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Private plaintiffs alleging that defendants conspired to fix prices in violation of antitrust law must usually prove their claims through circumstantial evidence, generally in the form of "plus factors"--evidence indicating that the defendants' parallel conduct was caused by collusion, not by independent decision-making. Supreme Court precedent requires fact finders to examine antitrust plaintiffs' evidence holistically. With increasing frequency, however, federal courts in price-fixing cases improperly isolate each piece of circumstantial evidence presented by the plaintiff and then deprive it of all probative value because that single piece of evidence is insufficient, standing alone, to prove a price-fixing conspiracy. As a result, federal courts routinely grant summary judgment to price-fixing defendants even when plaintiffs have proffered more than enough evidence to prove their case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the inconsistencies in the Supreme Court case R (Gallaher Group Ltd) v Competition and Markets Authority [2018] related to a dispute over price-fixing in the tobacco market. It highlights the consideration of the investigation by Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) instead of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) by judicial reviewers Lord Carnwath and Lord Sumption.

Recently, Uber driver (and former Uber CEO) Travis Kalanick has been sued under antitrust laws. The plaintiffs argue that Mr. Kalanick and the other Uber drivers have engaged in a price fixing arrangement that violates §1 of the Sherman Act. The case, Meyer v. Uber (originally Meyer v. Kalanick), is still being litigated. This Comment will analyze each side's potential arguments and will ultimately conclude that the court should find Uber drivers not guilty of a Sherman Act violation. This determination will be based on: the merits of the various arguments, how such a holding would fit within the history of antitrust law, and how it would set effective precedent for the future. Additionally, this Comment argues that Uber's place in the sharing economy distinguishes it from previous antitrust violators the plaintiffs will likely analogize it to. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although price-fixing agreements remain per se illegal in the United States, courts have undermined the per se rule against price fixing by making it harder for plaintiffs to prove that such an agreement exists. For example, most courts that have considered the issue have held that defendants' price-fixing conduct in a foreign market is not probative of price fixing in the United States. This Article examines the relationship between foreign and domestic price-fixing activity and shows how expanding a price-fixing cartel from foreign markets into the United States benefits the cartel by reducing the risk of arbitrage, stabilizing the cartel, and concealing the conspiracy from global antitrust authorities. The Article then takes the insights from the empirical and theoretical cartel literature and applies them to antitrust doctrine in order to demonstrate why defendants' overseas price-fixing arrangements are relevant to proving the existence of an agreement in litigation claiming that the same defendants fixed prices in the American market. Finally, the Article encourages courts to better understand how international price-fixing cartels operate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. system has relied heavily on antitrust class actions as a means of ensuring compensation and deterrence. Although this tool seems sensible in theory, the reality is that it remains highly controversial. On the one hand, commentators argue that class actions force defendants to settle cases lacking merit. Even if a settlement agreement is assumed to have a merit, class actions are accused of doing a poor job in compensating victims and deterring wrongdoers. On the other hand, the proponents of class actions claim that there is no reliable empirical evidence proving that class action schemes caused negative effects on antitrust litigation. The public debate about the effectiveness of class actions illustrate the controversial nature of American class actions fairly well. Therefore, using comparative insights from the predominant controversies, this study will determine how well antitrust class actions fulfill compensation objectives and to what extent they can facilitate deterrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ever since the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Matsushita, various U.S. district courts have issued a series of rulings that appear to constitute a new learning on the economics of collusive behavior and to elevate the economic evidentiary bar for successful proof of price-fixing and bid-rigging. The rulings use game theory constructs expressed as pure, interdependent behavior that theoretically can result in supracompetitive prices in the absence of any agreement. The most recent explanation of this learning is contained in the 2016 titanium dioxide (TiO2) opinion Valspar v. E. I. DuPont, which raises the bar for proving a Sherman Act Sec. 1 violation. This and earlier rulings appear counterintuitive when their reasoning is tested against the context of Judge Richard Posner's opinion on the value of circumstantial evidence in High Fructose Corn Syrup and In re Text Messaging. This article identifies market structure and behavioral features typically found in cartel arrangements, and tests the efficacy of what is perceived as a new learning on collusion/competition with empirical data from twelve alleged price-fixing conspiracies successfully litigated over the past two decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a court case on the lawfulness of a fixed-price system for the sale by pharmacies of prescription-only medicinal products for human use and whether such system is conformity with European Union (EU) laws. Topics covered include the facts of the case, the interpretation by the European Court of Justice of Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and the argument on the benefit of price competition of prescription-only medicinal products.

The article focuses on the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals in the United States v. Apple on the per se liable for price-fixing related to deals it negotiated with book publishers leading up to the launch of its iBooks platform. It mentions that per se rule with the rule of reason normally applied to vertical contracts of the electronic commerce company Amazon and the publishing industry.

The article focuses on the issues related to the criminal trials of the public companies of the U.S. and their refusal for the settlements. Topics discussed include the natural gas pipeline exploded of Pacific Gas and Electric Co. for which the company was charged for alleged violation of Pipeline Safety Act, FedEx Corp. was charged for violating a number of drug-related laws and the U.S. Supreme Court case Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. related to price-fixing.

The article discusses the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's ruling in the 2014 case United States v. Hui Hsiung which deals with America's Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA), U.S. jurisdictional issues, and the scope of the nation's Sherman Antitrust Act in relation to import trade. An international price fixing conspiracy between several foreign manufacturers is examined, along with the AU Optronics Corporation of America (AUOA) firm.

The article discusses the status of America's antitrust laws and patent system as of May 2015, and it mentions the nation's Sherman Act, as well as the legal aspects of competition and innovation in the U.S. Judicial deference and the U.S. Supreme Court are addressed, along with America's 1914 Clayton Antitrust Act and several legal cases. Judicial hostility towards patents is examined, as well as judge-made rules regarding patent litigation. Price fixing-related lawsuits are assessed.

The article offers information on the judicial decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in the case of United States v. Apple Inc., in which the Court addressed the charges price-fixing conspiracy for electronic books against the computer giant Apple violating the Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Topics discussed include the significance of the most favored nation clause (MFN), prohibition of unreasonable restraints of trade and the rule of reason.

The article focuses on enforcement of antitrust policy for protection of consumer welfare within the framework of technological innovation in the U.S. It discusses the U.S district court's ruling in price-fixing case United States v. Apple Inc., in which Apple conspired to raise the price of e-books in violation of the Sherman Act, and the pricing strategy of American international electronic commerce company Amazon before American multinational corporation Apple entered the market.

In prosecuting a price-fixing agreement among airlines – one of several such cases around the world – the New Zealand Commerce Commission faced a jurisdictional challenge as to whether there is a market for inbound air cargo services 'in New Zealand'. At a time when competition authorities increasingly skip market definition and assess competitive effects directly (especially in merger inquiries), this case turned almost entirely on the delineation of the relevant market. It revisited some of the first principles of market definition – including the product and geographic dimensions of the market where transport services are concerned, supply-side substitution, and the role of derived demand – and highlighted shortcomings in existing guidelines in the USA and elsewhere. Five economic experts took part in a 'hot tub' process in the High Court of New Zealand. Setting some useful criteria for defining markets in the context of derived demand from downstream customers, the court ruled in favour of the Commission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]