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Optimal taxation for democracies with less than perfect voters: A public choice perspective.
- Source :
-
Kyklos . Feb2024, Vol. 77 Issue 1, p3-21. 19p. - Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- This paper analyzes optimal tax policy from the perspective of voters who want public policies to systematically advance their interests. Self‐acknowledged ignorance implies that voters have a practical interest in transparent and stable tax systems that allow personal tax burdens to be calculated accurately and easily. Such properties reduce voter mistakes. However, a voter's normative interests may conflict with these practical interests, because ideas about a good life or good society often support tax system complexity. Tradeoffs between these two aims of democratic tax systems imply that the optimal tax system for a democracy neither minimizes voter errors nor maximizes a social welfare function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *OPTIMAL taxation
*SOCIAL choice
*TAX incidence
*FISCAL policy
*VOTERS
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00235962
- Volume :
- 77
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Kyklos
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 174563398
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12356