22 results on '"Ontological Parsimony"'
Search Results
2. Groups as fictional agents.
- Author
-
Moen, Lars J. K.
- Abstract
Can groups really be agents or is group agency just a fiction? Christian List and Philip Pettit argue influentially for group-agent realism by showing how certain groups form and act on attitudes in ways they take to be unexplainable at the level of the individual agents constituting them. Group agency is therefore considered not a fiction or a metaphor but a reality we must account for in explanations of certain social phenomena. In this paper, I challenge this defence of group-agent realism by showing how it is undermined by individual-level analysis of how individuals interact within groups. While group agency can be a useful fiction, real agents are at the individual level, not the collective level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
3. Paraphrasability and the Causal Status of Types.
- Subjects
PHOTOGRAPHS ,PARAPHRASE ,SEMANTICS ,ONTOLOGY ,PHILOSOPHY - Abstract
Some are attracted to the view that repeatable artworks, such as films, novels, plays, symphonies, photographs, and the like, are a particular kind of abstracta – namely, types. This view, however, is not unproblematic. One of the most serious problems it faces is the so‐called "creation problem." The core idea behind this problem is that, on the one hand, it seems reasonable to accept the claims that (1) repeatable artworks are types, (2) types cannot be created, and (3) repeatable artworks are created, but, on the other hand, these claims form an inconsistent triad. A popular solution to the creation problem is that (2) can be rejected because the justification for (2) is based on a false assumption – that no type can stand in causal relations. Although this solution looks promising, it can be accepted only if its proponent can refute what might be called the "paraphrasability argument." On this argument, types are not to be regarded as capable of standing in causal relations because any discourse implying the causality of types should be paraphrased into discourse that does not imply this. My aim in this essay is to show that there is good reason to consider the paraphrasability argument sound and, hence, that the foregoing solution to the creation problem fails. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
4. Proportionality, Abstract Causation, and the Exclusion Problem.
- Author
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Aliyev, Alexey
- Subjects
- *
CAUSATION (Philosophy) , *ABSTRACT art , *POPULARITY , *MATERIALISM , *ONTOLOGY - Abstract
A considerable number of philosophers are attracted to what might be called 'causal type-abstractionism' – the view that photographs, symphonies, models of cars, novels, flags, and other multiply instantiable entities that are, or at least seem to be, artifacts are a particular kind of abstracta, namely causally efficacious types. Despite its popularity, however, causal type-abstractionism faces a problem: Given some plausible assumptions, it commits us to a seemingly unpalatable consequence – that there is widespread type-causal overdetermination, or, in other words, a multitude of situations where one and the same effect has two or more distinct independently sufficient causes, at least one of which involves type causation. Recently, a powerful solution to this problem has been offered by Tim Juvshik. Drawing upon the literature on mental causation, he argues that the foregoing consequence could be avoided without abandoning causal type-abstractionism – if we adopt a particular treatment of causes based on Stephen Yablo's principle of proportionality. My primary goal in this essay is to show that the given solution fails. Additionally, I aim to sketch a solution that, I think, provides a promising type-abstractionist way to resolve the problem being discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
5. There is no reason to replace the Razor with the Laser.
- Author
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Thunder, Simon
- Subjects
RAZORS ,LASERS - Abstract
In recent times it has become common to encounter philosophers who recommend the replacement of one principle concerning theory choice, Ockham's Razor, with another: the Laser. Whilst the Razor tells us not to multiply entities beyond necessity, the Laser tells us only to avoid multiplying fundamental entities beyond necessity. There appear to be seven arguments in the literature for the Laser. They divide into three categories: arguments from the nature of non-fundamentality attempt to motivate the Laser by appeal to various observations about what it is to be non-fundamental; arguments from cases describe hypothetical or actual cases, and allege that only the Laser accords with our intuitive judgements about them; and arguments from analogy claim that ontological parsimony is analogous to conceptual economy, and that this analogy recommends the Laser. I provide novel responses to each of the extant arguments for the Laser, and conclude that there is currently no good reason for replacing the Razor with the Laser. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
6. The Metaphysics of Habits in Buridan
- Author
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Klima, Gyula, Klima, Gyula, Editor-in-Chief, Faucher, Nicolas, editor, and Roques, Magali, editor
- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
7. A Common Sense Defence of Ostrich Nominalism.
- Author
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Guillon, Jean-Baptiste
- Subjects
NOMINALISM ,REALISM ,PHILOSOPHY ,METHODOLOGY ,ECONOMIC activity - Abstract
When the meta-philosophies of Nominalism and Realism are compared, it is often said that Nominalism is motivated by a methodology of ontological economy, while Realism would be motivated by an appeal to Common Sense. In this paper, I argue that this association is misguided. After briefly comparing the meta-philosophy of Common Sense and the meta-philosophy of economy, I show that the core motivation in favour of Realism relies in fact in a principle of economy which violates the methodology of Common Sense. I conclude that Common Sense philosophers should endorse Nominalism (and more precisely Ostrich Nominalism). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
8. 'Intrinsic Time' and the Minimal Self: Reflections on the Methodological and Metaphysical Significance of Temporal Experience
- Author
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Reynolds, Jack, Reynolds, Jack, editor, and Sebold, Richard, editor
- Published
- 2016
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
9. The Spirit of Nature
- Author
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Reid, Jasper and Reid, Jasper
- Published
- 2012
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
10. On Quantitative and Qualitative Parsimony.
- Author
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Sendłak, Maciej
- Subjects
- *
PARSIMONIOUS models , *QUANTITATIVE research , *QUALITATIVE research , *METAPHYSICS - Abstract
The distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony is supposed to allow David Lewis to dismiss one of the charges against his modal realism: that is, the charge of bloated ontology. The aim of this paper is to undermine Lewis's response to this objection. In order to do this, a distinction between multipliable and nonmultipliable objects is introduced. Based on this it is argued that the acceptance of Lewis's response requires one to believe in modal realism in the first place-that is, one has to believe in the view that the existence of nonactual spatiotemporal worlds does not affect the quality of the ontological commitment. Although the paper focuses on the problem of the metaphysics of possible worlds, this should be regarded merely as a case study. Accordingly, the results of this analysis should find applications in other metaphysical debates as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
11. Contingentism about Individuals and Higher-Order Necessitism
- Author
-
Manuel Pérez Otero
- Subjects
Williamson ,ontological parsimony ,pre-theoretical intuitions ,Barcan Formula ,simplicity ,possible worlds semantics ,modal logic ,contingentism ,necessitism ,Philosophy (General) ,B1-5802 - Abstract
Necessitism about individuals claims that necessarily every individual necessarily exists. An analogous necessitist thesis attributes necessary existence to properties and relations. Both theses have been defended by Williamson. Furthermore, Williamson specifically argues against the hybrid conjunction of first-order contingentism (the negation of necessitism about individuals) and higher-order necessitism; a combination that would bring about additional drawbacks. I work out a defence of the hybrid combination, including some replies to Williamson’s additional objections. Considerations of ontological parsimony and pre-theoretical intuitions favour the hybrid view over necessitism at all orders (which Williamson mainly defends by invoking considerations of simplicity).
- Published
- 2013
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
12. The Ontological Status of Representations
- Author
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Scheutz, Matthias, Riegler, Alexander, editor, Peschl, Markus, editor, and von Stein, Astrid, editor
