post-peer review Factor Analytic Tests section. All versions of this article have been corrected.] Philosophers and behavioral scientists refer to wisdom as unbiased reasoning that guides one toward a balance of interests and promotes a good life. However, major instruments developed to test wisdom appear biased, and it is unclear whether they capture balance-related tendencies. We examined whether shifting from global, de-contextualized reports to state-level reports about concrete situations provides a less biased method to assess wise reasoning (e.g., intellectual humility, recognition of uncertainty and change, consideration of the broader context at hand and perspectives of others, integration of these perspectives or compromise), which may be aligned with the notion of balancing interests. Results of a large-scale psychometric investigation (N = 4,463) revealed that the novel Situated WIse Reasoning Scale (SWIS) is reliable and appears independent of psychological biases (attribution bias, bias blind spot, self-deception, and impression management), whereas global wisdom reports are subject to such biases. Moreover, SWIS scores were positively related to indices of living well (e.g., adaptive emotion regulation, mindfulness), and balancing of cooperative and self-protective interests, goals (influence-vs.-adjustment), and causal inferences about conflict (attribution to the self-vs.-other party). In contrast, global wisdom reports were unrelated or negatively related to balance-related measures. Notably, people showed modest within-person consistency in wise reasoning across situations or over time, suggesting that a single-shot measurement may be insufficient for whole understanding of trait-level wisdom. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for research on wisdom, judgment and decision making, well-being, and prosociality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

We discuss two relatively understudied yet important phenomena relevant to the ecologically crucial task of gathering reliable information from human faces. First, facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) predicts aggressiveness judgments and is associated with aggression-related behavior and life history outcomes. A significant body of research indicates fWHR is an honest evolutionary signal of propensity to aggression yet little is known about how or if this signal is preserved in judgments across race boundaries. Evidence for a universal relationship between increased fWHR and enhanced aggression perception has been found using Asian and white face stimuli, but race moderated the relationship between high fWHR and ratings in a pain ascription task using black and white faces. Second, we examine research on olfactory cues to face perception and focus particular attention on the possibility that face judgments may be influenced by putrescine, an organic compound found recently to heighten threat and escape-related cognitions in a single subliminal odor presentation study. Here we probe how fWHR and face race interact in aggression judgments during subliminal exposure to putrescine and a control condition. We present a standardized method of subliminal putrescine delivery and find null effects of putrescine on face judgments. Overall, our primarily white participants show a reduced difference in aggressiveness ratings to black faces from low to high levels of fWHR compared to the same contrast in white face stimuli, consistent with an account in which black faces are not perceived with the same configural precision as white faces.

The present study examined the effect of stimulus valence on two levels of selection in the cognitive system, selection of a task-set and selection of a response. In the first experiment, participants performed a spatial compatibility task (pressing left and right key according to the locations of stimuli) in which stimulus-response mappings were determined by stimulus valence. There was a standard spatial stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) effect for positive stimuli (flowers) and a reversed SRC effect for negative stimuli (spiders), but the same data could be interpreted as showing faster responses when positive and negative stimuli were assigned to compatible and incompatible mappings, respectively, than when the assignment was opposite. Experiment 2 disentangled these interpretations, showing that valence did not influence a spatial SRC effect (Simon effect) when task-set retrieval was unnecessary. Experiments 3 and 4 replaced keypress responses with joystick deflections that afforded approach/avoidance action coding. Stimulus valence modulated the Simon effect (but did not reverse it) when the valence was task-relevant (Experiment 3) as well as when it was task-irrelevant (Experiment 4). Therefore, stimulus valence influences task-set selection and response selection, but the influence on the latter is limited to conditions where responses afford approach/avoidance action coding.

This study used a Web-based naturalistic story-reading paradigm to investigate the impact of number of exposures on incidental acquisition and long-term retention of new meanings for known words by native English-speaking adults. Participants read one of four custom written stories in which they encountered novel meanings (e.g., a safe concealed within a piece of furniture) for familiar words (foam). These meanings appeared two, four, six, or eight times in the narrative. Results showed reasonably good memory of the new meanings, assessed by cued recall of novel meanings and word forms, after only two exposures, emphasizing the importance of initial encounters. Accuracy in cued recall of novel meanings showed a linear, incremental increase with more exposures. There was no significant forgetting after 1 week, regardless of the number of exposures during training, demonstrating the efficiency with which adults acquire new word meanings incidentally through reading and retain them over time. Open Practices: This article has been awarded an Open Data badge. All data and analysis scripts are publicly accessible via the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/ybu6r. Learn more about the Open Practices badges from the Center for Open Science: https://osf.io/tvyxz/wiki.

