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In ancient China, art has never been a substitute for the category of 'truth' in the sense of Western aestheticism, but a mimic for goodness and beauty. The image in traditional Chinese aesthetics never transcended the idea to the level of Western abstraction, and that is because the artistic expression bore a social synthesis, rather than metaphysical, between human beings, reality, and the world. However, the Ming Dynasty introduces a Dionysian discourse that challenges the Apollonian tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Nietzschean Übermensch or 'superman' was frequently invoked in sports-writing of the early twentieth century. While the misappropriation of this figure by the Nazis and Fascists in their programmes of national or racial renewal is well known, the superman appeared in other, less familiar contexts too. This article explores the various roles that the 'superman' played in Anglophone as well as German-speaking discourse prior to 1933, as a way of expressing, and interrogating, the ideals that shaped modern athletic culture and of framing long-standing debates in the history of sport: on professionalism and amateurism, national identity, commercialisation and specialisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

James Baldwin’s story “Sonny’s Blues” and Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy share much in common. Timothy Golden and Robert Reid have both situated the story within Nietzsche’s conceptualizations of the Dionysian and Apollonian. However, this paper fills in, revises, and challenges interpretations by Golden and Reid, emphasizing that the story is an explicit dramatization of The Birth of Tragedy, with direct references to Nietzsche’s ideas regarding the Dionysian ground of experience and the Apollonian impulse to represent that experience. At the end of the story, however, the narrative slips free from the Nietzschean schematization and suggests a transcendent other at work, an otherness that shines on Sonny’s blues and effects a release for the narrator. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines David Frischmann’s well-known yet little-studied translation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The article opens by placing the Zarathustra translation in the context of Frischmann’s adulation of European literature, suggesting that the biblical Hebrew idiom his translations develop is at odds with the broader scheme of his cultural architecture. It is followed by a detailed evaluation of Frischmann’s reception of Nietzsche’s work, reconstructing the Hebrew author’s idiosyncratic definition of the philosopher’s “Europeanness.” The article concludes with a close analysis of what I define as the “scriptural quality” that Frischmann sought to grant his translation, justified by his identification of Nietzsche as the modern author who came closest to reflecting the Bible’s aesthetic greatness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The two basic conflicting forces throughout Wharton's tragic novels have a great affinity with the cult of the Apollonian and Dionysian in ancient Greek religion and in Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy. On the one hand, it is the Apollonian ideal of civilized society and individual restraint, which is a beautiful illusion maintained in a bright appearance. When it encounters Dionysus, it is its defensive social rules, the social restrictions, and oppression it imposes on individuals; on the other hand, it is the awakening of Dionysian primitive passion, which tears off the social and individual protective veil of Apollo and reaches the Dionysian tragic cognition at the root of existence, requiring breaking social barriers and indulging the vitality of primitive nature. In this paper, the cult of the Apollonian and Dionysian in ancient Greek religion and as defined by Nietzsche in his The Birth of Tragedy is used to analyze the inner conflicts in the protagonists of Wharton's tragic novels and the patterns of tragedy in each of her studied novels. Through such archetypal criticism of religious cults in Wharton's major works, this paper attempts to refute most of the negative criticism of her novels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nietzsche is the world's most (in)famous atheist, bearer of the monumental tiding of the Death of God. His works contain biting critiques of Christianity and, to a lesser degree, of Judaism as well. Rabbi Mordechai Yosef Leiner of Izbica [=RMY] (1800–1854) was a leading Hasidic master in 19th century Poland. Despite their seemingly incongruent world views and backgrounds, bringing the German philosopher and the Polish Rebbe into conversation bears significant fruit. The significance of my study is two-fold. First, based upon similar philosophical moves by both Nietzsche and RMY, I aim to establish a philosophical foundation upon which to create a secular religious space which, beyond the local discussion around Nietzsche and RMY themselves, is of vital importance in a world continuously divided along inter-religious and secular-religious grounds. In addition, I will sharpen what we mean when we discuss the "religiosity" of Nietzsche and how this religiosity may confront nihilism. I believe that Nietzsche's orienting insight that God is dead can serve as an inspiration to create a phenomenologically religious "space" devoid of metaphysical and transcendental assertions and that there is a Hasidic master willing to meet him there. The quest of RMY was to reveal a Torah bereft of "Levushim", that is to say, bereft of the familiar Jewish and kabbalistic mythical trappings. When the traditional Christian and Jewish myths which refer to a transcendent reality are discarded, the search for meaning is relocated onto the immanent stage of human ("All too Human") phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution traces the history of the German Qur'an