Crime and punishment; drama and meaning: lessons from On the Genealogy of Morals II.

This paper takes up Nietzsche's contrast between a relatively enduring 'drama' of punishment, which consists in sequences of procedures, and a congeries of often discrepant meanings and purposes of the drama and contrasts it favorably with the distinction between a definition of punishment and a justification for it which received a good deal of attention in the middle of the twentieth century in anglophone philosophical circles. My chief thesis is that the philosophical lesson to be drawn from the widely acknowledge failure of efforts to further the philosophical understanding of punishment by the latter route is Nietzsche's: that the concept in question and the practices that fall under it are fundamentally insusceptible to ahistorical methods. I argue for the thesis proper in the first section of the paper, and explore consequences of it for our understanding of the connection between punishment and justice in the second. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]