Humans can see through the complexity of scenes, faces, and objects by quickly extracting their redundant low-spatial and low-dimensional global properties, or their style. It remains unclear, however, whether semantic coding is necessary, or whether visual stylistic information is sufficient, for people to recognize and discriminate complex images and categories. In two experiments, we systematically reduce the resolution of hundreds of unique paintings, birds, and faces, and test people's ability to discriminate and recognize them. We show that the stylistic information retained at extremely low image resolutions is sufficient for visual recognition of images and visual discrimination of categories. Averaging over the 3 domains, people were able to reliably recognize images reduced down to a single pixel, with large differences from chance discriminability across 8 different image resolutions. People were also able to discriminate categories substantially above chance with an image resolution as low as 2 × 2 pixels. We situate our findings in the context of contemporary computational accounts of visual recognition and contend that explicit encoding of the local features in the image, or knowledge of the semantic category, is not necessary for recognizing and distinguishing complex visual stimuli. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

An emerging area of research in cognitive science is the utilization of networks to model the structure and processes of the mental lexicon in healthy and clinical populations, like aphasia. Previous research has focused on only one type of word similarity at a time (e.g., semantic relationships), even though words are multi-faceted. Here, we investigate lexical retrieval in a picture naming task from people with Broca’s and Wernicke’s aphasia and healthy controls by utilizing a multiplex network structure that accounts for the interplay between multiple semantic and phonological relationships among words in the mental lexicon. Extending upon previous work, we focused on the global network measure of closeness centrality which is known to capture spreading activation, an important process supporting lexical retrieval. We conducted a series of logistic regression models predicting the probability of correct picture naming. We tested whether multiplex closeness centrality was a better predictor of picture naming performance than single-layer closeness centralities, other network measures assessing local and meso-scale structure, psycholinguistic variables and group differences. We also examined production gaps, or the difference between the likelihood of producing a word with the lowest and highest closeness centralities. Our results indicated that multiplex closeness centrality was a significant predictor of picture naming performance, where words with high closeness centrality were more likely to be produced than words with low closeness centrality. Additionally, multiplex closeness centrality outperformed single-layer closeness centralities and other multiplex network measures, and remained a significant predictor after controlling for psycholinguistic variables and group differences. Furthermore, we found that the facilitative effect of closeness centrality was similar for both types of aphasia. Our results underline the importance of integrating multiple measures of word similarities in cognitive language networks for better understanding lexical retrieval in aphasia, with an eye towards future clinical applications.

Interest in wisdom in the cognitive sciences, psychology, and education has been paralleled by conceptual confusions about its nature and assessment. To clarify these issues and promote consensus in the field, wisdom researchers met in Toronto in July of 2019, resolving disputes through discussion. Guided by a survey of scientists who study wisdom-related constructs, we established a common wisdom model, observing that empirical approaches to wisdom converge on the morally-grounded application of metacognition to reasoning and problem-solving. After outlining the function of relevant metacognitive and moral processes, we critically evaluate existing empirical approaches to measurement and offer recommendations for best practices. In the subsequent sections, we use the common wisdom model to selectively review evidence about the role of individual differences for development and manifestation of wisdom, approaches to wisdom development and training, as well as cultural, subcultural, and social-contextual differences. We conclude by discussing wisdom’s conceptual overlap with a host of other constructs and outline unresolved conceptual and methodological challenges.

Objectives Across the life span, deficits in executive functioning (EF) are associated with poor behavioral control and failure to achieve goals. Though EF is often discussed as one broad construct, a prominent model of EF suggests that it is composed of three subdomains: inhibition, set shifting, and updating. These subdomains are seen in both younger (YA) and older adults (OA), with performance deficits across subdomains in OA. Therefore, our goal was to investigate whether subdomains of EF might be differentially affected by age, and how these differences may relate to broader global age differences in EF. Methods To assess these age differences, we conducted a meta-analysis at multiple levels, including task level, subdomain level, and of global EF. Based on previous work, we hypothesized that there would be overall differences in EF in OA. Results Using 1,268 effect sizes from 401 articles, we found overall differences in EF with age. Results suggested that differences in performance are not uniform, such that variability in age effects emerged at the task level, and updating was not as affected by age as other subdomains. Discussion These findings advance our understanding of age differences in EF, and stand to inform early detection of EF decline.

Abstract. Language comprehenders have been arguing to mentally represent the implied orientation of objects. However, compared to the effects of shape, size, and color, the effect of orientation is rather small. We examined a potential explanation for the relatively low magnitude of the orientation effect: Object size moderates the orientation effect. Theoretical considerations led us to predict a smaller orientation effect for small objects than for large objects in a sentence–picture verification task. We furthermore investigated whether this pattern generalizes across languages (Chinese, Dutch, and English) and tasks (picture-naming task). The results of the verification task show an orientation effect overall, which is not moderated by object size (contrary to our hypothesis) and language (consistent with our hypothesis). Meanwhile, the preregistered picture–picture verification task showed the predicted interaction between object size and orientation effect. We conducted exploratory analyses to address additional questions.

Agents that can make better use of computation, experience, time, and memory can solve a greater range of problems more effectively. A crucial ingredient for managing such finite resources is intelligently chosen abstract representations. But, how do abstractions facilitate problem solving under limited resources? What makes an abstraction useful? To answer such questions, we review several trends in recent reinforcement-learning research that provide insight into how abstractions interact with learning and decision making. During learning, abstraction can guide exploration and generalization as well as facilitate efficient tradeoffs---e.g., time spent learning versus the quality of a solution. During computation, good abstractions provide simplified models for computation while also preserving relevant information about decision-theoretic quantities. These features of abstraction are not only key for scaling up artificial problem solving, but can also shed light on what pressures shape the use of abstract representations in humans and other organisms.