edition published by the Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha'at-e-Islam Lahore (Lahore-Ahmadiyya) in Berlin in 1939. Maulvi Sadr-ud-Dīn, the Lahore-Ahmadiyya missionary who erected the first mosque in Berlin, fashioned the translation. To reach out to a German audience gearing up for war, he entrusted his Berlin collaborator, the philosopher Hugo Marcus, with the details of the commentary. The narrative starts in 1924, when Tatar intellectuals first sat down with Sadr-ud-Dīn to discuss the necessity of preparing Qur'an editions for European readers. It ends with the publication of the German Qur'an at the moment Germans were finalising their war preparations. Hugo Marcus' approach to his commentary involved relating single Qur'an verses to Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy, focusing on genius, heroism, and suffering. In making that choice, he connected the Qur'anic text to the Herrenethik ('ethics of male superiority') that pervaded National-Socialist (Nazi) ideology. From this emerged an exegesis full of delusions about masculinity and racist arrogance. A comparison with Hugo Marcus' writings of the 1930s illustrates how it was wrought. In their approach to racism, nationalism, and war, Ahmadi Muslim missionaries and German Muslims in Berlin differed considerably. In their many attempts to bridge East and West through religion, their disagreements on these issues present a pivotal moment in intercultural communication, leaving an imprint on how the Qur'an was explained in Sadr-ud-Dīn's translation. Whereas the Lahore-Ahmadiyya tried to smooth the way towards an 'international religion' and defended the 'Jihad of the Pen', German Muslims steered close to the expectations of a frenzied, war-minded public. A straightforward document, Hugo Marcus' tafsīr served to exonerate them in advance, wherever they were heading. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Cormac McCarthy's Suttree, the novel's titular protagonist Cornelius Suttree resists his father's self‐righteous conviction in the Nietzschean "pathos of distance" by living among Knoxville's helpless and destitute and testing the theory that "there is nothing occurring in the streets." Among the city's underclass, Suttree finds a commonality in human suffering and comes to the profound realization that "all souls are one and all souls lonely." The essay demonstrates how Suttree's personal experience of dearth and deprivation and the sense of fellow feeling, pity, and outrage elicited from his perception of and concern for the frequently unjust suffering of others are instances of pathos that persuade him to reject his father's aristocratic and elitist "pathos of distance" in favor of the egalitarian and democratic "pathos of oneness." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality warns that revenge's reactiveness can jeopardize salutary change in shared values. I identify an overlooked revenge-mitigating praxis in the spatial movements of Nietzsche's fictional prophet Zarathustra, who seeks collaborators to overcome Christian morality and create new world-affirming values. Zarathustra's well-known response to revenge, specifically the revenge against time undergirding interpersonal revenge, is willing the eternal return of the same. But he also exemplifies a more available response. "Passing by" is a coming close to, followed by a veering away from, the most insistent embodiments of reigning values. Although Nietzsche inspires agonistic political theory, Zarathustra avoids direct contest in the usual late modern milieux, which he finds constitutively vulnerable to revenge. When revenge floods the communal passional reservoir, it forestalls recovery—essential to new-values creation—of passions effaced by reigning values. Zarathustra still approaches the usual milieux to know the present-past as the raw material of the future. But by then veering away he practices relaxing his value-creative will and not raging against the present-past. Repeated passing by helps him accept and thus better take up the raw material of the future and accept value change's slow temporality. Since passing by's concern is the value horizon, not the political sphere, and since it minimizes direct resistance, it may be less reactive to the political sphere than directly contestatory versions of "refusal." Analysis of Gandhi's value-praxis confirms passing by as a tactic for less reactive value-creation and as a lens on the reactiveness of different value-praxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We have become estranged from the cosmic movements, according to Bataille. We are confined by the error linked to the representation of ‘the stationary earth’. We have negated the immersive immanence of the whole and made nature into a fixed world of tools and things. How then do we recognise ourselves as part of the ‘rapture of the heavens’? Bataille urges us to consider life as a solar phenomenon, the free play of solar energy on the earth. This paper argues how Bataille’s cosmic vision anticipates both planetary and ecological thinking. This entails a base materialism of difference based on a radical Nietzschean and Heraclitean theory of becoming and flux. This thought is developed along Bataillean concepts such as the movement of the whole, the labyrinthine, and compound beings, ipseity, as well as the concept of a communifying movement. This materialism paired with Vladimir Vernadsky’s biosphere lays the foundation for the laws of the general economy, which also constitutes an economy inclusive of a general ecology: a tragic vision of Gaia and Dionysos. Finally, poetry is considered, as a way we might reconnect with the universe and stimulate ecological imagination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Georges Bataille made no secret of the importance Friedrich Nietzsche’s life and work held for him. But Bataille’s encounter with Nietzsche remained paradoxical: he rejected or ignored most of