Search

The book review discusses "Behind Tax Policy Controversies: Social, Legal and Economic Foundations" by Steven M. Sheffrin. The book provides an overview of tax policy issues, including optimal taxation principles, tax fairness, racial bias in the tax code, and taxing the wealthy. Sheffrin explores the underlying social, legal, and economic principles at play in these policy choices and trade-offs. The book offers an even-handed and easy-to-understand introduction to these core tax issues and introduces readers to the literature of tax policy and important doctrinal ideas. It serves as a valuable resource for readers interested in gaining a deeper understanding of tax policy. [Extracted from the article]

We extend Stiglitz (J Public Econ, 17, 213–240,1982) to a dynamic and stochastic optimal taxation model, while assessing the effects of exogenous wage regulations. We show that when wage regulations are imposed, consumption inequality rises more than when they are removed. The results lead to an important policy implication that in the face of exogenous wage regulations, the social planner who can design optimal tax schedule prefers to widen the consumption inequality. From this perspective, the drive to enhance production efficiency outweighs the motivation for redistribution. A conventional wisdom that full employment commitment and minimum wage legislation should serve as a buffer for the minority may not be taken for granted. In the qualitative analysis, we find that as wage regulations tighten, the lower bound of the marginal tax rate on capital rises. Our quantitative result validates that, showing that the marginal tax rate on capital increases to varying degrees in response to wage requirements of varying tightness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper begins with a survey of the literature on the political economy approaches to labor income taxation. We focus on recent progress made by examining in detail the specific properties of nonlinear taxes derived in the context of voting. Next, we present new results on the existence of a majority voting equilibrium that unifies work in the standard framework. Finally, we discuss how recent theoretical results help us uncover empirical patterns from the last 50 years in the US tax system, namely, a sharp decrease in top marginal tax rates, the rise of the Earned Income Tax Credit, and increased progressivity in the middle of the income distribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we study clean energy transition in a modified version of the Ramsey growth model by including nonrenewable and renewable resources as well as pollution externalities. The main difference from previous works is that we consider imperfect substitution between nonrenewable and renewable resources. We characterize the social optimum and show that the economy converges to a clean state in the long run. We then study the decentralized equilibrium and show that the economy converges to the same state even without regulation, but with higher environmental damage. Further, we investigate the properties of the taxation trajectory that drives the laissez-faire economy to follow the optimal path and show that it can be either increasing or decreasing over time. We identify different channels that influence the path of optimal taxation and show that it depends, among other things, on the level of capital, the cost of renewable energy and the degree of substitution between renewable and nonrenewable resources. • A growth model with nonrenewable and renewable resources and pollution externalities. • Nonrenewable and renewable resources are considered as imperfect substitutes. • Social optimum and decentralized equilibrium characterized. • Decentralized economy converges to the clean state even without regulation. • Optimal taxation trajectory can be increasing or decreasing over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Environmental & Social Management Journal / Revista de Gestão Social e Ambiental is the property of Environmental & Social Management Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper derives necessary and sufficient conditions for allocations to be incentive compatible in multidimensional screening problems that satisfy a generalized single crossing property. We then devise a numerical method based on these results to solve multidimensional screening problems. Importantly, our numerical method can be applied to multidimensional screening problems for which existing approaches cannot be applied. We apply this method to several numerical examples in the context of multidimensional optimal taxation. In addition to illustrating how to apply our theoretical results and implement our numerical method, our simulations highlight the importance of bunching in optimal multidimensional taxation. Finally, we prove that bunching must occur in multidimensional optimal taxation problems when the social planner has sufficiently redistributive preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature has long analysed optimal taxation policies in economies where tax evasion is widespread. Nevertheless, very little has been produced on the relationship between public debt, tax evasion, and long-term economic growth. In this article, we investigate the relationship between sovereign debt sustainability and tax evasion by computing under which conditions the debt/GDP ratio is endogenously mean reverting in the context where tax evasion may increase the public debt and public expenditure is used to finance public and merit goods. For a log utility consumer, the level of tax evasion has no effect on the mean reverting conditions while the same is not true for more general functional forms. Finally, we conclude that allowing for tax