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The article focuses on the limitations of the New York Times v. Sullivan decision in protecting democratic efficacy, arguing that the defamation tort primarily addresses the harm of democratic disempowerment rather than merely personal dignity. Topics include the inherent flaws in Sullivan's balance between free speech and defamation, the current impact of these flaws on democratic participation, and potential reforms to better protect both free expression and democratic engagement.

As a vocal minority increasingly airs their displeasure with the actual malice rule the U.S. Supreme Court established in New York Times v. Sullivan, media defense attorneys find themselves searching for way to pushback against the possible erosion of a key First Amendment protection for free speech. This article calls for a reconsideration of the “matter of public concern” standard that a plurality of the Court promulgated in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia. The article outlines the chief concerns brought by those who wish to reconsider the requirement that public officials and public figures prove reckless disregard for the truth to recover in defamation cases. Upon closer inspection, many of these concerns reflect a frustration with increasing criticism of public officials as well as procedural changes in addition to the actual malice standard that have made it more difficult for litigants to successfully sue for defamation. It argues the Rosenbloom standard strikes the proper balance between the protection for individual reputation and the ability to engage in meaningful public deliberation in a democratic society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conservative legal establishment is waging war on modern liberalism with Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization marking its most recent victory. Against this backdrop, this Article contends that attacks from the right on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan—the Court’s defining First Amendment decision that places political speech at the center of free speech doctrine—are motivated not by bona fide doctrinal disagreements but rather the cynical belief that the specter of defamation liability unrestrained by Sullivan will silence political opponents and, in turn, hasten the end of modern liberalism. So while the battle over Sullivan may not have the same partisan salience as attacks on Roe v. Wade, the political implications of overruling Sullivan are nevertheless vast. This Article confronts this troubling development. First, it tracks the politicization of defamation law in recent years, contextualizing it within the right’s broader war on modern liberalism and cataloging the likely consequences of overruling Sullivan. Second, it asserts that claims from the right that Sullivan is un-American and ahistorical are nothing more than self-serving projection meant to detract from the undemocratic and historically unsupported principles that underlie the right’s assault on Sullivan. In fact, this Article contends that Sullivan is quintessentially American—both ideologically and historically. Specifically, it asserts that Sullivan is the result of a long recognized duty of a citizen in this country to impeach public officials through critical political speech and, when necessary, even defamatory speech. In all of this, the fight over Sullivan is not about defamation law, but the basic right to govern ourselves at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article details the constitutionalizing of defamation of the U.S. Presidents. Topics include the development of the actual malice standard in the U.S. Supreme Court case New York Times v. Sullivan; former President Trump's history of filing defamation lawsuits as both a private citizen and President; and history of common law seditious libel and the First Amendment's impact on the government's legal authority to pursue defamation claims against its critics.

In its 1964 decision, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court held that, in order for defamation against a public official to be found, "actual malice" had to be established – that is, "that the statement was made ... with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not". The fairly clear and readily applicabile actual malice standard from Sullivan stands in contrast to the vaguer standards of analysis embodied in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This article aims to show certain limitations of that ECtHR jurisprudence by considering some of its most notable decisions. Considering cases of both civil and criminal defamation, it suggests that, had a standard similar to Sullivan been applied, these would have been decided differently, leading to better protection of the freedoms of authors and publishers.

This Article traces how and why the First Amendment has gone from a shield of the powerless to a sword of the powerful in the past hundred years. The central doctrinal role of "content neutrality" and "viewpoint neutrality" in this development is analyzed; the crucial tipping points of anti-Semitism, in Collin v. Smith, and pornography, in Hudnut v. American Booksellers, are identified. The potential for substantive equality to promote freedom of speech is glimpsed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, in 1964 and its significant impact on democracy in the U.S. It discusses the involvement of the "New York Times" magazine in defamation, the key role played by the media in the Civil Rights Movement in the U.S., and the Supreme Court's constraints on defamation law and the increase in influence of the magazine in the arrival of the Internet and social media.