Nietzsche’s major concepts while nevertheless insisting on the value of Nietzsche’s thought and experience as a necessary counterpoint to the political, religious, and social currents of modernity. This paper demonstrates the extent to which Bataille owes the content and to some degree also the form of his idiosyncratic reading of Nietzsche to the influence and example of the Russian emigré philosopher Lev Shestov (1866–1938). In 1925, Georges Bataille published a translation of Shestov’s The Idea of the Good in Tolstoy and Nietzsche: Philosophy and Preaching, co-signed with Shestov’s daughter Tatiana Beresovski-Chestov. The translation was the product of a period during which Bataille also spent time with the older man and benefited from his tutelage. It was Shestov’s interpretation of the meaning of the death of God in Nietzsche’s life and thought that would have the most decisive influence on Bataille’s own life and work and make him, in his turn, a philosopher of tragedy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses Nietzsche's engagement with the sublime in Dawn to shed light on an aspect thereof that has so far been overlooked: Nietzsche's deployment of the sublime as a philosophical framework for coming to terms with epistemic limits and transcendental errors. By engaging with the sublime both descriptively and methodologically, Nietzsche promotes an awareness of cognitive limits that fosters, instead of impeding, the pursuit of knowledge and the accomplishment of philosophical endeavors. While complicating the minimal existing literature on the topic, this article highlights Nietzsche's philosophically unique use of the sublime in navigating a characteristically post-Kantian epistemic issue (the awareness of epistemic partiality and inadequacy) and in mitigating an illusory faith in reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes how the French fascist and collaborationist author Pierre Drieu la Rochelle thought critically about the forms and the functions of the modern writer-prophet. In essays dedicated to the cases of D. H. Lawrence and Friedrich Nietzsche, as well as to his own ideological and literary trajectory in the interwar years, Drieu defined the true prophet as a writer of decadence, one compelled to narrate and embody the decline of the nation. By assuming this burden, the writer-prophet in turn becomes doomed to be misunderstood or ignored by his decadent contemporaries. This logic of prophecy's ultimate failure provides a key to understanding the political and literary vision of Drieu's autobiographical fascist bildungsroman Gilles (1939). Finally, this article considers how Drieu's linking of prophecy and literary posterity can be seen as anticipating his recent controversial inclusion in the prestigious Bibliothèque de la Pléiade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nietzsche claims that suffering is needed for achievement. Morality, he thinks, aims to end suffering, and so would end achievement. I argue that at best some achievements are partly caused by suffering. Nietzsche could get a more secure connection between suffering and achievement by arguing that some achievements are constituted in part by suffering. But in both the causal and constitutive cases, moralists do not condemn inflicting on oneself the suffering involved in achievement. Nietzsche could instead argue, more simply, that morality is mistaken to think suffering is bad. He could deploy a 'conditionality' view of organic wholes, on which the value of suffering changes when part of an achievement, to argue that in some cases, suffering is good. I argue that here the conditionality view is less plausible than Moore's view of organic wholes, on which suffering would remain bad. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wallace Stevens is often recognized as a philosophical poet, but his work also reveals a deep mystical dimension that places him in the tradition of negative theology. Stevens's mystical tendencies are similar to, and in part inspired by, those of Rainer Maria Rilke, who also explored mysticism, eschatology, and the influence of Friedrich Nietzsche. Both poets use aphorisms and play with language to express the ineffable and transcendent while engaging in a broader conversation with German literature and philosophy. Read through the prism of Rilke's poetry, Stevens's complex relationship to mysticism challenges conventional interpretations of his work as purely philosophical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The passages composed by Nietzsche around the time he spent at Sorrento reflect an engagement with the anarcho-utopian socialist milieu into which he had been introduced by Malwida von Meysenbug. The "Sorrentino politics" that appear in Human, All Too Human I and II and later works need to be understood in the context of an affirmative form of political thought that could remedy the pessimism and nihilism that he finds in the politics of all sides. Nietzsche argues that the monarchical state, modern industrialism, and the restricted ownership of capital and property all undermine the goal of creating a life-affirming culture for Europe. He also provides a criticism of a utopian teleology of equality in the future – whether religious or socialist – that imposes an objective notion of purpose. Nietzsche rejects the Schopenhauerian pessimism of resignation while affirmatively engaging with the thought of Alexander Herzen and Guiseppe Mazzini. