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Temporal information-processing is critical for adaptive behavior and goal-directed action. It is thus crucial to understand how the temporal distance between behaviorally relevant events is encoded to guide behavior. However, research on temporal representations has yielded mixed findings as to whether organisms utilize relative versus absolute judgments of time intervals. To address this fundamental question about the timing mechanism, we tested mice in a duration discrimination procedure in which they learned to correctly categorize tones of different durations as short or long. After being trained on a pair of target intervals the mice transferred to conditions in which cue durations and corresponding response locations were systematically manipulated. Specifically, responses and/or durations of cues were switched in different experimental phases so that either the relative or absolute mapping remained constant. The findings indicate that the transfer occurred most readily when relative relationships of durations and response locations were preserved. In contrast, when the animals had to re-map these relative relations, their temporal discrimination ability was impaired, and they required extensive training to re-establish temporal control. However, preserving the response location of one of the cue durations in such conditions was found to help with initial transfer. These results demonstrate that mice can represent experienced durations both as having a certain magnitude (absolute representation) and as being shorter or longer of the two durations (an ordinal relation to other cue durations), with relational control having a greater influence in temporal discriminations.

We introduce the Category Abstraction Learning (CAL) model, a cognitive framework formally describing category learning built on similarity-based generalization, dissimilarity-based abstraction, two attention learning mechanisms, error-driven knowledge structuring, and stimulus memorization. Our hypotheses draw on an array of empirical and theoretical insights connecting reinforcement and category learning. The key novelty of the model is its explanation of how rules are learned from scratch based on three central assumptions. (a) Category rules emerge from two processes of stimulus generalization (similarity) and its direct inverse (category contrast) on independent dimensions. (b) Two attention mechanisms guide learning by focusing on rules, or on the contexts in which they produce errors. (c) Knowing about these contexts inhibits executing the rule, without correcting it, and consequently leads to applying partial rules in different situations. The model is designed to capture both systematic and individual differences in a broad range of learning paradigms. We illustrate the model's explanatory scope by simulating several benchmarks, including the classic Six Problems, the 5-4 problem, and linear separability. Beyond the common approach of predicting average response probabilities, we also propose explanations for more recently studied phenomena that challenge existing learning accounts, regarding task instructions, individual differences in rule extrapolation in three different tasks, individual attention shifts to stimulus features during learning, and other phenomena. We discuss CAL's relation to different models, and its potential to measure the cognitive processes regarding attention, abstraction, error detection, and memorization from multiple psychological perspectives. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

How do we decide what to say to ensure our meanings will be understood? The Rational Speech Act model (RSA, Frank & Goodman, 2012) asserts that speakers plan what to say by comparing the informativity of words in a particular context. We present the first example of an RSA model of sentence level (who-did-what-to-whom) meanings. In these contexts, the set of possible messages must be abstracted from entities in common ground (people and objects) to possible events (Jane eats the apple, Marco peels the banana), with each word contributing unique semantic content. How do speakers accomplish the transformation from context to compositional, informative messages? In a communication game, participants described transitive events (e.g. Jane pets the dog), with only two words, in contexts where two words either were or were not enough to uniquely identify an event. Adults chose utterances matching the predictions of the RSA even when there was no possible fully 'successful' utterance. Thus we show that adults’ communicative behavior can be described by a model that accommodates informativity in context, beyond the set of possible entities in common ground. This study provides the first evidence that adults' language production is affected, at the level of argument structure, by the graded informativity of possible utterances in context, and suggests that full- blown natural speech may result from speakers who model and adapt to the listener’s needs.

Given the growing interest in retrieval practice among educators, it is valuable to know when retrieval practice does and does not improve student learning—particularly for educators who have limited classroom time and resources. In this literature review, we developed a narrow operational definition for “classroom research” compared to previous reviews of the literature. We screened nearly 2,000 abstracts and systematically coded 50 experiments to establish a clearer picture of benefits from retrieval practice in real world educational settings. Our review yielded 60 effect sizes and a total n = 5,374, the majority of which (62%) revealed medium or large benefits from retrieval practice. We found that retrieval practice improved learning for a variety of education levels, content areas, experimental designs, spacing of retrieval practice, final test delays, retrieval and final test formats, and timing of feedback; however, only 10 out of 50 experiments were conducted in non-WEIRD countries. Based on our review of the literature, we make eight recommendations for future research and provide educators with a better understanding of the robust benefits of retrieval practice across a range of school and classroom settings.

How do our valuation systems change to homeostatically correct undesirable psychological or physiological states, such as those caused by hunger? There is evidence that hunger increases discounting for food rewards, biasing choices towards smaller but sooner food reward over larger but later reward. However, it is not understood how hunger modulates delay discounting for non-food items. We outline and quantitatively evaluate six possible models of how our valuation systems modulate discounting of various commodities in the face of the undesirable state of being hungry. With a repeated-measures design, an experimental hunger manipulation, and quantitative modeling, we find strong evidence that hunger causes large increases in delay discounting for food, with an approximately 25% spillover effect to non-food commodities. The results provide evidence that in the face of hunger, our valuation systems increase discounting for commodities, which cannot achieve a desired state change as well as for those commodities that can. Given that strong delay discounting can cause negative outcomes in many non-food (consumer, investment, medical, or inter-personal) domains, the present findings suggest caution may be necessary when making decisions involving non-food outcomes while hungry.

By definition, individuals with absolute pitch (AP) can categorize an isolated musical note with near perfect accuracy without a reference pitch. This definition implies a uniformity of performance across people; however, in reality AP is a complex, multidimensional ability, shaped by both early and recent auditory experiences. In the present study we assess how individual differences in working memory, musical expertise, and language background relate to the accuracy with which an AP possessor can identify an isolated musical note. In a standard test of AP ability, all AP participants performed virtually perfectly. When tested on more challenging notes, drawn from less frequently experienced timbres and octave ranges, we found that working memory positively related to note categorization performance, though only among individuals who reported a tonal language background. This interaction between tonal language and working memory, however, may have been partly grounded by differences in musical expertise reported between tonal and non-tonal language. Supporting this possibility, in a follow-up analysis we observed a general interaction between working memory performance and musical expertise across all participants. Taken together, these results highlight the complexity of AP categorization when considered as an auditory skill rather than a native talent. The observation that working memory may be an important component of auditory processing in AP when the to-be-judged sounds are less easily categorized is consistent with recent theoretical accounts of how working memory and expertise relate to auditory recognition more broadly.

