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Ross argued that false memory researchers misunderstand the concepts of repression and dissociation, as well as the writings of Freud. In this commentary, we show that Ross is wrong. He oversimplifies and misrepresents the literature on repressed and false memory. We rebut Ross by showing the fallacies underlying his arguments. For example, we adduce evidence showing that the notions of dissociation or repression are unnecessary to explain how people may forget and then remember childhood sexual abuse, stressing that abuse survivors may reinterpret childhood events later in life. Also, Ross overlooks previous critiques concerning dissociation. Finally, we will demonstrate that Ross misrepresents work by Freud and Loftus in the area of repressed and false memory. His article confuses, not clarifies, an already heated debate on the existence of repressed memory.

Previous research shows that manipulations (e.g. levels-of-processing) that facilitate true memory often increase susceptibility to false memory. An exception is the generation effect. Using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, Soraci et al. found that generating rather than reading list items led to an increase in true but not false memories. They argued that generation led to enhanced item-distinctiveness that drove down false memory production. In the current study, we investigated the effects of generative processing on valenced stimuli and after a delayed retention interval to examine factors that may lead to a generation effect that increases false memories. At the immediate test, false recognition rates for both negative and neutral valanced critical lures were similar across read and generate conditions. However, after a one-week delay, we saw a valence differentiation, with a generation effect for false recognition but only for negative stimuli. The roles of item-specific and relational processing during encoding and their interaction with long-term retention are discussed.

What does science tell us about memory phenomena such as false and repressed memories? This issue is highly pressing as incorrect knowledge about these memory phenomena might contribute to egregious effects in the courtroom such as false accusations of abuse. In the current article, we provide a succinct review of the scientific nature of false and repressed memories. We demonstrate that research has shown that about 30% of tested subjects formed false memories of autobiographical experiences. Furthermore, this empirical work has also revealed that such false memories can even be implanted for negative events and events that allegedly occurred repeatedly. Concerning the controversial topic of repressed memories, we show that plausible alternative explanations exist for why people claim to have forgotten traumatic experiences; explanations that do not require special memory mechanisms such as the unconscious blockage of traumatic memories. Finally, we demonstrate that people continue to believe that unconscious repression of traumatic incidents can exist. Disseminating scientifically articulated knowledge on the functioning of memory to contexts such as the courtroom is necessary as to prevent the occurrence of false accusations and miscarriages of justice. ispartof: MEMORY vol:30 issue:1 pages:16-21 ispartof: location:England status: published

General Audience Summary A bitter controversy exists surrounding the topic of therapy-induced false memories. Because of this controversy, memory scholars have devised several ways to create false memories. The "lost-in-the-mall" paradigm has become the popular procedure to implant false autobiographical memories. Although the paradigm is highly influential, the paradigm is time consuming and requires extensive training to interview participants and score participants' reports. Therefore, we offer an elegant new and straightforward paradigm to implant false autobiographical memories. Inspired by the memory blindness literature and because of the COVID-19 pandemic, we created a new paradigm that can be fully implemented online. In this paradigm, subjects receive a list of twenty autobiographical events including a critical false event (i.e., swimming trunks falling off), and have to indicate whether they ever experienced these events. Following a 1-week interval, participants stating that they did not experience the false event receive a second survey suggesting that they actually did experience the false event and stating that they experienced several true events. Participants have to provide, before and after receiving imagination instructions, belief and recollection ratings, and event-related details. In the present study, we also told one group that the false event happened once (Single group) while the other group was suggested that the event happened repeatedly (Repeated group). Depending on the memory type (e.g., false belief or false memory), false memory implantation ranged between 9% and 30%. Furthermore, false beliefs were most likely to be elicited in the Single group while false memory rates did not statistically differ between groups. This novel paradigm can offer new insights on how false autobiographical memories can be implanted.We offer an elegant new and straightforward paradigm to implant false autobiographical memories. Participants received 20 autobiographical events including a critical false event (i.e., swimsuit falling off) and had to indicate whether they ever experienced these events. After 1 week, participants who did not experience the false event received a second survey suggesting that they actually did experience the false event. Participants had to provide belief and recollection ratings and event-related details. Also, one group of participants was told that the false event happened once (Single group) while the other group was told that the event happened repeatedly (Repeated group). Depending on the memory type (e.g., false belief or false memory), false memory implantation ranged between 9% and 30%. Furthermore, false beliefs were most likely to be elicited in the Single group. This novel paradigm can offer new insights on how false autobiographical memories can be implanted.