In insight problem solving solutions with AHA! experience have been assumed to be the consequence of restructuring of a problem which usually takes place shortly before the solution. However, evidence from priming studies suggests that solutions with AHA! are not spontaneously generated during the solution process but already relate to prior subliminal processing. We test this hypothesis by conducting an fMRI study using a modified compound remote associates paradigm which incorporates semantic priming. We observe stronger brain activity in bilateral anterior insulae already shortly after trial onset in problems that were later solved with than without AHA!. This early activity was independent of semantic priming but may be related to other lexical properties of attended words helping to reduce the amount of solutions to look for. In contrast, there was more brain activity in bilateral anterior insulae during solutions that were solved without than with AHA!. This timing (after trial start / during solution) x solution experience (with / without AHA!) interaction was significant.The results suggest that a) solutions accompanied with AHA! relate to early solution-relevant processing and b) both solution experiences differ in timing when solution-relevant processing takes place. In this context, we discuss the potential role of the anterior insula as part of the salience network involved in problem-solving by allocating attentional resources.

Forensic science techniques are often used in criminal trials to infer the identity of theperpetrator of crime and jurors often find this evidence very persuasive. Unfortunately, two of the leading causes of wrongful convictions are forensic science testing errors and false or misleading forensic testimony (Saks & Koehler, 2005). Therefore, it is important to understand jurors pre- existing beliefs about forensic science, as these beliefs may impact how they evaluate forensic evidence in the courtroom. In this study, we examine people’s perceptions of the likelihood of error and human judgment involved at each stage of the forensic science process (i.e., collection, storage, testing, analysis, reporting, and presenting). In addition, we examine peoples’ perceptions of the accuracy of — and human judgment involved in — 16 different forensic techniques. We find that, in contrast to what would be expected by the CSI effect literature, participants believed that the process of forensic science involved considerable human judgment and was relatively error-prone. In addition, participants had wide-ranging beliefs about the accuracy of various forensic techniques, ranging from 65.18% (document analysis) up to 89.95% (DNA). For some forensic techniques, estimates were lower than that found in experimental proficiency studies, suggesting that our participants are more skeptical of certain forensic evidence than they need to be. Keywords: Forensic science, forensic evidence, accuracy, error rate, CSI effect.

Bows and arrows, houses and kayaks are just a few examples of the highly optimized tools that humans have produced and used to colonize new environments1,2. Because there is much evidence that humans’ cognitive abilities are unparalleled3,4, many believe that such technologies resulted from our superior causal reasoning abilities5–7. However, others have stressed that the high dimensionality of human technologies makes them very difficult to understand causally8. Instead, they argue that optimized technologies emerge through the retention of small improvements across generations without requiring understanding of how these technologies work1,9. Here we show that a physical artefact becomes progressively optimized across generations of social learners in the absence of explicit causal understanding. Moreover, we find that the transmission of causal models across generations has no noticeable effect on the pace of cultural evolution. The reason is that participants do not spontaneously create multidimensional causal theories but, instead, mainly produce simplistic models related to a salient dimension. Finally, we show that the transmission of these inaccurate theories constrains learners’ exploration and has downstream effects on their understanding. These results indicate that complex technologies need not result from enhanced causal reasoning but, instead, can emerge from the accumulation of improvements made across generations. An experiment shows that complex technologies need not result from our superior causal reasoning abilities but, instead, can emerge from the accumulation of improvements across generations without requiring understanding of how these technologies work.

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is an assimilative change in liking of neutral conditioned stimuli (CS) following pairings with positive or negative stimuli (unconditioned stimulus, US). Dual-process theories postulate that, in addition to a controlled propositional process underlying conscious learning of CS-US contingencies, a second automatic and associative learning process exists that underlies EC effects. A central argument for dual-process theories is the dissociation between US expectancy and CS evaluation in extinction learning: When CSs are presented alone subsequent to CS-US pairings, participants cease to expect USs but continue to exhibit EC effects. This dissociation is typically interpreted as demonstration that EC is resistant to extinction, and consequently, that EC is driven by a distinct learning process. We tested an alternative single-process account, namely that expectancy-liking dissociations are caused by different judgment strategies afforded by the dependent measures rather than due to separable learning processes. According to this view, CS evaluations are by default integrative judgments---summaries of large portions of the learning history---whereas US expectancy reflects momentary judgments focusing on recent events. In a counterconditioning and two extinction experiments, we eliminate the expectancy-liking dissociations reported in the literature by inducing nondefault momentary evaluative judgments, and demonstrate a reversed dissociation when we additionally induced integrative expectancy judgments. Our findings corroborated a-priori predictions based on MINERVA 2, a formal single-process memory model. Hence, dissociations between US expectancy and conditioned CS liking reflect judgment properties and can be accounted for parsimoniously by a single learning process.

A recent surge of interest in the empirical measurement of mind-wandering has led to an increase in the use of thought-probing to measure attentional states, which has led to large variation in methodologies across studies (Weinstein in Behavior Research Methods, 50, 642-661, 2018). Three sources of variation in methodology include the frequency of thought probes during a task, the number of response options provided for each probe, and the way in which various attentional states are framed during the task instructions. Method variation can potentially affect behavioral performance on the tasks in which thought probes are embedded, the experience of various attentional states within those tasks, and/or response biases to the thought probes. Therefore, such variation can be problematic, both pragmatically and theoretically. Across three experiments, we examined how manipulating probe frequency, response options, and framing affected behavioral performance and responses to thought probes. Probe frequency and framing did not affect behavioral performance or probe responses. But, in light of the present results, we argue that thought probes need at least three responses, corresponding to on-task, off-task, and task-related interference. When researchers are specifically investigating mind-wandering, the probe responses should also distinguish between mind-wandering, external distraction, and mind-blanking.

