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When, why, and how will political elites politicize issues related to international trade in the domestic political sphere? We argue that the welfare effects and complexity of a state's international trade policies affect the degree to which political elites will bring issues related to international trade into domestic discussions, as well as the way those discussions of trade are framed. Political elites are more likely to discuss international trade, in general, when the welfare effects of their state's trade policies are greater. Moreover, when a state's trade policies are more complex, political elites on the left are more likely to frame their discussions by highlighting the need for protectionist measures, while political elites on the right are more likely to frame their discussions by highlighting the benefits of free trade. We test this argument by analyzing the discussions of international trade put for by political elites in their party platforms. The results show that the welfare effects and complexity of a state's trade policies affect when, why, and how elites discuss international trade in the domestic political sphere. We conclude by highlighting the implications these results have for future research focusing on the creation of trade policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question of when and why states use issue linkage as a bargaining strategy - changing the set of issues that characterize the bargaining agenda. It argues that a state is likely to do so: (1) if the current set of issues does not foster an exchange of concessions that could lead to agreement, and (2) if a state faces a costly alternative to agreement,and thus places significant value on reaching an agreement. Empirical rules for measuring these abstract concepts are presented, and an original large-N dataset of multilateral climate change conferences held from 2007- 2010 is constructed to test these hypotheses. I then illustrate the hypothesized e ects at work with a case analysis of the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. I conclude by discussing the implications of these results for future work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When and why will states adopt more (or less) cooperative bargaining strategies? This question presents an empirical challenge because analyzing the effects of "structural" features of international negotiations (i.e., features of the bargaining "game") on state bargaining behavior requires that these factors be both theoretically and empirically exogenous from the bargaining strategies they seek to explain. To begin to address this question, this paper analyzes "structurally-constrained" international negotiations - negotiations in which states are constrained in their ability to alter central features of the bargaining game. The argument is then tested using a large-N dataset constructed from 146 interviews conducted with state negotiators involved in the decision-making process of the European Union - one of the central forms of structurally-constrained bargaining in the international system. The paper concludes by showing how this empirical analysis can contribute to the future study of both structurally-constrained and unconstrained bargaining in a broad range of international negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What role, if any, does political competition play in states' economic decision-makingprocesses? Most studies examining economic policies have tended to overlook this question,choosing to focus instead on questions of how economic policy preferences are formed, andrelying on an assumption that the relative reflection of different preferences in society translatesdirectly into policy outcomes. Addressing this question, I analyze the political decision-makingprocess using a 'bargaining' framework. Addressing the 'economic pluralist' literature, I arguethat the size of groups holding different preferences is a component of bargaining power, but it isnot sufficient, on its own to explain economic policy outcomes. Rather, group size interacts withother institutional components of bargaining power to influence states' economic policy choices.I then use this bargaining framework to analyze states' choice between exchange rate stabilityand monetary policy autonomy under a high degree of international capital mobility. Testingthis argument on this economic policy choice, I use a cross-sectional time-series statistical modelto analyze the economic policies of twenty-one OECD countries and interpret these findings. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do international institutions affect bargaining cooperation? I argue that international institutions can enhance bargaining cooperation by facilitating issue linkage. While institutions are often argued to promote issue linkage, the causal mechanisms connecting this process to increasing bargaining cooperation are undertheorized. Thus, I present a model that demonstrates how issue linkage can then lead to bargaining cooperation, defined as lessening the time it takes to reach a bargaining outcome. I modify the war of attrition model to create a new, step-wise bargaining model that takes into account to important aspects of a bargaining process – time delay and the possibility of third offers. A model of bargaining taking into account the introduction of third offers in addition to the time delay found in the war of attrition model, can be thought of as a bargaining model over time with various cut-points. These cut-points represent the addition of third offers, and change the bargaining process taking place. After each cutpoint, a new bargain over time will begin where the old bargain left off. Using this model, then, I show that international institutions can enhance bargaining cooperation by facilitating issue linkage, which increases costs to states to remain at the status quo and moves their relative bargaining positions closer together within a policy space. These two factors, then, lead to a decrease in the time it takes states to reach a bargaining agreement, and thus further bargaining cooperation. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What role, if any, does political competition play in states' economic decision-making processes? Most studies examining economic policies have tended to overlook this question, choosing to focus instead on questions of how economic policy preferences are formed, and relying on an assumption that the relative reflection of different preferences in society translates directly into policy outcomes. Addressing this question, I analyze the political decision-making process using a 'bargaining' framework. Within this context, I argue that rather than mere group size, the relative bargaining power of different societal preferences within the state institutions influences economic policy outcomes. Addressing the 'economic pluralist' literature, I show that the size of groups holding different preferences is a component of bargaining power, but it is not sufficient, on its own to explain economic policy outcomes. I then use this framework to examine one important economic policy choice highlighted by the Mundell-Flemming model - the choice between exchange rate stability and monetary policy autonomy under a high degree of international capital mobility. Testing this argument on this economic policy choice, I use a cross-sectional time-series statistical model to analyze the economic policies of twenty-one OECD countries and interpret these findings. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do representatives act upon the policy preferences of those they represent? I argue that the institutional position of representatives and the type of bargaining strategy that they use within the decision-making process interact in fundamental ways with important implications for the forwarding of preferences within a representational setting. In particular, I argue that understanding the different institutional positions of representatives through variations in the discretion of agents within a principal-agent context, ‘agential autonomy’ leads to integrative bargaining while ‘tight control’ leads to competitive bargaining. It is important to understand the conditions under which these different bargaining strategies are used, as they have important implications for the way interests are reflected in the agreement reached, as demonstrated by the literature of negotiation theory. To analyze this argument, I examine the case of Coreper I – a legislative body of the European Union. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]