Events that conform to our expectations, i.e, are congruent with our world knowledge or schemas, are better remembered than unrelated events. Yet events that conflict with schemas can also be remembered better. We examined this apparent paradox in four experiments, in which schemas were established by training ordinal relationships between randomly-paired objects, while episodic memory was tested for the number of objects on each trial. Better memory was found for both congruent and incongruent trials, relative to unrelated trials, producing memory performance that was a “U-shaped” function of congruency. Furthermore, the incongruency advantage, but not congruency advantage, emerged even if the information probed by the memory test was irrelevant to the schema, while the congruency advantage, but not incongruency advantage, also emerged after initial encoding. Schemas therefore augment episodic memory in multiple ways, depending on the match between novel and existing information.

Although euphemisms are intended to put a more positive spin on the words they replace, some euphemisms are ineffective. Our study examined the effectiveness of a popular euphemism for persons with disabilities, special needs. Most style guides prescribe against using the euphemism special needs and recommend instead using the non-euphemized term disability; disability advocates argue adamantly against the euphemism special needs, which they find offensive. In contrast, many parents of children with disabilities prefer to use special needs rather than disability. But no empirical study has examined whether special needs is more or less positive than the term it replaces. Therefore, we gathered a sample of adult participants from the general population (N = 530) and created a set of vignettes that allowed us to measure how positively children, college students, and middle-age adults are viewed when they are described as having special needs, having a disability, having a certain disability (e.g., is blind, has Down syndrome), or with no label at all. We predicted and observed that persons are viewed more negatively when described as having special needs than when described as having a disability or having a certain disability, indicating that special needs is an ineffective euphemism. Even for members of the general population who have a personal connection to disability (e.g., as parents of children with disabilities), the euphemism special needs is no more effective than the non euphemized term disability. We also collected free associations to the terms special needs and disability and found that special needs is associated with more negativity; special needs conjures up more associations with developmental disabilities (such as intellectual disability) whereas disability is associated with a more inclusive set of disabilities; and special needs evokes more unanswered questions. These findings recommend against using the euphemism special needs.

This paper investigates how cognition facilitates the adoption of new words through a study of the large-scale Reddit corpus, which contains written, threaded conversations conducted over the internet. Parameters for the cognitive architecture are estimated. Using ACT-R's account of declarative memory, the activation of memory chunks representing words is traced and compared to usage statistics sampled from a year of data. Potential values for decay and retrieval threshold are identified according to model fit and growth rates of word adoption. The resulting estimate for the decay parameter, d, is 0.22, and the estimate for the retrieval threshold parameter, rt, lies between 3.4 and 4.5.

[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported in Vol 115(6) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2018-63189-002). In the article, the original supplemental material has been revised to include a clarifying note to the Tests of model fit over larger sample (Samples C-G) section and post-peer review analyses added to the Post-peer review Factor Analytic Tests section. All versions of this article have been corrected.] Philosophers and behavioral scientists refer to wisdom as unbiased reasoning that guides one toward a balance of interests and promotes a good life. However, major instruments developed to test wisdom appear biased, and it is unclear whether they capture balance-related tendencies. We examined whether shifting from global, de-contextualized reports to state-level reports about concrete situations provides a less biased method to assess wise reasoning (e.g., intellectual humility, recognition of uncertainty and change, consideration of the broader context at hand and perspectives of others, integration of these perspectives or compromise), which may be aligned with the notion of balancing interests. Results of a large-scale psychometric investigation (N = 4,463) revealed that the novel Situated WIse Reasoning Scale (SWIS) is reliable and appears independent of psychological biases (attribution bias, bias blind spot, self-deception, and impression management), whereas global wisdom reports are subject to such biases. Moreover, SWIS scores were positively related to indices of living well (e.g., adaptive emotion regulation, mindfulness), and balancing of cooperative and self-protective interests, goals (influence-vs.-adjustment), and causal inferences about conflict (attribution to the self-vs.-other party). In contrast, global wisdom reports were unrelated or negatively related to balance-related measures. Notably, people showed modest within-person consistency in wise reasoning across situations or over time, suggesting that a single-shot measurement may be insufficient for whole understanding of trait-level wisdom. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for research on wisdom, judgment and decision making, well-being, and prosociality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

We discuss two relatively understudied yet important phenomena relevant to the ecologically crucial task of gathering reliable information from human faces. First, facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) predicts aggressiveness judgments and is associated with aggression-related behavior and life history outcomes. A significant body of research indicates fWHR is an honest evolutionary signal of propensity to aggression yet little is known about how or if this signal is preserved in judgments across race boundaries. Evidence for a universal relationship between increased fWHR and enhanced aggression perception has been found using Asian and white face stimuli, but race moderated the relationship between high fWHR and ratings in a pain ascription task using black and white faces. Second, we examine research on olfactory cues to face perception and focus particular attention on the possibility that face judgments may be influenced by putrescine, an organic compound found recently to heighten threat and escape-related cognitions in a single subliminal odor presentation study. Here we probe how fWHR and face race interact in aggression judgments during subliminal exposure to putrescine and a control condition. We present a standardized method of subliminal putrescine delivery and find null effects of putrescine on face judgments. Overall, our primarily white participants show a reduced difference in aggressiveness ratings to black faces from low to high levels of fWHR compared to the same contrast in white face stimuli, consistent with an account in which black faces are not perceived with the same configural precision as white faces.

The present study examined the effect of stimulus valence on two levels of selection in the cognitive system, selection of a task-set and selection of a response. In the first experiment, participants performed a spatial compatibility task (pressing left and right key according to the locations of stimuli) in which stimulus-response mappings were determined by stimulus valence. There was a standard spatial stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) effect for positive stimuli (flowers) and a reversed SRC effect for negative stimuli (spiders), but the same data could be interpreted as showing faster responses when positive and negative stimuli were assigned to compatible and incompatible mappings, respectively, than when the assignment was opposite. Experiment 2 disentangled these interpretations, showing that valence did not influence a spatial SRC effect (Simon effect) when task-set retrieval was unnecessary. Experiments 3 and 4 replaced keypress responses with joystick deflections that afforded approach/avoidance action coding. Stimulus valence modulated the Simon effect (but did not reverse it) when the valence was task-relevant (Experiment 3) as well as when it was task-irrelevant (Experiment 4). Therefore, stimulus valence influences task-set selection and response selection, but the influence on the latter is limited to conditions where responses afford approach/avoidance action coding.