Item does not contain fulltext In two experiments, we examined the role of gesture in reinterpreting a mental image. In Experiment 1, we found that participants gestured more about a figure they had learned through manual exploration than about a figure they had learned through vision. This supports claims that gestures emerge from the activation of perception relevant actions during mental imagery. In Experiment 2, we investigated whether such gestures have a causal role in affecting the quality of mental imagery. Participants were randomly assigned to gesture, not gesture, or engage in a manual interference task as they attempted to reinterpret a figure they had learned through manual exploration. We found that manual interference significantly impaired participants' success on the task. Taken together, these results suggest that gestures reflect mental imaginings of interactions with a mental image and that these imaginings are critically important for mental manipulation and reinterpretation of that image. However, our results suggest that enacting the imagined movements in gesture is not critically important on this particular task. 12 p.

Event-related potentials (ERPs) provide a window into how the brain is processing language. Here, we propose a theory that argues that ERPs such as the N400 and P600 arise as side effects of an error-based learning mechanism that explains linguistic adaptation and language learning. We instantiated this theory in a connectionist model that can simulate data from three studies on the N400 (amplitude modulation by expectancy, contextual constraint, and sentence position), five studies on the P600 (agreement, tense, word category, subcategorization and garden-path sentences), and a study on the semantic P600 in role reversal anomalies. Since ERPs are learning signals, this account explains adaptation of ERP amplitude to within-experiment frequency manipulations and the way ERP effects are shaped by word predictability in earlier sentences. Moreover, it predicts that ERPs can change over language development. The model provides an account of the sensitivity of ERPs to expectation mismatch, the relative timing of the N400 and P600, the semantic nature of the N400, the syntactic nature of the P600, and the fact that ERPs can change with experience. This approach suggests that comprehension ERPs are related to sentence production and language acquisition mechanisms.

Cognitive control is applied in situations that require overriding a habitual and automatic response. The conflict monitoring hypothesis and the Expected Value of Control (EVC) theory as its extension posit a control system responsible for detecting conflicting occasions and adapting to them dynamically within a task. Here we evaluate this prediction in two versions of one of the most popular tasks in cognitive control, namely the Stroop task. We hypothesized that nearby-items interference combines with task interference in the multi-item version effectively turning it into a multi-task that may challenge cognitive control. Adopting an alternative methodology tracking within-task performance, we compared the classical multi-item version of the Stroop task and its single-item counterpart in adults and children. The results revealed a within-task performance decline only in the multi-item version of the task, in both incongruent and neutral conditions, modulated by the presumed maturity of the control system. These findings suggest capacity constraints in control implementation and allocation under conditions requiring parallel execution of multiple cognitive tasks. Task complexity and demands seem to modulate effects on performance. We discuss implications for cognitive control as well as substantial concerns regarding the calculation and use of indices of interference based on the commonly used multi-item version of the Stroop task.

Evaluative conditioning (EC) changes the preference towards a formerly neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus; CS), by pairing it with a valent stimulus (unconditioned stimulus; US), in the direction of the valence of the US. When the CS is presented suboptimally (i.e., too briefly to be consciously perceived), contingency awareness between CS and US can be ruled out. Hence, EC effects with suboptimally presented CSs would support theories claiming that contingency awareness is not necessary for EC effects to occur. Recent studies reported the absence of EC with briefly presented CSs when both CS and US were presented in the visual modality, even though the CSs were identified at above-chance levels. Challenging this finding, Heycke et al. (R Soc Open Sci 4(9):160935, 2017) found some evidence for an EC effect with briefly presented visual stimuli in a cross-modal paradigm with auditory USs, but that study did not assess CS visibility. The present study realized a close replication of this study, while deviated from it using different stimuli, introducing a brief practice phase, and adding a CS visibility check. Overall EC for briefly presented stimuli was absent, and results from the visibility check show that an EC effect with briefly presented CSs was only found, when the CSs were identified at above-chance levels.

Previous work suggests that humans find it difficult to learn the structure of causal systems given observational data alone. We identify two conditions that enable successful structure learning from observational data: people succeed if the underlying causal system is deterministic, and if each pattern of observations has a single root cause. In four experiments, we show that either condition alone is sufficient to enable high levels of performance, but that performance is poor if neither condition applies. A fifth experiment suggests that neither determinism nor root sparsity takes priority over the other. Our data are broadly consistent with a Bayesian model that embodies a preference for structures that make the observed data not only possible but probable.