The article focuses on assaults on First Amendment culture and ruling most responsible for narrowing libel law and limiting the success of public official plaintiffs was New York Times Co. v. Sullivan Co. and protection of speech and democracy cannot function.

The article discusses the efforts by U.S. courts to protect press freedom during crises by examining the cases New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and New York Times Co. v. U.S. (Pentagon Papers). Also cited are how the U.S. Supreme Court highlighted how the U.S. Constitution protect freedom of the press, the civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, and defamation law.

The article focuses on the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan on the tort of defamation to protect freedom of speech and press. It mentions that U.S. President Donald Trump has made defamation law a repeated theme of his public communications and calls to expand defamation law by removing safeguards and increasing money damages. It also mentions regulation of false advertising is believed to increase consumer confidence in the marketplace.

The article focuses on legal ethics issues for government lawyers in the U.S. Topics discussed include laws governing disciplinary consequence for lawyers who have engaged in criminal conduct under the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct; the U.S. President Donald Trump's relationship with intelligence agencies; and the U.S. Supreme Court case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan on defamation.

The article focuses on the influence of philosopher Immanuel Kant on the Chief Justice Warren Burger Court. Topics include philosopher John Rawls evolution of the Warren Court's First Amendment jurisprudence of political speech; Alexander Meiklejohn's influence on Justice William J. Brennan's understanding of the First Amendment; and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan court case on same.

The article focuses on constitutional history protecting freedom of press with respect to political issues in the U.S. Topics include balancing of First Amendment to U.S. Constitution rights with one's right to protect his reputation; the U.S. Supreme Court case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan on defamation; and legal regime of corporate compliance.

This Article endeavors to catalog and resolve cases involving competing free speech values, and then applies its solutions to violent and disruptive protests. Almost every First Amendment case can be framed as implicating free speech values on both sides of the First Amendment equation. Government action directly abridges speech, but government inaction may allow private parties too much control over others' speech. First Amendment doctrine, which generally protects speech only from suppression by state actors, can thus compromise the very free speech values that form the rationales for the First Amendment. Scholars and litigants have argued that government regulation of speech, to preserve free speech values, is necessary in areas ranging from campaign finance, to access to media resources, to bigoted speech. This Article argues that strict adherence to a formal state action doctrine should resolve most, but not all, clashes between free speech doctrine and values. A robust application of the state action doctrine-where government interference to preserve speech values is not considered as part of the First Amendment calculus--also best advances both formal and substantive First Amendment equality. This Article proceeds in three parts. First, the Article chronicles the Supreme Court's approach to cases involving competing free speech values. The Article then demonstrates why the state action doctrine, with its associated formal equality and neutrality principles, will ultimately advance free speech values. Finally, the Article considers political protests, and distinguishes between prosecution of violent protesters, which should be encouraged, and legislation criminalizing disruptive protest tactics, which may be unconstitutional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on challenges of distinction between constitutional construction and constitutional interpretation in the U.S. Topics discussed include New York Times Co. v. Sullivan court case which created a constitutional privilege that requires public officials suing for defamation to prove actual malice; challenges of faithful interpretations of the Constitution; and court case United States v. Lopez on Commerce Clause.

The article discusses Section 230 of the U.S. Communications Decency Act of 1996 in relation to the First Amendment to America's Constitution, legal protections for internet speech, and intermediary liability protection. The legal aspects of websites and internet users are addressed, along with secondary liability for defamation in the U.S. and the attitudes of judges and legal scholars. Several American constitutional law-related cases are examined, including New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.

When the right and duty to criticize government and its officials is under attack in the United States, the democracy is threatened. The idea of holding those in power accountable, and its origin, assume particular importance. While this “central meaning” of the First Amendment culminated with Justice William Brennan'sNew York Times Co. v. Sullivanopinion in 1964, the process of discovering that meaning actually began more than a century and a half before. Near the end of the eighteenth century, a political battle ensued over the meaning of the First Amendment. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 were signed into law by a chief executive who sought to control political criticism of him and the government over which he presided. This article focuses on the role of Thomas Jefferson in the resistance to these laws. This battle, according to Justice Brennan, “[F]irst crystalized a national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment.” This article posits that this conflict resulted in birth of the modern First Amendment – the discovery of its central meaning – and is premised on the notion that revisiting the events described herein is especially relevant within a period in which officials in high office threaten speech and press rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores evidence of a trend or shift in the outcome of libel and invasion of privacy cases against the press in the U.S. Topics discussed include the U.S. Supreme court's decision in the case "New York Times v. Sullivan;" difficulties in identifying the limits of the public figure category, once courts agreed to assign that fictional identity to more than just celebrities; and official acts of public officials to reporting on their private behavior.

