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The Combined Cognitive Bias Hypothesis proposes that emotional information processing biases associate with each other and may interact to conjointly influence mental health. Yet, little is known about the interrelationships amongst cognitive biases, particularly in adolescence. We used data from the CogBIAS longitudinal study (Booth et al. 2017), including 451 adolescents who completed measures of interpretation bias, memory bias, and a validated measure of general mental health in a typical population. We used a moderated network modelling approach to examine positive mental health related moderation of the cognitive bias network. Mental health was directly connected to positive and negative memory biases, and positive interpretation biases, but not negative interpretation biases. Further, we observed some mental health related moderation of the network structure. Network connectivity decreased with higher positive mental health scores. Network approaches allow us to model complex relationships amongst cognitive biases and develop novel hypotheses for future research.

How do we decide what to say to ensure our meanings will be understood? The Rational Speech Act model (RSA, Frank & Goodman, 2012) asserts that speakers plan what to say by comparing the informativity of words in a particular context. We present the first example of an RSA model of sentence level (who-did-what-to-whom) meanings. In these contexts, the set of possible messages must be abstracted from entities in common ground (people and objects) to possible events (Jane eats the apple, Marco peels the banana), with each word contributing unique semantic content. How do speakers accomplish the transformation from context to compositional, informative messages? In a communication game, participants described transitive events (e.g. Jane pets the dog), with only two words, in contexts where two words either were or were not enough to uniquely identify an event. Adults chose utterances matching the predictions of the RSA even when there was no possible fully 'successful' utterance. Thus we show that adults’ communicative behavior can be described by a model that accommodates informativity in context, beyond the set of possible entities in common ground. This study provides the first evidence that adults' language production is affected, at the level of argument structure, by the graded informativity of possible utterances in context, and suggests that full- blown natural speech may result from speakers who model and adapt to the listener’s needs.

How do our valuation systems change to homeostatically correct undesirable psychological or physiological states, such as those caused by hunger? There is evidence that hunger increases discounting for food rewards, biasing choices towards smaller but sooner food reward over larger but later reward. However, it is not understood how hunger modulates delay discounting for non-food items. We outline and quantitatively evaluate six possible models of how our valuation systems modulate discounting of various commodities in the face of the undesirable state of being hungry. With a repeated-measures design, an experimental hunger manipulation, and quantitative modeling, we find strong evidence that hunger causes large increases in delay discounting for food, with an approximately 25% spillover effect to non-food commodities. The results provide evidence that in the face of hunger, our valuation systems increase discounting for commodities, which cannot achieve a desired state change as well as for those commodities that can. Given that strong delay discounting can cause negative outcomes in many non-food (consumer, investment, medical, or inter-personal) domains, the present findings suggest caution may be necessary when making decisions involving non-food outcomes while hungry.

By definition, individuals with absolute pitch (AP) can categorize an isolated musical note with near perfect accuracy without a reference pitch. This definition implies a uniformity of performance across people; however, in reality AP is a complex, multidimensional ability, shaped by both early and recent auditory experiences. In the present study we assess how individual differences in working memory, musical expertise, and language background relate to the accuracy with which an AP possessor can identify an isolated musical note. In a standard test of AP ability, all AP participants performed virtually perfectly. When tested on more challenging notes, drawn from less frequently experienced timbres and octave ranges, we found that working memory positively related to note categorization performance, though only among individuals who reported a tonal language background. This interaction between tonal language and working memory, however, may have been partly grounded by differences in musical expertise reported between tonal and non-tonal language. Supporting this possibility, in a follow-up analysis we observed a general interaction between working memory performance and musical expertise across all participants. Taken together, these results highlight the complexity of AP categorization when considered as an auditory skill rather than a native talent. The observation that working memory may be an important component of auditory processing in AP when the to-be-judged sounds are less easily categorized is consistent with recent theoretical accounts of how working memory and expertise relate to auditory recognition more broadly.

Events that conform to our expectations, i.e, are congruent with our world knowledge or schemas, are better remembered than unrelated events. Yet events that conflict with schemas can also be remembered better. We examined this apparent paradox in four experiments, in which schemas were established by training ordinal relationships between randomly-paired objects, while episodic memory was tested for the number of objects on each trial. Better memory was found for both congruent and incongruent trials, relative to unrelated trials, producing memory performance that was a “U-shaped” function of congruency. Furthermore, the incongruency advantage, but not congruency advantage, emerged even if the information probed by the memory test was irrelevant to the schema, while the congruency advantage, but not incongruency advantage, also emerged after initial encoding. Schemas therefore augment episodic memory in multiple ways, depending on the match between novel and existing information.

Although euphemisms are intended to put a more positive spin on the words they replace, some euphemisms are ineffective. Our study examined the effectiveness of a popular euphemism for persons with disabilities, special needs. Most style guides prescribe against using the euphemism special needs and recommend instead using the non-euphemized term disability; disability advocates argue adamantly against the euphemism special needs, which they find offensive. In contrast, many parents of children with disabilities prefer to use special needs rather than disability. But no empirical study has examined whether special needs is more or less positive than the term it replaces. Therefore, we gathered a sample of adult participants from the general population (N = 530) and created a set of vignettes that allowed us to measure how positively children, college students, and middle-age adults are viewed when they are described as having special needs, having a disability, having a certain disability (e.g., is blind, has Down syndrome), or with no label at all. We predicted and observed that persons are viewed more negatively when described as having special needs than when described as having a disability or having a certain disability, indicating that special needs is an ineffective euphemism. Even for members of the general population who have a personal connection to disability (e.g., as parents of children with disabilities), the euphemism special needs is no more effective than the non euphemized term disability. We also collected free associations to the terms special needs and disability and found that special needs is associated with more negativity; special needs conjures up more associations with developmental disabilities (such as intellectual disability) whereas disability is associated with a more inclusive set of disabilities; and special needs evokes more unanswered questions. These findings recommend against using the euphemism special needs.