- Published
- 1999
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
13. The Place of Relations in Hieronymus Pardo's Semantics of Propositions.
- Author
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Pérez-Ilzarbe, Paloma
- Subjects
- *
RELATION (Philosophy) , *SEMANTICS , *LANGUAGE & languages - Abstract
I examine a sixteenth-century development of the anti-realist propositional semantics which is based on the notion of ‘mode’. Pardo uses this notion to offer a personal interpretation of the Buridanian criticism ofcomplexe significabilia. He develops a middle way between the reduction of the significate of propositions to particular things and the postulation of non-standard entities which are only complexly signifiable. The key to this middle way is Pardo's understanding of the notion of ‘mode’ as connoting a relation between individual things. He offers a new interpretation of the signification of syncategorematic terms, and a definition of ‘comparative’ notions, by which something is known ‘relatively’ with respect to some other thing. And a real relational correlate is postulated for these relational ways of knowing. Relations are thus used to grant a specific significate of propositions, without renouncing the strict Buridanian rejection of any extra-categorialcomplexe significabilia. The role of relations in Pardo's propositional semantics consists in allowing a new (intensional) understanding of the significate of propositions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]
- Published
- 2016
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
14. Determinable Properties and Overdetermination of Causal Powers.
- Author
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Christensen, Jonas
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS ,QUALITY (Philosophy) ,PHILOSOPHICAL research - Abstract
Do determinable properties such as colour, mass, and height exist in addition to their corresponding determinates , being red, having a mass of 1 kilogram, and having a height of 2 metres? Optimists say yes, pessimists say no. Among the latter are Carl Gillett and Bradley Rives who argue that optimism leads to systematic overdetermination of causal powers and hence should be rejected on the grounds that the position is ontologically unparsimonious. In this paper I defend optimism against this charge by showing that overdetermination of causal powers cannot plausibly be avoided when grounding what I call joint powers. It is therefore not clear why the optimist should be worried about the overdetermination of causal powers that follows from positing determinable properties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2014
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
15. Contingentism about Individuals and Higher-Order Necessitism.
- Author
-
PÉREZ OTERO, Manuel
- Subjects
- *
PARSIMONIOUS models , *SEMANTICS , *MODAL logic , *INTUITION - Abstract
Necessitism about individuals claims that necessarily every individual necessarily exists. An analogous necessitist thesis attributes necessary existence to properties and relations. Both theses have been defended by Williamson. Furthermore, Williamson specifically argues against the hybrid conjunction of first-order contingentism (the negation of necessitism about individuals) and higher-order necessitism; a combination that would bring about additional drawbacks. I work out a defence of the hybrid combination, including some replies to Williamson's additional objections. Considerations of ontological parsimony and pretheoretical intuitions favour the hybrid view over necessitism at all orders (which Williamson mainly defends by invoking considerations of simplicity). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2013
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
16. Is If-then-ism Still an Option?
- Author
-
Arko, Matija
- Abstract
Copyright of Synthesis Philosophica is the property of Croatian Philosophical Society and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)
- Published
- 2006
17. A Common Sense Defence of Ostrich Nominalism
- Author
-
Guillon, J.B. (Jean-Baptiste)
- Subjects
- Ostrich nominalism, Common sense, Universals, Ockham’s razor, Ontological parsimony, Grounding
- Abstract
When the meta-philosophies of Nominalism and Realism are compared, it is often said that Nominalism is motivated by a methodology of ontological economy, while Realism would be motivated by an appeal to Common Sense. In this paper, I argue that this association is misguided. After briefly comparing the meta-philosophy of Common Sense and the meta-philosophy of economy, I show that the core motivation in favour of Realism relies in fact in a principle of economy which violates the methodology of Common Sense. I conclude that Common Sense philosophers should endorse Nominalism (and more precisely Ostrich Nominalism).