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Nietzsche - Studien is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Nietzsche - Studien is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Nietzsche - Studien is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Nietzsche - Studien is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Nietzsche - Studien is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Nietzsche (1844–1900) struggles with complexity and many-sidedness throughout his life. He is a nuanced thinker who offers fragments instead of a rigid philosophical system, yet he admires the 'virtuous energy' with which systematic thinkers, especially the pre-Socratic philosophers, express themselves. His ability to write with comparable energy is hindered by university philosophy, which privileges restraint and consistency. Therefore, he adopts a practice of spontaneous life writing in order to become simple and honest in thought and life. Inspired by figures such as Emerson, Diogenes, and Sterne, he grasps the 'nearest shoddy words' and continually produces new insights in disjointed monologues and aphorisms. Nietzsche's vague metaphors, loose language, inconsistency, and hyperbole stem from this practice, and his autobiography, Ecce Homo (1888), is the closest that he ever comes to rekindling the energy of the pre-Socratics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I examine the method behind Nietzsche's genealogical critique. I do not offer a comprehensive characterization and defense of his execution of this critique, but I sometimes allude to elements of it in order to illustrate its method. I review versions of genealogical critique that consist in challenging the epistemic standing of moral judgments (their justification or their truth) by exposing their historical contingency. I argue that they misconstrue Nietzschean genealogy, which is best conceived as a pragmatic enterprise, which aims at uncovering their function and asking whether they are useful or harmful. I argue that such a pragmatic conception of genealogy accounts for its peculiar combination of history and fiction. I then show how this pragmatic view of moral judgments fulfills Nietzsche's ambition to develop a compelling naturalistic conception of them and explain the importance he ascribes to a functional critique of them. I conclude by considering two questions this pragmatic conception of genealogy poses for its critical bearing: How can moral judgments best explained in terms of their functional usefulness turn out to be harmful? Since Nietzsche believes that any practice, including morality, has multiple functions, how is a functional critique of morality even possible? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foucault's corpus is animated by an ethical or political impulse: to liberate individuals from a kind of oppression, one which does not involve the familiar tyranny of the totalitarian state but exploits instead values that the victim of oppression herself accepts, and which then leads the oppressed agent to be complicit in her own subjugation. Foucault's critique also depends on a skeptical thesis about the epistemological authority of the social sciences that is supposed to be supported by his genealogies of those sciences. It is this conjunction of claims – that individuals oppress themselves in virtue of certain normative claims they accept because of their supposed epistemic merits – that marks Foucault's uniquely disturbing contribution to the literature whose diagnostic aim is, with Weber, to understand the oppressive character of modernity, and whose moral aim is, with the Frankfurt School, human liberation. Foucault is also a kind of 'realist' in his approach: he does not offer moral arguments to persuade people that they ought to behave differently than they do, but instead shows people the actual history of the institutions and norms to which they subjugate themselves. This essay explains Foucault's critical and realist project, and concludes with critical reflections on its plausibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In March 1916 the German Jewish writer, philosopher, and anarchist-activist Gustav Landauer gave a lecture on Friedrich Hölderlin's hymn "The Rhine" (1802) at a women's club in central Berlin. The lecture aims to derive from Hölderlin a concept of community designed to disavow German militarism and gesture to a wholly different understanding of the social. Taking his cue from Hölderlin, Landauer thus argues that community is not a state in which self-sufficient subjects join together on the basis of certain ostensibly shared attributes (language, territory, ethnicity, etc.) but is a relationship of mutual obligation geared toward irreducible openness—a "community of love" (Liebesgemeinschaft). Accordingly, Landauer not only anticipates crucial aspects of later engagements with the concept of community but also sets the tone for an anarchistic strand of Hölderlin reception around the time of World War I that has hitherto remained relatively underexplored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transhumanism presents a view of human progress by transcending the human, regarding finitude and suffering to be fundamental problems that must be overcome by radical bioenhancement technologies. Recent theologians have compared Christianity and transhumanism as competing deifications via grace and technology, respectively. Ron Cole-Turner is a cautious yet optimistic interpreter of the relationship between Christian deification and transhumanism, regarding them, on the one hand, to be incompatible based on self-centeredness vs. kenosis, while on the other hand, they can be compatible through a robust theology of creation and transfiguration such that creative human efforts via technology will be an active agent in transforming the world in glory. In this way, Christian transhumanism offers a vision of human progress in deification that transfigures creation through technology. In this paper, I challenge this proposal. I wish to show how transhumanism in any stripe, whether secular, Christian, or other, is fundamentally incompatible with Christian deification for two reasons: (1) incompatible views of progress and (2) incompatible views of human agency in deification. I will address each in turn. I then propose that human progress is infinite growth in the love of Christ. Finally, I suggest how a view of human agency affects