Misinformation often continues to influence people’s memory and inferential reasoning after it has been retracted; this is known as the continued influence effect (CIE). Previous research investigating the role of attitude-based motivated reasoning in this context has found conflicting results: Some studies have found that worldview can have a strong impact on the magnitude of the CIE, such that retractions are less effective if the misinformation is congruent with a person’s relevant attitudes, in which case the retractions can even backfire. Other studies have failed to find evidence for an effect of attitudes on the processing of misinformation corrections. The present study used political misinformation—specifically fictional scenarios involving misconduct by politicians from left-wing and right-wing parties—and tested participants identifying with those political parties. Results showed that in this type of scenario, partisan attitudes have an impact on the processing of retractions, in particular (1) if the misinformation relates to a general assertion rather than just a specific singular event, and (2) if the misinformation is congruent with a conservative partisanship.

Most work in the neurosciences collapses data from multiple subjects to obtain robust statistical results. This research agenda ignores that even in healthy subjects brain structure and function are known to be highly variable. Recently, Finn and colleagues showed that the brain's functional organisation is unique to each individual and can yield human-specific connectome fingerprints. This raises the question whether unique functional brain architecture may reflect a unique implementation of cognitive processes and problem solving - i.e. "Can we identify single individuals based on how they think?". The present study addresses the general question of interindividual differences in the specific context of human random number generation. We analyzed the deployment of recurrent patterns in the pseudorandom sequences to develop an identification scheme based on subject-specific volatility patterns. We demonstrate that individuals can be reliably identified based on how they how they generate randomness patterns alone. We moreover show that this phenomenon is driven by individual preference and inhibition of patterns, together forming a cognitive fingerprint.

In two ERP experiments, we investigated whether readers prioritize animacy over real-world event-knowledge during sentence comprehension. We used the paradigm of Paczynski and Kuperberg (2012), who argued that animacy is prioritized based on the observations that the ‘related anomaly effect’ (reduced N400s for context-related anomalous words compared to unrelated words) does not occur for animacy violations, and that animacy violations but not relatedness violations elicit P600 effects. Participants read passive sentences with plausible agents (e.g., The prescription for the mental disorder was written by the psychiatrist) or implausible agents that varied in animacy and semantic relatedness (schizophrenic/guard/pill/fence). In Experiment 1 (with a plausibility judgment task), plausible sentences elicited smaller N400s relative to all types of implausible sentences. Crucially, animate words elicited smaller N400s than inanimate words, and related words elicited smaller N400s than unrelated words, but Bayesian analysis revealed substantial evidence against an interaction between animacy and relatedness. Moreover, at the P600 time-window, we observed more positive ERPs for animate than inanimate words and for related than unrelated words at anterior regions. In Experiment 2 (without judgment task), we observed an N400 effect with animacy violations, but no other effects. Taken together, the results of our experiments fail to support a prioritized role of animacy information over real-world event-knowledge, but they support an interactive, constraint-based view on incremental semantic processing.

In uncertain environments we must balance our need to gather information with our desire to reap rewards by exploiting current knowledge. Achieving this balance is further complicated in reactive environments where actions produce long-lasting change to the system. In four experiments, we investigate how people learn to make effective decisions from experience in a dynamic multiarmed bandit task. In contrast to the typical exploitation-dependent diminishing rewards found in previous studies, options were framed as skills that developed greater rewards the more they were chosen. In Experiment 1, we provide a proof of concept, and in Experiments 2-4 we explore the boundaries of participants' sensitivity to reactive dynamics. Our results suggest that most individuals can learn effective strategies for coping with these reactive environments. A two-part comparison of several competing psychological models supports several conclusions: (a) a sizable minority of individuals learned that their environment was reactive, (b) evidence suggests several distinct groups of individuals employed unique decision strategies, and (c) testing models with the simulation method reveals qualitative misfits that motivate future theory development. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

A major problem resulting from the massive use of social media is the potential spread of incorrect information. Yet, very few studies have investigated the impact of incorrect information on individual and collective decisions. We performed experiments in which participants had to estimate a series of quantities, before and after receiving social information. Unbeknownst to them, we controlled the degree of inaccuracy of the social information through ‘virtual influencers’, who provided some incorrect information. We find that a large proportion of individuals only partially follow the social information, thus resisting incorrect information. Moreover, incorrect information can help improve group performance more than correct information, when going against a human underestimation bias. We then design a computational model whose predictions are in good agreement with the empirical data, and sheds light on the mechanisms underlying our results. Besides these main findings, we demonstrate that the dispersion of estimates varies a lot between quantities, and must thus be considered when normalizing and aggregating estimates of quantities that are very different in nature. Overall, our results suggest that incorrect information does not necessarily impair the collective wisdom of groups, and can even be used to dampen the negative effects of known cognitive biases.

Prokrastinasi akademik menjadi satu masalah bidang akademik yang sering dialami siswa. Prokrastinasi akademik dapat membawa dampak sebagai penyebab atau akibat dari timbulnya masalah lain. Melalui pendekatan Cognitive Beharioral Therapy, konseling individu diberikan kepada konseli yang mengalami prokrastinasi akademik untuk mengatasi masalah yang dihadapinya sehingga dapat kembali produktif dalam mengerjakan setiap tugas akademik yang dimilikinya.