- Published
- 2021
18. Složenost jednostavnosti
- Author
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Restović, Ivan
- Subjects
Occamova britva, jednostavnost, složenost, ontološka jednostavnost, sintaktička jednostavnost, štedljivost ,Occamova britva ,jednostavnost ,složenost ,ontološka jednostavnost ,sintaktička jednostavnost ,štedljivost ,Occam’s razor ,sintactical parsimony ,simplicity ,parsimony ,ontological parsimony - Abstract
Članak se bavi analizom i implikacijama načela koje ima široku primjenu u svim filozofijskim disciplinama. Riječ je o Occamovoj britvi. Nastoji se ilustrirati da je spomenuto načelo samo jedna od dvije vrste jednostavnosti među kojima postoji svojevrsna asimetrija. Druga vrsta jednostavnosti često se naziva elegancija. Dvije vrste jednostavnosti propituju se s obzirom na njihovu upotrebu pri izgradnji teorije, te upotrebu svake od njih kao arbitra pri izboru „bolje“ teorije. Cilj je ovog rada, u maniri većine filozofskih djela, prije otvoriti neka zanimljiva pitanja, negoli ponuditi „konačne“ odgovore., This article concerns a principle which is widespread in all philosophical disciplines – Occam’s razor. It displays implications and overal analysis of principle in question. Undergoing detailed reasoning, it becomes clear that Occam’s razor is just one of the two types of simplicity, the other being elegance. Intention is to explore the limits of two types of simplicity being used, on one hand, to create a theory or, on the other hand, to evaluate which of the competing theories is “better one”. In anything but seldom philosophical manner, this article raises more questions than it answers.
- Published
- 2012
19. Is If-then-ism Still an Option?
- Author
-
Matija Arko
- Subjects
ComputerSystemsOrganization_COMPUTER-COMMUNICATIONNETWORKS ,if-then-ism ,ontological parsimony ,naturalism ,philosophy of mathematics ,Wenn-Dann-Ismus ,ontologische Sparsamkeit ,Naturalismus ,Philosophie der Mathematik ,si-alors-sinon ,parcimonie ontologique ,naturalisme ,philosophie des mathématiques - Abstract
In this paper I am going to try to prove that if-then-ism is not an option. I will focus on if-then-ism as a strategy to reduce ontological commitments in mathematics. I will start with the definition of if-then-ism in The Principles of Mathematics. Then I am going to discuss the Putnam’s criticism of if-then-ism. Next I will move on to some arguments of Cian Dorr that support it. In the end, I will talk about ontological parsimony as the general motivation for adopting the if-then-ism. I will discuss ontological parsimony in connection with naturalism and argue that demand for ontological parsimony does not follow from naturalism., Je parlerai dans cet article du si-alors-sinon comme d’une stratégie de nos obligations ontologiques dans les mathématiques. Je commencerai par la définition du si-alors-sinon dans les Principia mathematica. Ensuite, je discuterai la critique du si-alors-sinon par Putnam. Suivront certains arguments de Ciana Dorra qui l’appuient. Finalement, il sera question de la « parcimonie » ontologique en tant que motif d’adoption du si-alors-sinon. Je traiterai de la parcimonie ontologique en liaison avec le naturalisme en essayant de démontrer que la parcimonie ontologique n’est pas une exigence découlant du naturalisme., Im Folgenden werde ich über den Wenn-Dann-Ismus als Strategie zur Verringerung unserer ontologischen Verpflichtungen in der Mathematik sprechen. Ich beginne mit der Definition des Wenn-Dann-Ismus in Principles of Matemathics. Danach setze ich mich mit Puntnams Kritik des Wenn-Dann-Ismus auseinander. Es folgen einige Argumente von Cian Dorr, die diese Kritik unterstützen. Zuletzt soll von der ontologischen Sparsamkeit als allgemeinem Motiv für die Aneignung des Wenn-Dann-Ismus die Rede sein. Ich werde von der ontologischen Sparsamkeit („parsimony”) in Zusammenhang mit dem Naturalismus sprechen und zugunsten der These argumentieren, dass die Bevorzugung der ontologischen Sparsamkeit nicht aus dem Naturalismus hervorgeht.
