Search

Multiteam structures are increasingly used to coordinate complex tasks between different groups. To realize this potential, however, the members of a multiteam structure must manage a complex set of boundary relations within, between, and beyond the various constituent teams—boundary relations that can be cooperative, competitive, or some combination of both at the same time. This multimethod study provides insight into how multiteam structures can meet this challenge. Specifically, we examined how the different organizations that utilize and support the Dutch railway system learned to manage boundaries as they transitioned from a centralized, arms-length structure to a colocated, multiteam structure for coordinating disruption responses (i.e., the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC)). In part 1 of our study, qualitative analyses of interview, observational, and archival data suggested that learning to manage boundaries within the ROCC was not simple or linear but evolved through trial and error during various phases. Ultimately, the ROCC developed an approach we call “integrated pluralism,” establishing a dynamic balance that combines both collaborative and competitive approaches to boundary management. In this manner, the ROCC teams were able to attain integrated solutions and coordinated task accomplishment while simultaneously defending internal team operations and home organization interests. In part 2, we employed an interrupted time series analysis to demonstrate that the implementation of the ROCC resulted in significant performance improvements. Consistent with the results of part 1, we found that these improvements emerged gradually over time as teams learned to work out their boundary relations and transitioned to integrated pluralism. These findings provide new insights into how individuals and teams can work together to tackle the unique boundary management challenges presented by multiteam structures and illuminate the dynamic trial and error process by which component teams can learn to both cooperate and compete.

Moral reasoning typically informs environmental decision-making by measuring the possible outcomes of policies or actions in light of a preferred ethical theory. This method is subject to many problems. Environmental pragmatism tries to overcome them, but it suffers also from some pitfalls. This paper proposes a new method of environmental pragmatism that avoids the problems of both the traditional method of environmental moral reasoning and of the general versions of environmental pragmatism. We call it 'justificatory moral pluralism' - it develops the intuition that normative ethical theories need not be mutually exclusive. This leaves room for important forms of pluralist environmental ethics that do not require a once-and-for-all prior commitment to an ethical theory when deciding about policies or courses of action related to the protection of the environment. Justificatory moral pluralism offers a viable solution to the recurrent conflicts between efficient environmental decisions and the need for moral reasoning.

A common assumption in non-relativistic quantum mechanics is that self-adjoint operators mathematically represent properties of quantum systems. Focusing on spin, we argue that a natural view considers observables as determinable properties and their eigenvalues as their corresponding determinates. We provide a taxonomy of the different views that one can hold, once it is accepted that spin can be modelled with the determinable-determinate relation. In particular, we present the two main families of views, dubbed Spin Monism and Pluralism, and we show that the current literature does not take a stance between the two. Then we put forward two arguments in favour of the former. Finally, we present a new account of Spin Monism, that is absent in current literature; such a view is worth discussing, or so we contend, because several compelling considerations support it, and it opens new ways of thinking about the ontology of quantum mechanics.

This study discusses the extent to which Goodman’s constructivist conception of worldmaking may serve the needs of scientific practice. I argue that worldmaking should help us retain a common methodological order and a basic framework for scientific pluralism. In this way it should provide us not only with better scientific knowledge but also with a greater understanding of the world in general that would be inclusive of both scientific and nonscientific disciplines. The main purpose of this paper is to show that, if revisited, Goodman’s idea of versions, including even mutually exclusive scientific theories, can aid the gradual progress of pluralistic science. Taking the prevailing criticism of Goodman’s conception into account, I argue that worldmaking can serve as a methodological apparatus for scientific disciplines because it presents a position of moderated constructivism which, thanks to the variable criterion of rightness, offers a way to maintain both relativism and skepticism.

An increasing number of arguments for causal pluralism invoke empirical psychological data. Different aspects of causal cognition—specifically, causal perception and causal inference—are thought to involve distinct cognitive processes and representations, and they thereby distinctively support transference and dependency theories of causation, respectively. We argue that this dualistic picture of causal concepts arises from methodological differences, rather than from an actual plurality of concepts. Hence, philosophical causal pluralism is not particularly supported by the empirical data. Serious engagement with cognitive science reveals that the connection between psychological concepts of causation and philosophical notions is substantially more complicated than is traditionally presumed.

Ideas about regulatory pluralism provided an intellectual foundation for the post-1980s transformation in regulatory frameworks from predominantly state-centric regulation to a growing emphasis on ...