evasion is not a suitable policy to make the debt/GDP ratio stable over time, especially in low-growth economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores subjects in optimal income taxation characterized by recent research interest, practical importance in light of concerns about inequality, potential for misunderstanding, and prospects for advancement. Throughout the analysis, paths for further investigation are highlighted. Areas of focus include multidimensional abilities and endogenous wages; asymmetric information and the income of founders; production and consumption externalities from labor effort; market power and rents; behavioral phenomena relating to perceptions of the income tax schedule, myopic labor supply, and the interactions of savings, savings policies, and labor supply; optimal income transfers; the relationship between optimal income taxation and the use of other instruments; and issues relating to the social welfare function and utility functions, including non-welfarist objectives, welfare weights, heterogeneous preferences, and taxation of the family. (JEL D63, D82, D91, H21, H24, H53, J22) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies optimal linear policy directed at private long‐term care insurance in the context where individuals are myopic, that is, underestimate their dependency risk. Without government intervention, myopic individuals underinsure, while the first‐best optimum requires full insurance. To decentralize the first‐best, one needs personalized linear subsidies on private insurance premiums combined with personalized lump‐sum taxes to finance these subsidies and redistribute resources among individuals. In the second‐best setting where only uniform instruments can be used, the determination of the optimal insurance subsidy rate includes three main considerations: standard efficiency concern, correction for myopia, and redistributive concerns. While the correction for myopia pushes for a higher subsidy rate, the analysis of the redistributive concerns is far less straightforward. Overall, the redistributive concerns depend on three main factors: whether wealthier individuals are less myopic, how the probability of dependency varies with wealth and what is the type of absolute risk aversion exhibited by individual preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The typical method of solving for the optimal nonlinear tax schedule relies on deriving optimal incentive-compatible allocations. While this "primal approach" is mathematically rigorous, it lacks intuitive appeal. This paper considers a different method that relies on directly solving for the optimal tax system. This "dual approach" is much closer to actual tax policy as it centers around the welfare effects of tax reforms. I show that it can easily incorporate preference heterogeneity, as well as individual utility misoptimization. Beyond solving for the optimal tax system, the dual approach allows one to obtain insights into the welfare effects of small nonlinear tax reforms outside the optimum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Barro (J Polit Econ 98:S103–S126, 1990) established an endogenous growth model with taxed-financed public services that affect production or utility. Since there is only an income tax, the tax rate must be positive under a balanced-budget restriction. Then there arises a question as to whether the famous zero-capital-tax result of Chamley (Econometrica 54:607–622, 1986) applies in the Barro model if the government is allowed to tax capital and labor incomes, respectively. To examine this question, we develop a generalized Barro model, which combines characteristics of the Chamley model by incorporating elastic labor supply and capital and labor income taxation. By using the dual approach, we derive simple formulas for optimal income taxation and the second-best rules for public consumption and production services. In particular, we demonstrate that both capital and labor incomes should be taxed when the economy grows along a balanced-growth path. The intuition behind our positive capital tax result is that, under the balanced-budget constraint, the government has to minimize each time's tax distortion by equating the marginal excess burdens of capital and labor taxation at any time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Time is often an important ingredient of a healthy lifestyle. Starting from this observation, this paper studies optimal public policy concerned with promoting healthy choices taking into account both monetary and time investments in health. Individuals tend to underestimate the importance of their health while making decisions, which makes their investments too low compared to the first‐best. While the decentralization of the first‐best requires personalized subsidies on both time and monetary investments, this may be problematic due to informational issues. In a second‐best world where individual productivities and time investments are publicly unobservable, whereas monetary investments are observable in an anonymous way, the paper considers a policy with a non‐linear income tax and a linear subsidy on monetary health investments. If there are no incentive concerns, all other things equal, monetary investments complementary (substitutable) to time investments should be subsidized more (less) than those independent of time use. The addition of incentive concerns demonstrates that optimal subsidization of monetary health investments is less straightforward than one might think. Overall, the time ingredient in the production of health does play a role in the optimal policy design, affecting not only the subsidy on monetary health investments but also the income taxation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the