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Can judging an individual as being morally responsible for a negative act affect memory for details of the act? We presented participants with a story describing an individual (Frank) who committed a crime (he walked out on a restaurant bill). Some participants were told that the negative act was not intentional and that Frank was essentially a good person. Others were told that the negative act was intentional and that Frank actually enjoyed it. Control participants were given no extra information. All the participants then judged Frank's moral responsibility for walking out on the bill. When asked a week later to recall information about the event, the participants who had received negative information about Frank remembered that Frank had walked out on a larger restaurant bill than he actually had. Moreover, the degree of memory distortion was predicted by the degree of moral blame that had been attributed to Frank. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a randomized experiment, women (N = 441) watched either a loss- or gain-framed video emphasizing the prevention or detection functions of the Pap test to test the hypothesis that loss- and gain-framed messages differentially influence health behaviors depending on the risk involved in performing the behavior. As predicted, loss-framed messages emphasizing the costs of not detecting cervical cancer early (a risky behavior) and gain-framed messages emphasizing the benefits of preventing cervical cancer (a less risky behavior) were most persuasive in motivating women to obtain a Pap test. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In six studies, we examined two foundational questions about moral praise. First, what makes an action praiseworthy? In Study 1, participants reported that actions that exceed duties (compared with dutiful actions) deserve greater praise and are perceived as less likely to happen. Second, what do observers infer from praise? Praise may communicate information about local norms. In Study 2, we found that-in general-participants expect praise to increase the likelihood of a behavior. However, in Studies 3-6, participants inferred that moral behavior that receives praise is less common and is less required and expected of people. These inferences led individuals to judge that someone would be less likely to perform a behavior that was praised. These studies provide insight into the lay beliefs and communicative function of moral praise., Competing Interests: Declaration of Conflicting InterestsThe author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Across four studies, we test the hypothesis that people exhibit "slippery slope" thinking in their judgments of moral character-that is, do observers judge that a person who behaves immorally will become increasingly immoral over time? In Study 1, we find that a person who commits an immoral act is judged as more likely to behave immorally and as having a worse character in the future than in the past. In Study 2, we find that it is the commission of an immoral act specifically-rather than merely attempting an immoral act-that drives this slippery slope effect. In Study 3, we demonstrate that observers judge the moral agent as more likely to commit acts of greater severity further in time after the initial immoral act. In Study 4, we find that this effect is driven by an anticipated corrupting of moral character, related to perceptions of the agent's guilt., Competing Interests: Declaration of Conflicting InterestsThe author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

People often feel guilt for accidents-negative events that they did not intend or have any control over. Why might this be the case? Are there reputational benefits to doing so? Across six studies, we find support for the hypothesis that observers expect "false positive" emotions from agents during a moral encounter - emotions that are not normatively appropriate for the situation but still trigger in response to that situation. For example, if a person accidentally spills coffee on someone, most normative accounts of blame would hold that the person is not blameworthy, as the spill was accidental. Self-blame (and the guilt that accompanies it) would thus be an inappropriate response. However, in Studies 1-2 we find that observers rate an agent who feels guilt, compared to an agent who feels no guilt, as a better person, as less blameworthy for the accident, and as less likely to commit moral offenses. These attributions of moral character extend to other moral emotions like gratitude, but not to nonmoral emotions like fear, and are not driven by perceived differences in overall emotionality (Study 3). In Study 4, we demonstrate that agents who feel extremely high levels of inappropriate (false positive) guilt (e.g., agents who experience guilt but are not at all causally linked to the accident) are not perceived as having a better moral character, suggesting that merely feeling guilty is not sufficient to receive a boost in judgments of character. In Study 5, using a trust game design, we find that observers are more willing to trust others who experience false positive guilt compared to those who do not. In Study 6, we find that false positive experiences of guilt may actually be a reliable predictor of underlying moral character: self-reported predicted guilt in response to accidents negatively correlates with higher scores on a psychopathy scale., (Copyright © 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Previous research has shown that political attitudes are highly heritable, but the proximal physiological mechanisms that shape ideology remain largely unknown. Based on work suggesting possible ideological differences in genes related to low-level sensory processing, we predicted that taste (i.e., gustatory) sensitivity would be associated with political ideology. In 4 studies (combined N = 1,639) we test this hypothesis and find robust support for this association. In Studies 1-3, we find that sensitivity to the chemicals PROP and PTC-2 well established measures of taste sensitivity-are associated with greater political conservatism. In Study 4, we find that fungiform papilla density, a proxy for taste bud density, also predicts greater conservatism, and that this association is partially statistically mediated by disgust sensitivity. This work suggests that low-level physiological differences in sensory processing may shape an individual's political attitudes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