Philosophical arguments often assume that the folk tends towards moral objectivism. Although recent psychological studies have indicated that lay persons’ attitudes to morality are best characterized in terms of non-objectivism-leaning pluralism, it has been maintained that the folk may be committed to moral objectivism implicitly. Since the studies conducted so far almost exclusively assessed subjects’ metaethical attitudes via explicit cognitions, the strength of this rebuttal remains unclear. The current study attempts to test the folk’s implicit metaethical commitments. We present results of a newly developed Implicit Association Test (IAT) for metaethical attitudes which indicate that the folk generally tend towards moral non-objectivism on the implicit level as well. We discuss implications of this finding for the philosophical debate.

Purpose This paper presents a review of research methodologies used in addressing problems in the financial management of property and construction journals from 2005 to 2020. Design/methodology/approach Content analysis of 258 research papers published in the Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction was carried out, enabling the exploration of research approaches, epistemology, strategies, data collection and data analysis methods used in addressing problems researched in the area of financial management of property and construction Findings The findings show that quantitative approaches and methods dominate, whereas qualitative and mixed methods were prominent in-depth understanding of a topics were needed. Interestingly, almost a third of the publications did not adopt quantitative approaches. In some journal issues, there was relatively high use of qualitative and multi-method approaches and up to 12% of the articles published over the past 16 years could be described as based on pragmatism. Research limitations/implications An important implication of this paper is that a conventionally number-based area of research does not preclude the use of qualitative and mixed approaches. The findings are only generalisable to the Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction. Practical implications Financial management researchers could benefit greatly by considering pluralistic approaches more in the design of their studies. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is an original synthesis of the articles published between 2005 and 2020. It provides new insight into the use of research methodologies by authors and how they have been combined to address their research problems. It further investigates an old issue or question about methodological choice-making using new evidence and original empirical work.

In this paper, I argue that an adequate meta-semantic framework capable of accommodating the range of projects currently identified as projects in conceptual engineering must be sensitive to the fact that concepts (and hence projects relating to them) fall into distinct kinds. Concepts can vary, I will argue, with respect to their direction of determination, their modal range, and their temporal range. Acknowledging such variations yields a preliminary taxonomy of concepts and generates a meta-semantic framework that allows us both to accommodate the full range of cases and to identify a proper subset of concepts for special ameliorative consideration. Ignoring such variations, in contrast, leads to a restricted meta-semantic framework that accommodates only a subset of the particular projects while generating implausible accounts of others.

Using the new 11-item Vertical and Horizontal Spiritual Fitness Inventory, the study examines whether vertical spirituality (which is traditional spirituality), and horizontal spirituality (which i...

This short article discusses the Chinese concept of harmonism as developed in a book by Zhihe Wang titled Process and Pluralism: Chinese Thought on the Harmony of Diversity. This book develops themes in Whitehead’s philosophy as they illuminate the concept of harmonism and constructive postmodernism.

Pluralism is relevant to conceptual engineering in many ways. First of all, we face the issue of pluralism when trying to characterize the very object(s) of conceptual engineering. Is it just conce...

The article considers the phenomena of unified and plural rationality, and hence the possibility or its absence to unify experience, culture, politics, economics, etc. To illustrate the problem, it is suggested to consider the differences between the modern and postmodern eras. It is attempted to deduce the ontological basis of cultural differences and the dynamics of knowledge development in general. Author of the article reflects upon contemporary challenges related to the instability of the state of knowledge, and propose possible solutions of modern social and philosophical problems on the basis of phenomenology.

Kant’s essays in the philosophy of history, such as Universal History and Conjectural Beginning, offer a speculative account of the gradual development of reason in our species and of the way the mature use of reason can be attained. Such mature use of reason, as Kant explains a few years later in the published Anthropology, is characterized by abandoning the standpoint of “practical egoism” and learning how to exercise the psychological disposition to “pluralism”. To be a pluralist, he claims, means to be capable of seeing things from other people’s standpoints, of giving deliberative weight to the needs of others, and of taking part in universally valid judgments. But Kant is never explicit about what is required in order to become a pluralist, nor does he explain what it means to be a pluralist beyond a brief remark in the Anthropology. My paper takes a detailed look at this under-studied notion and offers a novel account of this notion. I explicate the features of pluralistic thinking and I connect this notion to the public use of reason, the three maxims of common human understanding, and the role played by interpersonal communication in advancing the progress of our rational capacities. I also explain the key role of education in reason’s development and the conceptual relationship between the enlightenment of an individual and the enlightenment of the human species.