how we think about suffering as a means to human progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay argues that although political thinkers frequently draw on his thought, Friedrich Nietzsche has not been read as a 'thinker of politics' in his own regard because the Euro-American field of political thought owes its very notion of 'politics' to the conceptual heritage Nietzsche's project directly challenges. The first part of the essay traces the prevailing conception of politics to Aristotle, in whose view politics is the quintessentially human (anthropos) activity of organising collective life through reason/speech (logos). The second part presents Nietzsche's project as a novel type of political naturalism, one which replaces the two Aristotelian axioms underpinning standard construals of politics, namely logocentrism and anthropocentrism. For Nietzsche, politics is not a unique, intra-species behaviour of certain bipedal primates, but the relational power dynamics present in all of nature, humans included. Nietzsche's political naturalism thereby gifts us an image of politics befitting the thoroughly entangled, volatile world we urgently have to come to terms with today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to clarify the relationship between conscience and bad conscience in the Second Essay of the Genealogy of Morality (GM II). Conscience, which Nietzsche calls the “will's memory” (GM II, 1), is a faculty that enables agents to generate and sustain the motivation necessary to honor commitments, while bad conscience is that “other gloomy thing” (GM II, 4), gloomy because it is a self‐punishing faculty that produces feelings of guilt. In addition to having different functions, conscience and bad conscience have distinct causal origins. Conscience originated as a memory of “I will nots” inculcated by punishment (GM II, 3), whereas bad conscience is produced by the process of “internalization” (GM II, 16)—not punishment (GM II, 14–15). It would seem to be possible, then, that an agent could have a conscience without having a bad conscience. The sovereign individual is sometimes interpreted in such terms. I argue that this separation is impossible, however. An agent would be incapable of generating and sustaining the motivation to honor commitments, thus having a conscience, without having undergone the process of internalization, necessitating the presence of bad conscience as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conspiracy theories pose a serious threat to our society these days. People often dismiss conspiracy theory believers as at best gullible or, more often, unintelligent. However, there are cases in which individuals end up believing conspiracy theories out of no epistemic fault of their own. In this paper, I want to offer a diagnosis of the problem by focusing on the genealogy of the conspiracy theory beliefs. Drawing on a novel interpretation of Nietzsche’s use of genealogies, I argue that the problem of belief in conspiracy theories is best understood as a broadly political one regarding the oppressive, dominating and exploitative world in which conspiracy theory believers find themselves in. I then draw on the work of Maria Lugones, the feminist philosopher, to offer an approach to addressing the problem of belief in conspiracy theories, which recommends radical humility and playfulness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many critics of morality seem nonetheless committed to a normative stance of some kind. This paper uses the context of Nietzsche studies as a laboratory to experiment with a solution to this problem. I argue that Nietzsche's critique of normativity and his promulgation of normative judgments can be made consistent if we understand Nietzsche as pursuing the criterion of the size of future history. First (§1) I present the problem of normativity as it appears in Nietzsche's work and the literature. Then (§2), I introduce the criterion of the size of future history and show that it addresses the requirements established in §1. I then address some objections to this criterion (§3). Finally, I suggest some applications of this criterion to specific areas of Nietzsche's discourse and to some of our broader normative intuitions (§4). I conclude that the criterion of the size of future history, if well understood, can provide a solution to the problem of normative inescapability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though it is acknowledged that Nietzsche read Ludwig Feuerbach, little attention has been given to the significance of Feuerbach's anthropological re-imagination of religion for the trajectory of Nietzsche's own vision for liberated humanity, the Übermensch. For Feuerbach, the Christian religion represents a form of wish-fulfillment and subconscious worship of the human being as divine, where many of the presuppositions of orthodox Christianity (monotheism, human fallenness, other-worldliness, etc.) only impede human flourishing. The acknowledgement of the psychological damage wrought by the scheme and implications of Christian metaphysics is, for Feuerbach and Nietzsche alike, a necessary step in liberating humans from their own self-imposed shackles and enabling the human spirit to actualize its latent potentialities. This paper aims to identify Feuerbachian themes that Nietzsche appropriates for his own purposes in Thus Spake Zarathustra, attending to Nietzsche's early reading of Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity (1841) during a key period of his intellectual development (1861–1863), and arguing that Feuerbach's impact on Nietzsche is far more subtle and profound than commonly recognized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a reflection on the relationship between philosophy and history, highlighting the influence of Michel Foucault in this field. Three articles are mentioned that explore different aspects of Foucault's work, from his connection with Immanuel Kant to his relationship with Nietzsche's philosophy. In addition, three additional articles are included on Epicurean hedonism, the intersections between hermeneutics and psychoanalysis, and a methodological proposal for approaching contemporary art. The issue also includes reviews of Mexican films starring or made by women, as well as a review of the novel "El Reino" by Emmanuel Carrère. The editorial team of Xipe Totek wishes readers a happy summer and announces the migration of their website to the Open Journal Systems platform. [Extracted from the article]