The survival processing advantage refers to the finding that processing information according to its survival value improves memory retention. We used mass-testing across three experiments to examine whether the survival processing advantage could be extended to crime-related contexts when adopting both offender’s (Experiment 1 and 2) and victim’s (Experiment 3) perspectives. Interestingly, crime-related scenarios produced the lowest memory retention in Experiments 2 and 3, indicating no mnemonic benefit resulting from crimerelated processing. Furthermore, in Experiments 1 and 2, we failed to replicate the standard survival processing effect, while in Experiment 3 the superior survival memory retention emerged in comparison with the standard control conditions (i.e., moving and pleasantness). Overall, our experiments showed that crime-related contexts did not lead to superior memory retention. Moreover, although we detected some failures to replicate the survival processing effect, this evidence is not sufficiently compelling to argue that there was a general absence of the survival processing advantage.

Objectives The role of self in veridical memory has been extensively studied, but what is the role of self in false memory development across the life span? The current study examined the impact of self-reference on associative false memory in children, younger adults, and older adults, and further investigated possible mechanisms concerning how self-reference might affect false memory in different age groups. Methods Combining a self-reference manipulation with the Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm, children, younger adults, and older adults encoded DRM word lists as paired with their own name, another person’s name, or a red square. Later their true and false recognition memory as well as recollection and familiarity were measured. Results A self-enhanced false memory effect was found in all age groups. That is, participants generated more false memories in the self-reference condition relative to the other-reference and neutral conditions. Furthermore, when examining its underlying memory mechanisms, we found that self-reference mainly increased false recollection in younger adults but facilitated familiarity of critical lures in older adults. Discussion Although self-reference increases false memory in both younger and older adults, the underlying mechanisms are different in that older adults have more self-relevant false familiarity while younger adults generate more self-relevant phantom recollection. The current study also has implications for eyewitness reports, suggesting that the self-relevance of memory may be one relevant factor to consider when evaluating potential risk factors of false memory.

Expert witnesses and scholars sometimes disagree on whether suggestibility and compliance are related to people's tendency to falsely confess. Hence, the principal aim of this review was to amass the available evidence on the link between suggestibility and compliance and false confessions. We reviewed experimental data in which false confessions were experimentally evoked and suggestibility and compliance were measured. Furthermore, we reviewed field data of potential false confessions and their relationship with suggestibility and compliance. These diverse databases converge to the same conclusion. We unequivocally found that high levels of suggestibility (and to a lesser extent compliance) were associated with an increased vulnerability to falsely confess. Suggestibility measurements might be informative for expert witnesses who must evaluate the false confession potential in legal cases.

Early childhood events are rarely remembered in adulthood. In fact, memory for these early experiences declines during childhood itself. This holds regardless of whether these memories of autobiographical experiences are traumatic or mundane, everyday experiences. Indeed, what people tend to remember from their childhoods involves relatively innocuous experiences, ones often devoid of emotion. In this article, I provide an overview of the types of memories adults recall from their childhoods and the ages at which these memories are believed to have been formed. Along the way, I provide a brief exegesis of the neurobiological and cognitive underpinnings of early memory development. I will show that changes and growth in neural interconnectivity as well as the development of various cognitive structures (e.g., the inception of the cognitive self) help propel the emergence of a mature autobiographical memory system, one that can and does serve as a reconstructive base for remembering events that occur in later childhood and adulthood. During the course of this review, I detail the nature of early memories, their fragility, and the adaptive consequences of forgetting and supplanting these memories with newer, more age-appropriate experiences throughout childhood.

What does believing in repressed memory mean? In a recent article in this journal, Brewin, Li, Ntarantana, Unsworth, and McNeilis (2019, Study 3) argued that when people are asked to indicate their belief in repressed memory, they might actually think of deliberate memory suppression rather than unconscious repressed memory. They further argued that in contrast to belief in unconscious repressed memory, belief in deliberate memory suppression is not scientifically controversial. In this commentary, we show that they are incorrect on both counts. Although Brewin and colleagues surveyed people to indicate their belief in deliberate memory suppression, they neglected to ask their participants whether they (also) believed in unconscious repressed memory. We asked people from the general population whether they believed that traumatic experiences can be unconsciously repressed for many years and then recovered. In 2 studies of the general population, we found high endorsement rates (Study 1 [N = 230]: 59.2% [n = 45]; Study 2 [N = 79]: 67.1% [n = 53]) of the belief in unconscious repressed memory. These endorsement rates did not statistically differ from endorsement rates to statements on repressed memory and deliberate memory suppression. In contrast to what Brewin et al. argued, belief in unconscious repressed memory among lay people is alive and well. Finally, we contend that Brewin et al. overstated the scientific evidence bearing on deliberate repression (suppression). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

The United States – Mexico War (1846–1848) and the division of the two countries by both land and water boundaries changed the border landscape. One change was the establishment of International Bo...