How does prior experience shape skilled performance in structured environments? We use skilled typing of natural text to evaluate correspondence between performance (keystroke timing) and structure in the environment (letter uncertainty). We had ∼350 typists copy-type English text. We reproduced Ostry's (1983) analysis of interkeystroke interval as a function of letter position and word length, that showed prominent first-letter and midword slowing effects. We propose a novel account that letter position and word length effects on keystroke dynamics reflect informational uncertainty about letters in those locations, rather than resource limited planning/buffering processes. We computed positional uncertainty for letters in all positions of words from length one to nine using Google's n-gram database. We show that variance in interkeystroke interval by letter position and word length tracks natural variation in letter uncertainty. Finally, we provide a model showing how a general learning and memory process could acquire sensitivity to patterns of letter uncertainty in natural English. In doing so, we draw an equivalence between Logan's (1988) instance theory of automatization and Shannon's measure of entropy (H) from information theory. Instance theory's predictions for automatization as a function of experience follow exactly the uncertainty in the choice set being automatized. As a result, instance theory stands as a general process model explaining how context-specific experiences in a structured environment tune skilled performance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

This study used a Web-based naturalistic story-reading paradigm to investigate the impact of number of exposures on incidental acquisition and long-term retention of new meanings for known words by native English-speaking adults. Participants read one of four custom written stories in which they encountered novel meanings (e.g., a safe concealed within a piece of furniture) for familiar words (foam). These meanings appeared two, four, six, or eight times in the narrative. Results showed reasonably good memory of the new meanings, assessed by cued recall of novel meanings and word forms, after only two exposures, emphasizing the importance of initial encounters. Accuracy in cued recall of novel meanings showed a linear, incremental increase with more exposures. There was no significant forgetting after 1 week, regardless of the number of exposures during training, demonstrating the efficiency with which adults acquire new word meanings incidentally through reading and retain them over time. Open Practices: This article has been awarded an Open Data badge. All data and analysis scripts are publicly accessible via the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/ybu6r. Learn more about the Open Practices badges from the Center for Open Science: https://osf.io/tvyxz/wiki.

Humans can see through the complexity of scenes, faces, and objects by quickly extracting their redundant low-spatial and low-dimensional global properties, or their style. It remains unclear, however, whether semantic coding is necessary, or whether visual stylistic information is sufficient, for people to recognize and discriminate complex images and categories. In two experiments, we systematically reduce the resolution of hundreds of unique paintings, birds, and faces, and test people's ability to discriminate and recognize them. We show that the stylistic information retained at extremely low image resolutions is sufficient for visual recognition of images and visual discrimination of categories. Averaging over the 3 domains, people were able to reliably recognize images reduced down to a single pixel, with large differences from chance discriminability across 8 different image resolutions. People were also able to discriminate categories substantially above chance with an image resolution as low as 2 × 2 pixels. We situate our findings in the context of contemporary computational accounts of visual recognition and contend that explicit encoding of the local features in the image, or knowledge of the semantic category, is not necessary for recognizing and distinguishing complex visual stimuli. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

An emerging area of research in cognitive science is the utilization of networks to model the structure and processes of the mental lexicon in healthy and clinical populations, like aphasia. Previous research has focused on only one type of word similarity at a time (e.g., semantic relationships), even though words are multi-faceted. Here, we investigate lexical retrieval in a picture naming task from people with Broca’s and Wernicke’s aphasia and healthy controls by utilizing a multiplex network structure that accounts for the interplay between multiple semantic and phonological relationships among words in the mental lexicon. Extending upon previous work, we focused on the global network measure of closeness centrality which is known to capture spreading activation, an important process supporting lexical retrieval. We conducted a series of logistic regression models predicting the probability of correct picture naming. We tested whether multiplex closeness centrality was a better predictor of picture naming performance than single-layer closeness centralities, other network measures assessing local and meso-scale structure, psycholinguistic variables and group differences. We also examined production gaps, or the difference between the likelihood of producing a word with the lowest and highest closeness centralities. Our results indicated that multiplex closeness centrality was a significant predictor of picture naming performance, where words with high closeness centrality were more likely to be produced than words with low closeness centrality. Additionally, multiplex closeness centrality outperformed single-layer closeness centralities and other multiplex network measures, and remained a significant predictor after controlling for psycholinguistic variables and group differences. Furthermore, we found that the facilitative effect of closeness centrality was similar for both types of aphasia. Our results underline the importance of integrating multiple measures of word similarities in cognitive language networks for better understanding lexical retrieval in aphasia, with an eye towards future clinical applications.

People often have difficulty understanding processes of biological change, and they typically reject drastic life cycle changes such as metamorphosis, except for animals with which they are familiar. Even after a lesson about metamorphosis, people often do not generalize to animals not seen during the lesson. This might be partially due to the perceptual richness of the diagrams typically used during lessons on metamorphosis, which serves to emphasize the individual animal rather than a class of animals. In two studies, we examined whether the perceptual richness of a diagram influences adults’ learning and transfer of knowledge about metamorphosis. One study was conducted in a laboratory setting and the other online. In both studies, adults who saw the bland diagram during the lesson accurately transferred more than adults who saw the rich diagram during the lesson.

Several studies found cross‐linguistic structural priming with various language combinations. Here, we investigated the role of two important domains of language variation: case marking and word order, for transitive and ditransitive structures. We varied these features in an artificial language learning paradigm, using three different artificial language versions in a between‐subjects design. Priming was assessed between Dutch (no overt case marking, SVO word order) and a) an SVO order version, b) a case marking version, and c) an SOV order version. Similar within‐language and cross‐linguistic priming was found in all versions for transitives, indicating that cross‐linguistic structural priming was not hindered. In contrast, for ditransitives we found similar within‐language priming for all versions, but no cross‐linguistic priming. The finding that cross‐linguistic priming is possible between languages that vary in morphological marking or word order, is compatible with studies showing cross‐linguistic priming between natural languages that differ on these dimensions.

Uncertainty plays a critical role in reinforcement learning and decision making. However, exactly how it influences behavior remains unclear. Multiarmed-bandit tasks offer an ideal test bed, since computational tools such as approximate Kalman filters can closely characterize the interplay between trial-by-trial values, uncertainty, learning, and choice. To gain additional insight into learning and choice processes, we obtained data from subjects’ overt allocation of gaze. The estimated value and estimation uncertainty of options influenced what subjects looked at before choosing; these same quantities also influenced choice, as additionally did fixation itself. A momentary measure of uncertainty in the form of absolute prediction errors determined how long participants looked at the obtained outcomes. These findings affirm the importance of uncertainty in multiple facets of behavior and help delineate its effects on decision making.