This paper argues that Nietzsche shares the aim of contemporary Sellarsian efforts to reconcile the natural and the normative. However, as Joseph Rouse notes, the Sellarsian strategy collapses into dualism by virtue of its treatment of natural causality and normativity as different in kind and of the normative as operating parallel to the causal (Rouse 2002). The paper argues that Nietzsche avoids this dualism by offering a constitutively causal account of the normative. He does this by identifying the normative with dominant drives of the self. It is argued that these dominant drives, like natural causes in the world, are modally dispositional and differ from natural causes in degree rather than dualistically in kind. However, the identification of the normative status of our values with dominant drives has been subject to strenuous criticism. Specifically, it is argued that the normative cannot be identified with dominant drives for fear of eliminating the normative. The paper responds to these criticisms in detail and argues that the constitutively causal account of normativity that stems from Nietzsche's identification of the normative with dominant drives can be defended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How is Nietzsche's genealogy of morality relevant to his revaluation of values? I consider and reject three accounts: contingency accounts, pedigree accounts, and unmasking accounts. I then propose an alternative account. On this view, Nietzsche provides a 'deconstructive genealogy' that indicates whether and where we should expect to find unity in our current moral practices. Moreover, Nietzsche's history contributes to a critique of contemporary morality because it reveals that morality is unlikely to have the kind of unity required by many of its defenders. After explaining and defending this account of genealogical critique in GM , I show how it can be generalized to domains besides morality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Filosofía UIS is the property of Universidad Industrial de Santander and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The topic of the study is the phenomenon of the death of God in the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche and its reflection through interpretation and evaluation by the following thinkers: M. Heidegger, K. Jaspers, E. Fink, G. Deleuze and P. Kouba. Special attention is paid to the reasons and consequences of the cultural and dramatic event, which is the death of God. Attention is also focused on the personality types that are characteristic after the death of God and on the desirable and undesirable life possibilities that this event opens up. The current reception of Nietzsche's statement "God is dead" demonstrates that his insight and justification of the consequences that flow from the death of God in the sense of the loss of Christian faith in his existence is justified. The result of the analysis is that there are consequences regarding 1) the current Western metaphysics in its onto-theological structure, 2) the loss of the guarantee of the so-called moral interpretation of the world and its "benefits" for a spiritually weak person, 3) the character and spiritual level of a person to project the overall meaning of life. At the same time, in our postmodern era, some consequences of the death of God are confirmed. The argumentation confirms the legitimacy of these three consequences of the death of God. This is the main thesis of the study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The paper redefines workplace spirituality (WS/WPS) by transcending the existential vacuum (in psychiatric terms a sense of lack of meaning of human existence and thus of work), leading to the development of workplace creativity, productivity and satisfaction, targeting operational profitability and organizational optimization. Design/methodology/approach: Spirituality is analyzed philosophically, following the Nietzschean definition in response to Schopenhauer's primordial suffering. Philosophical syncretism yields a viable organizational culture change model of spiritualizing the workplace. For this purpose, specific techniques are proposed which are combined with those already applied to various large companies and organizations. Findings: Spirituality in the workplace acts as a catalyst for developing beneficial qualities by increasing employee job satisfaction, organizational efficiency and business profitability, when equally responding to stakeholders' needs. Practical implications: The suggested change model holistically fosters organizational, operational, individual and collective effectiveness through work place spirituality redefined. Originality/value: For the first time spirituality in the workplace is discussed under a brand new perspective, resulting in an interdisciplinary emerging model, contributing to the field by providing guidance to academics and practitioners to its auspicious implementation through organizational culture change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that Friedrich Nietzsche was a mystic and that his post- Gay Science (1882) thought should be understood as an unfolding expression of his mystical experiences. Drawing on Nietzsche's Nachlass (notes), letters, and published writings, I show that he undoubtedly had at least two major mystical experiences and that these experiences were the source of all