This paper investigates how cognition facilitates the adoption of new words through a study of the large-scale Reddit corpus, which contains written, threaded conversations conducted over the internet. Parameters for the cognitive architecture are estimated. Using ACT-R's account of declarative memory, the activation of memory chunks representing words is traced and compared to usage statistics sampled from a year of data. Potential values for decay and retrieval threshold are identified according to model fit and growth rates of word adoption. The resulting estimate for the decay parameter, d, is 0.22, and the estimate for the retrieval threshold parameter, rt, lies between 3.4 and 4.5.

[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported in Vol 115(6) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2018-63189-002). In the article, the original supplemental material has been revised to include a clarifying note to the Tests of model fit over larger sample (Samples C-G) section and post-peer review analyses added to the Post-peer review Factor Analytic Tests section. All versions of this article have been corrected.] Philosophers and behavioral scientists refer to wisdom as unbiased reasoning that guides one toward a balance of interests and promotes a good life. However, major instruments developed to test wisdom appear biased, and it is unclear whether they capture balance-related tendencies. We examined whether shifting from global, de-contextualized reports to state-level reports about concrete situations provides a less biased method to assess wise reasoning (e.g., intellectual humility, recognition of uncertainty and change, consideration of the broader context at hand and perspectives of others, integration of these perspectives or compromise), which may be aligned with the notion of balancing interests. Results of a large-scale psychometric investigation (N = 4,463) revealed that the novel Situated WIse Reasoning Scale (SWIS) is reliable and appears independent of psychological biases (attribution bias, bias blind spot, self-deception, and impression management), whereas global wisdom reports are subject to such biases. Moreover, SWIS scores were positively related to indices of living well (e.g., adaptive emotion regulation, mindfulness), and balancing of cooperative and self-protective interests, goals (influence-vs.-adjustment), and causal inferences about conflict (attribution to the self-vs.-other party). In contrast, global wisdom reports were unrelated or negatively related to balance-related measures. Notably, people showed modest within-person consistency in wise reasoning across situations or over time, suggesting that a single-shot measurement may be insufficient for whole understanding of trait-level wisdom. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for research on wisdom, judgment and decision making, well-being, and prosociality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

We discuss two relatively understudied yet important phenomena relevant to the ecologically crucial task of gathering reliable information from human faces. First, facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) predicts aggressiveness judgments and is associated with aggression-related behavior and life history outcomes. A significant body of research indicates fWHR is an honest evolutionary signal of propensity to aggression yet little is known about how or if this signal is preserved in judgments across race boundaries. Evidence for a universal relationship between increased fWHR and enhanced aggression perception has been found using Asian and white face stimuli, but race moderated the relationship between high fWHR and ratings in a pain ascription task using black and white faces. Second, we examine research on olfactory cues to face perception and focus particular attention on the possibility that face judgments may be influenced by putrescine, an organic compound found recently to heighten threat and escape-related cognitions in a single subliminal odor presentation study. Here we probe how fWHR and face race interact in aggression judgments during subliminal exposure to putrescine and a control condition. We present a standardized method of subliminal putrescine delivery and find null effects of putrescine on face judgments. Overall, our primarily white participants show a reduced difference in aggressiveness ratings to black faces from low to high levels of fWHR compared to the same contrast in white face stimuli, consistent with an account in which black faces are not perceived with the same configural precision as white faces.

The present study examined the effect of stimulus valence on two levels of selection in the cognitive system, selection of a task-set and selection of a response. In the first experiment, participants performed a spatial compatibility task (pressing left and right key according to the locations of stimuli) in which stimulus-response mappings were determined by stimulus valence. There was a standard spatial stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) effect for positive stimuli (flowers) and a reversed SRC effect for negative stimuli (spiders), but the same data could be interpreted as showing faster responses when positive and negative stimuli were assigned to compatible and incompatible mappings, respectively, than when the assignment was opposite. Experiment 2 disentangled these interpretations, showing that valence did not influence a spatial SRC effect (Simon effect) when task-set retrieval was unnecessary. Experiments 3 and 4 replaced keypress responses with joystick deflections that afforded approach/avoidance action coding. Stimulus valence modulated the Simon effect (but did not reverse it) when the valence was task-relevant (Experiment 3) as well as when it was task-irrelevant (Experiment 4). Therefore, stimulus valence influences task-set selection and response selection, but the influence on the latter is limited to conditions where responses afford approach/avoidance action coding.

This study used a Web-based naturalistic story-reading paradigm to investigate the impact of number of exposures on incidental acquisition and long-term retention of new meanings for known words by native English-speaking adults. Participants read one of four custom written stories in which they encountered novel meanings (e.g., a safe concealed within a piece of furniture) for familiar words (foam). These meanings appeared two, four, six, or eight times in the narrative. Results showed reasonably good memory of the new meanings, assessed by cued recall of novel meanings and word forms, after only two exposures, emphasizing the importance of initial encounters. Accuracy in cued recall of novel meanings showed a linear, incremental increase with more exposures. There was no significant forgetting after 1 week, regardless of the number of exposures during training, demonstrating the efficiency with which adults acquire new word meanings incidentally through reading and retain them over time. Open Practices: This article has been awarded an Open Data badge. All data and analysis scripts are publicly accessible via the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/ybu6r. Learn more about the Open Practices badges from the Center for Open Science: https://osf.io/tvyxz/wiki.

Humans can see through the complexity of scenes, faces, and objects by quickly extracting their redundant low-spatial and low-dimensional global properties, or their style. It remains unclear, however, whether semantic coding is necessary, or whether visual stylistic information is sufficient, for people to recognize and discriminate complex images and categories. In two experiments, we systematically reduce the resolution of hundreds of unique paintings, birds, and faces, and test people's ability to discriminate and recognize them. We show that the stylistic information retained at extremely low image resolutions is sufficient for visual recognition of images and visual discrimination of categories. Averaging over the 3 domains, people were able to reliably recognize images reduced down to a single pixel, with large differences from chance discriminability across 8 different image resolutions. People were also able to discriminate categories substantially above chance with an image resolution as low as 2 × 2 pixels. We situate our findings in the context of contemporary computational accounts of visual recognition and contend that explicit encoding of the local features in the image, or knowledge of the semantic category, is not necessary for recognizing and distinguishing complex visual stimuli. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