An important part of any math curriculum is solving word problems. Such problems are particularly difficult for many students. It has been shown that the difficulty of word problems arises from the characteristics of the problems themselves (e.g., arithmetic and linguistic characteristics) and the solver. However, very little is known about how the environmental factor teaching quality (i.e., cognitive activation, supportive climate and classroom management) influences successful solution of word problems. Therefore, in a sample of 387 5th and 6th grade students we measured ability to solve word problems in such a way that we independently manipulated the linguistic (lexical consistency and nominalization) and arithmetic (operation and carry/borrow) complexity. Individual characteristics (intelligence, motivation, mathematical and reading skill, socio-economic status) was also measured. The results showed that both individual capability and environmental factors influenced word problem performance. Intelligence, reading and mathematical skills positively influenced the overall accuracy. In the face of nominalization, the teaching quality scales “cognitive activation” and “supportive climate” were associated with higher solution accuracy of problems with greater reading difficulty. These results provide evidence for the importance of environmental factors, and not only individual factors, on performance on linguistically demanding word problems.

Executive functions (EFs) enable us to control our attention and behavior in order to set and work toward goals. Strong EF skills are linked to better academic performance, and greater health, wealth, and happiness in later life. Research into EF development has been hampered by a lack of scalable measures suitable for infancy through to toddlerhood. The 31-item Early Executive Functions Questionnaire (EEFQ) complements temperament measures by targeting cognitive and regulatory capabilities. Exploratory Factor Analysis (n = 486 8- to 30-month-olds) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (n = 317 9- to 30-month-olds) indicate Inhibitory Control, Flexibility, and Working Memory items load onto a common “Cognitive Executive Function (CEF)” factor, while Regulation items do not. The CEF factor shows strong factorial measurement invariance for sex, and partial strong factorial measurement invariance for age. CEF and Regulation scores show limited floor and ceiling effects, good internal consistency, short-term stability, and convergent validity with carer-report measures of attentional control. The EEFQ is sensitive to developmental change. Results indicate that the widely overlooked period between late infancy and early toddlerhood may be a sensitive period for EF development. The low-resource demands of the EEFQ afford the possibility to study emergent EFs at scale; opening up new opportunities in basic developmental and intervention research.

Is there a fundamental difference between counting years and kilograms? Marbles and centimeters? Floors and euros? Recent evidence suggests that non-mathematical world knowledge irrelated to the mathematical structure of a problem can nevertheless influence its semantic encoding. To tackle this question, we created arithmetic word problems devised to promote contrasting encodings by featuring different quantities, in French and in English. We designed three experiments investigating the representations constructed and memorized by 302 adult participants when solving the problems. After an initial solving task, participants were given an unexpected task: either recall the problems (Experiments 1 and 2) or identify experimenter-induced changes in target problem sentences (Experiment 3). We predicted that the use of specific quantities in the problem statements was enough to lead participants to erroneously recall mathematical information that was not present in the problems, but that could be inferred from one of the two possible encodings of the situations. Results across all three experiments consistently indicate that participants construct and memorize a different problem encoding depending on the quantities involved. They misremembered problems involving durations, heights, or elevators by including new information into their problem representation. The same recall mistakes were not made for problems involving prices, weights or collections. This supports the claim that knowledge related to daily-life quantities substantially influences arithmetic reasoning, despite such knowledge being irrelevant for abstract reasoning.

General, non-mathematical knowledge about the entities described in an arithmetic word problem may interfere with its encoding. We used behavioral and eye-tracking measures to investigate how the use of specific quantities may foster a cardinal representation of the numbers mentioned in a problem, whereas other quantities may favor an ordinal representation instead. We asked 50 pre-service teachers to complete a solution validity assessment task. We compared participants’ gaze patterns on isomorphic problems to gather insights into their encoded representations. On problems featuring cardinal quantities, we found that specific sentences describing elements relevant in a cardinal understanding of the problems but irrelevant otherwise were looked at longer and were the focus of a higher number of backward eye movements. Additionally, an increase in pupil dilation on correctly solved cardinal problems supported the idea that participants need to engage in a recoding process when facing semantic incongruence.

В работе описана проверка влияния различных гипнотических и не-гипнотических вербальных внушений на эффективность решения инсайтной задачи “9 свинок”. Проведено двойное-слепое межгрупповое экспериментальное исследование. Проанализировано влияние факторов и их взаимодействий на ключевые характеристики процесса решения задачи. Значимого эффекта факторов на ключевые характеристики обнаружить не удалось.

Caffeine is the most widely consumed psychotropic drug in the world, with numerous studies documenting the effects of caffeine on people’s alertness, vigilance, mood, concentration, and attentional focus. The effects of caffeine on creative thinking, however, remain unknown. In a randomized placebo-controlled between-subject double-blind design the present study investigated the effect of moderate caffeine consumption on creative problem solving (i.e., convergent thinking) and creative idea generation (i.e., divergent thinking). We found that participants who consumed 200 mg of caffeine (approximately one 12 oz cup of coffee, n = 44), compared to those in the placebo condition (n = 44), showed significantly enhanced problem-solving abilities. Caffeine had no significant effects on creative generation or on working memory. The effects remained after controlling for participants’ caffeine expectancies, whether they believed they consumed caffeine or a placebo, or for changes in mood. Possible mechanisms and future directions are discussed.