the cardinal motifs of his later thought. The apparent tensions or paradoxes between Nietzsche's cardinal teachings, above all that between the superman and the eternal recurrence, are resolved once they are understood as products of a mystical epistemology derived from an intuitive source of knowledge purportedly beyond the dualities intrinsic to ordinary modes of cognition. This intuitio mystica , which Nietzsche declared to be the real purpose of all philosophy, is coextensive with a type of mysticism I call apotheosis , based on the individual ego's identification with a unity underlying all reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is common in accounts of the secularization of Western thought to make reference to the name of Nietzsche. Nietzsche is undeniably a critic of religion, but he is equally a critic of the secular. It is for this reason that I propose thinking about Nietzsche's philosophy as postsecular. This term is one that has evolved over the last couple decades in response to the so-called "return of the religious" in society, social theory, and philosophy and suggests that secularity and religiosity are not antithetical and therefore that we must move beyond the forms of thinking that would regard them as such. First , I focus on his concepts of will to power, interpretation, perspectivism, and history, and sketch how they are all interrelated and how these ground his interpretation of religion. Based on this view, I show, second , that while religion is, for Nietzsche, a historical perspective, it is also, for him, part of the historical genealogy of secularity. This point leads to my final one on the relationship between secularity and religion in Nietzsche's thought, where I argue that, on his own terms, Nietzsche's anti-Christianity is a hyper-Christianity, even while rejecting facets of Christianity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Basically, humans desire nothing but to be happy. Humans exert much effort to make their lives meaningful and worth living. For humans, obtaining the meaning of existence is the foundation of happiness. However, despite humans' desire to be happy, an ugly truth still remains: life is a tragedy. Friedrich Nietzsche argues that life is a constant struggle and that to live is to suffer. By seeing this ugly picture of life, humans gradually fall into depression. "Depression is a common mental disorder that presents with depressed mood, loss of interest or pleasure . . . and may lead to suicide (WHO, 2021)." More so, science contends that specific brain dysfunctions cause depression, and various solutions are offered to address this, like taking anti-depressants and undergoing psychotherapy, but amidst all these, depression remains. In this case, what other means can be utilized to address the problem of depression? Using the philosophical-qualitative method, this paper will attempt to address the perennial issue of depression. This paper attempts to understand the problem of depression by tracing it to the degradation of meaning and will resolve it by explaining the essential role aesthetics plays in man's existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The essay questions the predominant perception of human thinking as a gender-neutral enterprise. It holds that sexual difference is deeply engrained in language and thinking, regardless of the biological sexual identities of those who express those thoughts. The essay critiques the traditional thought for superficially linking the meaning of sexuality with biological gender. It opposes the characterisation of masculine thinking as man's thinking and feminine thinking as woman's. Masculine language expressions can sometimes happen from women writers, and male thinkers sometimes produce feminine writings. Biological bodily sexual identity is not a pointer to the psychical sexual behaviour of humans. Psychoanalytic gender theories explaining the inessentiality of human sexuality help this work to demonstrate that man's and woman's sex identities are arbitrarily produced by language. It exposes the process of the emergence of sexual difference in the human psyche, language, and thinking. To do that, this study anchors primarily on the reflections of Lacan, Nietzsche, and Saussure. Lacanian psychoanalysis is used as the theoretical source to explain the role of language in forming masculine and feminine identities. Nietzsche's prioritisation of the value of natural existence, sensuality, and beauty over abstract truths propagated by masculine metaphysics enables us to explain how feminine experience differs from the masculine conception of truth. Saussure's linguistic theory, which challenged the masculine representative function of language, is used to justify the essay's claim that 'affects' created on the human body by objects of the world are the source of feminine linguistic expression. 'Affects' produce bodily intensities, from which new linguistic signs, metaphors, images, and idioms are formed, leading to imaginative reactivation of instinctual libidinal drives, which is considered the source of sexually different thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article asks whether we can identify a vitalistic undertow in Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy that would make sense for contemporary political and constitutional theory as well. The arguments are presented by contrasting Nietzsche's philosophy with the social theory of Herbert Spencer. After an introduction, the first main part discusses Spencer and his so-called 'organic analogy' in which he draws parallels between natural organisms and the body politic. Spencer's social theory is a paradigmatic example of vitalism and organic state theory and, as a counterpoint, can help tease out Nietzsche's vitalism as well. The article then examines Nietzsche's admittedly fragmentary encounters with Spencer and his flirtations with vitalism and organic state theory. In the conclusions, the