Memories can have consequences on people’s eating behavior. In the current experiment, we examined the effect of belief versus recollection on food preferences and then investigated whether explicit belief (i.e., self- reported) or implicit belief (i.e., measured by an autobiographical implicit association test; aIAT) had a similar effect on food preferences. Participants (N = 163) were falsely told that they got sick after eating egg salad in their childhood and then received guided imagery to induce false beliefs/recollections concerning the food-aversive event. Half of the participants with false memories were debriefed and told that the event was false to reduce their belief in the event. Belief, not recollection regarding the food-aversive event, impacted participants’ food preferences. Furthermore, we found that explicit, but not implicit, belief predicted participants’ food preferences. The current results suggest that explicit judgments of belief in a memory may explain the consequences resulting from memories.

Memory is considered to be a flexible and reconstructive system. However, there is little experimental evidence demonstrating how associations are falsely constructed in memory, and even less is known about the role of the self in memory construction. We investigated whether false associations involving non-presented stimuli can be constructed in episodic memory and whether the self plays a role in such memory construction. In two experiments, we paired participants’ own names (i.e., self-reference) or the name “Adele” (i.e., other-reference) with words and pictures from Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) lists. We found that (1) participants not only falsely remembered the non-presented lure words and pictures as having been presented, but also misremembered that they were paired with their own name or “Adele,” depending on the referenced person of related DRM lists; and (2) there were more critical lure–self associations constructed in the self-reference condition than critical lure–other associations in the other-reference condition for word but not for picture stimuli. These results suggest a self-enhanced constructive effect that might be driven by both relational and item-specific processing. Our results support the spreading-activation account for constructive episodic memory.

Previous research has shown that with reduced attention at encoding, false recognition of critical lures for negative arousing DRM lists were higher than positive arousing lists. The current study extends this research to examine the role of attention for both arousing and nonarousing valenced false memory formation. Further, due to contradictory findings in past research, we examined attention at encoding using both within- (Experiment 1) and between-(Experiment 2) participants design. Participants were exposed to high and low arousing, valenced DRM lists under full and reduced attention conditions. Experiment 1 revealed that only negative arousing false memories were not affected by reduced attention at study, all other false memories decreased. In Experiment 2, although recognition of negative high arousing critical lures was higher, false memories increased in the reduced attention condition for all list types. Differences in attention during encoding affect the retrieval of emotional stimuli dependent on arousal and valence, however, our decision strategies can override the impact of this when it comes to retrieval.

We investigated the extent to which activation of specific information in associative networks during a memory task could facilitate subsequent analogical problem solving in healthy older adults as well as those with early onset Alzheimer’s disease. We also examined whether these priming effects were stronger when the activation of the critical solution term during the memory task occurred when the item was actually presented (true memories) or when this item arose due to spreading activation to a related but nonpresented item (false memory). Older adult controls (OACs) and people with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) were asked to solve 9 verbal proportional analogies, 3 of which had been primed by Deese/Roediger-McDermott lists where the critical lure (and problem solution) was presented as a word in the list (true memory), 3 of which were primed by DRM lists whose critical lures were spontaneously activated during list presentation (false memory), and 3 of which were unprimed. As expected, OACs were better (both in terms of speed and accuracy) at solving problems than people with AD and both groups were better when false memories were primes than when true memories were primes or there were no primes. There were no reliable differences between unprimed and true prime problems. These findings demonstrate that (a) priming of problem solutions extends to verbal proportional analogies in OACs and people with AD, (b) false memories are more effective at priming problem solutions than true memories, and (c) there are clear positive consequences to the production of false memories.

Memories of past experiences can guide our decisions. Thus, if memories are undermined or distorted, decision making should be affected. Nevertheless, little empirical research has been done to examine the role of memory in reinforcement decision-making. We hypothesized that if memories guide choices in a conditioning decision-making task, then manipulating these memories would result in a change of decision preferences to gain reward. We manipulated participants' memories by providing false feedback that their memory associations were wrong before they made decisions that could lead them to win money. Participants' memory ratings decreased significantly after receiving false feedback. More importantly, we found that false feedback led participants' decision bias to disappear after their memory associations were undermined. Our results suggest that reinforcement decision-making can be altered by false feedback on memories. The results are discussed using memory mechanisms such as spreading activation theories.