An emerging area of research in cognitive science is the utilization of networks to model the structure and processes of the mental lexicon in healthy and clinical populations, like aphasia. Previous research has focused on only one type of word similarity at a time (e.g., semantic relationships), even though words are multi-faceted. Here, we investigate lexical retrieval in a picture naming task from people with Broca’s and Wernicke’s aphasia and healthy controls by utilizing a multiplex network structure that accounts for the interplay between multiple semantic and phonological relationships among words in the mental lexicon. Extending upon previous work, we focused on the global network measure of closeness centrality which is known to capture spreading activation, an important process supporting lexical retrieval. We conducted a series of logistic regression models predicting the probability of correct picture naming. We tested whether multiplex closeness centrality was a better predictor of picture naming performance than single-layer closeness centralities, other network measures assessing local and meso-scale structure, psycholinguistic variables and group differences. We also examined production gaps, or the difference between the likelihood of producing a word with the lowest and highest closeness centralities. Our results indicated that multiplex closeness centrality was a significant predictor of picture naming performance, where words with high closeness centrality were more likely to be produced than words with low closeness centrality. Additionally, multiplex closeness centrality outperformed single-layer closeness centralities and other multiplex network measures, and remained a significant predictor after controlling for psycholinguistic variables and group differences. Furthermore, we found that the facilitative effect of closeness centrality was similar for both types of aphasia. Our results underline the importance of integrating multiple measures of word similarities in cognitive language networks for better understanding lexical retrieval in aphasia, with an eye towards future clinical applications.

Criticisms of nudging suggest that nudges infringe on decision makers’ autonomy. Yet, little empirical research has explored whether people who are subjected to nudges agree. In three between-group experiments (N = 2083), we subject participants to contrasting choice architectures and measure experiences of autonomy, choice-satisfaction, perceived threat to freedom of choice, and objection to the choice architecture. Participants who received a prosocial opt-out default nudge made more prosocial choices but did not report lower autonomy or choice satisfaction than participants in opt-in default or active-choice conditions. This was the case even when the presence of the nudge was disclosed, and when monetary choice stakes were introduced. With monetary choice stakes, participants perceived the threat to freedom of choice as slightly higher in the nudge condition than in the other conditions, but objection to the choice architecture did not differ between the conditions. Taken together, our results suggest that default nudges are less manipulative and autonomy-infringing than sometimes feared. We recommend that policymakers include measures of choice experiences when testing out new interventions.

While uncertainty is present in most data analysis pipelines, reasoning with uncertainty is challenging for novices and experts alike. Fortunately, researchers are making significant advancements in the communication of uncertainty. In this chapter, we detail new visualization methods and emerging cognitive theories that describe how we reason with visual representations of uncertainty. We describe the best practices in uncertainty visualization and the psychology behind how each approach supports viewers' judgments. This chapter begins with a brief overview of conventional and state-of-the-art uncertainty visualization techniques. Then we take an in-depth look at the pros and cons of each technique using cognitive theories that describe why and how the mind processes different types of uncertainty information.

The present study investigated how task-irrelevant attributes of a stimulus affected responses in a multiattribute version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT). In Experiment 1, participants categorized images of Black and White male and female individuals on the basis of either race or gender. Both the race and gender of the individuals affected task performance regardless of which attribute was currently relevant to performing the task, yielding the IAT effects on both attributes. However, the influences of a task-irrelevant attribute depended on whether the task-relevant attribute was categorized compatibly or incompatibly with the underlying implicit biases. These results suggest that individuals are still categorized implicitly based on task-irrelevant social attributes and that the explicit categorization required in the standard IAT has a considerable impact on implicit social biases. Experiment 2 considered a third, nonsocial attribute (the color of the picture frame) and reproduced task-irrelevant IAT effects and their dependence on explicit categorization. However, Experiments 3 and 4 suggested that the task-irrelevant IAT effects based on social attributes are determined by whether the task-relevant attribute is a social or nonsocial attribute. The results raise fundamental questions about the basic assumptions underpinning the interpretations of the results from the IAT. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Objectives Across the life span, deficits in executive functioning (EF) are associated with poor behavioral control and failure to achieve goals. Though EF is often discussed as one broad construct, a prominent model of EF suggests that it is composed of three subdomains: inhibition, set shifting, and updating. These subdomains are seen in both younger (YA) and older adults (OA), with performance deficits across subdomains in OA. Therefore, our goal was to investigate whether subdomains of EF might be differentially affected by age, and how these differences may relate to broader global age differences in EF. Methods To assess these age differences, we conducted a meta-analysis at multiple levels, including task level, subdomain level, and of global EF. Based on previous work, we hypothesized that there would be overall differences in EF in OA. Results Using 1,268 effect sizes from 401 articles, we found overall differences in EF with age. Results suggested that differences in performance are not uniform, such that variability in age effects emerged at the task level, and updating was not as affected by age as other subdomains. Discussion These findings advance our understanding of age differences in EF, and stand to inform early detection of EF decline.

Abstract. Language comprehenders have been arguing to mentally represent the implied orientation of objects. However, compared to the effects of shape, size, and color, the effect of orientation is rather small. We examined a potential explanation for the relatively low magnitude of the orientation effect: Object size moderates the orientation effect. Theoretical considerations led us to predict a smaller orientation effect for small objects than for large objects in a sentence–picture verification task. We furthermore investigated whether this pattern generalizes across languages (Chinese, Dutch, and English) and tasks (picture-naming task). The results of the verification task show an orientation effect overall, which is not moderated by object size (contrary to our hypothesis) and language (consistent with our hypothesis). Meanwhile, the preregistered picture–picture verification task showed the predicted interaction between object size and orientation effect. We conducted exploratory analyses to address additional questions.