Objectives Across the life span, deficits in executive functioning (EF) are associated with poor behavioral control and failure to achieve goals. Though EF is often discussed as one broad construct, a prominent model of EF suggests that it is composed of three subdomains: inhibition, set shifting, and updating. These subdomains are seen in both younger (YA) and older adults (OA), with performance deficits across subdomains in OA. Therefore, our goal was to investigate whether subdomains of EF might be differentially affected by age, and how these differences may relate to broader global age differences in EF. Methods To assess these age differences, we conducted a meta-analysis at multiple levels, including task level, subdomain level, and of global EF. Based on previous work, we hypothesized that there would be overall differences in EF in OA. Results Using 1,268 effect sizes from 401 articles, we found overall differences in EF with age. Results suggested that differences in performance are not uniform, such that variability in age effects emerged at the task level, and updating was not as affected by age as other subdomains. Discussion These findings advance our understanding of age differences in EF, and stand to inform early detection of EF decline.

Abstract. Language comprehenders have been arguing to mentally represent the implied orientation of objects. However, compared to the effects of shape, size, and color, the effect of orientation is rather small. We examined a potential explanation for the relatively low magnitude of the orientation effect: Object size moderates the orientation effect. Theoretical considerations led us to predict a smaller orientation effect for small objects than for large objects in a sentence–picture verification task. We furthermore investigated whether this pattern generalizes across languages (Chinese, Dutch, and English) and tasks (picture-naming task). The results of the verification task show an orientation effect overall, which is not moderated by object size (contrary to our hypothesis) and language (consistent with our hypothesis). Meanwhile, the preregistered picture–picture verification task showed the predicted interaction between object size and orientation effect. We conducted exploratory analyses to address additional questions.

Agents that can make better use of computation, experience, time, and memory can solve a greater range of problems more effectively. A crucial ingredient for managing such finite resources is intelligently chosen abstract representations. But, how do abstractions facilitate problem solving under limited resources? What makes an abstraction useful? To answer such questions, we review several trends in recent reinforcement-learning research that provide insight into how abstractions interact with learning and decision making. During learning, abstraction can guide exploration and generalization as well as facilitate efficient tradeoffs---e.g., time spent learning versus the quality of a solution. During computation, good abstractions provide simplified models for computation while also preserving relevant information about decision-theoretic quantities. These features of abstraction are not only key for scaling up artificial problem solving, but can also shed light on what pressures shape the use of abstract representations in humans and other organisms.

Despite the growing popularity of digital health interventions, limitations of traditional behavior change theories and a lack of theory integration hinder theory-driven behavior change applications. In this paper, we aim to review theories relevant to lifestyle behavior change from the broader psychology literature and then integrate these theories into a new theoretical framework called adaptive decision-making to address two specific problems. First, our framework represents lifestyle behaviors at two levels—one of individual daily decisions (action level) and one of larger behavioral episodes (reflection level)—to more closely match the temporal characteristics of lifestyle behaviors and their associated digital data. Second, the framework connects decision-making theories and learning theories to explain how behaviors and cognitive constructs dynamically influence each other, making it a suitable scaffold for building computational models. We map common digital intervention techniques onto the behavioral and cognitive processes in the framework and discuss possible contributions of the framework to both theory development and digital intervention design.

Metamemory can be defined as the knowledge about one's memory capabilities and about strategies that can aid memory. In this paper, we describe the development and validation of the Eyewitness Metamemory Scale (EMS), tailored specifically for use in face memory and eyewitness identification settings. Participants (N = 800) completed the EMS and other measures on general metamemory. Results from exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis revealed good factorial validity, internal consistency, and content validity. The EMS items emerged into three distinct factors: memory contentment, memory discontentment, and memory strategies. The EMS is a brief and easily administrable questionnaire that might be used to assess self-ratings of face recognition capacity and use of strategies to encode faces.

Humans often appear to desire information for its own sake, but it is presently unclear what drives this desire. The important role that resolving uncertainty plays in stimulating information seeking has suggested a tight coupling between the intrinsic motivation to gather information and performance gains, construed as a drive for long-term learning. Using an asteroid-avoidance game that allows us to study learning and information seeking at an experimental time-scale, we show that the incentive for information-seeking can be separated from a long-term learning outcome, with information-seeking best predicted by per-trial outcome uncertainty. Specifically, participants were more willing to take time penalties to receive feedback on trials with increasing uncertainty in the outcome of their choices. We found strong group and individual level support for a linear relationship between feedback request rate and information gain as determined by per-trial outcome uncertainty. This information better reflects filling in the gaps of the episodic record of choice outcomes than long-term skill acquisition or assessment. Our results suggest that this easy to compute quantity can drive information-seeking, potentially allowing simple organisms to intelligently gather information for a diverse episodic record of the environment without having to anticipate the impact on future performance.

Background Research examining the relation between spatial skills and the science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields has focused on small-scale spatial skills, even though some STEM disciplines—particularly the geography and geoscience (GEO) fields—involve large-scale spatial thinking at the core of their professional training. In Study 1, we compared large-scale navigation skills of experienced geologists with those of experienced psychologists, using a novel virtual navigation paradigm as an objective measure of navigation skills. In Study 2, we conducted a longitudinal study with novice Geographic Information Systems (GIS) students to investigate baseline navigational competence and improvement over the course of an academic semester. Results In Study 1, we found that geologists demonstrated higher navigational competence and were more likely to be categorized as integrating separate routes, compared to their non-STEM counterparts. In Study 2, novice GIS students showed superior baseline navigational competence compared to non-STEM students, as well as better spatial working memory and small-scale mental rotation skills, indicating self-selection. In addition, GIS students’ spatial skills improved more over the course of a semester than those of non-STEM students. Conclusions Our findings highlight the importance of large-scale spatial thinking for enrollment and success in the GEO fields but likely also across the broader range of thinking involving spatial distributions. We discuss the potential of GIS tools to develop spatial skills at an early age.