How do people judge whether someone deserves moral praise for their actions? In contrast to the large literature on moral blame, work on how people attribute praise has, until recently, been scarce. However, there is a growing body of recent work from a variety of subfields in psychology (including social, cognitive, developmental, and consumer) suggesting that moral praise is a fundamentally unique form of moral attribution and not simply the positive moral analogue of blame attributions. A functional perspective helps explain asymmetries in blame and praise: we propose that while blame is primarily for punishment and signaling one's moral character, praise is primarily for relationship building., (Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Most people have been both the victim and the perpetrator of a moral transgression at some point in their lives; this article asks whether one set of moral experiences is easier to remember than the other, and why. In Study 1, we documented this basic asymmetry, finding that individuals recalled more instances in which they were the victim of a moral transgression than instances in which they were the perpetrator. In Study 2, we found that this asymmetry in memory arises because experiences of being the victim are perceived more negatively than experiences of being the perpetrator. In Studies 3 and 4, we demonstrated the critical role of intent in this asymmetry, finding that victim memories emphasize perpetrator intent to a greater degree than do perpetrator memories (Study 3), and that the memory asymmetry disappeared when individuals recalled unintentional moral violations (Study 4). Finally, in Study 5, we ruled out a potential alternative mechanism for these effects-that of self-protective motivation on the part of perpetrators. We found that the threat associated with the moral violation moderated victim (but not perpetrator) memories, a finding that is inconsistent with a motivational account for perpetrator memories. This research demonstrates that perceived agency shapes emotional experience and autobiographical memory and speaks to the importance of studying morality as it occurs in everyday contexts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

We argue that Tomasello's account overlooks important psychological distinctions between how humans judge different types of moral obligations, such as prescriptive obligations (i.e., what one should do) and proscriptive obligations (i.e., what one should not do). Specifically, evaluating these different types of obligations rests on different psychological inputs and has distinct downstream consequences for judgments of moral character.

We explored in detail the ordered nanostructures and the ternary phase diagram of the polystyrene-polybutadiene-poly(tert-butyl methacrylate) (PS-PB-PtBMA) triblock copolymer via dissipative particle dynamics (DPD) simulations and coarse-grained models. The mesoscopic simulations show that the PS-PB-PtBMA copolymer in the bulk state can generate eight equilibrium phase regions with well-defined morphologies such as core-shell variations of spheres, cylinders, perforated layers, lamellar, gyroid, as well as cylinder-in-lamella, spheres-in-lamella, and cylinders in hexagonal lattice. The ordered phases exhibit high dependence on the chemical nature and volume fraction, thus portraying specific composition regions with high thermodynamic stability over a ternary phase diagram. The ternary phase diagram, including all equilibrium and metastable nanostructures detected, is described, and analysed in this work in detail. Finally, our dynamic simulation outcomes agree with experimental results. Our aim is to contribute to the understanding of the relationship between block volume fractions and bulk morphologies in ternary polymer systems.

We argue that existing data on folk-economic beliefs (FEBs) present challenges to Boyer & Petersen's model. Specifically, the widespread individual variation in endorsement of FEBs casts doubt on the claim that humans are evolutionarily predisposed towards particular economic beliefs. Additionally, the authors' model cannot account for the systematic covariance between certain FEBs, such as those observed in distinct political ideologies.

Moral judgments play a critical role in motivating and enforcing human cooperation, and research on the proximate mechanisms of moral judgments highlights the importance of intuitive, automatic processes in forming such judgments. Intuitive moral judgments often share characteristics with deontological theories in normative ethics, which argue that certain acts (such as killing) are absolutely wrong, regardless of their consequences. Why do moral intuitions typically follow deontological prescriptions, as opposed to those of other ethical theories? Here, we test a functional explanation for this phenomenon by investigating whether agents who express deontological moral judgments are more valued as social partners. Across 5 studies, we show that people who make characteristically deontological judgments are preferred as social partners, perceived as more moral and trustworthy, and are trusted more in economic games. These findings provide empirical support for a partner choice account of moral intuitions whereby typically deontological judgments confer an adaptive function by increasing a person's likelihood of being chosen as a cooperation partner. Therefore, deontological moral intuitions may represent an evolutionarily prescribed prior that was selected for through partner choice mechanisms. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).)