The COVID-19 global pandemic has left many feeling a sense of profound uncertainty about their world, safety, and livelihood. Individuals are faced with a range of explanatory frameworks that can help reduce feelings of uncertainty. Such frameworks are offered by numerous sources, including government and health-organizations as well as sources espousing misinformation and conspiracy theories. Conspiratorial thinking (CT) may impede adherence to empirically-based guidelines for mitigating the spread and impact of COVID-19, highlighting the need to understand the psychological factors that contribute to CT. It is hypothesized that one of the key psychological drivers of CT is the need for understanding and certainty; thus, those who are particularly intolerant to uncertainty may be quicker to accept conspiratorial explanations. In addition, paranoia and delusion-proneness may constitute cognitive styles that further predispose individuals towards CT. In the present study we aimed to examine the relationship of intolerance to uncertainty and CT regarding COVID-19 and whether this relationship is mediated by individual differences in delusion-proneness and paranoia. Our results from an online survey (N=261) show that higher levels of intolerance of uncertainty, delusion-proneness, and paranoid ideation were associated with stronger CT. Furthermore, delusion-proneness and paranoia mediated the relationship between intolerance to uncertainty and CT. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of individual differences in intolerance to uncertainty, delusion proneness and paranoia in the development of CT in the context of crisis and uncertainty due to the COVID-19 pandemic. These findings provide evidence that specific individual differences can create susceptibility to misinformation and may have implications for message framing strategies when designing informational interventions.

Agents that can make better use of computation, experience, time, and memory can solve a greater range of problems more effectively. A crucial ingredient for managing such finite resources is intelligently chosen abstract representations. But, how do abstractions facilitate problem solving under limited resources? What makes an abstraction useful? To answer such questions, we review several trends in recent reinforcement-learning research that provide insight into how abstractions interact with learning and decision making. During learning, abstraction can guide exploration and generalization as well as facilitate efficient tradeoffs---e.g., time spent learning versus the quality of a solution. During computation, good abstractions provide simplified models for computation while also preserving relevant information about decision-theoretic quantities. These features of abstraction are not only key for scaling up artificial problem solving, but can also shed light on what pressures shape the use of abstract representations in humans and other organisms.

Forensic science techniques are often used in criminal trials to infer the identity of theperpetrator of crime and jurors often find this evidence very persuasive. Unfortunately, two of the leading causes of wrongful convictions are forensic science testing errors and false or misleading forensic testimony (Saks & Koehler, 2005). Therefore, it is important to understand jurors pre- existing beliefs about forensic science, as these beliefs may impact how they evaluate forensic evidence in the courtroom. In this study, we examine people’s perceptions of the likelihood of error and human judgment involved at each stage of the forensic science process (i.e., collection, storage, testing, analysis, reporting, and presenting). In addition, we examine peoples’ perceptions of the accuracy of — and human judgment involved in — 16 different forensic techniques. We find that, in contrast to what would be expected by the CSI effect literature, participants believed that the process of forensic science involved considerable human judgment and was relatively error-prone. In addition, participants had wide-ranging beliefs about the accuracy of various forensic techniques, ranging from 65.18% (document analysis) up to 89.95% (DNA). For some forensic techniques, estimates were lower than that found in experimental proficiency studies, suggesting that our participants are more skeptical of certain forensic evidence than they need to be. Keywords: Forensic science, forensic evidence, accuracy, error rate, CSI effect.

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is an assimilative change in liking of neutral conditioned stimuli (CS) following pairings with positive or negative stimuli (unconditioned stimulus, US). Dual-process theories postulate that, in addition to a controlled propositional process underlying conscious learning of CS-US contingencies, a second automatic and associative learning process exists that underlies EC effects. A central argument for dual-process theories is the dissociation between US expectancy and CS evaluation in extinction learning: When CSs are presented alone subsequent to CS-US pairings, participants cease to expect USs but continue to exhibit EC effects. This dissociation is typically interpreted as demonstration that EC is resistant to extinction, and consequently, that EC is driven by a distinct learning process. We tested an alternative single-process account, namely that expectancy-liking dissociations are caused by different judgment strategies afforded by the dependent measures rather than due to separable learning processes. According to this view, CS evaluations are by default integrative judgments---summaries of large portions of the learning history---whereas US expectancy reflects momentary judgments focusing on recent events. In a counterconditioning and two extinction experiments, we eliminate the expectancy-liking dissociations reported in the literature by inducing nondefault momentary evaluative judgments, and demonstrate a reversed dissociation when we additionally induced integrative expectancy judgments. Our findings corroborated a-priori predictions based on MINERVA 2, a formal single-process memory model. Hence, dissociations between US expectancy and conditioned CS liking reflect judgment properties and can be accounted for parsimoniously by a single learning process.

Both humans and non-human animals regularly encounter decisions involving risk and uncertainty. This paper provides an overview of our research program examining risky decisions in which the odds and outcomes are learned through experience in people and pigeons. We summarize the results of 15 experiments across 8 publications, with a total of over 1300 participants. We highlight 4 key findings from this research: (1) people choose differently when the odds and outcomes are learned through experience compared to when they are described; (2) when making decisions from experience, people overweight values at or near the ends of the distribution of experienced values (i.e., the best and the worst, termed the “extreme-outcome rule”), which leads to more risk seeking for relative gains than for relative losses; (3) people show biases in self-reported memory whereby they are more likely to report an extreme outcome than an equally-often experienced non-extreme outcome, and they judge these extreme outcomes as having occurred more often; and (4) under certain circumstances pigeons show similar patterns of risky choice as humans, but the underlying processes may not be identical. This line of research has stimulated other research in the field of judgement and decision making, illustrating how investigations from a comparative perspective can lead in surprising directions.

Decision-making competence (DMC) has potential utility in incrementally predicting decision-making behavior relative to general mental ability (g). However, prior research presents an incomplete depiction of the degree to which these two constructs overlap. This paper evaluated both theoretical and empirical discriminant validity evidence for DMC. Theoretically, DMC and g are distinct constructs though highly interconnected; both constructs exist within the intelligence nomological network. However, our empirical findings demonstrate scores on the Adult-Decision Making Competence assessment, are largely indistinguishable from g. Future research should treat DMC as an acquired skill as opposed to an underlying individual difference.