optimal tax structure in a family decision model where spouses first collectively choose child quantity and then non-cooperatively decide child quality. In the model, both child quality and child quantity are suboptimally low due to the non-cooperative behavior of couples. Moreover, the model allows for both child quality and child quantity to have external effects on society. We show that under the optimal tax framework, income taxes, rather than child taxes/subsidies, play an effective role in correcting the low fertility level caused by spouses' non-cooperative behavior. Whether a child tax or subsidy is optimal depends on the relative size of non-cooperation within couples and the external effects of children on society. Child taxes become optimal in the absence of an externality of children on society, regardless of the availability of a lump-sum tax. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes optimal tax policy from the perspective of voters who want public policies to systematically advance their interests. Self‐acknowledged ignorance implies that voters have a practical interest in transparent and stable tax systems that allow personal tax burdens to be calculated accurately and easily. Such properties reduce voter mistakes. However, a voter's normative interests may conflict with these practical interests, because ideas about a good life or good society often support tax system complexity. Tradeoffs between these two aims of democratic tax systems imply that the optimal tax system for a democracy neither minimizes voter errors nor maximizes a social welfare function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the optimal taxation of participation within a monopolistically competitive product market that exhibits increasing markups. Individual labor supply responds along both intensive and extensive margins. The government simultaneously optimizes a nonlinear Mirrleesian income tax scheme, a flat profit tax rate, and a flat unemployment benefit. It is shown analytically that the monetized welfare cost of an increase in unemployment benefit is higher under monopolistic competition compared to under perfect competition. Nevertheless, numerical simulations suggest that the optimal unemployment benefit increases in response to greater markups when the government simultaneously optimizes all of its tools. The reason is that, along with a higher profit tax, rising markups require a decline in marginal income taxes. Lower marginal income taxes relieve the extensive margin distortions and accommodate an increase in the unemployment benefit. Accordingly, optimal nominal participation taxes remain approximately unchanged for the lower half of the ability distribution. For the upper half, the decline in income taxes outweighs the increase in the unemployment benefit, leading to lower optimal nominal participation taxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study delves into the influence of carbon accounting and green finance on the sustainable development index within a dataset of 500 Chinese publicly listed companies over the period from 2010 to 2020. Leveraging analysis conducted through the fully modified OLS methodology, the research findings unveil that the adoption of carbon accounting positively impacts the sustainable development index among these Chinese-listed firms. However, the number of employees engaged in these companies exhibits an adverse effect on the sustainable development index, and the consumption of resources, including water and electricity, demonstrates an inverse relationship with the overall sustainability of the firms. In light of these findings, the research suggests several central policies to bolster sustainable development. These include expanding green finance markets by harnessing financial technology (fintech) and big data, advancing corporate sustainability management, investing in green energy projects, and establishing an efficient green taxation system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several EU countries have targets for the reduction of CO2e emissions that go beyond the target set by the EU. We study what would be the optimal carbon tax policy in such EU frontrunner countries, focusing on two questions: 1) How should national climate policy be coordinated with the European Emissions Trading System (ETS), and 2) How should an EU frontrunner country address the risk of carbon leakage? We show that these issues are closely linked and that the answers to the two questions depend on the following factors: i) The shadow cost assigned to carbon leakage, ii) The rates of carbon leakage in the ETS and non-ETS sectors, and iii) The price of ETS emission allowances relative to the domestic marginal abatement cost of attaining the desired reduction of domestic emissions. Our analysis shows that it is preferable for an EU frontrunner country to implement a national ETS sector carbon tax that results in a higher total carbon price in the national ETS sector compared to the national non-ETS sector. We illustrate how our theoretical model can be combined with a modified version of the GTAP-E general equilibrium model of the world economy to estimate the parameters of the optimal national carbon tax scheme in an EU frontrunner country, using Denmark as an example. We find that the ETS sector should pay a total carbon price that is between 33 and 78 percent above that of the rest of the economy depending on the aversion to carbon leakage. Key policy insights It is generally optimal for an EU frontrunner country – one with a domestic emission target beyond that set by the EU – to implement a national ETS sector tax. The total national carbon price should be higher in the ETS sector compared to the non-ETS sector. Data