The article focuses on the legal status of fake news in the U.S. Topics include background of defamation law; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan court case established the actual malice standard; and sticking balance between First Amendment rights to U.S. Constitution namely freedom of speech and individual's right to recover for unlawful harm of the reputation.

This article argues that media outlets should be completely immune from defamation suits initiated by a U.S. President. The article presents the current defamation standard for public officials and explores the history of tense President-press relations. It then argues that defamation lawsuits are a dangerous tool in the hands of a sitting President and that the potential for abuse of these lawsuits makes them inconsistent with the First Amendment. In support of this claim, the author offers several doctrinal and policy rationales for eliminating the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan standard with respect to a sitting President in favor of a zero-liability rule. In a political climate dominated by charges of "Fake News" and with the election of a notoriously litigious President, now is an opportune time to explore the implications of allowing a sitting President to bring a cause of action for defamation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers insight to the role of lawyer Fred Gray in promoting civil rights in the U.S. Topics discussed include lawyers participation in preventing civil rights; NAACP v. Alabama case addressing freedom of association; Gomillion v. Lightfoot court case addressing racial gerrymandering; and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan case on constitutionalizing the law of defamation.

The article focuses on the laws governing free speech and press in the U.S. Topics discussed include issues surrounding the identification of public figure category; invasion of privacy torts; and court cases New York Times v. Sullivan, Eramo v. Rolling Stone, LLC and Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC on the same.

Defamatory comments on social media have become commonplace. When the online community is outraged by some event, social media users often flood the Internet with hateful and false comments about the alleged perpetrator, feeling empowered by their numbers and anonymity. This wave of false and harmful information has caused many individuals to lose their jobs and suffer severe emotional trauma. This Comment explores whether the target of social media backlash can bring a successful defamation claim against the users who have destroyed their reputations on and offline. Notably, one of the biggest hurdles these plaintiffs will face is the public figure doctrine, which requires public figures to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defamatory statements were made with actual malice, a much higher standard than the usual negligence standard. This Comment concludes that courts should hold that the average social media user does not meet the public figure test and therefore only needs to prove the defamatory social media posts were made negligently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the frenzied run of presidential primaries in 2016, Republican nominee Donald Trump vowed to “open up” libel laws to make suing the media easier. This apparent attempt to resurrect seditious libel brought a flurry of debate about how American libel laws might be altered in this context. “We are going to have people sue you like you’ve never got sued before,” Trump said. This article seeks to rearticulate the landmarkNew York Times v. Sullivandecision as a case about social duty and the duty that is owed to journalists in an increasingly contentious political climate. I argue that protecting this right to criticize public officials and public figures is as important as ever in our democratic system.Sullivanwas a case about civil rights, about the right of African-American leaders and the media to cover and criticize how the police behaved in the 1960s when faced with the social revolution of the civil rights movement. This essay also focuses on three previously unstudied cases filed by police officers in the New York area in the 1960s.Sullivansecured our right to speak without a vindictive government bearing down on us via our legal system, but other cases decided outside the national spotlight suggest how that right was further cemented by the interaction of the media and the civil rights movement. Be it the brutality of police 50 years ago and today, or coverage of presidential candidates, I argue that journalists and the public are owed this right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Should lawyers be treated as public figures for purposes of defamation claims and, therefore, be subjected to a higher evidentiary standard of actual malice under the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan? The question of whether lawyers should be treated as public figures raises broad questions about the nature of defamation law and the legal profession. By examining the Supreme Court's defamation jurisprudence through the lens of cases involving lawyers as plaintiffs, one can see the deficiencies and inconsistencies in the Court's opinions more clearly. And by examining the Court's defamation cases through this lens, one can also see more clearly some of the complexities the legal profession now faces and its sometimes conflicting view of itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) laws apply in protection against defamation liability under the First Amendment in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision New York Times v. Sullivan. Topics discussed include anti-SLAPP statute violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, SLAPP suits are filed with the intention to intimidate, harass, censor and punish and goals of reducing the use of abusive litigation as method to suppress First Amendment.