- Published
- 2006
20. Reconstructing pacifism
- Author
-
Müller, Olaf L. and Meggle, Georg
- Subjects
Wert ,Kosovo ,Immanuel KANT ,Humanitäre Intervention ,Ontologische Sparsamkeit ,Fakt/Werte-Dichotomie ,900 Geschichte ,Ontological Parsimony ,Regulative Idea ,Frieden ,Dicke ethische Begriffe ,Utilitarismus ,Peace ,Pazifismus ,Fact ,100 Philosophie ,Regulative Ideen ,Hilary PUTNAM ,Utilitarianism ,Science/Ethics Distinction ,Entanglement of Fact and Value ,Dichte ethische Begriffe ,Pacifism ,Humanitarian Intervention ,Valueladeness of Fact ,Tatsache ,Konsequentialismus ,940 Geschichte Europas ,Gerechter Krieg ,ddc:100 ,ddc:320 ,Consequentialism ,ddc:940 ,War ,Counterfactual ,Regulative Principle ,320 Politik ,ddc:900 ,Thick Ethical Concepts ,Krieg ,Value - Abstract
Pazifisten und deren Gegner streiten sich meist nicht bloss über moralische, sondern auch über faktisch-deskriptive Fragen. Z.B. sind beide Seiten bei der Kosovo-Krise (1998/9) zu völlig entgegengesetzten Beschreibungen gekommen. Kein Wunder, denn der Pazifist betrachtet die Fakten legitimerweise im Lichte seines Systems von Werten. Seine Gegnerin betrachtet die Fakten im Lichte eines alternativen Wertsystems, und der Streit, der sich angeblich auf wertfrei deskriptivem Boden bewegt, kommt zu keinem Ende, weil es keine objektiven Tatsachen aus dem betreffenden Krieg gibt, die den Streit eindeutig entscheiden könnten. Die wertbeladene Weltsicht des Pazifisten lässt sich als Befolgung dreier epistemischer Imperative verstehen: 1) Zur Natur des Menschen: Wehre Dich gegen Dämonisierungen der Gegenseite; versuche immer, den Fall aus der Sicht der Gegenseite zu verstehen. 2) Zu friedfertigen Alternativen: Suche immer nach friedfertigen Alternativen zum geplanten Militäreinsatz. 3) Zur unkontrollierbaren Eskalation: Schärfe deinen Blick für unkontrollierbare, irreversible Nebenfolgen des militärischen Einsatzes, und achte besonders auf die Gefahr, dass ein weiterer Weltkrieg ausbrechen könnte. Nicht die objektive Realität entscheidet darüber, wie weit man bei der Befolgung dieser Imperative gehen sollte. Die Entscheidung hängt vielmehr von uns selbst ab – so ähnlich wie im Fall einer Naturwissenschaftlerin, die sich dafür entscheidet, hinter dem Chaos des Mannigfaltigen noch nach einer gemeinsamen Tiefenstruktur zu suchen. Diese Parallele hat eine überraschende Konsequenz. Die epistemischen Imperative des Pazifisten können mit Kants regulativen Prinzipien verglichen werden, die laut Kant notwendig sind, um unseren naturwissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen eine Orientierung zu geben. Und so verdienen die Pazifisten einen Vorwurf ganz sicher nicht: den Vorwurf, auf irrationale Weise blind zu sein für die harten Wirklichkeit. Pacifists and their opponents disagree not only about moral questions, but most often about factual questions as well. For example, they came to divergent descriptions of the crisis in Kosovo. According to my reconstruction of pacifism, this is not a surprise because the pacifist, legitimately, looks at the facts in the light of her system of value. Her opponent, in turn, looks at the facts in the light of alternative systems of value, and the quarrel between the two parties about supposedly descriptive matters does not come to an end as there is no objective reality about the war in question that could settle the issue. If I am right, the pacifist's value-laden way of looking at reality can be reconstructed as an obedience to three epistemic imperatives. First, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Human Nature ("Resist against demonizing the other side; always try to understand the case from their point of view"). Second, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Non-Violent Alternatives ("Always search for non-violent alternatives to projected military action"). Third, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Uncontrolled Escalation ("Sharpen your attention for uncontrolled, irreversible side effects of military action, particularly for the danger of escalation to another world war"). Objective reality does not decide how far one should go in following these imperatives. Rather, the decision about this is our's—similarly as in case of the scientist who decides to search for common deep structure behind the chaos of the manifold. So the pacifist's epistemic imperatives can be compared to Kant's regulative principles that are necessary for guiding the scientific scrutiny of reality. Not Reviewed
- Published
- 2004
21. Pazifismus mit offenen Augen
- Author
-
Strub, Jean-Daniel, Grotefeld, Stefan, Müller, Olaf L., Strub, Jean-Daniel, Grotefeld, Stefan, and Müller, Olaf L.