for Denmark indicate that the total national ETS sector carbon price should be at least 33 percent higher than that of the national non-ETS sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates optimal asset scrapping conditions under taxation and inflation by adjusting Koowattanatianchai and Charles's (2015) model on optimal asset duration, which omits the scrapping problem. We decompose the overall effects of taxation and inflation on the optimal scrapping policy into direct and indirect effects via the discount rate, and find that contradictory results in the existing literature of asset scrapping are all correct since they are compartments of our generalized framework. Simulation analysis is also conducted using the Thai logistics industry, with the results confirming the properties of the developed model and highlighting the importance of inflation and taxation in the surrounding economic context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates multistage taxes on firms in a limited tax capacity economy. We characterize the optimal taxation of informal firms reinterpreting behavioral and mechanical effects. Our numerical exercises highlight the relationship between misreporting costs and the elasticities of reported revenues and costs. We explore a tax reform in Brazil with a survey of informal firms to estimate these elasticities (0.55 and 0.94, respectively), which imply smaller sheltering costs for input expenditures. The optimal multistage tax system includes (i) differential linear taxes across the production chain and (ii) a positive, but very small, tax refund rate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The philanthropic sector is highly consequential, particularly in the United States, and the most important policies directed toward this sector are tax policies. Yet most economic analysis of the optimal tax treatment of charitable giving is ad hoc, treating it as a subject unto itself. This article advances a different approach: integrating the tax treatment of charitable giving into the optimal income tax framework that has been developed over the past half century. The results supplement or overturn conventional wisdom. Notably, the analysis of revenue effects and the purported efficiency of subsidies to charitable giving is recast, focusing on the pertinent externalities rather than the direct revenue costs, which themselves are irrelevant in the basic case. Distributive concerns regarding donors are also misplaced because distributive effects can be offset by tax rate adjustments to the broader income tax and transfer system. These ideas are developed systematically, with an emphasis on intuition rather than technical formalism. The analysis also broadens and deepens the assessment of externalities from charitable giving, which are more numerous and heterogeneous than is generally recognized. Finally, refocusing our understanding of the optimal tax treatment of charitable giving identifies important subjects requiring further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study optimal income taxation in a two‐group framework where the private cost of misreporting income is positively correlated with productivity. If high‐wage types always reveal their income truthfully, then letting low‐wage types cheat leads to Pareto‐superior outcomes regardless of the audit costs (as compared to deterrence). With no cheating, redistribution takes place on first‐ or second‐best frontiers and low‐wage types always end up worse off than high‐wage types. Letting low‐wage types misreport reduces the need to recourse to second‐best mechanisms. Additionally, it increases the reach of first‐best redistribution to outcomes at which low‐wage types are better off than high‐wage types. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We formally model a Cournot duopoly market in which a corporate socially responsible (CSR) firm interacts with a profit-maximizing firm and where the market is regulated with an emission tax. We consider three different kinds of CSR firm behaviors: (i) consumer-friendly; (ii) environmentally-friendly; and (iii) consumer-environmentally friendly. Unlike most theoretical works within this literature, which typically use specific functional forms, we use general structures for the inverse demand function, the cost function, and for emission levels and damage functions. In terms of modeling strategy, we use two game-theoretic approaches: (i) a simultaneous game and (ii) a sequential three-stage ex-post game, in which decisions are time consistent. We found that the optimal emissions taxation rule is modified when considering different CSR motivations. We show that depending upon the CSR motivation and the price elasticity of demand in some cases we can obtain optimal emission tax rates higher, lower, or equal to marginal external emission. Finally, we also found that firms adopting consumer-friendly CSR behavior are more effective in improving the environment compared to environmentally friendly firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Passenger transport has significant externalities, including carbon emissions and air pollution. Public health research has identified additional social gains from active travel, due to the health benefits of physical exercise. Per mile, these benefits greatly exceed the external costs from car use. We introduce active travel into an optimal fuel taxation model and characterize analytically the second‐best optimal fuel tax. We find that accounting for active travel benefits increases the optimal fuel tax by 44% in the USA and 38% in the UK. Fuel taxes should be implemented jointly with other policies aimed at increasing the uptake of active travel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This