Drawing on interviews with, and ethnographic observations of, evangelical Christian musicians with experience of contemporary worship music—as well as secular heavy metal and punk rock—this article...

The objective of this article is to analyze the concept of constitutional pluralism as a methodological basis for the construction of the legal system of the European Union. In particular, attention is paid to investigating the particularities of the interaction and operation of the different constitutional legal systems within the legal sphere of the European Union, studying the constitutional collisions derived from the interaction of European Union law and the law national of the Member States. Dialectical, comparative legal, historical, systemic-structural and formal dogmatic methods were used in the research. The article concluded that the national constitutional courts of the Member States of the European Union can give priority to their constitutional rules only if those rules are clear and reflect substantial constitutional obligations. However, in any case, in order to maintain the coherence of the legislation of the European Union and the national legislation of the Member States, it is necessary to amend the national Constitutions of the Member States of the European Union.

This paper differentiates between two readings of Aristotle’s argument that unity and being are not “genē” (UBANG for short). On the first reading – proposed by commentators such as Ackrill, Shields, Loux, and McDaniel – UBANG entails the proposition that there are no features that characterise all beings insofar as they are, referred to by its contemporary proponents, including McDaniel, as ‘ontological pluralism’. On the second reading – proposed here – UBANG does not entail this proposition. The paper argues that only on the second reading does Aristotle’s argument secure its conclusion, that the second reading is, in fact, the correct reading of UBANG, and that anyone who thinks that UBANG succeeds and entails ontological pluralism probably equivocates between two different senses of ‘genos’.

This review seeks to understand the implications of empiricism, interpretivism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, pluralism, and solipsism in social science inquiry within social reality, using scoping review method. An in-depth review of the literature was conducted to understand the various philosophical alignments or paradigms applied in social sciences research. The study is aimed at understanding and applying these paradigms with the view of having a deep comprehension of the turbulences plaguing society and proffering solutions to them. From the review, it was discovered that the various philosophical alignments in social science inquiry provide the scientist or researcher with a worldview of the different perspectives and multiple levels of analysis of the social world. Thus, creating a systematic lens from which individuals (at several levels), groups, and organizations are examined to know the; “when”, “how”, and “why” they behave the way and manner that they do. It was concluded that an adequate understanding of these paradigms would better shape the methodology to be adopted in conducting research studies within the social and/or behavioural sciences. This will help determine its objectivity, rigor, or the extent to which scientific methodology is applied within social science researches. Lastly, a combination of these paradigms creates a mixed-method, which demonstrates knowledge validity and objectivity in investigator triangulation (which involves; observation, questionnaire administration, and interview), data triangulation (which encompasses collecting data at different times from different people in different places as a cross-check for validity and to check the interpretation and conclusion arrived at), methodological triangulation (which includes within-method triangulation and between method triangulation: the former entails the application of various techniques within the same method, while the latter applies a combination of research methods), generalization, verification, explanation, and deductions. This will allow for data gathering and/or fact-finding, in search of new knowledge, and subsuming new valid knowledge, enhance research results and findings efficacy.

Recent years have seen enticing empirical approaches to solving the epistemological problem of the theory-ladenness of observation. I group these approaches in two categories according to their method of choice: testing and refereeing. I argue that none deliver what friends of theory-neutrality want them to. Testing does not work because both evidence from cognitive neuroscience and perceptual pluralism independently invalidate the existence of a common observation core. Refereeing does not work because it treats theory-ladenness as a kind of superficial, removable bias. Even if such treatment is plausible, there is likely no method to ascertain that effects of this bias are not present. More importantly, evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that a deeper, likely irremovable kind of theory-ladenness lies within the perceptual modules.

Рассматривается история идей Исайи Берлина, представляющая собой историю изменения и смены моделей человеческого развития. Указывается, что одной из фундаментальных установок Берлина является ценностный плюрализм, корни которого он обнаруживает в философии Дж. Вико, И. Гердера. Определяется, что ценностный плюрализм Берлина подразумевает под собой наличие множественных и несоизмеримых человеческих ценностей, которые находятся в состоянии противостояния и даже конфликта друг с другом. The article is devoted to I. Berlin's history of ideas, which is the history of change and shifts of models of human development. It is pointed out that one of his fundamental ideas is pluralism of values, the roots of which he discovered in the philosophy of G. Vico, I. Herder. It is maintained that the pluralism of values implies the presence of multiple and incommensurable human values, which are in a state of confrontation and even conflict with each other.