Both normative theories of ethics in philosophy and contemporary models of moral judgment in psychology have focused almost exclusively on the permissibility of acts, in particular whether acts should be judged on the basis of their material outcomes (consequentialist ethics) or on the basis of rules, duties, and obligations (deontological ethics). However, a longstanding third perspective on morality, virtue ethics, may offer a richer descriptive account of a wide range of lay moral judgments. Building on this ethical tradition, we offer a person-centered account of moral judgment, which focuses on individuals as the unit of analysis for moral evaluations rather than on acts. Because social perceivers are fundamentally motivated to acquire information about the moral character of others, features of an act that seem most informative of character often hold more weight than either the consequences of the act or whether a moral rule has been broken. This approach, we argue, can account for numerous empirical findings that are either not predicted by current theories of moral psychology or are simply categorized as biases or irrational quirks in the way individuals make moral judgments., (© The Author(s) 2014.)

Background: The emotion of disgust appears to promote psychological and behavioral avoidance, a dynamic that has significant implications in physical and psychological outcomes in colorectal cancer (CRC). Patients, caregivers, and health professionals alike are all potentially susceptible to responding with disgust and the associated avoidance., Objective: This article aimed to review the early-stage literature related to disgust and CRC, consider the clinical implications, and suggest an appropriate research agenda., Methods: Given limited research in this area, a systematic review of the literature was broadened to include disgust and all cancers. MEDLINE, Web of Science, SCOPUS, and ProQuest Dissertations and Theses databases were searched, with additional works sourced by reviewing citation lists and/or by contacting the lead authors., Results: Nine studies were identified relating to disgust and cancer screening, and 6 related to disgust and cancer treatment. Two broad findings emerged: (1) disgust appears to be promoting aversion to (and avoidance of) CRC screening, and (2) several known elicitors of disgust are widely apparent in CRC contexts., Conclusions: Disgust likely represents a key emotional substrate for avoidance among CRC patients, caregivers, and health professionals. Further research is required to identify disgust's elicitors and effects in CRC contexts, informing interventions that target early identification of persons at risk of maladaptive outcomes. Exposure therapies and mindfulness training may be well suited to treating disgust-generated avoidance., Implications for Practice: Disgust has significant implications in CRC contexts. Oncology nurses are uniquely positioned to guide clinical interventions and ultimately improve outcomes in this area.

Do people sometimes seek to atone for their transgressions by harming themselves physically? The current results suggest that they do. People who wrote about a past guilt-inducing event inflicted more intense electric shocks on themselves than did those who wrote about feeling sad or about a neutral event. Moreover, the stronger the shocks that guilty participants administered to themselves, the more their feelings of guilt were alleviated. We discuss how this method of atonement relates to other methods examined in previous research., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved.)

Three empirical studies document the intuitive spillover of moral taint from a person who engages in immoral acts to another individual who is related by ties of blood kinship. In Study 1, participants were more likely to recommend that the biological grandchild of a wrongdoer, compared to a non-biological grandchild, help the descendants of his grandfather's victims. In Study 2, participants were more willing to hold two long-lost identical twins in custody for a crime committed by one twin than to hold two perfect look-alikes for a crime committed by one look-alike. Study 3 provides direct evidence that spillover effects based on blood kinship are manifested in an intuitive sense of moral taint., (Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

An induction of disgust can lead to more negative attitudes toward an entire social group: Participants who were exposed to a noxious ambient odor reported less warmth toward gay men. This effect of disgust was equally strong for political liberals and conservatives, and was specific to attitudes toward gay men-there was only a weak effect of disgust on people's warmth toward lesbians, and no consistent effect on attitudes toward African Americans, the elderly, or a range of political issues., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Dominant theories of moral blame require an individual to have caused or intended harm. However, the current four studies demonstrate cases where no harm is caused or intended, yet individuals are nonetheless deemed worthy of blame. Specifically, individuals are judged to be blameworthy when they engage in actions that enable them to benefit from another's misfortune (e.g., betting that a company's stock will decline or that a natural disaster will occur). Evidence is presented suggesting that perceptions of the actor's wicked desires are responsible for this phenomenon. It is argued that these results are consistent with a growing literature demonstrating that moral judgments are often the product of evaluations of character in addition to evaluations of acts.