According to Spearman’s law of diminishing returns (SLODR), IQ test scores are more g saturated among those with low, compared to those with high, ability. The present simulation shows that such difference in saturation can be observed if test scores are affected by a disturbing factor, for example, low motivation, illness, or linguistic confusion, that varies in magnitude between individuals. More contemporary criteria of SLODR can also be satisfied if test scores are affected by disturbance, especially if the disturbance variable is negatively skewed. This indicates a possible threat against the validity of findings supporting SLODR and points at the importance for researchers to try to eliminate the influence of such disturbing factors from their studies.

Some heuristics and biases are assumed to be universal for human decision-making, and may thus be expected to appear consistently and need to be considered when planning for real-life decision-making. Yet results are mixed when exploring the biases in applied settings, and few studies have attempted to robustly measure the combined impact of various biases during a decision-making process. We performed three pre-registered classroom experiments in which trained medical students read case descriptions and explored follow-up information in order to reach and adjust mental health diagnoses (∑N = 224). We tested whether the order of presenting the symptoms led to a primacy effect, whether there was a congruence bias in selecting follow-up questions, and whether confidence increased during the decision process. Our results showed increased confidence for participants that did not change their decision or sought disconfirming information. There was some indication of a weak congruence bias in selecting follow-up questions. There was no indication of a stronger congruence bias when confidence was high, and there was no support for a primacy effect of the order of symptom presentation. We conclude that the biases are difficult to demonstrate in pre-registered analyses of complex decision-making processes in applied settings.

Objective: The present study aimed to compare the cognitive functions of women who reported a history of eating disorders (ED) with women who did not report any such history. Within the group of women who reported a history of ED, it aimed to compare the cognitive functions of those who met anorexia nervosa body mass index (BMI) criteria at the time of assessment with those who did not meet such criteria. Method: The sample in this observational cross-sectional study belonged to the UK Biobank cohort, and consisted of 260,601 women in middle to older age, of whom 347 had a lifetime history of ED. Participants underwent sociodemographic, medical and psychological evaluation, and were assessed with four computerized cognitive tasks. Multiple regression analyses were conducted to take account of covariates. Results: Slower reaction time was found in those with an ED history: differences of small effect size were found across different levels of model adjustment (d=-.096 [95% CI -.201, .009] to -.150 [95% CI -.249, -.052]). Reasoning, visuospatial memory and prospective memory were not significantly different between those with and without a history of ED. A consistent pattern of results was not found when comparing the sub-sample of participants with ED split according to current BMI criteria. Discussion: The findings suggest that an ED history may correlate with slower processing speed in middle to older age, but this may be partly accounted for by clinical covariates. Further research in population-representative cohorts is required.

Our interactions with the visual world are guided by attention and visual working memory. Things that we look for and those we ignore are stored as templates that reflect our goals and the tasks at hand. The nature of such templates has been widely debated. A recent proposal is that these templates can be thought of as probabilistic representations of task-relevant features. Crucially, such probabilistic templates should accurately reflect feature probabilities in the environment. Here we ask whether observers can quickly form a correct internal model of a complex (bimodal) distribution of distractor features. We assessed observers’ representations by measuring the slowing of visual search when target features unexpectedly match a distractor template. Distractor stimuli were heterogeneous, randomly drawn on each trial from a bimodal probability distribution. Using two targets on each trial, we tested whether observers encode the full distribution, only one peak of it, or the average of the two peaks. Search was slower when the two targets corresponded to the two modes of a previous distractor distribution than when one target was at one of the modes and another between them or outside the distribution range. Furthermore, targets on the modes were reported later than targets between the modes that, in turn, were reported later than targets outside this range. This shows that observers use a correct internal model, representing both distribution modes using templates based on the full probability distribution rather than just one peak or simple summary statistics. The findings further confirm that performance in odd-one out search with repeated distractors cannot be described by a simple decision rule. Our findings indicate that probabilistic visual working memory templates guiding attention, dynamically adapt to task requirements, accurately reflecting the probabilistic nature of the input.

Despite its importance for public transportation, communication within organizations or the general understanding of organized knowledge, our understanding of how human individuals navigate complex networked systems is still limited owing to the lack of datasets recording a sufficient amount of navigation paths of individual humans. Here, we analyse 10587 paths recorded from 259 human subjects when navigating between nodes of a complex word-morph network. We find a clear presence of systematic detours organized around individual hierarchical scaffolds guiding navigation. Our dataset is the first enabling the visualization and analysis of scaffold hierarchies whose presence and role in supporting human navigation is assumed in existing navigational models. By using an information-theoretic argumentation, we argue that taking short detours following the hierarchical scaffolds is a clear sign of human subjects simplifying the interpretation of the complex networked system by an order of magnitude. We also discuss the role of these scaffolds in the phases of learning to navigate a network from scratch.

Over the past 15 years, there has been an explosion of new research on the role of the hippocampus in representation of information about time in memory. Much of this work was inspired by the ideas and research of Howard Eichenbaum, who made major contributions to our understanding of the neurobiology of episodic memory and the neural representation of time. In this paper, I will review evidence regarding the role of time in understanding hippocampal function. This review will cover a broad range of evidence from studies of humans and nonhuman animals with a narrative arc that follows Howard’s major discoveries. These studies demonstrate that the hippocampus encodes information in relation to an episodic context, and that time, as well as space, serves to define these contexts. Moreover, the research has shown that the hippocampus can encode temporal, spatial, and situational information in parallel. Building on this work, I present a new framework for understanding temporal structure in human episodic memory. I conclude by outlining current controversies and new questions that must be addressed by the field in the years to come.