Funder: studienstiftung des deutschen volkes; doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100004350, Funder: Prins Bernhard Cultuurfonds, How many correct logics are there? Monists endorse that there is one, pluralists argue for many, and nihilists claim that there are none. Reasoning about these views requires a logic. That is the meta-logic. It turns out that there are some meta-logical challenges specifically for the pluralists. I will argue that these depend on an implicitly assumed absoluteness of correct logic. Pluralists can solve the challenges by giving up on this absoluteness and instead adopt contextualism about correct logic. This contextualism is naturalistically appealing.

Hermeneutics encounters three current challenges: by more quantitative orientations, by stances that reject pluralism, and by criticism that the hermeneutic field is elitist and esoteric. The article offers a response through Ricœur. The hermeneutic “choice in favor of meaning” insists upon the ontological value of the human condition. It shows the insufficiency of the quantitative approach, the remaining value of pluralistic consideration of what human meaning entails, and the real world consequences of interpretation. Examples in Ricœur show how a hermeneutic choice in favor of meaning is not passive but instead reads texts with a particular orientation even when the text seems engaged in another project. The article’s final part undertakes an internal critique, raising the adequacy of Ricœur’s emphasis on meaning as an affirmation of “being.” The example of Buddhist insistence on “emptiness” is offered as one counterexample. The article concludes by arguing that in our contentious times hermeneutics confirms its contemporary vitality through its choice in favor of meaning even as it retains pluralistic consideration of what that meaning entails.

This paper explores some variants and aspects of multi-quantificational criteria of existence, examining these in the context of the debate between monism and pluralism in analytical philosophy. Assuming familiarity with the findings to date (summarized in broad terms at the outset), we seek to apply to these the newly introduced concepts of “substitution” and “substitutional model”. Possible applications of formal theories involving multiple types of existential quantifier are highlighted, together with their methods of construction. These considerations then lead to a thesis asserting the irrelevance of both multi-quantificational criteria and assumptions involving quantificational ontology to the debate between monism and pluralism in ontology. Many quantifiers cannot properly distinguish different modes of existence–as we aim to show by furnishing a general method for constructing counter-examples to any theory that assumes that different types of existential quantifier correspond to different modes of existence.

This paper explores the tension between endorsements of relativism and anti-relativisms in the European historical culture between 2000 and 2020. Relativism, defined as the idea that the authority of a claim is always and only dependent on the context in which it is made, has historically been controversial. In the EU’s historical culture, relativism is sometimes endorsed, and sometimes not. This paper finds that in the EU historical culture, anti-relativism should analytically be distinguished from anti-relativizing—even though the terminology of “relativism” and “relativizing” is often used interchangeably. This insight helps to understand what is at stake in EU debates around memory and history and replaces the question of whether (not) to be relativist, with that of when (not) to relativize.

Geoffrey Hodgson’s argument provides much to consider. His characterization of heterodoxy is quite specific to a particular reading of the economic discipline. His criteria for heterodoxy as the re...

IntroductionThe Self-Pluralism Scale (SPS) measures the declared degree of self-pluralism, visible already in William James’s works. Self-pluralism refers to the degree to which one perceives oneself as typically feeling, behaving, and being different, in different situations, and at different times. The purpose of the current study was to evaluate the psychometric properties of the Polish version of the SPS.Material and methodsA total of 1747 participants (67% were women) between the ages of 15 and 70 years completed the SPS along with measures of self-concept inconsistency, self-concept differentiation, dissociative experiences, internal dialogical activity, personality, and social desirability.ResultsInternal reliability and test-retest reliability were high. The full version has too low indices of fit whereas the brief, 10-item version fits the data well. As indicators of the convergent validity, a positive correlation of SPS with self-concept inconsistency, self-concept differentiation, dissociative experiences, internal dialogical activity and neuroticism and a negative correlation with agreeableness and social desirability were found.ConclusionsThe results suggest that the brief, 10-item version is more valid than the full, 30-item version. The tool may be used for scientific research concerning self-pluralism. After collecting data from a sample that would allow norms to be constructed, the tool may also be useful for individual diagnosis.