Researchers have recently argued that utilitarianism is the appropriate framework by which to evaluate moral judgment, and that individuals who endorse non-utilitarian solutions to moral dilemmas (involving active vs. passive harm) are committing an error. We report a study in which participants responded to a battery of personality assessments and a set of dilemmas that pit utilitarian and non-utilitarian options against each other. Participants who indicated greater endorsement of utilitarian solutions had higher scores on measures of Psychopathy, machiavellianism, and life meaninglessness. These results question the widely-used methods by which lay moral judgments are evaluated, as these approaches lead to the counterintuitive conclusion that those individuals who are least prone to moral errors also possess a set of psychological characteristics that many would consider prototypically immoral., (Copyright © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Many moral codes place a special emphasis on bodily purity, and manipulations that directly target bodily purity have been shown to influence a variety of moral judgments. Across two studies, we demonstrated that reminders of physical purity influence specific moral judgments regarding behaviors in the sexual domain as well as broad political attitudes. In Study 1, individuals in a public setting who were given a reminder of physical cleansing reported being more politically conservative than did individuals who were not given such a reminder. In Study 2, individuals reminded of physical cleansing in the laboratory demonstrated harsher moral judgments toward violations of sexual purity and were more likely to report being politically conservative than control participants. Together, these experiments provide further evidence of a deep link between physical purity and moral judgment, and they offer preliminary evidence that manipulations of physical purity can influence general (and putatively stable) political attitudes.

Two studies demonstrate that a dispositional proneness to disgust ("disgust sensitivity") is associated with intuitive disapproval of gay people. Study 1 was based on previous research showing that people are more likely to describe a behavior as intentional when they see it as morally wrong (see Knobe, 2006, for a review). As predicted, the more disgust sensitive participants were, the more likely they were to describe an agent whose behavior had the side effect of causing gay men to kiss in public as having intentionally encouraged gay men to kiss publicly-even though most participants did not explicitly think it wrong to encourage gay men to kiss in public. No such effect occurred when subjects were asked about heterosexual kissing. Study 2 used the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2006) as a dependent measure. The more disgust sensitive participants were, the more they showed unfavorable automatic associations with gay people as opposed to heterosexuals. Two studies demonstrate that a dispositional proneness to disgust ("disgust sensitivity") is associated with intuitive disapproval of gay people. Study 1 was based on previous research showing that people are more likely to describe a behavior as intentional when they see it as morally wrong (see Knobe, 2006, for a review). As predicted, the more disgust sensitive participants were, the more likely they were to describe an agent whose behavior had the side effect of causing gay men to kiss in public as having intentionally encouraged gay men to kiss publicly-even though most participants did not explicitly think it wrong to encourage gay men to kiss in public. No such effect occurred when subjects were asked about heterosexual kissing. Study 2 used the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2006) as a dependent measure. The more disgust sensitive participants were, the more they showed unfavorable automatic associations with gay people as opposed to heterosexuals.

The success of criminal acts can sometimes depend critically on the oversight or negligence of uninvolved bystanders (e.g., someone leaving a first-floor window open). Four studies examined how the contribution of a negligent bystander affects blame for the perpetrator of a crime. Although participants stated that discounting blame for the perpetrator was normatively inappropriate in this context, they expected that others would make this very "error." Instead, across all four studies, bystander negligence amplified ascriptions of perpetrator blame. This amplification occurred because the bad action of the bystander provided an implicit standard of comparison for the perpetrator's act, framing it as more blameworthy. A variety of alternative mechanisms--that bystander negligence altered perceived crime avoidability, prompted spontaneous counterfactualizing, or increased victim empathy--were tested and ruled out. Implications for legal contexts are discussed.

Children regulate negative emotions in a variety of ways. Emotion education programs typically discourage emotional disengagement and encourage emotional engagement or "working through" negative emotions. The authors examined the effects of emotional disengagement and engagement on children's memory for educational material. Children averaging 7 or 10 years of age (N=200) watched either a sad or an emotionally neutral film and were then instructed to emotionally disengage, instructed to engage in problem solving concerning their emotion, or received no emotion regulation instructions. All children then watched and were asked to recall the details of an emotionally neutral educational film. Children instructed to disengage remembered the educational film better than children instructed to work through their feelings or children who received no emotion regulation instructions. Although past research has indicated that specific forms of emotional disengagement can impair memory for emotionally relevant events, the current findings suggest that disengagement is a useful short-term strategy for regulating mild negative emotion in educational settings.

The social intuitionist model (J. Haidt, 2001) posits that fast and automatic intuitions are the primary source of moral judgments. Conscious deliberations play little causal role; they are used mostly to construct post hoc justifications for judgments that have already occurred. In this article, the authors present evidence that fast and automatic moral intuitions are actually shaped and informed by prior reasoning. More generally, there is considerable evidence from outside the laboratory that people actively engage in reasoning when faced with real-world moral dilemmas. Together, these facts limit the strong claims of the social intuitionist model concerning the irrelevance of conscious deliberation.