The article proposes a view of evaluative conditioning (EC) as resulting from judgments based on learning instances stored in memory. It is based on the formal episodic memory model MINERVA 2. Additional assumptions specify how the information retrieved from memory is used to inform specific evaluative dependent measures. The present approach goes beyond previous accounts in that it uses a well-specified formal model of episodic memory; it is however more limited in scope as it aims to explain EC phenomena that do not involve reasoning processes. The article illustrates how the memory-based-judgment view accounts for several empirical findings in the EC literature that are often discussed as evidence for dual-process models of attitude learning. It sketches novel predictions, discusses limitations of the present approach, and identifies challenges and opportunities for its future development.

Our ability to detect statistical dependencies between different events in the environment is strongly biased by the number of coincidences between them. Even when there is no true covariation between a cue and an outcome, if the marginal probability of either of them is high, people tend to perceive some degree of statistical contingency between both events. The present paper explores the ability of the Comparator Hypothesis to explain the general pattern of results observed in this literature. Our simulations show that this model can account for the biasing effects of the marginal probabilities of cues and outcomes. Furthermore, the overall fit of the Comparator Hypothesis to a sample of experimental conditions from previous studies is comparable to that of the popular Rescorla-Wagner model. These results should encourage researchers to further explore and put to the test the predictions of the Comparator Hypothesis in the domain of biased contingency detection.

Goal-directed processes, relying on an integrated brain system involving fronto-parietal and medio-ventral basal-ganglia areas, are at the basis of the expression of flexible behavior. Here we investigate how the mechanisms for the top-down manipulation of internal representations can enhance goal-directed behavior. To this purpose, we propose a system-level computational model tested with the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), an important neuropsychological test used for measuring cognitive flexibility. Based on the brain anatomy and functioning involved in the performance of this test, we identified three fundamental processes that support the internal manipulation of representations and are posed at the core of the model: (a) an executive working memory selecting goals and behavioral rules; (b) a visual working memory representing perceptual stimuli at different levels of abstraction; (c) a manipulator selecting the visual working memory contents on the basis of behavioral rules stored in the executive working memory. The model also encompasses other components that allows it to interact with the environment and to ground its internal representations on realistic input patterns. The model is able to reproduce the behavior and errors of different groups of healthy and pathological WCST participants and on this basis furnishes predictions on the type of cognitive processes and impairments underlying their behavior and errors. Based on these analyses and results, we argue that the proposed internal representation manipulation mechanism is not only important for the solution of the WCST, but also at the core of the flexibility of multiple aspects of goal-directed behavior.

Research on executive function in early childhood has flourished in recent years. Much of this work is premised on a view of executive function development as the emergence of a set of domain general component processes (e.g., working memory updating, inhibitory control, and shifting). This view has shaped how we think about relations between executive function and other aspects of development, the role of the environment in executive function development, and how best to improve executive function in children who struggle with it. However, there are conceptual and empirical reasons to doubt that executive function should be defined in this way. I argue executive function development is better understood as the emergence of skills in using control in the service of specific goals. Such goals activate and are influenced by mental content like knowledge, beliefs, norms, values, and preferences that are acquired with development and are important to consider in understanding children’s executive function performance. This account better explains empirical findings than the components view; leads to specific, testable hypotheses; and has implications for theory, measurement, and interventions.

This study aimed to propose to add a new perspective on what may create the impression of “mind” in other beings. The conventional is perspective is that when we observe mental activities in animals, this creates in us the impression that they have a mind. On the other hand, the authors’ proposal is that when we observe unpredictable activities in living beings, this creates in us the impression of mind. This “unpredictability” is a characteristic product of all living things and is not limited to animals. In response to this additional perspective of mind, we assumed that the following questions would arise, “Is mind as the source of unpredictability an imaginary thing? Does it really exist?” To answer this question, a conceptual model of mind was proposed, and its validity was investigated by introducing studies on the relationship between animals’ unpredictability and emergent behavior. In section “Animal Mind as a Behavioral Inhibition Network,” we examined the question from the perspectives of comparative psychology, ethology, and neurophysiology. As a result, we obtained the hypothesis that every animal can have a “behavioral inhibition network” and that this corresponds with the source of unpredictability. The function of the behavioral inhibition network is to create “unpredictable behavior.” It makes an observer facing the animal feel unpredictability of the animal. However, unpredictable behavior may arise from exogenous factors such as congenital malfunction in the mechanism to generate an innately acquired behavior, as well as environmental disturbances. Therefore, in the section “Innate and Emergent Behavior of Animals,” we introduce studies where unpredictable behavior seems to occur endogenously. In these studies, various animal species were examined in unexperienced problem-solving tasks that could not be solved by innately acquired behaviors. As a result, each animal solved the problem by generating unpredictable behaviors with high frequency. Such biologically significant unpredictable behaviors are referred to as “emergent behaviors.” In the section “Discussion,” we investigate whether the behavioral inhibition network matches the mind that one experiences in their daily life. Finally, toward a science of universal mind, we introduce experimental results suggesting the possibility that plants and materials such as stones have a similar structure to a behavioral inhibition network.