The role of philosophy in Russian (Soviet and post-Soviet) society over the past 100 years is considered. A century in this case is not only a generally accepted important key measure of world history but also the anniversary of the first national state research center in the field of philosophy, the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, celebrated in 2021. In the general methodological introduction, the author focuses on the place of philosophy in the system of social division of labor. The 100-year history of the academic institution, counted by the author from the establishment of the Institute of Scientific Philosophy in 1921 under the leadership of G.G. Shpet, is further subdivided into four stages: the 1920s, the victory of Lenin’s ideas and the formation of an independent Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism; the 1930s–early 1950s, criticism of “Menshevik idealism” and the subordination of philosophy to the goals of party–political ideology; the 1960s–1980s, a humanistic turn of Soviet philosophy, at the origins of which were A.A. Zinov’ev and E.V. Il’enkov; and the post-Soviet period, philosophical pluralism and the loss of common orientations.

This study aims to determine how the influence of religious knowledge and religiosity on pluralism of students Kajen. This research is quantitative with three variables, they are religious knowledge and religiosity as independent variables, and pluralism as dependent variable. Data analyzing of this research used the correlation of product moment for the partial test, and linear regression test for the simultaneous test. The results of data analysis to the 136 samples showed that there is a positive and significant correlation between religious knowledge and pluralism, it shown by the value of sig is smaller than the value of alpha. Furthermore, the second hypothesis test showed the same results that there is a positive and significant relationship between religiosity and pluralism, the value of sig 0,0003,00, it means that religious knowledge and religiosity influence together on pluralism. Equation of regression’s line Y=0,511X_1+0,274X_2+44,728, showed that the value of coefficient X1 and X2 is positive, means both of them influence on pluralism positively (Y).

Background and Context: Computational thinking and practices (CT|P) are key competencies for learners in science and engineering. For studies with young adolescents as participants, manifested rese...

Nowadays, very often in connection with postmodern philosophy, there appears a question of a normative call for pluralism. The argumentation made by postmodernists focuses mostly on the notions of violence and of metaphysics which, according to them, is a theoretical ground for violence. In the following paper we will try to present the possibile justification of this normative call, the reception of this call on Polish and international grounds, and also we will try to present how, in the face of this call, religion can function. To do this we will show concepts of religion; the first concept by Janusz Salamon (not connected to postmodernism) and the second by Gianni Vattimo (strictly postmodern).

Observers of the evolution of international relations (IR) theory often point to an American hegemony in the discipline on a global level. However, more recent analyses show that there has been a systematic and increasing Canadianization of IR scholarship in Canada since the 1990s, facilitated by government policies that fostered the hiring of domestic candidates and the creation of Canadian foreign policy research centers. This process has by no means been a cohesive one, yet it reflects a tendency in Canadian IR to make room for a pluralism in ontological as well as epistemological and methodological terms. This opening up of space for diversity is an important yet underappreciated characteristic of Canadian IR's contribution to the discipline, which has not been seriously examined beyond the study of Canadian foreign policy. This article assesses the impact of Canadian IR scholarship on the development of a “Global IR” through an examination of its contributions to Asia-Pacific and African IR. We argue that despite its heterogeneity, Canadian IR scholarship in both areas is characterized by a common set of elements that, taken together, reflect a distinctly Canadian way of studying and practicing IR in relation to the Global South: pluralism and reflexivism.

Xunzi was chronologically third of the three great Confucian philosophers of the classical period, following Confucius and Mencius. I have elsewhere argued for a constructivist, as opposed to a realist, interpretation of Xunzi’s philosophy. On the constructivist account, sages and exemplary persons are responsible for the contingent social artifice that characterize the way. Unlike realism, according to which there is just one right way, constructivism is compatible with pluralism. This article responds to the work of Aaron Stalnaker, specifically his critique of the constructivist account as it pertains to the concept li 理 (pattern). Stalnaker appeals to Xunzi’s use of the phrase “dali” 大理, which he translates “the Great Pattern.” Stalnaker also emphasizes certain passages that he believes suggest a realist interpretation of Xunzi. I explain why this issue is fundamentally about whether or not Xunzi’s view presupposes transcendence, and then I explain why neither the passages Stalnaker emphasizes nor Xunzi’s use of the phrase dali strongly suggest a transcendent realism. Finally, I highlight other passages that tend to suggest a constructivist interpretation. While a decisive conclusion cannot be drawn, I argue that, on the whole, the constructivist account appears to provide the more consistent interpretation of Xunzi’s worldview.