A recent surge of interest in the empirical measurement of mind-wandering has led to an increase in the use of thought-probing to measure attentional states, which has led to large variation in methodologies across studies (Weinstein in Behavior Research Methods, 50, 642-661, 2018). Three sources of variation in methodology include the frequency of thought probes during a task, the number of response options provided for each probe, and the way in which various attentional states are framed during the task instructions. Method variation can potentially affect behavioral performance on the tasks in which thought probes are embedded, the experience of various attentional states within those tasks, and/or response biases to the thought probes. Therefore, such variation can be problematic, both pragmatically and theoretically. Across three experiments, we examined how manipulating probe frequency, response options, and framing affected behavioral performance and responses to thought probes. Probe frequency and framing did not affect behavioral performance or probe responses. But, in light of the present results, we argue that thought probes need at least three responses, corresponding to on-task, off-task, and task-related interference. When researchers are specifically investigating mind-wandering, the probe responses should also distinguish between mind-wandering, external distraction, and mind-blanking.

Event-related potentials (ERPs) provide a window into how the brain is processing language. Here, we propose a theory that argues that ERPs such as the N400 and P600 arise as side effects of an error-based learning mechanism that explains linguistic adaptation and language learning. We instantiated this theory in a connectionist model that can simulate data from three studies on the N400 (amplitude modulation by expectancy, contextual constraint, and sentence position), five studies on the P600 (agreement, tense, word category, subcategorization and garden-path sentences), and a study on the semantic P600 in role reversal anomalies. Since ERPs are learning signals, this account explains adaptation of ERP amplitude to within-experiment frequency manipulations and the way ERP effects are shaped by word predictability in earlier sentences. Moreover, it predicts that ERPs can change over language development. The model provides an account of the sensitivity of ERPs to expectation mismatch, the relative timing of the N400 and P600, the semantic nature of the N400, the syntactic nature of the P600, and the fact that ERPs can change with experience. This approach suggests that comprehension ERPs are related to sentence production and language acquisition mechanisms.

Cognitive control is applied in situations that require overriding a habitual and automatic response. The conflict monitoring hypothesis and the Expected Value of Control (EVC) theory as its extension posit a control system responsible for detecting conflicting occasions and adapting to them dynamically within a task. Here we evaluate this prediction in two versions of one of the most popular tasks in cognitive control, namely the Stroop task. We hypothesized that nearby-items interference combines with task interference in the multi-item version effectively turning it into a multi-task that may challenge cognitive control. Adopting an alternative methodology tracking within-task performance, we compared the classical multi-item version of the Stroop task and its single-item counterpart in adults and children. The results revealed a within-task performance decline only in the multi-item version of the task, in both incongruent and neutral conditions, modulated by the presumed maturity of the control system. These findings suggest capacity constraints in control implementation and allocation under conditions requiring parallel execution of multiple cognitive tasks. Task complexity and demands seem to modulate effects on performance. We discuss implications for cognitive control as well as substantial concerns regarding the calculation and use of indices of interference based on the commonly used multi-item version of the Stroop task.

In two ERP experiments, we investigated whether readers prioritize animacy over real-world event-knowledge during sentence comprehension. We used the paradigm of Paczynski and Kuperberg (2012), who argued that animacy is prioritized based on the observations that the ‘related anomaly effect’ (reduced N400s for context-related anomalous words compared to unrelated words) does not occur for animacy violations, and that animacy violations but not relatedness violations elicit P600 effects. Participants read passive sentences with plausible agents (e.g., The prescription for the mental disorder was written by the psychiatrist) or implausible agents that varied in animacy and semantic relatedness (schizophrenic/guard/pill/fence). In Experiment 1 (with a plausibility judgment task), plausible sentences elicited smaller N400s relative to all types of implausible sentences. Crucially, animate words elicited smaller N400s than inanimate words, and related words elicited smaller N400s than unrelated words, but Bayesian analysis revealed substantial evidence against an interaction between animacy and relatedness. Moreover, at the P600 time-window, we observed more positive ERPs for animate than inanimate words and for related than unrelated words at anterior regions. In Experiment 2 (without judgment task), we observed an N400 effect with animacy violations, but no other effects. Taken together, the results of our experiments fail to support a prioritized role of animacy information over real-world event-knowledge, but they support an interactive, constraint-based view on incremental semantic processing.

Do people discriminate between men and women when they have the option to punish defectors or reward cooperators? Here we report on four pre-registered experiments, that shed some light on this question. Study 1 (N=544) shows that people do not discriminate between genders when they have the option to punish (reward) defectors (cooperators) in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma with third-party punishment/reward. Study 2 (N=253) extends Study 1 to a different method of punishing/rewarding: participants are asked to rate the behaviour of a defector/cooperator on a scale of 1 to 5 stars. In this case too, we find that people do not discriminate between genders. Study 3a (N=331) and Study 3b (N=310) conceptually replicate Study 2 with a slightly different gender manipulation. These latter studies show that, in situations where they do not have specific beliefs about the gender of the defector/cooperator's partner, neither men nor women discriminate between genders., Comment: Forthcoming in the Journal of the Economic Science Association

Introduction: According to cognitive models of depression, selective attentional biases (ABs) for mood-congruent information are core vulnerability factors of depression maintenance. However, findings concerning the presence of these biases in depression are mixed. This study aims to clarify the presence of these ABs among individuals with clinical and subclinical depression. Method: We compared three groups based on a semi-structured diagnostic interview and a depressive symptoms scale (BDI-II): 34 individuals with major depressive disorder (clinically depressed); 35 with a dysphoric mood but without the criteria of major depressive disorder (i.e., subclinically depressed), and 26 never been depressed individuals. We examined AB for sad and happy materials in three modified versions of the exogenous cueing task using scenes, facial expressions, and words. Brooding, anhedonia, and anxiety were also evaluated. Results: In contrast to our hypotheses, there were no ABs for negative or positive information, regardless of the task and the groups. Neither the association between AB toward negative information and brooding nor the one between AB away from positive stimuli and anhedonia was significant. Bayes factors analyses revealed that the present pattern of findings does not result from a lack of statistical power.Discussion: Our results raise questions about how common AB is in depression. From a theoretical point of view, because individuals with depression did not exhibit AB, our results also seemingly challenge the claim that AB figures prominently in the maintenance of depression. We believe the present null results to be particularly useful for future meta-research in the field.