- Abstract
Pazifisten und deren Gegner streiten sich meist nicht bloß über moralische, sondern auch über faktisch-deskriptive Fragen. Zum Beispiel sind beide Seiten bei der Kosovo-Krise (1998/9) zu völlig entgegengesetzten Beschreibungen gekommen. Laut meiner Rekonstruktion des Pazifismus ist das keine Überraschung, weil der Pazifist die Fakten legitimerweise im Lichte seines Systems von Werten betrachtet. Seine Gegnerin betrachtet die Fakten im Lichte eines alternativen Wertsystems, und der Streit zwischen den beiden Parteien, der sich angeblich auf wertfrei deskriptivem Boden bewegt, hört nie auf, weil es keine objektiven Tatsachen aus dem betreffenden Krieg gibt, die den Streit für die eine oder andere Seite eindeutig entscheiden könnten. Die wertbeladene Weltsicht des Pazifisten lässt sich als eine Befolgung dreier epistemischer Imperative verstehen: (1) Imperativ zur Natur des Menschen: "Wehre Dich gegen Dämonisierungen der Gegenseite; versuche immer, den Fall aus der Sicht der Gegenseite zu verstehen". (2) Imperativ zugunsten friedfertiger Alternativen: "Suche immer nach friedfertigen Alternativen zum geplanten Militäreinsatz". (3) Imperativ bezüglich unkontrollierbarer Eskalation: "Schärfe deinen Blick für unkontrollierbare, irreversible Nebenfolgen des militärischen Einsatzes, und achte besonders auf die Gefahr, dass ein weiterer Weltkrieg ausbrechen könnte". Nicht die objektive Realität entscheidet darüber, wie weit man bei der Befolgung dieser Imperative gehen sollte. Die epistemischen Imperative des Pazifisten können mit Kants regulativen Prinzipien verglichen werden, die laut Kant notwendig sind, um unseren naturwissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen eine Orientierung zu geben. Und wenn sich also die Erkenntnismethode des Pazifisten in entscheidender Hinsicht nicht von der naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnismethode unterscheidet, dann verdienen die Pazifisten einen Vorwurf ganz sicher nicht: den Vorwurf, auf irrationale Weise blind zu sein für die harten Wirklichkeiten., Pacifists and their opponents disagree not only about moral questions, but most often about factual questions as well. For example, they came to divergent descriptions of the crisis in Kosovo. According to my reconstruction of pacifism, this is not a surprise because the pacifist, legitimately, looks at the facts in the light of her system of value. Her opponent, in turn, looks at the facts in the light of alternative systems of value, and the quarrel between the two parties about supposedly descriptive matters does not come to an end as there is no objective reality about the war in question that could settle the issue. If I am right, the pacifist's value-laden way of looking at reality can be reconstructed as an obedience to three epistemic imperatives. First, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Human Nature ("Resist against demonizing the other side; always try to understand the case from their point of view"). Second, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Non-Violent Alternatives ("Always search for non-violent alternatives to projected military action"). Third, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Uncontrolled Escalation ("Sharpen your attention for uncontrolled, irreversible side effects of military action, particularly for the danger of escalation to another world war"). Objective reality does not decide how far one should go in following these imperatives. Rather, the decision about this is our's—similarly as in case of the scientist who decides to search for common deep structure behind the chaos of the manifold. So the pacifist's epistemic imperatives can be compared to Kant's regulative principles that are necessary for guiding the scientific scrutiny of reality., Not Reviewed
- Published
- 2007
22. Reconstructing pacifism
- Author
-
Meggle, Georg, Müller, Olaf L., Meggle, Georg, and Müller, Olaf L.