The article focuses on the protection granted to free speech under U.S. Constitution First Amendment. Topics discussed include Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission court case on same; role of Roberts Supreme Court in delivering the same; and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan court case on same.

The article discusses several of the U.S. constitutional implications of libelous microblog statements that are published on the Twitter social networking service operated by the Twitter Inc. firm, and it mentions the authors' claim that these types of social media statements are known as twibel. U.S. libel, tort, and common laws are addressed, along with a malice legal standard and a defamation per se legal doctrine. Defamation law cases such as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan are examined.

The article offers information of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen G. Breyer and discusses his conceptions related to freedom of speech. Topics discussed include protection granted to freedom of speech under U.S. Constitution; attributes of Breyer's life prior to his Supreme Court appointment; and New York Times v. Sulliuan court case on same.

This Article jointly examines legal biographies of two landmark First Amendment decisions and the Justices who produced them. In The Great Dissent (Henry Holt and Co. 2013), Thomas Healy explores Oliver Wendell Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United States (1919), which arguably laid the cornerstone for modern American free speech jurisprudence. In The Progeny (ABA 2014), Stephen Wermiel and Lee Levine explore William J. Brennan's majority opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) and the development and evolution of its progeny over Brennan's remaining twenty-five years on the Court. The Article then explores three ideas: (1) the connections and intersections between these watershed opinions and their revered authors, including how Brennan in New York Times and its progeny brought to fruit the First Amendment seeds that Holmes planted in Abrams; (2) three recent Supreme Court decisions that show how deeply both decisions are engrained into the First Amendment fabric; and (3) how Brennan took the speech-protective lead in many other areas of First Amendment jurisprudence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a panel discussion on the protection of First Amendment substance by the U.S. First Amendment procedures held during the 2014 National Lawyers Convention in Washington, D.C. Topics include procedural rules such as the prior restraint and overbreadth doctrines and relaxation of ripeness rules, the civil harassment case New York Times v. Sullivan showing the interaction between free speech and due process issues, and the importance of good lawyering in First Amendment cases.

The article argues for reconsideration of free speech protections by asserting that speech about action and inaction of lower-level government employees in their official capacity to be protected under First Amendment. It mentions that lower-level government employees play important role in policy-making, public perception and governance and mentions decision taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in court cases New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Hutchinson v. Proxmire and the Rosenblatt v. Baer.

Justice William J. Brennan's opinion inNew York Times Co. v. Sullivanis widely recognized for many reasons, including, as articulated by Professor Harry Kalven, that it put “the First Amendment right side up for the first time” by identifying its “central meaning.” That meaning is the constitutional protection of speech critical of government and its officials – speech vital in a self-governing democracy. Justice Brennan's approach was derived, in part, from the writings of James Madison, to whom the justice refers generously throughout the opinion, and Alexander Meiklejohn, to whom Justice Brennan gave credit only after the fact. This article examines the philosophical lineage from Madison to Meiklejohn to Brennan, and does so through the lens of path dependence, a perspective that advocates that history matters. A critique of path dependence emerges. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses impact of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court on the case New York Times v. Sullivan on the legal and political community, role of the decision in signifying civil rights, and judicial opinion of the court on Brown v. Board of Education.

An essay is presented in which the author explores the impact of the decision on the U.S. Supreme Court case New York Times v. Sullivan on the religious clauses. Topics discussed include the laws emphasizing on the clauses for free speech and political expression, laws for defining sexual orientation, and the laws for the regulation of employee benefits.