In the coronavirus “infodemic,” people are exposed to official recommendations but also to potentially dangerous pseudoscientific advice claimed to protect against COVID-19. We examined whether irrational beliefs predict adherence to COVID-19 guidelines as well as susceptibility to such misinformation. Irrational beliefs were indexed by belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories, COVID-19 knowledge overestimation, type I error cognitive biases, and cognitive intuition. Participants (N = 407) reported (1) how often they followed guidelines (e.g., handwashing, physical distancing), (2) how often they engaged in pseudoscientific practices (e.g., consuming garlic, colloidal silver), and (3) their intention to receive a COVID-19 vaccine. Conspiratorial beliefs predicted all three outcomes in line with our expectations. Cognitive intuition and knowledge overestimation predicted lesser adherence to guidelines, while cognitive biases predicted greater adherence, but also greater use of pseudoscientific practices. Our results suggest an important relation between irrational beliefs and health behaviors, with conspiracy theories being the most detrimental. This is the peer‐reviewed version of the article: Teovanović, P.; Lukić, P.; Zupan, Z.; Lazić, A.; Ninković, M.; Žeželj, I. Irrational Beliefs Differentially Predict Adherence to Guidelines and Pseudoscientific Practices during the COVID-19 Pandemic. Applied Cognitive Psychology 2021, 35 (2), 486–496. [https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3770]

In uncertain environments we must balance our need to gather information with our desire to reap rewards by exploiting current knowledge. Achieving this balance is further complicated in reactive environments where actions produce long-lasting change to the system. In four experiments, we investigate how people learn to make effective decisions from experience in a dynamic multiarmed bandit task. In contrast to the typical exploitation-dependent diminishing rewards found in previous studies, options were framed as skills that developed greater rewards the more they were chosen. In Experiment 1, we provide a proof of concept, and in Experiments 2-4 we explore the boundaries of participants' sensitivity to reactive dynamics. Our results suggest that most individuals can learn effective strategies for coping with these reactive environments. A two-part comparison of several competing psychological models supports several conclusions: (a) a sizable minority of individuals learned that their environment was reactive, (b) evidence suggests several distinct groups of individuals employed unique decision strategies, and (c) testing models with the simulation method reveals qualitative misfits that motivate future theory development. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

A large literature debates whether emotions are universal and innate. Here, we ask whether reasoning about such matters is shaped by intuitive Essentialist biases that link innateness to the material body. To gauge the perception of innateness, we asked laypeople to evaluate whether emotion categories will be recognized spontaneously by hunter–gatherers who have had no contact with Westerners. Experiment 1 shows that participants believe that emotions are innate and embodied (facially and internally) and these two properties correlate reliably. Experiment 2 demonstrates that the link is causal. When told that emotions are localized in specific brain areas (i.e., embodied), participants concluded that emotions are innate. Experiment 3 shows that this naïve view persists even when participants are explicitly informed that these emotions are acquired. Our results are the first to suggest that laypeople incorrectly believe that, if emotions are embodied, then they must be innate. We suggest that people’s failure to grasp the workings of their psyche arises from the human psyche itself.

Self-other distinction is crucial for empathy, since it prevents the confusion of self-experienced emotions with those of others. We aimed to extend our understanding of the neurocognitive mechanisms of self-other distinction. Thirty-one female participants underwent continuous theta burst transcranial magnetic stimulation (cTBS) targeting the right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG), a sub-region of the temporoparietal junction previously shown to be involved in self-other distinction, and the vertex, a cortical control site. Right after stimulation they completed a visuo-tactile empathy task in an MRI scanner. Self-other distinction was assessed by differences in emotion judgments, and brain activity between conditions differing in the requirement for self-other distinction. Effects of brain stimulation on self-other distinction depended on individual differences in dispositional empathic understanding: cTBS of rSMG, compared to vertex, enhanced self-other distinction in participants with lower dispositional empathic understanding, but diminished it in participants with higher empathic understanding. On the neural level, this inverse relationship between empathic disposition and self-other distinction performance was linked to a reduction of cTBS-induced rSMG activity in persons with lower dispositional empathy, and an increase in those with lower dispositional empathy. These opposite cTBS impacts were also associated with two anatomically and functionally distinct networks. These findings open up novel perspectives on the causal role of rSMG in self-other distinction and empathy. They also suggest that considering individual differences may yield novel insights into how brain stimulation affects higher-level affect and cognition, and its neural correlates.

We explore whether children’s strategies on a causal learning task show a bias observed in adults towards “exploitative” hypothesis revision. Adults and children (ages 4–6) were presented with evidence which initially seemed to conform to a simple, salient rule (e.g. blue blocks activate a machine), but then encountered evidence that violated this rule. The true rule in the "near" condition was more complex, but could be reached through iterative revision of the salient rule, while in the "distant" condition, the true rule was comparatively simple, but incremental revision could not yield the true rule. Participants then predicted the behaviour of a set of new blocks. Adults performed better in the near condition, while in the distant condition adults did not appear to revise their initial hypothesis significantly. Unlike adults, children's overall performance in both conditions was similar, while condition differences may reflect a broader search for alternative solutions.

The reliance on feelings when judging risks and benefits is one of the most fundamental valuation processes in risk perception. Although previous research suggests that the affect heuristic reliably predicts an inverse correlation between risk and benefit judgments, it has not yet been tested if the affect heuristic is sensitive to elicitation method effects (joint/separate evaluation) and to what extent individual differences in cognitive abilities may mediate the risk-benefit correlation. Across two studies we find that (1) the risk-benefit correlation is stable across different elicitation methods and for different domains (e.g., social domain, sensation-seeking domain, health domain, economic domain) and (2) the strength of the inverse correlation is tied to individual cognitive abilities-primarily cognitive reflection ability. Funding Agencies|Marianne and Marcus Wallenberg Foundation [2014-0173]

Modern media report news remarkably fast, often before the information is confirmed. This general tendency is even more pronounced in times of an increasing demand for information, such as in the case of pressing natural phenomena or the pandemic spreading of diseases. Yet, even if early reports correctly identify their content as suspicions (rather than facts), recipients may not adequately consider the preliminary nature of such information. Theories on language processing suggest that understanding a suspicion requires its reconstruction as a factual assertion first—which can later be erroneously remembered. This would lead to a bias to remember and treat suspicions as if they were factual, rather than falling for the reverse mistake. In five experiments, however, we demonstrate the opposite pattern. Participants read news headlines with explanations for distinct events either in form of a fact or a suspicion (as still being under investigation). Both kinds of framings increased the participants’ belief in the correctness of the respective explanations to an equal extent (relative to receiving no explanation). Importantly, however, this effect was not mainly driven by a neglect of uncertainty cues. In contrast, three memory experiments (recognition and cued recall) revealed a reverse distortion: a bias to falsely remember and treat a presented “fact” as if it were merely a suspicion. These surprising results stress the importance of developing new theoretical accounts on the processing of (un-)certainty cues which take into account their broader context, such as source credibility and the presence of uncertainty in other unrelated headlines.

