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Olexandr Lukovyna’s interview with Professor Plínio Junqueira Smith is devoted to skeptic research in Brazilian philosophy, the beginning of skeptic studies in Brazil, Oswaldo Porchat’s and Ezequiel de Olaso’s roles in establishing the tradition of skeptic studies, contemporary studies in skepticism, and the global state of affairs in skeptic research.

O artigo responde a duas perguntas: o que Montaigne entende por experiência? Como ele constrói sua ciência de si mesmo com base na experiência? Há diversos tipos de experiência e é preciso compreender como cada tipo permite a construção de sua ciência. Aprende-se da experiência coletiva da prática jurídica pelo contraexemplo; da experiência interna da alma pelo exemplo tomado a contrapelo; e, por fim, pelo exemplo da experiência pura, aprendem-se as regras para a saúde corporal.

Depoimento em homenagem a Celso Favaretto.

O texto busca apresentar a atualização das atitudes céticas, como a suspensão do juízo, e sua incidência no campo da atitude nas ciências e na vida. Com o intuito de descrever em linhas gerais como é, ou pode ser, uma vida neopirrônica, para que o leitor julgue isso por si mesmo.

Throughout his philosophical career, Bacon was concerned about the skeptical attack on philosophical dogmatism. In different works, he reshaped the ancient skeptical arguments in many ways until he finally developed his own criticism in the form of the Theory of the Idols in the Novum Organum. There is no doubt that skepticism was very important in his philosophical thinking, and scholars have taken different views of this debt. Some argue that his own position is at bottom skeptical, while others downplay the role played by skepticism. One may wonder, therefore, what Bacon’s Theory of the Idols relation to skepticism is and to what extent his own criticism is original. In order to assess this issue, some interpretations will be presented and assessed. Then I will focus on his treatment of the skeptical proposition “nothing can be known”, for this is the key to understanding Bacon’s view of skepticism. According to Bacon, it is essential to distinguish an absolute and a conditional statement of this proposition. What will emerge is that Bacon’s refusal of the tradition, though based on many skeptical arguments, is very different in kind from the skeptical attack on dogmatism. One main difference is that the skeptical attack on dogmatism is based on assumptions made by the dogmatists themselves, while Bacon’s Theory of the Idols does not rest on any such assumptions. Moreover, Bacon does not wish to destroy dogmatism; rather, he gently invites the reader to try another way of thinking and see if they can obtain better results: while the skeptical attack is confined to dogmatism, Bacon is putting aside the whole tradition, skepticism included. Finally, I examine the role played by skepticism in the positive, constructive conception and practice of Baconian science.

Though no theory about reflection is advanced, some things are said about philosophical reflection and how one should pursue philosophical investigation. I think that the most important clash in philosophy is the conflict between skeptics and dogmatists. First, I recall some of their mutual criticisms. This sets the criterion according to which we shall decide their dispute. Then, I describe philosophical investigation as a kind of reflection which has two complementary sides: on the one hand, philosophers reflect on ordinary thinking, trying to produce a better view of the world; on the other, they reflect on the philosophical results of this first reflection. I suggest that while skeptics and dogmatists pursue truth in philosophical investigation, they do it using different sorts of abilities and under different conditions. Accordingly, there is a skeptical reflection and a dogmatic reflection both on ordinary and on philosophical beliefs. In the final section, I argue for the superiority of the skeptical stance, which may be called neo-Pyrrhonism. In my view, the neo-Pyrrhonist is more truthful to the philosophical criterion of impartiality and rationality, whereas dogmatists move away from it at some point. I also explain why skeptics can suspend judgment and investigate the truth at the same time, while they accuse dogmatists of rashness, interrupting their investigation too soon. The basic point is to realize that, in the case of the Pyrrhonian skeptic, tranquility is no longer a product of philosophical investigation, but one of its conditions.

O artigo pretende analisar o conceito comum de percepção. A concepção comum seria uma concepção relacional da percepção. A percepção seria, não somente um estado mental, mas um padrão de eventos, no qual estariam envolvidos os seguintes elementos: uma causa ou ocasião; uma sensação ou experiência; efeitos, manifestações ou reações. Em seguida, analisam-se esses elementos, dando destaque para a percepção como uma atividade cognitiva, para o papel da linguagem na experiência perceptiva e para o papel causal do objeto. AbstractThe aim of this paper is to describe the common concept of perception. According to the common view, perception is intrinsically relational. Perception is not merely a mental state, but it is composed of a pattern of events, involving: causes and occasions; sensations and experiences; effects, manifestations and reactions. All these elements are analysed, and special attention is given to the notion of cognitive activity, to the role played by language in relation to perceptual experience, and to the causal role played by objects.