Forensic science techniques are often used in criminal trials to infer the identity of theperpetrator of crime and jurors often find this evidence very persuasive. Unfortunately, two of the leading causes of wrongful convictions are forensic science testing errors and false or misleading forensic testimony (Saks & Koehler, 2005). Therefore, it is important to understand jurors pre- existing beliefs about forensic science, as these beliefs may impact how they evaluate forensic evidence in the courtroom. In this study, we examine people’s perceptions of the likelihood of error and human judgment involved at each stage of the forensic science process (i.e., collection, storage, testing, analysis, reporting, and presenting). In addition, we examine peoples’ perceptions of the accuracy of — and human judgment involved in — 16 different forensic techniques. We find that, in contrast to what would be expected by the CSI effect literature, participants believed that the process of forensic science involved considerable human judgment and was relatively error-prone. In addition, participants had wide-ranging beliefs about the accuracy of various forensic techniques, ranging from 65.18% (document analysis) up to 89.95% (DNA). For some forensic techniques, estimates were lower than that found in experimental proficiency studies, suggesting that our participants are more skeptical of certain forensic evidence than they need to be. Keywords: Forensic science, forensic evidence, accuracy, error rate, CSI effect.

Bows and arrows, houses and kayaks are just a few examples of the highly optimized tools that humans have produced and used to colonize new environments1,2. Because there is much evidence that humans’ cognitive abilities are unparalleled3,4, many believe that such technologies resulted from our superior causal reasoning abilities5–7. However, others have stressed that the high dimensionality of human technologies makes them very difficult to understand causally8. Instead, they argue that optimized technologies emerge through the retention of small improvements across generations without requiring understanding of how these technologies work1,9. Here we show that a physical artefact becomes progressively optimized across generations of social learners in the absence of explicit causal understanding. Moreover, we find that the transmission of causal models across generations has no noticeable effect on the pace of cultural evolution. The reason is that participants do not spontaneously create multidimensional causal theories but, instead, mainly produce simplistic models related to a salient dimension. Finally, we show that the transmission of these inaccurate theories constrains learners’ exploration and has downstream effects on their understanding. These results indicate that complex technologies need not result from enhanced causal reasoning but, instead, can emerge from the accumulation of improvements made across generations. An experiment shows that complex technologies need not result from our superior causal reasoning abilities but, instead, can emerge from the accumulation of improvements across generations without requiring understanding of how these technologies work.

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is an assimilative change in liking of neutral conditioned stimuli (CS) following pairings with positive or negative stimuli (unconditioned stimulus, US). Dual-process theories postulate that, in addition to a controlled propositional process underlying conscious learning of CS-US contingencies, a second automatic and associative learning process exists that underlies EC effects. A central argument for dual-process theories is the dissociation between US expectancy and CS evaluation in extinction learning: When CSs are presented alone subsequent to CS-US pairings, participants cease to expect USs but continue to exhibit EC effects. This dissociation is typically interpreted as demonstration that EC is resistant to extinction, and consequently, that EC is driven by a distinct learning process. We tested an alternative single-process account, namely that expectancy-liking dissociations are caused by different judgment strategies afforded by the dependent measures rather than due to separable learning processes. According to this view, CS evaluations are by default integrative judgments---summaries of large portions of the learning history---whereas US expectancy reflects momentary judgments focusing on recent events. In a counterconditioning and two extinction experiments, we eliminate the expectancy-liking dissociations reported in the literature by inducing nondefault momentary evaluative judgments, and demonstrate a reversed dissociation when we additionally induced integrative expectancy judgments. Our findings corroborated a-priori predictions based on MINERVA 2, a formal single-process memory model. Hence, dissociations between US expectancy and conditioned CS liking reflect judgment properties and can be accounted for parsimoniously by a single learning process.

A recent surge of interest in the empirical measurement of mind-wandering has led to an increase in the use of thought-probing to measure attentional states, which has led to large variation in methodologies across studies (Weinstein in Behavior Research Methods, 50, 642-661, 2018). Three sources of variation in methodology include the frequency of thought probes during a task, the number of response options provided for each probe, and the way in which various attentional states are framed during the task instructions. Method variation can potentially affect behavioral performance on the tasks in which thought probes are embedded, the experience of various attentional states within those tasks, and/or response biases to the thought probes. Therefore, such variation can be problematic, both pragmatically and theoretically. Across three experiments, we examined how manipulating probe frequency, response options, and framing affected behavioral performance and responses to thought probes. Probe frequency and framing did not affect behavioral performance or probe responses. But, in light of the present results, we argue that thought probes need at least three responses, corresponding to on-task, off-task, and task-related interference. When researchers are specifically investigating mind-wandering, the probe responses should also distinguish between mind-wandering, external distraction, and mind-blanking.

Event-related potentials (ERPs) provide a window into how the brain is processing language. Here, we propose a theory that argues that ERPs such as the N400 and P600 arise as side effects of an error-based learning mechanism that explains linguistic adaptation and language learning. We instantiated this theory in a connectionist model that can simulate data from three studies on the N400 (amplitude modulation by expectancy, contextual constraint, and sentence position), five studies on the P600 (agreement, tense, word category, subcategorization and garden-path sentences), and a study on the semantic P600 in role reversal anomalies. Since ERPs are learning signals, this account explains adaptation of ERP amplitude to within-experiment frequency manipulations and the way ERP effects are shaped by word predictability in earlier sentences. Moreover, it predicts that ERPs can change over language development. The model provides an account of the sensitivity of ERPs to expectation mismatch, the relative timing of the N400 and P600, the semantic nature of the N400, the syntactic nature of the P600, and the fact that ERPs can change with experience. This approach suggests that comprehension ERPs are related to sentence production and language acquisition mechanisms.

Cognitive control is applied in situations that require overriding a habitual and automatic response. The conflict monitoring hypothesis and the Expected Value of Control (EVC) theory as its extension posit a control system responsible for detecting conflicting occasions and adapting to them dynamically within a task. Here we evaluate this prediction in two versions of one of the most popular tasks in cognitive control, namely the Stroop task. We hypothesized that nearby-items interference combines with task interference in the multi-item version effectively turning it into a multi-task that may challenge cognitive control. Adopting an alternative methodology tracking within-task performance, we compared the classical multi-item version of the Stroop task and its single-item counterpart in adults and children. The results revealed a within-task performance decline only in the multi-item version of the task, in both incongruent and neutral conditions, modulated by the presumed maturity of the control system. These findings suggest capacity constraints in control implementation and allocation under conditions requiring parallel execution of multiple cognitive tasks. Task complexity and demands seem to modulate effects on performance. We discuss implications for cognitive control as well as substantial concerns regarding the calculation and use of indices of interference based on the commonly used multi-item version of the Stroop task.