The liberal international order is a fragmented institutional complex, comprising often disparate elements. One of these is a distinctive institutional approach to the global organization of cultural difference. This approach combines universal Westphalian sovereignty (and the pluralist interstate order it facilitates) with international human rights norms that seek to protect the cultural freedoms of individuals. I term this institutional amalgam “global pluralism”. Like many elements of the liberal order, such pluralism is now under challenge, confronted by resurgent ethno-nationalism, politicized religion, and civilizational chauvinism. The key question is whether global pluralism has the adaptive capacities to withstand such challenges. This article develops a theoretical framework for comprehending these institutional capacities. Conceiving global pluralism as a “diversity regime,” I argue that such regimes always rest on social “recognition contracts,” and that these give them certain structural characteristics: configurations of political authority and modes of cultural recognition. Focusing on these characteristics, I compare global pluralism with past Western and non-Western diversity regimes, and clarify the adaptive strengths and weaknesses of different institutional forms. This contractual-structural analysis exposes the historical uniqueness of global pluralism but also its structural vulnerabilities. While global pluralism has distinct advantages over past diversity regimes—principally, that it does not itself generate unstable cultural cleavages and hierarchies—it requires complex forms of social contracting to sustain, and its individualist mode of recognition struggles to accommodate collectivist cultural claims. Such contracting is essential, however, if global pluralism is to withstand current challenges, all of which involve collectivist claims.

When is a belief justified? There are three families of arguments we typically use to support different accounts of justification: (1) arguments from our intuitive responses to vignettes that involve the concept; (2) arguments from the theoretical role we would like the concept to play in epistemology; and (3) arguments from the practical, moral, and political uses to which we wish to put the concept. I focus particularly on the third sort (3), and specifically on arguments of this sort offered by Clayton Littlejohn in Justification and the Truth-Connection (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) and Amia Srinivasan in ‘Radical Externalism’ (Philos Rev 129(3): 395–431, 2018) in favour of externalism. I counter Srinivasan’s argument in two ways: (a) first, I show that the internalist’s concept of justification might figure just as easily in the sorts of structural explanation Srinivasan thinks our political goals require us to give; and (b) I argue that the internalist’s concept is needed for a particular political task, namely, to help us build more effective defences against what I call epistemic weapons. I conclude that we should adopt an Alstonian pluralism about the concept of justification.

I examine situations in which we say that different subjects have ‘different’, ‘competing’, or ‘conflicting understandings’ of a phenomenon. In order to make sense of such situations, we should turn our attention to an often neglected ambiguity in the word ‘understanding’. Whereas the notion of understanding that is typically discussed in philosophy is, to use Elgin’s terms, tethered to the facts, there is another notion of understanding that is not tethered in the same way. This latter notion is relevant because, typically, talk of two subjects having ‘different’, ‘competing’, or ‘conflicting understandings’ of a phenomenon does not entail any commitment to the proposition that these subjects understand the phenomenon in the tethered sense of the word. This paper aims, first, to analyze the non-tethered notion of understanding, second, to clarify its relationship to the tethered notion, third, to explore what exactly goes on when ‘different’, ‘competing’, or ‘conflicting understandings’ clash and, fourth, to discuss the significance of such situations in our epistemic practices. In particular, I argue for a version of scientific pluralism according to which such situations are important because they help scientific communities achieve their fundamental epistemic goals—most importantly, the goal of understanding the world in the tethered sense.

Is evidential pluralism possible when we move to the social sciences, and if so, to what degree? What are the analytical benefits? The answer put forward in this article is that there is a tradeoff between how serious social science methodologies take the study of mechanisms and the analytical benefits that flow from evidential pluralism. In the social sciences, there are a range of different approaches to studying mechanisms, differentiated by (1) the degree to which the ‘process’ is unpacked theoretically, and (2) whether the approach takes seriously the particular nature of social phenomena and the epistemological consequences that flow from this, as in realist approaches to the study of mechanisms, or whether more neopositivist-based foundational assumptions are adopted. Depending on which approach to study mechanisms is used, evidential pluralism is either: easy but superficial, very productive but challenging, or almost impossible because of the fundamental differences between the types of claims being made and the forms of evidence used.

From Carl Becker’s The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers to recent work on religion in the Enlightenment, it has been argued that the Enlightenment has significant religious elem...