© The Author(s) 2018. Children are often viewed as poor eyewitnesses. Fact-finders, lawyers, and researchers assume that children are exceptionally prone to accept external suggestive (leading) questions and to create false memories. Is this assumption justified? This review will show it is not. First, studies on spontaneous false memories—elicited without any suggestive pressure—reveal that children are less likely than adults to produce them. Second, under certain circumstances, children are even less prone to accept external suggestions than adults. This counterintuitive finding happens when false suggestions contain information that is associatively related but in actuality not experienced by children or adults. Using empirically based interview protocols can maximize the retrieval of accurate memories in children and adults. Furthermore, expert witnesses should use alternative scenarios to better evaluate whether statements by children or adults are based on truth or fiction. ispartof: Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences. vol:6 issue:1 pages:87-93 status: published

The current experiment examined the effect of forewarning on children's (11 to 12 years of age) and adults' spontaneous false memory creation by presenting participants with semantically related word lists that are often used to elicit false memories (i.e., Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm). The forewarning consisted of an explanation of the false memory effect and a demonstration of a DRM word list and an associated recognition task. It was hypothesized that children would have fewer false memories than adults using the DRM paradigm and that forewarning would reduce the number of critical lures remembered by children and adults. We found a developmental reversal effect in that children had lower false memory levels than adults and that forewarning reduced, but did not eliminate, false memory propensity in both children and adults. Our findings further indicated that forewarning was more effective in reducing false memory levels in 11- to 12-year-old children than in adults. Finally, analyses revealed that participants were more accurate when they received a forewarning as compared to when they did not.

On the basis of converging research, we concluded that the controversial topic of unconscious blockage of psychological trauma (i.e., repressed memory) remains very much alive in clinical, legal, and academic contexts. In his commentary, Brewin (this issue, p. 443) conducted a cocitation analysis and concluded that scholars do not adhere to the concept of unconscious repression. Furthermore, he argued that previous survey research did not specifically assess unconscious repression. Here, we present critical evidence that runs counter to his claims. First, we inspected his cocitation analysis and found that some scholars support notions that are closely related to unconscious repression. Furthermore, we conducted another analysis on the basis of articles' similarity. Again, we found examples of scholars specifically endorsing unconscious repressed memories. Second, as opposed to what Brewin reports, recent survey research now exists that bears directly on people's beliefs regarding unconscious repression. This work reveals that large percentages of people (e.g., students and eye-movement desensitization and reprocessing [EMDR] clinicians) endorse the concept of unconscious repressed memories. The belief in unconscious repressed memory can continue to contribute to harmful consequences in clinical, legal, and academic domains (e.g., false accusations of abuse). ispartof: PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE vol:16 issue:2 pages:454-460 ispartof: location:United States status: published

Memories of the past can guide humans to avoid harm. The logical consequence of this is if memories are changed, avoidance behavior should be affected. More than 80 years of false memory research has shown that people's memory can be re-constructed or distorted by receiving suggestive false feedback. The current study examined whether manipulating people's memories of learned associations would impact fear related behavior. A modified sensory preconditioning paradigm of fear learning was used. Critically, in a memory test after fear learning, participants received verbal false feedback to change their memory associations. After receiving the false feedback, participants' beliefs and memories ratings for learned associations decreased significantly compared to the no feedback condition. Furthermore, in the false feedback condition, participants no longer showed avoidance to fear conditioned stimuli and relevant subjective fear ratings dropped significantly. Our results suggest that manipulating memory associations might minimize avoidance behavior in fear conditioning. These data also highlight the role of memory in higher order conditioning. ispartof: FRONTIERS IN BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE vol:15 ispartof: location:Switzerland status: published

People sometimes falsely deny having experienced an event. In the current experiments, we examined the effect of false denials on forgetting and false memory formation. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with emotionally-negative and neutral associatively related word lists known to engender false memories. After encoding, half of the participants had to falsely deny having seen the words while the other half had to tell the truth. During a final memory test (recall or source monitoring task), participants who falsely denied forgot that they discussed certain words with an experimenter. Furthermore, the act of falsely denying reduced the formation of false memories. These results were partially replicated in Experiment 2 where participants also had to re-learn several words and received a second memory task. This latter design feature diminished the effect of false denials on false memory creation. Our experiments suggest that false denials not only have negative consequences (forgetting), but can have positive ones too (reduction in false memories).