Evaluative conditioning (EC) changes the preference towards a formerly neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus; CS), by pairing it with a valent stimulus (unconditioned stimulus; US), in the direction of the valence of the US. When the CS is presented suboptimally (i.e., too briefly to be consciously perceived), contingency awareness between CS and US can be ruled out. Hence, EC effects with suboptimally presented CSs would support theories claiming that contingency awareness is not necessary for EC effects to occur. Recent studies reported the absence of EC with briefly presented CSs when both CS and US were presented in the visual modality, even though the CSs were identified at above-chance levels. Challenging this finding, Heycke et al. (R Soc Open Sci 4(9):160935, 2017) found some evidence for an EC effect with briefly presented visual stimuli in a cross-modal paradigm with auditory USs, but that study did not assess CS visibility. The present study realized a close replication of this study, while deviated from it using different stimuli, introducing a brief practice phase, and adding a CS visibility check. Overall EC for briefly presented stimuli was absent, and results from the visibility check show that an EC effect with briefly presented CSs was only found, when the CSs were identified at above-chance levels.

Previous work suggests that humans find it difficult to learn the structure of causal systems given observational data alone. We identify two conditions that enable successful structure learning from observational data: people succeed if the underlying causal system is deterministic, and if each pattern of observations has a single root cause. In four experiments, we show that either condition alone is sufficient to enable high levels of performance, but that performance is poor if neither condition applies. A fifth experiment suggests that neither determinism nor root sparsity takes priority over the other. Our data are broadly consistent with a Bayesian model that embodies a preference for structures that make the observed data not only possible but probable.

Misinformation often continues to influence people’s memory and inferential reasoning after it has been retracted; this is known as the continued influence effect (CIE). Previous research investigating the role of attitude-based motivated reasoning in this context has found conflicting results: Some studies have found that worldview can have a strong impact on the magnitude of the CIE, such that retractions are less effective if the misinformation is congruent with a person’s relevant attitudes, in which case the retractions can even backfire. Other studies have failed to find evidence for an effect of attitudes on the processing of misinformation corrections. The present study used political misinformation—specifically fictional scenarios involving misconduct by politicians from left-wing and right-wing parties—and tested participants identifying with those political parties. Results showed that in this type of scenario, partisan attitudes have an impact on the processing of retractions, in particular (1) if the misinformation relates to a general assertion rather than just a specific singular event, and (2) if the misinformation is congruent with a conservative partisanship.

Successful navigation requires memorising and recognising the locations of objects across different perspectives. Although these abilities rely on hippocampal functioning, which is susceptible to degeneration in older adults, little is known about the effects of ageing on encoding and response strategies that are used to recognise spatial configurations. To investigate this, we asked young and older participants to encode the locations of objects in a virtual room shown as a picture on a computer screen. Participants were then shown a second picture of the same room taken from the same (0°) or a different perspective (45° or 135°) and had to judge whether the objects occupied the same or different locations. Overall, older adults had greater difficulty with the task than younger adults although the introduction of a perspective shift between encoding and testing impaired performance in both age groups. Diffusion modelling revealed that older adults adopted a more conservative response strategy, while the analysis of gaze patterns showed an age-related shift in visual-encoding strategies with older adults attending to more information when memorising the positions of objects in space. Overall, results suggest that ageing is associated with declines in spatial processing abilities, with older individuals shifting towards a more conservative decision style and relying more on encoding target object positions using room-based cues compared to younger adults, who focus more on encoding the spatial relationships among object clusters. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (10.3758/s13421-020-01089-3) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

In two ERP experiments, we investigated whether readers prioritize animacy over real-world event-knowledge during sentence comprehension. We used the paradigm of Paczynski and Kuperberg (2012), who argued that animacy is prioritized based on the observations that the ‘related anomaly effect’ (reduced N400s for context-related anomalous words compared to unrelated words) does not occur for animacy violations, and that animacy violations but not relatedness violations elicit P600 effects. Participants read passive sentences with plausible agents (e.g., The prescription for the mental disorder was written by the psychiatrist) or implausible agents that varied in animacy and semantic relatedness (schizophrenic/guard/pill/fence). In Experiment 1 (with a plausibility judgment task), plausible sentences elicited smaller N400s relative to all types of implausible sentences. Crucially, animate words elicited smaller N400s than inanimate words, and related words elicited smaller N400s than unrelated words, but Bayesian analysis revealed substantial evidence against an interaction between animacy and relatedness. Moreover, at the P600 time-window, we observed more positive ERPs for animate than inanimate words and for related than unrelated words at anterior regions. In Experiment 2 (without judgment task), we observed an N400 effect with animacy violations, but no other effects. Taken together, the results of our experiments fail to support a prioritized role of animacy information over real-world event-knowledge, but they support an interactive, constraint-based view on incremental semantic processing.

Learning to play a musical instrument involves mapping visual + auditory cues to motor movements and anticipating transitions. Inspired by the serial reaction time task and artificial grammar learning, we investigated explicit and implicit knowledge of statistical learning in a sensorimotor task. Using a between-subjects design with four groups, one group of participants were provided with visual cues and followed along by tapping the corresponding fingertip to their thumb, while using a computer glove. Another group additionally received accompanying auditory tones; the final two groups received sensory (visual or visual + auditory) cues but did not provide a motor response—all together following a 2 × 2 design. Implicit knowledge was measured by response time, whereas explicit knowledge was assessed using probe tests. Findings indicate that explicit knowledge was best with only the single modality, but implicit knowledge was best when all three modalities were involved.

Two longitudinal studies investigated the development of syntactic representations in late second language (L2) learners by means of structural priming in an artificial language (AL) paradigm. Several studies found cross-linguistic structural priming in L2 learners, suggesting that they have shared syntactic representations across languages. But how are these shared representations established? Hartsuiker and Bernolet’s (2017) account claims that 1) L2 syntactic representations evolve gradually from being item-specific to more abstract, and that 2) over time these representations are integrated with available native language (L1) representations. We tested predictions of this theory with native Dutch speakers, who acquired the AL in the lab during five sessions by means of a battery of tasks, the last of which was a sentence priming task. The AL syntax resembled Dutch syntax. We manipulated the relation between prime and target to investigate whether structural priming occurred in conditions with meaning overlap (item-specific) and without overlap (abstract). In Experiment 1, participants responded only in the AL, but in Experiment 2, where the AL was more difficult, the target sentence could also be in Dutch. In both studies, there was an effect of within-language priming and AL-Dutch priming in transitives and ditransitives, but no effect of Dutch-AL priming in ditransitives on Day 1. On Days 2–5, however, priming emerged in most cross-linguistic priming conditions. These findings partly confirm Hartsuiker and Bernolet’s (2017) predictions and suggest that at least for structures that are very similar between languages, shared syntactic representations can be established very early during language learning.