Confabulation is typically understood to be dysfunctional. But this understanding neglects the phenomenon's potential benefits. In fact, we think that the benefits of non-clinical confabulation provide a better foundation for a general account of confabulation. In this paper, we start from these benefits to develop a social teleological account of confabulation. Central to our account is the idea that confabulation manifests a kind of willful ignorance. By understanding confabulation in this way, we can provide principled explanations for the difference between clinical and non-clinical cases of confabulation and the extent to which confabulation is rational.

Choosing between options characterized by multiple cues can be a daunting task. People may integrate all information at hand or just use lexicographic strategies that ignore most of it. Notably, integrative strategies require knowing exact cue weights, whereas lexicographic heuristics can operate by merely knowing the importance order of cues. Here we study how using integrative or lexicographic strategies interacts with learning about cues. In our choice-learning-estimation paradigm people first make choices, learning about cues from qualities of chosen options, and then estimate qualities of new options. We developed delta-elimination (DE), a new lexicographic strategy that generalizes previous heuristics to any type of environment, and compared it to the integrative weighted-additive (WADD) strategy. Our results show that participants learned cue weights regardless of the choice strategy employed. The group of people best described by the DE strategy learned cue weights, exactly like the group best described by the WADD. Still, there was an interaction between the adopted strategy and the cue weight learning process: the DE users learned cue weights slower than the WADD users. This work advances the study of lexicographic choice strategies, both empirically and theoretically, and deepens our understanding of strategy selection, in particular the interaction between the strategy used and learning the structure of the environment.

There is a norm in psychological research to use causally ambiguous statistical language, rather than straightforward causal language, when describing methods and results of nonexperimental studies. We hypothesized that this norm leads to higher ratings of study quality and greater acceptance of policy recommendations that rely on causal interpretations of the results. In a preregistered experiment, we presented psychology faculty, postdocs, and doctoral students (n=142) with abstracts from hypothetical studies. Abstracts described studies’ results using either straightforward causal or causally ambiguous statistical language, but all concluded with policy recommendations relying on causal interpretations of the results. As hypothesized, participants rated studies with causally ambiguous statistical language as of higher quality (by .48-.59 SD) and as similarly or more supportive (by .16-.26 SD) of policy recommendations. Thus, causally ambiguous statistical language may allow psychologists to communicate causal interpretations to readers without being punished for violating the norm against straightforward causal language.

Background: Cognitive biases seem to play an important role in the development and maintenance of emotional disorders such as depression and anxiety. Novel procedures, known as Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM), aim to reduce these dysfunctional information processing modes. This study aims to develop a brief online intervention program to modify biased interpretations in depression and anxiety overcoming some methodological issues that have been addressed in previous literature. Methods: Volunteer participants will be recruited via social media, posters and universities. They will be randomly assigned to the experimental group or a waiting list control group. Both groups will attend two assessment sessions at the lab. The assessment will consist of questionnaires measuring cognitive and emotional variables as well as three experimental tasks to measure cognitive biases (i.e., attention, memory and interpretation). After the first assessment session only participants in the experimental group will receive a link to follow the four-sessions program at home. All participants will receive, via email, follow-up questionnaires two weeks and three months after the second assessment session.Discussion: This study will test an online program potentially beneficial to modify cognitive variables in disorders such as depression and anxiety. Several limitations of previous CBM procedures are addressed and the impact of the program both on cognitive performance and clinical symptoms will be explored.Trial registration: This trial was prospectively registered on June 17, 2019 with the ClinicalTrials.gov NCT03987477

People find positive attribute frames (e.g., 75% lean) more persuasive than negative ones (e.g., 25% fat). In three pre-registered experiments, we tested whether this effect would be magnified by using verbal quantifiers instead of numerical ones (e.g., ‘high % lean’ vs. ‘75% lean’). This moderating effect of quantifier format was predicted based on previous empirical work and two non-exclusive accounts of framing effects. First, verbal quantifiers are presumed to be a more intuitive format than numerical quantifiers, so might predispose people more to judgement biases such as the framing effect. Second, verbal quantifiers draw a greater focus to the attributes they describe. This could provide a linguistic signal that the positive frame is better than the negative one. In three experiments, we manipulated the attribute frame (positive or negative) and the quantifier format (verbal or numerical) between-subjects, and quantity pairs (e.g., 5% fat and 95% lean or 25% fat and 75% lean) within-subjects. We also tested if participants focused more on the attributes in the frame, by measuring whether participants selected causal sentence completions about the beef that focused on why it had fat meat or lean meat. Results showed a robust framing effect, which was partially mediated by the focus of the sentence completions. However, the verbal format did not increase the magnitude of the framing effect. These results suggest that a focus on the attribute contributes to the framing effect, but contrary to past work, this focus is not different between verbal and numerical quantifiers.

As social robots are increasingly introduced into health interventions, one potential area where they might prove valuable is in supporting people’s psychological health through conversation. Given the importance of self-disclosure for psychological health, this study assessed the viability of using social robots for eliciting rich disclosures that identify needs and emotional states in human interaction partners. Three within-subject experiments were conducted with participants interacting with another person, a humanoid social robot, and a disembodied conversational agent (voice assistant). We performed a number of objective evaluations of disclosures to these three agents via speech content and voice analyses and also probed participants’ subjective evaluations of their disclosures to three agents. Our findings suggest that participants overall disclose more to humans than artificial agents, that agents’ embodiment influences disclosure quantity and quality, and that people are generally aware of differences in their personal disclosures to three agents studied here. Together, the findings set the stage for further investigation into the psychological underpinnings of self-disclosures to artificial agents and their potential role in eliciting disclosures as part of mental and physical health interventions.

