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We evaluate the long-term effect of a "girl-friendly" primary school program in Burkina Faso, using a regression discontinuity design. The intervention consisted of upgrading existing three-classroom schools to six-classroom schools to accommodate more grades. After seven years, the program increased enrollment by 15.5 percentage points and increased test scores by 0.29 standard deviations. Students in treatment schools progress further through the grades, compared to students in non-selected schools. These upgraded schools are effective at getting children into school, getting children to start school on time, and keeping children in school longer. Overall, we find that the schools sustain the large impacts observed about three years earlier, with enrollment declining slightly from 18.5 to 14.9 for the cohorts of children who were exposed to both the first and second phases of the intervention.

We evaluate the long-term effects of a "girl-friendly" primary school program in Burkina Faso, using a regression discontinuity design. Ten years later, primary school-age children in villages selected for the program attend school more often and score significantly higher on standardized tests. We also find long-term effects on academic and social outcomes for children exposed earlier in the program. Secondary-school-age youths and young adults (those old enough to have finished secondary school) complete primary and secondary school at higher rates and perform significantly better on standardized tests. Women old enough to have completed secondary school delay both marriage and childbearing.

One way to improve struggling schools' access to effective teachers is to use selective transfer incentives. Such incentives offer bonuses for the highest-performing teachers to move into schools serving the most disadvantaged students. In this report, we provide evidence from a randomized experiment that tested whether such a policy intervention can improve student test scores and other outcomes in low-achieving schools. The intervention, known to participants as the Talent Transfer Initiative (TTI), was implemented in 10 school districts in seven states. The highest-performing teachers in each district--those who ranked in roughly the top 20 percent within their subject and grade span in terms of raising student achievement year after year (an approach known as value added)--were identified. These teachers were offered $20,000, paid in installments over a two-year period, if they transferred into and remained in designated schools that had low average test scores. The main findings from the study include: (1) The transfer incentive successfully attracted high value-added teachers to fill targeted vacancies; (2) The transfer incentive had a positive impact on test scores (math and reading) in targeted elementary classrooms; and (3) The transfer incentive had a positive impact on teacher-retention rates during the payout period; retention of the high-performing teachers who transferred was similar to their counterparts in the fall immediately after the last payout. Seven appendixes are included: (1) Supplemental Materials for Chapters I and II; (2) Value-Added Analysis to Identify Highest-Performing Teachers; (3) Supplemental Materials for Chapter III; (4) Identification of Focal Teachers; (5) Supplemental Materials for Chapter IV; (6) Supplemental Materials for Chapter V; and (7) Supplemental Materials for Chapter VI. (Contains 114 footnotes, 61 figures, and 92 tables.) [For the executive summary, see ED544268.]

One way to improve struggling schools' access to effective teachers is to use selective transfer incentives. Such incentives offer bonuses for the highest-performing teachers to move into schools serving the most disadvantaged students. In this report, we provide evidence from a randomized experiment that tested whether such a policy intervention can improve student test scores and other outcomes in low-achieving schools. The intervention, known to participants as the Talent Transfer Initiative (TTI), was implemented in 10 school districts in seven states. The highest-performing teachers in each district--those who ranked in roughly the top 20 percent within their subject and grade span in terms of raising student achievement year after year (an approach known as value added)--were identified. These teachers were offered $20,000, paid in installments over a two-year period, if they transferred into and remained in designated schools that had low average test scores. The main findings from the study include: (1) The transfer incentive successfully attracted high value-added teachers to fill targeted vacancies; (2) The transfer incentive had a positive impact on test scores (math and reading) in targeted elementary classrooms; and (3) The transfer incentive had a positive impact on teacher-retention rates during the payout period; retention of the high-performing teachers who transferred was similar to their counterparts in the fall immediately after the last payout.(Contains 5 figures, 1 box, and 5 footnotes.) [For the full report, see ED544269.]

This report describes the implementation and intermediate impacts of an intervention designed to provide incentives to induce a school district's highest-performing teachers to work in its lowest-achieving schools to improve student achievement. The report is part of a larger study that used random assignment to form equivalent groups of classrooms ("teacher teams") that either had the chance to participate in the intervention or did not. A future report will focus on the impacts of the intervention on student achievement and other outcomes. By focusing on implementation, this report will provide important information for policymakers and district administrators wishing to understand issues associated with teacher transfer incentives. Chapter II describes the formation of the study sample. Chapter III documents implementation information from the period of intensive activity that takes place during the spring and summer leading up to the transfers, when transfer teacher candidates are identified and recruited, and principals at the receiving schools interview and make offers to them. Chapter IV describes the teachers who transferred, the teachers who would fill the vacancies in high-need schools in the absence of a transfer incentive, the degree of collaboration and interaction among teachers, and the changes that happen inside the receiving school as a result of the transfer incentive. The last two phenomena--collaboration and changes in resource allocation--relate to the indirect and resource allocation effects discussed in the logic model above. Finally, Chapter V provides a brief summary of findings and next steps for the study. Appended are: (1) Analysis of Survey Nonresponse; (2) Value-Added Analysis to Identify Highest-Performing Teachers; and (3) Supplemental Tables and Figures. (Contains 24 tables, 27 figures and 59 footnotes.) [For "Moving Teachers: Implementation of Transfer Incentives in Seven Districts. Executive Summary. NCEE 2012-4052," see ED530749.]

This report describes the implementation and intermediate impacts of an intervention designed to provide incentives for a school district's highest-performing teachers to work in its lowest-achieving schools. The report is part of a larger study in which random assignment was used to form two equivalent groups of classrooms organized into teacher "teams" that are composed of teachers in the same grade level and subject (math, reading, or both in the case of an elementary school grade). Teams were assigned to either a treatment group that had the chance to participate in the intervention described below and or a control group that did not. Intermediate outcomes, measured for both the treatment and control teams, include the mix of teachers who make up the team, the climate of collaboration and cooperation in the team, and the way in which resources are allocated within the teacher team. A future report will focus on the impacts of the intervention on student achievement and other outcomes like retention. (Contains 2 tables, 2 figures and 9 footnotes.) [For the full report, "Moving Teachers: Implementation of Transfer Incentives in Seven Districts. NCEE 2012-4051," see ED530746.]