International audience; Infants are able to use the contexts in which familiar words appear to guide their inferences about the syntactic category of novel words (e.g., “This is a” + “dax” -> dax = object). The current study examined whether 18-month-old infants can rapidly adapt these expectations by tracking the distribution of syntactic structures in their input. In French, la petite can be followed by both nouns (la petite balle, “the little ball”) and verbs (la petite mange, “the little one is eating”). Infants were habituated to a novel word, as well as to familiar nouns or verbs (depending on the experimental group), all appearing after la petite. The familiar words served to create an expectation that la petite would be followed by either nouns or verbs. If infants can utilize their knowledge of a few frequent words to adjust their expectations, then they could use this information to infer the syntactic category of a novel word – and be surprised when the novel word is used in a context that is incongruent with their expectations. However, infants in both groups did not show a difference between noun and verb test trials. Thus, no evidence for adaptation-based learning was found. We propose that infants have to entertain strong expectations about syntactic contexts before they can adapt these expectations based on recent input.

In uncertain environments we must balance our need to gather information with our desire to reap rewards by exploiting current knowledge. Achieving this balance is further complicated in reactive environments where actions produce long-lasting change to the system. In four experiments, we investigate how people learn to make effective decisions from experience in a dynamic multiarmed bandit task. In contrast to the typical exploitation-dependent diminishing rewards found in previous studies, options were framed as skills that developed greater rewards the more they were chosen. In Experiment 1, we provide a proof of concept, and in Experiments 2-4 we explore the boundaries of participants' sensitivity to reactive dynamics. Our results suggest that most individuals can learn effective strategies for coping with these reactive environments. A two-part comparison of several competing psychological models supports several conclusions: (a) a sizable minority of individuals learned that their environment was reactive, (b) evidence suggests several distinct groups of individuals employed unique decision strategies, and (c) testing models with the simulation method reveals qualitative misfits that motivate future theory development. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Consuming more energy than is expended may reflect a failure of control over eating behaviour in obesity. Behavioural control arises from a balance between two dissociable strategies of reinforcement learning: model-free and model-based. We hypothesized that weight status relates to an imbalance in reliance on model-based and model-free control, and that it may do so in a linear or quadratic manner. To test this, 90 healthy participants in a wide BMI range (normal-weight (n=31), overweight (n=29), obese (n=30)) performed a sequential decision-making task. The primary analysis indicated that obese participants relied less on model-based control than overweight and normal-weight participants, with no difference between overweight and normal-weight participants. In line, secondary continuous analyses revealed a negative linear, but not quadratic, relationship between BMI and model-based control. Computational modelling of choice behaviour suggested that a mixture of both strategies was shifted towards less model-based control in obese participants. Furthermore, exploratory analyses of separate weights for model-free and model-based control showed stronger reliance on model-free control with increased BMI. Our findings suggest that obesity may indeed be related to an imbalance in behavioural control as expressed in a phenotype of less model-based control potentially resulting from enhanced reliance on model-free computations.

A single encounter with an ambiguous word (e.g. bark, ball) in the context of a less-frequent meaning (e.g. “Sally worried about how crowded the ball would be.”) can shift the later interpretation of the word toward the same subordinate meaning. This lexical-semantic retuning functions to improve future comprehension of ambiguous words. The present paper investigates the relationship between this form of learning and the specific processes that occur during sentence comprehension. One possibility is that lexical-semantic retuning occurs immediately upon hearing the ambiguous word, during initial meaning activation and selection, so priming should be strongest when the disambiguating context is provided before the ambiguous word (prior disambiguation). Alternatively, priming may relate to the degree of reinterpretation needed, which would predict maximal learning when the word is initially misunderstood because the critical context is given after the word (subsequent disambiguation, e.g. “Sally worried that the ball would be too crowded.”). In four experiments, adults listened to prior and subsequent disambiguation sentences, and were later tested on their interpretations of primed and unprimed ambiguous words. The results showed that lexical-semantic retuning can occur for both sentence types. Importantly, however, the emergence of priming for subsequent disambiguation sentences was sensitive to the prime conditions: when the task could potentially be performed without needing to re-analyse the ambiguity, then no significant priming was observed. This is consistent with the ‘good enough’ view of language processing which states that representations can remain as (im)precise as mandated by the situation, and that lexical-semantic retuning operates on the output of good-enough interpretation. More generally, our findings suggest that lexical-semantic retuning is driven by participants’ final interpretation of the word meanings during the prime encounter, regardless of initial meaning activation or misinterpretation.

Multiple learning systems allow individuals to flexibly respond to opportunities and challenges present in the environment. An evolutionarily conserved “Pavlovian” learning mechanism couples valence and action, promoting a tendency to approach cues associated with reward and to inhibit action in the face of anticipated punishment. Although this default response system may be adaptive, these hard-wired reactions can hinder the ability to learn flexible “instrumental” actions in pursuit of a goal. Such constraints on behavioral flexibility have been studied extensively in adults. However, the extent to which these valence-specific response tendencies bias instrumental learning across development remains poorly characterized. Here, we show that while Pavlovian response biases constrain flexible action learning in children and adults, these biases are attenuated in adolescents. This adolescent-specific reduction in Pavlovian bias may promote unbiased exploration of approach and avoidance responses, facilitating the discovery of rewarding behavior in the many novel contexts that adolescents encounter.