- Abstract
Pacifists and their opponents disagree not only about moral questions, but most often about factual questions as well. For example, they came to divergent descriptions of the crisis in Kosovo. According to my reconstruction of pacifism, this is not a surprise because the pacifist, legitimately, looks at the facts in the light of her system of value. Her opponent, in turn, looks at the facts in the light of alternative systems of value, and the quarrel between the two parties about supposedly descriptive matters does not come to an end as there is no objective reality about the war in question that could settle the issue. If I am right, the pacifist's value-laden way of looking at reality can be reconstructed as an obedience to three epistemic imperatives. First, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Human Nature ("Resist against demonizing the other side; always try to understand the case from their point of view"). Second, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Non-Violent Alternatives ("Always search for non-violent alternatives to projected military action"). Third, the Epistemic Imperative concerning Uncontrolled Escalation ("Sharpen your attention for uncontrolled, irreversible side effects of military action, particularly for the danger of escalation to another world war"). Objective reality does not decide how far one should go in following these imperatives. Rather, the decision about this is our's—similarly as in case of the scientist who decides to search for common deep structure behind the chaos of the manifold. So the pacifist's epistemic imperatives can be compared to Kant's regulative principles that are necessary for guiding the scientific scrutiny of reality., Pazifisten und deren Gegner streiten sich meist nicht bloss über moralische, sondern auch über faktisch-deskriptive Fragen. Z.B. sind beide Seiten bei der Kosovo-Krise (1998/9) zu völlig entgegengesetzten Beschreibungen gekommen. Kein Wunder, denn der Pazifist betrachtet die Fakten legitimerweise im Lichte seines Systems von Werten. Seine Gegnerin betrachtet die Fakten im Lichte eines alternativen Wertsystems, und der Streit, der sich angeblich auf wertfrei deskriptivem Boden bewegt, kommt zu keinem Ende, weil es keine objektiven Tatsachen aus dem betreffenden Krieg gibt, die den Streit eindeutig entscheiden könnten. Die wertbeladene Weltsicht des Pazifisten lässt sich als Befolgung dreier epistemischer Imperative verstehen: 1) Zur Natur des Menschen: Wehre Dich gegen Dämonisierungen der Gegenseite; versuche immer, den Fall aus der Sicht der Gegenseite zu verstehen. 2) Zu friedfertigen Alternativen: Suche immer nach friedfertigen Alternativen zum geplanten Militäreinsatz. 3) Zur unkontrollierbaren Eskalation: Schärfe deinen Blick für unkontrollierbare, irreversible Nebenfolgen des militärischen Einsatzes, und achte besonders auf die Gefahr, dass ein weiterer Weltkrieg ausbrechen könnte. Nicht die objektive Realität entscheidet darüber, wie weit man bei der Befolgung dieser Imperative gehen sollte. Die Entscheidung hängt vielmehr von uns selbst ab – so ähnlich wie im Fall einer Naturwissenschaftlerin, die sich dafür entscheidet, hinter dem Chaos des Mannigfaltigen noch nach einer gemeinsamen Tiefenstruktur zu suchen. Diese Parallele hat eine überraschende Konsequenz. Die epistemischen Imperative des Pazifisten können mit Kants regulativen Prinzipien verglichen werden, die laut Kant notwendig sind, um unseren naturwissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen eine Orientierung zu geben. Und so verdienen die Pazifisten einen Vorwurf ganz sicher nicht: den Vorwurf, auf irrationale Weise blind zu sein für die harten Wirklichkeit.
- Published
- 2004
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