The Effects of Structures and Power on State Bargaining Strategies.

When and why will states adopt more (or less) cooperative bargaining strategies? This question presents an empirical challenge because analyzing the effects of "structural" features of international negotiations (i.e., features of the bargaining "game") on state bargaining behavior requires that these factors be both theoretically and empirically exogenous from the bargaining strategies they seek to explain. To begin to address this question, this paper analyzes "structurally-constrained" international negotiations - negotiations in which states are constrained in their ability to alter central features of the bargaining game. The argument is then tested using a large-N dataset constructed from 146 interviews conducted with state negotiators involved in the decision-making process of the European Union - one of the central forms of structurally-constrained bargaining in the international system. The paper concludes by showing how this empirical analysis can contribute to the future study of both structurally-constrained and unconstrained bargaining in a broad range of international negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]