Learning to avoid harmful consequences can be a costly trial-and-error process. In such situations, social information can be leveraged to improve individual learning outcomes. Here, we investigated how participants used their own experiences and others’ social cues to avoid harm. Participants made repeated choices between harmful and safe options, each with different probabilities of generating shocks, while also seeing the image of a social partner. Some partners made predictive gaze cues towards the harmful choice option while others cued an option at random, and did so using neutral or fearful facial expressions. We tested how learned social information about partner reliability transferred across contexts by letting participants encounter the same partner in multiple trial blocks while facing novel choice options. Participants’ decisions were best explained by a reinforcement learning model that independently learned the probabilities of options being safe and of partners being reliable and combined these combined these estimates to generate choices. Advice from partners making a fearful facial expression influenced participants’ decisions more than advice from partners with neutral expressions. Our results showed that participants made better decisions when facing predictive partners and that they cached and transferred partner reliability estimates into new blocks. Using simulations we show that participants’ transfer of social information into novel contexts is better adapted to variable social environments where social partners may change their cuing strategy or become untrustworthy. Finally, we found no relation between autism questionnaire scores and performance in our task, but do find autism trait related differences in learning rate parameters., Author summary People learn about dangers in their environment by directly interacting with it or indirectly from social sources. While what is dangerous in an environment can change, many times one’s social context is relatively stable. Surprisingly little work has investigated how people learn to avoid dangers by combining their own experiences with social advice in repeated settings. Combining behavioral testing and computational modeling, here we show that people blend social cues with information from their own experiences. When entering a new environment, people utilize stored information about how good advice a social partner gives to improve their choices. Crucially, however, we show that people don’t entirely rely on social advice even when that is the only valid information they have to base their choice on. Using simulations we show that while this tendency to not fully rely on social advice is less than optimal in our experimental task, it might be adaptive in settings where social partners become unreliable. Increasing our understanding of how people learn to avoid dangers using individual experiences and social information furthers the development of ecologically valid models of value-based learning and decision-making.

Laboratory procedures have been used for decades as analogues for clinical processes with the goal of improving our understanding of psychological treatments and identifying strategies to make treatments more effective. The focus of this area of research has often been translation from the laboratory to the clinic. This process, however, has not been seamless; strategies that work in the laboratory do not always result in improved outcomes when applied clinically. One possible reason for this gap between experimental and clinical research is the failure to focus on translation from the clinic to the laboratory. In the current review, we will first discuss two well-established laboratory analogues (extinction and cognitive reappraisal), identify critical aspects of the related clinical procedures (exposure and cognitive restructuring) that we believe are missing from these analogues, and propose modifications to these analogues to better capture the clinical process. Second, we will further highlight the benefit of translation from the clinic to the laboratory by discussing two clinical procedures that have more recently been brought into the laboratory for examination (eye movement desensitization and reprocessing and imagery rescripting), discuss how we might improve translation from the clinic to the laboratory and future directions for this research.

Curiosity states benefit memory for curiosity target information, but also incidental information presented during curiosity states. Curiosity-related activity in dopaminergic regions and the hippocampus predicts such curiosity-enhanced memory for incidental information. However, it is not known whether incidental curiosity-enhanced memory depends on when incidental information during curiosity states is encountered. Here, participants incidentally encoded unrelated face images at different time points while they anticipated answers to trivia questions. Across two experiments, we found memory enhancements for unrelated faces presented during high- compared to low-curiosity states, but only when a face was presented shortly after a trivia question. This incidental curiosity-enhanced memory was independent of the type of encoding judgement and was evident both after a short (Experiment 1) and a 24-hour delay (Experiment 2). The findings suggest that processes associated with the elicitation of curiosity - but not processes preceding the satisfaction of curiosity - enhance memory for incidental information.

Paired-associate tasks are popular tasks used in basic and applied research on human memory and learning. A number of studies have shown that individuals differ in the strategies they use to encode information in paired-associate tasks and, importantly, that strategies differ in their effectiveness. What is not so well documented is how different strategies may affect the cognitive processes assessed by paired-associate tasks. In this study, we submit archival data to distributional and latent class analyses to infer strategy-use and classify individuals as elaborators or non-elaborators. We then used regression analyses within subgroups to identify differences in dependence on fluid intelligence and working memory capacity. To the extent that our classification of individuals was accurate, the results suggest that paired-associate learning is more reliant on fluid intelligence when elaborative rehearsal is utilized and more reliant on working memory capacity when using non-elaborative strategies. To offer further evidence of the validity of our approach, we also investigated correlations between strategy-use and fluid intelligence and working memory capacity. In accord with prior research, we found that cognitive abilities were positively correlated with what we infer to be differences in strategy-use. That the cognitive processes assessed by verbal paired-associate tasks may vary as a function of strategy-use should be a concern for all researchers and practitioners who use such tasks.

The relationship between executive functions (EF) and academic achievement is well-established, but leveraging this insight to improve educational outcomes remains elusive. Here, we propose a framework for relating the role of specific EF on specific precursor skills that support later academic learning. Starting from the premise that executive functions contribute to general math skills both directly – supporting the execution of problem solving strategies – and indirectly – supporting the acquisition of precursor mathematical content, we hypothesize that the contribution of domain-general EF capacities to precursor skills that support later learning can help explain relations between EF and overall math skills. We test this hypothesis by examining whether the contribution of inhibitory control on general math knowledge can be explained by inhibition's contribution to processing rational number pairs that conflict with individual's prior whole number knowledge. In 97 college students (79 female, age = 20.58 years), we collected three measures of EF: working memory (backwards spatial span), inhibition (color-word Stroop) and cognitive flexibility (task switching), and timed and untimed standardized measures of math achievement. Our target precursor skill was a decimals comparison task where correct responses were inconsistent with prior whole number knowledge (e.g., 0.27 vs. 0.9). Participants performed worse on these trials relative to the consistent decimals pairs (e.g., 0.2 vs. 0.87). Individual differences in the Stroop task predicted performance on inconsistent decimal comparisons, which in turn predicted general math achievement. With respect to relating inhibitory control to math achievement, Stroop performance was an independent predictor of achievement after accounting for age, working memory and cognitive flexibility, but decimal performance mediated this relationship. Finally, we found inconsistent decimals performance mediated the relationship of inhibition with rational number performance, but not other advanced mathematical concepts. These results pinpoint the specific contribution of inhibitory control to rational number understanding, and more broadly are consistent with the hypothesis that acquisition of foundational mathematical content can explain the relationships between executive functions and academic outcomes, making them promising targets for intervention.

Generic language (e.g., “Birds fly”) conveys generalizations about categories and is essential for learning beyond our direct experience. The meaning of generic language is notoriously hard to specify, however (e.g., penguins don’t fly). Tessler and Goodman (2019) proposed a model for generics that is mathematically equivalent to Bayesian belief-updating based on a single pedagogical example, suggesting a deep connection be- tween learning from experience and learning from language. Relatedly, Csibra and Shamsudheen (2015) argue that generics are inherently pedagogical, understood by infants as referring to a member of a kind. In two experiments with adults, we quantify the exchange-rate between generics and observations by relating their belief-updating capacity, varying both the number of observations and whether they are presented pedagogically or incidentally. We find generics convey stronger generalizations than single pedagogical observations (Expt. 1), even when the property is explicitly demarcated (Expt. 2). We suggest revisions to the vague quantifier model of generics that would allow it to accommodate this intriguing exchange-rate.