study aims to evaluate the impact of cannabis legalization on revenue mobilization and taxation in South Africa by analyzing the experiences of jurisdictions that have legalized cannabis. Methodology: A qualitative approach was employed, including a literature review and trend analysis. Data from Canada, California, Colorado, and Washington State, where cannabis has been legalized, were analyzed for 2018-2021. Results: The findings demonstrate that cannabis legalization significantly impacts revenue collection and taxation. However, optimal pricing and taxation policies are crucial to capture the illicit market, minimize negative externalities, and ensure industry growth. Legacy growers and previously disadvantaged individuals should be integrated into the legal market. Theoretical Contribution: The study contributes to the theoretical framework of Pigouvian taxation by examining its applicability to the cannabis industry and the challenges posed by illicit markets and product substitutability with alcohol and tobacco. Practical Implications: The study provides recommendations for South African policymakers on taxation policies, market regulation, and inclusive strategies to ensure a successful and sustainable cannabis industry while maximizing revenue mobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies how linear tax and education policy should optimally respond to skill-biased technical change (SBTC). SBTC affects optimal taxes and subsidies by changing (1) direct distributional benefits of each policy instrument, (2) indirect, general-equilibrium effects on wages, and (3) education distortions. Analytically, the effect of SBTC on these three components is shown to be ambiguous. In simulations for the US economy, SBTC makes the optimal tax system more progressive and lowers optimal education subsidies. This is because for both income taxes and education subsidies; their direct distributional effects become more important, which more than offsets the larger general-equilibrium effects and increased education distortions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effect of tax progressivity on optimal monetary policy in a two‐country new Keynesian model. We first address the issue that coefficients in both structural equations and the central bank's loss function are crucially affected by a change in tax progressivity in both countries. Second, we show that a change in tax progressivity significantly affects the properties of international monetary policy transmission. Third, we demonstrate that the impact of tax progressivity on international monetary policy transmission depends on the value of the constant relative risk‐aversion coefficients. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document is an interview with Matthew Adler, a professor of Law and Economics, Philosophy, and Public Policy at Duke University. Adler discusses his career trajectory, including his interest in Law and Economics and his shift to social welfare functions. He also talks about his experiences as a law clerk for Judge Harry Edwards and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. The interview covers topics such as cost-benefit analysis, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, and his views on interdisciplinary work in law, economics, and philosophy. The text discusses the author's experience as a law clerk and their transition into academia. They highlight the importance of legal analysis and how it can lead to finding the right answers in legal research. The author also discusses their interest in philosophy and the analytical reasoning skills they developed as a law clerk. They mention their work in administrative law and cost-benefit analysis, emphasizing the interdisciplinary nature of their research. The author values collaboration with scholars from different disciplines and believes it is important to find co-authors who bring unique perspectives to the table. The text discusses the importance of collaboration in academic research and the author's personal experiences with collaboration. It also touches on the author's philosophical convictions and their motivation for using the social welfare function approach in their work. The author explains the components of the social welfare function approach and the restrictions imposed on it. They also address the use of the approach in evaluating concepts like justice, poverty, and inequality. The text discusses the motivation behind using the social welfare function approach to evaluate well-being [Extracted from the article]

This paper augments the DMP model with large firms and intrafirm wage bargaining by an endogenous decision to become an entrepreneur that is based on heterogeneous entrepreneurial abilities. If workers' wage bargaining power is not too large and the match efficiency is not too low, the decentralized market equilibrium features an inefficiently high number of entrepreneurs, because they appropriate large parts of the surplus from matches. A realistic calibration with empirically plausible parameters shows this case to be the relevant one. Consequently, introducing a tax on the profits of entrepreneurs restores the constrained first-best allocation by affecting occupational choices. It drives rather unproductive entrepreneurs out of the market since the marginal entrepreneur is affected and not the average one. Thus, the negative effects on job creation are small. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of the expression of 'public economics' marked an epistemological rupture in the economic discourse about the state. The local problems and national intellectual traditions that had shaped the centuries-old field of public finance were cast aside in favour of new problems and new methods. From the 1970s onward, public economics became an integrated international field defined by a methodological approach embodied in general equilibrium. Mathematics and optimisation changed the nature of the questions considered. After briefly outlining the historic constitution of the field of public finance and how it was transformed in the middle of the twentieth century, we explain how a new economic theory of public expenditures emerged with one foot in the old public finance and one foot in the new public economics. We then hint at how the integration of risk into economic theory unexpectedly transformed the way economists conceptualised the public sector. Last, we consider how the maximisation of social welfare functions exhibiting a trade-off between equity and efficiency replaced principles of taxation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyses the import and appropriation of Rawls's theory of justice into the emerging field of optimal taxation theory in the 1970s. It focuses first on the pioneer contributions of Atkinson and Phelps to integrate Rawls's maximin into optimal taxation models, and then on their numerous followers during this decade. It shows that the maximin criterion was quickly accepted and appropriated in optimal taxation theory using "Rawlsian" Social Welfare Functions, which are founded on a welfarist interpretation of the maximin, unfaithful to Rawls. I try to explain why public economists made this choice, insisting on issues of simplicity, tractability, and comparisons with other ethical criteria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Jurídica (0103-3506) is the property of Revista Juridica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper argues that the ability to enforce taxes on offshore income may shape the redistributional properties of the tax system through two channels. First, it mechanically raises tax progressivity for given parameters of the tax system because high-income taxpayers own most of the offshore wealth. In the US, recent comprehensive reporting by offshore banks suggests the mechanical increase in average tax rates may be around 1.5 percentage points for the top 0.01 per cent and virtually zero below the top 1 per cent. Second, it may further raise tax progressivity by changing the trade-offs underlying optimal taxation in favour of higher taxation of top incomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Netherlands witnessed major reforms in income support for lone parents over the past decade, to simplify the support system and to improve the financial incentives to work. We consider whether the new system can be considered closer to 'optimal', using the inverse-optimal tax(ation) method. In our base model we find social welfare weights that were not monotonically declining in income before the reforms. The reforms fixed this anomaly for the group of lone parents as a whole, but the anomaly remains for lone parents with a child 0–3 years old. For a wide range of redistributive preferences we find that subsidies for working lone parents could be increased further. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the implications of distortions in intertemporal margins for the conduct of climate policy. We do so by introducing a framework that combines a standard two-period overlapping generations (OLG) model with a tractable model of household heterogeneity, in which over-accumulation of capital arises from uninsurable idiosyncratic labor income risk. We illustrate that market-based climate policies must be adjusted when the government cannot provide full insurance to households by taxing only capital and is constrained to transfer resources across generations for risk-sharing. In a numerical exercise, we find that idiosyncratic risk leads to an optimal capital income tax rate of 35 per cent and a carbon price 7.5 per cent lower than its first best. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is concerned with cross-dependencies between endogenous market structure and tax policy. We extend the Mirrlees (Rev Econ Stud 38:175–208, 1971) model of income taxation with a monopolistic competition framework with general additively separable consumer preferences. We show that quantity and variety distortions resulting from the market structure require adjustments to income tax policy, which also needs to be complemented with commodity or firm taxation to achieve the constrained social optimum. We calibrate the model and find that in policy design the failure to account for the market structure results in a welfare loss of 1.77%. Motivated by practical cases, we study a policy regime that is solely based on income taxation. We show that departures from the social optimum can be compensated by lower and less regressive income taxes and a smaller government compared to the regime with income and commodity taxes. We also examine the role of consumer preferences for policy outcomes and show that it is substantially amplified by an endogenous market structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Economics is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article studies the optimal design of corporate taxes when firms have private information about future investment opportunities and face financial constraints. A government whose goal is to efficiently raise a given amount of revenue from its corporate sector should attempt to tax unconstrained firms, which value resources inside the firm less than financially constrained firms. We show that a corporate payout tax (a tax on dividends and share repurchases) can both separate constrained and unconstrained firms and raise revenue and is therefore optimal. Our quantitative analysis implies that a revenue-neutral switch from profit taxation to