reconstructed narrative about Nietzsche's vitalism is linked with Nietzsche's main philosophical works in the hope of provisionally extracting a Nietzschean 'constitutional theory' from his notion of will to power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between his calling into question, on the one hand, the apparently unquestionable value of compassion itself, and his refusal, on the other hand, to concede that suffering is unconditionally bad, Nietzsche has been understood by many as expressing a callous indifference, or worse, to most human suffering. This article aims to show that this interpretation relies on an oversimplified characterization of the relevant moral emotions. Compassion (or pity, either of which word can be used to translate the German das Mitleid) is 'a polyphonous being', as Nietzsche insists in Daybreak (1881). A closer look at some key passages in Nietzsche's text, and some help from Greek thinkers Nietzsche points us toward, will demonstrate that this term has meanings that have been lost to us. Recovering those meanings will shed light both on Nietzsche's critique of compassion (or pity) and on his own attitude toward suffering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues for an interpretation of David Strauss: the Confessor and the Writer as embodying the key components of the Nietzschean practice of conflict with a 'worthier' enemy. These are carefully considered under the headings of 'agonism', 'imitation', and a propulsion towards 'escalation', that is, beckoning a response from other, would-be, 'worthier' enemies. Adding to the standard 'cultural' explanation for the origins of the Strauss essay, this article explores the polemical 'assassination' of Strauss as ultimately ordered towards assuming Strauss' status as the pre-eminent Post-Christian freethinker of the era. In this way, the Meditation also acts as an intentionally provocative means for Nietzsche to beckon his audience to both 'escalate' the struggle further, and to recognise his presence on the intellectual landscape. Nietzsche conceives greatness as facilitated through conflict; his conflict with Strauss, a worthier foe, anticipates the strategy and approach that Nietzsche will utilise in his later and more significant disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nietzsche's perspectivism has received restricted and unrestricted interpretations. The latter take the cognitive effects of 'perspectives' to be pervasive and general; the former argue they are restricted to special subject matters, have limited effects, or are not essentially cognitive at all. I argue on textual grounds that Nietzsche was committed to the unrestricted view. Comparison to A.W. Moore's treatment of perspectival representation in Points of View illuminates both the nature of perspectivism and key arguments needed to defend it. Nietzschean perspectivism must deny the very possibility of absolute representations (sensu Moore), and to do so, it must block a form of argument that promises to integrate perspectival representations into progressively less restricted, and ultimately absolute, representations of the world. Such arguments depend on a strong assumption about the unity of the independent world, which Moore accepts and Nietzsche denies. Nietzsche's pluralism about perspectives thereby turns out to rely on pluralism about the world, which shapes his understanding of us as essentially bounded cognitive agents. Nietzsche holds that the longing for absolute representation manifest in Moore, Leibniz, and many other philosophers, which aspires to overcome the limitations of perspective, amounts to ascetic self-denial about our cognitive condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes up Nietzsche's contrast between a relatively enduring 'drama' of punishment, which consists in sequences of procedures, and a congeries of often discrepant meanings and purposes of the drama and contrasts it favorably with the distinction between a definition of punishment and a justification for it which received a good deal of attention in the middle of the twentieth century in anglophone philosophical circles. My chief thesis is that the philosophical lesson to be drawn from the widely acknowledge failure of efforts to further the philosophical understanding of punishment by the latter route is Nietzsche's: that the concept in question and the practices that fall under it are fundamentally insusceptible to ahistorical methods. I argue for the thesis proper in the first section of the paper, and explore consequences of it for our understanding of the connection between punishment and justice in the second. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nietzsche offers us an account of how different drives interact with one another; it is rich but also appears to risk the homunculus fallacy. Competing attempts to deflect this charge on his behalf share an implicit consensus about the 'epistemic ends' of the account: they assume Nietzsche is trying to provide true explanations of psychological phenomena. I argue against this consensus. I claim that Nietzsche's characterisations of drive interaction are to be taken as fictive and are not intended to have explanatory value. They nevertheless facilitate genuine epistemic achievement. Drawing on Catherine Elgin's account of the epistemic role of idealised models in science, I argue that Nietzsche's account of drive interaction is a 'model of the mind' that, despite relying on falsehoods, can exemplify features of our psychology that aid us in making novel predictions. We then see that Nietzsche neatly sidesteps the homunculus fallacy; we can further understand more fully what Nietzsche hopes his drive psychology will teach us. We can now resolve, for example, outstanding interpretative puzzles about the relationship between psychic integration and Nietzsche's distinctive notion of spiritual health. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]