My main goal is to show how Hume’s mitigated scepticism fits within French scepticism in the early modern period. I argue that Hume wasn’t very familiar with ancient sources on scepticism, not even Cicero’s Academica. Instead, Hume could rely only on modern sources, mostly French ones, like Montaigne, La Mothe Le Vayer, Descartes, Pascal, Foucher, Huet, and Bayle. Faced with religious, scientific, and philosophical novelties, scepticism had to adapt itself to a new context and evolved in unpredictable ways. Though many modern sceptics (like Montaigne, Huet and Bayle) and philosophers (like Bacon, Malebranche and Pascal) didn’t think there was an important difference between Academics and Pyrrhonists, Hume (like Foucher) took the distinction very seriously, and drew a sharp distinction between them. Despite Hume’s assertion that there were no real sceptics, I suggest that Hume had particular thinkers in mind when he discussed these two kinds of scepticism. Next, I move to explain why Hume preferred to associate his own scepticism with Academic scepticism, despite his initial leaning towards Pyrrhonism. In this respect, Foucher’s Academic scepticism appears to be more important for Hume than usually assumed. Finally, I go on to show how Hume’s arguments against Pyrrhonism and in favour of a mitigated, Academic scepticism were based on his readings of Montaigne, Descartes and Pascal.

The first part of this paper will provide a reconstruction of Francis Bacon’s interpretation of Academic scepticism, Pyrrhonism, and Dogmatism, and its sources throughout his large corpus. It shall also analyze Bacon’s approach against the background of his intellectual milieu, looking particularly at Renaissance readings of scepticism as developed by Guillaume Salluste du Bartas, Pierre de la Primaudaye, Fulke Greville, and John Davies. It shall show that although Bacon made more references to Academic than to Pyrrhonian Scepticism, like most of his contemporaries, he often misrepresented and mixed the doctrinal components of both currents. The second part of the paper shall offer a complete chronological survey of Bacon’s assessment of scepticism throughout his writings. Following the lead of previous studies by other scholars, I shall support the view that, while he approved of the state of doubt and the suspension of judgment as a provisional necessary stage in the pursuit of knowledge, he rejected the notion of acatalepsia. To this received reading, I shall add the suggestion that Bacon’s criticism of acatalepsia ultimately depends on his view of the historical conditions that surround human nature. I deal with this last point in the third part of the paper, where I shall argue that Bacon’s evaluation of scepticism relied on his adoption of a Protestant and Augustinian view of human nature that informed his overall interpretation of the history of humanity and nature, including the sceptical schools. Instituto de Investigaciones en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales

In his critical period, Kant thought that scepticism was a threat to the metaphysical enterprise of Enlightenment. He consequently tried to tackle three of its species: Baylean scepticism, which doubts that reason could establish any truth concerning its ideas; Humean scepticism, which must be distinguished from Hume's formulation of the problem if we want to show that synthetica priorijudgements are possible; and Cartesian scepticism, which puts in doubt the reference of empirical concepts to things in the external world. Kant's treatment reveals the fundamental role played by scepticism in his critical enterprise not only as a triple challenge to the critical project, but also as an ally against idealist dogmatism.

The author distinguishes and compares two varieties of semantic skepticism. The first one, called scientific, is found in W. O. Quine’s intention of accounting for language —conveniently organized in purely extensional terms— as a complex of dispositions in verbal behavior. The second variety is present, according to this paper, in the Wittgensteinian problematic of following a rule. The author sustains that the basic weakness of the latter variety lies in its being based on a problematic theory —such as behaviorism; additionally, scientific semantic skepticism is open to the criticism that it cannot account of the normative aspect of linguistic practices.

A filosofia identifica duas teses banais sobre as coisas que todos parecemos sustentar: a de que percebemos coisas e a de que essas coisas percebidas existem realmente. Em seguida, a filosofia, ao interpretá-las de maneira rigorosa e ao julgar ver uma contradição entre elas, procurou melhorar esse esquema, substituindo a tese banal (já interpretada pela filosofia) da percepção imediata pela tese da percepção mediata das coisas, sem contudo lograr seu objetivo. Nova tentativa é feita pela filosofia ao substituir a outra tese banal (filosoficamente interpretada), a de que as coisas percebidas existem independentemente de nossa percepção, pela tese de que as coisas reais são dependentes de nós. Mas essa nova tentativa não nos leva muito mais longe do que a tentativa precedente. Em ambos os casos, o realismo degenera em alguma forma de idealismo. Finalmente. a filosofia tenta evitar os problemas presentes nessas várias teorias, ao criticar a tese de que só percebemos imediatamente o que se passa em nós. O resultado dessa discussão é uma versão mais robusta do realismo, que adota aquelas duas teses das quais a discussão partiu, tal como foram interpretadas pela filosofia. No último item, proponho minha visão geral sobre toda a discussão, em que as duas teses triviais são aceitas, sem nenhuma interpretação filosófica, sem justificação e mesmo sem dizer que elas são verdadeiras em qualquer sentido metafísico.