How does the order of individuals' interactions affect the emergence of shared conventions at the population level? The answer to this question is relevant for a number of fields, such as cultural evolution, linguistics, cognitive science or behavioral economics. In this study we investigate experimentally how two different network connectivity dynamics affect the evolution of the diversity of cultural variants of the communication system. We report an experiment in the lab in which participants engage in a Pictionary-like graphical communication task as members of a 4-participant micro-society, interacting in pairs with the other three members of the community across 4 rounds. The experiment has two main goals: First, to evaluate the effect of two network connectivity dynamics (early and late) on the evolution of the convergence of micro-societies on shared communicative conventions under controlled conditions. Second, to compare the predictions of the agent-based model described in a previous study (Segovia-Martín, Walker, Fay, & Tamariz, 2019) against experimental data, and calibrate the model to find the best-fitting parameter setting. Our experimental data shows that, as predicted by the model, an early connectivity dynamic increases convergence and a late connectivity dynamic slows down convergence. We found significant differences between conditions in round 3 and round 4. We estimate the best-fit parameter combination for the 96 data structures coded. Medium to high content bias, neutral to egocentric coordination bias and memory size of 3 rounds was associated with a better model fit. In the light of the model evaluation and the experiment outcome, we discuss the impact of our predictions on social influence research and possible factors that might help to improve model precision.

Mass media routinely present data on COVID-19 diffusion using either a log scale or a linear scale. We show that the scale adopted on these graphs has important consequences on how people understand and react to the information conveyed. In particular, we find that when we show the number of COVID-19 related deaths on a logarithmic scale, people have a less accurate understanding of how the pandemic has developed, make less accurate predictions on its evolution, and have different policy preferences than when they are exposed to a linear scale. Consequently, merely changing the scale can alter public policy preferences and the level of worry, despite the fact that people are exposed to a lot of COVID-19 related information. Reducing misinformation can help improving the response to COVID-19, thus, mass media and policymakers should always describe the evolution of the pandemic using a graph on a linear scale, or at least they should show both scales. More generally, our results confirm that policymakers should not only care about what information to communicate, but also about how to do it, as even small differences in data framing can have a significant impact.

A core proposition in economics is that voluntary exchanges benefit both parties. We show that people often deny the mutually beneficial nature of exchange, instead espousing the belief that one or both parties fail to benefit from the exchange. Across 4 studies (and 8 further studies in the Supplementary Materials), participants read about simple exchanges of goods and services, judging whether each party to the transaction was better off or worse off afterwards. These studies revealed that win–win denial is pervasive, with buyers consistently seen as less likely to benefit from transactions than sellers. Several potential psychological mechanisms underlying win–win denial are considered, with the most important influences being mercantilist theories of value (confusing wealth for money) and theory of mind limits (failing to observe that people do not arbitrarily enter exchanges). We argue that these results have widespread implications for politics and society.

Retail investors increasingly have access to both platforms that allow for sophisticated trading strategies - those profit in ways other than by selling an owned stock after price increase – and to financial-analyst reports upon which to build investment strategies. Building on the predecisional distortion literature, we study how consumers of financial-analyst reports bias information to support emerging preferences, both directional and volatility-based trades. We then present the results of two experiments conducted with retail investors with high financial literacy asked to develop investment strategies based financial-analyst reports. We find that those tend to who develop preferences toward bearish trades (i.e., profits from a stock price decrease) tend to bias new information more strongly those who develop preferences toward bullish trades (i.e., profits from a stock price increase). We also show that those leaning toward volatility-based trades (i.e., profit from either small or large price movements) tend to evaluate information in a less biased way and those leaning toward directional trades (bullish or bearish).

Problem definitions are defined here as one-sided in the case that while they might take into account one class of negative outcomes, such as those associated with the problem, at the same time they might ignore other classes of negative outcomes, such as those that may be encountered while implementing interventions that try to avoid the problem. An example is amputating all limbs with potentially cancerous moles on them to reduce the risk of mortality due to cancer as much as possible, without considering the increase in mortality due to the amputations. The global response to COVID-19 has been characterized by the availability of mathematical models for the potential mortality due to the spread of the pandemic. However in some cases the researchers guiding the responses of their respective nations with their mathematical models have explicitly pointed out that corresponding mathematical models of the impacts of economic shutdowns or other potential interventions on mortality have not been incorporated, and that there is a critical need to include such models. This paper generalizes this problem of one-sided problem definitions past the COVID-19 response to a wide variety of group problems where the pattern of one-sidedness applies, and explores how in current group decision-making systems one-sided problem definitions might consistently tend to be exploited in a way that is detrimental to collective well-being, as well as how a system of group decision-making meeting the requirements of a General Collective Intelligence solves the problem of one-sidedness to reliably maximize collective well-being.

We investigate whether COVID-19 exposure changes participants’ threat-detection threshold. Sensitivity to threat was measured in a signal detection task among 397 British adults who also reported how much vulnerable they felt to infectious disease. Participants’ data were then matched to the number of confirmed COVID-19 collected from the NHS database. We found that participants who perceive themselves as more likely to catch infectious diseases displayed a higher negativity bias in response to increased COVID-19 cases. In addition, we found a significant effect of education on participants’ punishment responsiveness in response to COVID-19 exposure. A second wave of data collection is planned exactly two weeks after the first one. The goal of this second wave is to replicate the findings and document the impact of increasing COVID-19 cases and deaths on people’s psychology.

Much of the communication around the current pandemic stresses the exponential growth in the number of infections. We observe that this approach may backfire: it becomes difficult to convince people to obey strict constraints when what will be achieved is merely a short delay in that growth. Based on a method we successfully used in a context of pension savings, we suggest how best to frame the gains of delaying tactics