payout taxation would increase the overall value of existing firms and new entrants by |$7\%$|⁠. This switch could be implemented in the current US tax system by making retained earnings fully deductible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Facing technological progress, how should a government reform income taxation? To address this question, optimal capital and labor income taxation is obtained for an economy of heterogeneous individuals. Technological progress raises optimal capital income tax rate and lowers optimal average marginal labor income tax rate if it is capital-biased by increasing relative capital productivity. Technological progress does the opposite if it is labor-biased by decreasing relative capital productivity. Neither capital-biased nor labor-biased technological progress affects optimal slope of labor income tax rate schedule. Technological progress does not affect optimal income taxation if it is unbiased by preserving relative capital productivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we use actual data provided by the Polish tax authority and characterise the properties of income distribution in Poland in the case of high-income earners. By employing a variety of techniques we are able to confirm that the distribution of income in Poland can be approximated with a Pareto distribution in its upper tail. This finding makes the formula for the optimal marginal tax rates of Saez [2001] applicable to the Polish case and allows us to provide estimates of the optimal marginal tax rates for Poland. We show that the current tax policy in Poland is not optimal. Specifically, we show, by relying on empirically viable estimates of the elasticity of the labour supply with respect to the wage, that the optimal marginal tax rate at high income levels exceeds 60%. In other words, we suggest that there is room for a welfare-improving reform in Poland, and we argue that high-income individuals should be expected to contribute substantially more at the margin than they currently do.

Copyright of Public Security & Public Order / Visuomenes Saugumas ir Viesoji Tvarka is the property of Mykolas Romeris University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

I study the optimal taxation of robots, other capital, and labor income. I show that it is optimal to distort robot adoption. The robot tax (or subsidy) exploits general-equilibrium effects to compress wages, which reduces income-tax distortions of labor supply, thereby raising welfare. In the calibrated model, when robots are expensive, a robot subsidy is optimal. As robots get cheaper, it becomes optimal to tax them. Yet, when reforming the status-quo tax system, most welfare gains can be achieved by adjusting the income tax. The additional gains from taxing robots differently from other equipment capital are close to zero. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I present a model of optimal capital taxation where agents with heterogeneous labor productivity randomly draw their rate of return to savings. Because of scale dependence, the distribution of rates of returns can depend on the amount saved. Uncertainty in returns to savings yields an insurance rationale for taxing capital on top of labor income. I first show that, because of scale dependence, agents making the same saving decision should access the same rate of return at the optimum. I then constrain the information set of the government and show that, as soon as return are uncertain, positive capital income taxation is needed at the optimum. The optimal linear tax on capital income trades off insurance with distortions to both savings and to the rate of return in a context of scale dependence. Eventually, I argue that scale dependence in and of itself is not sufficient to justify capital taxation on top of labor income taxes. These results are still valid when agents can optimize between a risk‐free and a risky‐asset that can both exhibit scale dependence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We extend the theory of optimal redistributive taxation to economies with an informal sector. In particular, in our model, workers can supply labor simultaneously to the formal and the informal sectors, which we call moonlighting. The optimal tax formula contains two novel terms capturing informality responses on an intensive and an extensive margin. Both terms decrease the optimal tax rates. We estimate the model with Colombian data and find that informality strongly reduces tax rates at all income levels. The possibility to migrate to entirely informal employment restricts tax rates at low and medium income levels, while the possibility of moonlighting is relevant at higher earnings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a new approach for the identification of Pareto‐improving tax reforms. This approach yields necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Pareto‐improving reform directions. A main insight is that "Two brackets are enough": When the system cannot be improved by altering tax rates in one or two income brackets, then there is no continuous reform direction that is Pareto‐improving. We also show how to check whether a given tax reform is Pareto‐improving. We use these tools to study the introduction of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the United States in 1975. A robust finding is that, prior to the EITC, the U.S. tax‐transfer system was not Pareto‐efficient. Under plausible assumptions about behavioral responses, the 1975 reform was not Pareto‐improving. Qualitatively, though, it had the right properties: A similar reform with earnings subsidies made available to a broader range of incomes would have been Pareto‐improving. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]