Bayle’s “sceptical method of antinomy” is of enduring historical interest, since so many figures of the period discussed it, including Hume, Kant, and Hegel. In the paper, I examine Bayle’s own definition of scepticism, and exhibit his scepticism at work in the writing of his Dictionary. The first part shows how the sceptical method is built into the very idea of a critique and Bayle’s philosophical reflections. Then, I turn to the application of the sceptical method in the Dictionnary. Finally, I compare Bayle’s use of this method and Sextus’ use, showing the novelties introduced by him.

Introduction, S. Charles, P. Smith.- What is Enlightenment Scepticism? A Critical Rereading of Richard Popkin, S. Charles.- Bayle and Pyrrhonism: Antinomy, Method, and History, P. Smith.- Fideism, Scepticism, or Free-Thought? The Dispute between Lamy and Saint-Laurens about Metaphysical Knowledge, S. Malinowski-Charles.- Leibniz's Anti-Scepticism, A. Pelletier.- The Protestant Critics of Bayle at the Dawn of the Enlightenment, A. Matytsin.- The 'Wise Pyrrhonism' of the Academie Royale des Sciences of Paris: Natural Light and Obscurity of Nature according to Fontenelle, L. Peterschmitt.- Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Moral Scepticisms, P. Kail.- A New Source for Hume's Treatise: Bayle and the First Half of the Section 'Of the immateriality of the Soul', G. Paganini.- Hume's Reply to Baylean Scepticism, T. Ryan.- How Can we Know if Scepticism is Right or Wrong? Hume and Reid's Epistemological Answers, C. Etchegaray.- Enfield's Brucker and Christian Anti-scepticism in Enlightenment Historiography of Philosophy, J.- C. Laursen.- Reasonable Scepticism in the French Enlightenment: some connections between Jean-Baptiste Boyer d'Argens, Louis de Beausobre and Voltaire, N. Correard.- Forms and Aims in Voltairean Scepticism, S. Pujol.- D'un scepticisme involontaire a un scepticisme existentiel. Un parcours philosophique dans l'oeuvre de Rousseau, M.-A. Nadeau.- An Uneasy Relationship: Atheism and Scepticism in the Late French Enlightenment, A. Kors.- From universal Pyrrhonism to Revolutionary Scepticism: Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville, S. Charles.- Kant's Criticism and the Legacy of Modern Scepticism, P. Smith.- Maimon, scepticisme et Lumieres, I. Radrizzani.- Scepticisme et dialectique des Lumieres chez le jeune Hegel, I. Testa.- Hegel on Scepticism and Irony, M. Biscuso.- Fichte et Schopenhauer face au scepticisme de Schulze, E. Brandao.- Building without a Foundation: On the Equating of Enlightenment with Scepticism in Post-Revolutionary French Thought, F. Brahami.- Scepticisme et Lumieres selon Lamennais, P. Knee.

This chapter proposes to distinguish the different forms of scepticism recognized by Kant: Baylean, Humean, and Cartesian scepticism. In order for his critical philosophy and indeed for the Enlightenment to stand, all three must be neutralized, if not refuted. Each of these three forms of scepticism is presented, in each case identifying its modern source and Kant’s elaboration of it. In all three cases, Kant distinguishes between the scepticism itself and the useful part of it that he integrates into his critical project. Thus, first Kant extracts “Hume’s problem” from Humean scepticism; then he isolates the sceptical method from Baylean scepticism; and finally, he distinguishes transcendental idealism from sceptical idealism. Subsequent German philosophy, including both post-Kantian scepticism and German idealism, would depend on his transcendental-idealist answer to these three modern forms of scepticism; his response to each would be made subject to detailed examination, as if the conflict between sceptics and anti-sceptics is destined never to end.

O artigo traça, em primeiro lugar, uma distinção entre dois tipos de ceticismo, o terapêutico, em que a cura do dogmatismo é a idéia motriz, e o fenomenista, cuja preocupação central é a descrição da vida comum. Em seguida, examinam-se as noções de terapia e de vida comum, na tentativa de depurar ou aperfeiçoar o ceticismo, chegando-se a conclusão de que a terapia cética mais coerente deve restringir-se ao próprio caso e de que a descrição da vida mais conforme à atitude cética confina-se à experiência pessoal. Por fim, formula-se uma posição cética, na qual predominam os aspectos terapêutico e autobiográfico.

El artículo discute la contribución de Guillermo Hurtado a la comprensión de ciertos conceptos fundamentales para la epistemología: la duda, la creencia y la sospecha. En primer lugar, discuto su metodología de analizar al lenguaje ordinario: por un lado, argumento que recurrir al lenguaje ordinario para establecer ciertas doctrinas filosóficas constituye una actitud dogmática, y, por otro, cuestiono si el lenguaje ordinario es lo suficientemente preciso para definir ciertos términos en una discusión filosófica. En segundo lugar, hago algunas sugerencias en la línea apuntada por él, la de trazar más distinciones que la epistemología tradicional. Examino, así, la idea de una duda razonable y las relaciones entre duda e investigación.