We examined the impact of social feedback and objective false evidence on belief in occurrence, belief in accuracy, and recollection of an autobiographical experience. Participants viewed six virtual scenes (e.g., park) and were tested on their belief/recollection. After 1-week, participants were randomly assigned to four groups. One group received social feedback that one scene was not experienced. A second group received objective false evidence that one of the scenes was not shown. A third group received both social feedback and objective false evidence and the control group did not receive any manipulation. Belief in occurrence dropped considerably in the social feedback group and in the combined group. Also, nonbelieved memories were most likely to occur in participants receiving both social feedback and objective false evidence. We show that social feedback and objective false evidence undermine belief in occurrence, but that they leave belief in accuracy and recollection unaffected.

We examined aging effects in reconsolidation and interference in episodic memory by reactivating memories for well-learned items in young and healthy older adults while controlling memory strength and the degree semantic processes contributed to memory. In Experiment 1, young and old adults learned pairs of real words and images to a strict criterion. After 24-hours, half of the images were reactivated and new words were paired with the images and learned to criterion. Following a 1-week delay, recognition and source monitoring were measured for both sets of pairings. Experiment 2 was a replication of Experiment 1, but using previously unknown novel words and unusual images. As predicted, older adults needed more trials to learn both the ASB and ASC pairings. Older adults required more trials to learn the new associations for reactivated than the not reactivated pairs, although there was no main effect of reactivation and no Age x Reactivation interaction for measures of recognition one-week later. These results are inconsistent with previous findings concerning age differences in reactivation effects in episodic memory. Instead, they suggest that once memory strength and input from semantic memory are better controlled, young and old adults perform similarly on tests of long-term recognition memory.

It is well established that processing information in relation to oneself (i.e., self-referencing) leads to better memory for that information than processing that same information in relation to others (i.e., other-referencing). However, it is unknown whether self-referencing also leads to more false memories than other-referencing does. In the current two experiments with European and East Asian samples, we presented participants the Deese–Roediger–McDermott lists together with their own name or other people’s name (i.e., “Trump” in Experiment 1 and “Li Ming” in Experiment 2). We found consistent results across the two experiments; that is, in the self-reference condition, participants had higher true and false memory rates compared with those in the other-reference condition. Moreover, we found that self-referencing did not exhibit superior mnemonic advantage in terms of net accuracy compared with other-referencing and neutral conditions. These findings are discussed in terms of theoretical frameworks such as spreading activation theories and the fuzzy-trace theory. We propose that our results reflect the adaptive nature of memory in the sense that cognitive processes that increase mnemonic efficiency may also increase susceptibility to associative false memories. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (10.3758/s13421-018-0851-3) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

The concept of denial has its roots in psychoanalysis. Denial has been assumed to be effective in blocking unwanted memories. In two experiments, we report that denial has unique consequences for remembering. In our two experiments, participants viewed a video of a theft, and half of the participants had to deny seeing certain details in the video, whereas the other half had to tell the truth. One day later, all participants were given either a source-monitoring recognition or a recall task. In these tasks, they were instructed to indicate (1) whether they could remember talking about certain details and (2) whether they could recollect seeing those details in the video. In both experiments, we found that denial made participants forget that they had talked about these details, while leaving memory for the video itself unaffected. This denial-induced forgetting was evident for both the source-monitoring recognition and recall tests. Furthermore, when we asked participants after the experiment whether they could still not remember talking about these details, those who had to deny were most likely to report that they had forgotten talking about the details. In contrast to a widely held belief, we show that denial does not impair memory for the experienced stimuli, but that it has a unique ability to undermine memory for what has been talked about.

False memories can result in severe legal consequences including the imprisonment of innocent people. False memory in eyewitnesses is the largest factor contributing to miscarriages of justice in the United States. To date, no study has focused on how false memories might play a role in the Chinese legal system. The purpose of this review is to summarize the latest findings on false memory and eyewitness testimony in the literature, and to shed some light on how the Chinese legal system may incorporate these experiences into practice. Overall, false memories of eyewitnesses are generated either by external misleading information or by internal cognitive processes; false memories may guide police investigations in the wrong direction or cause eyewitnesses to misidentify an innocent person as the perpetrator. We conclude that specially designed interview protocols such as the Cognitive Interview, warnings given to eyewitnesses, and blind lineup administration may prevent or lower the risk of false memory occurrence.

In child custody cases, children oftentimes provide allegations of experienced trauma against one of their parents. Such allegations can happen before any investigative interviews (e.g., by the police or child protective services) have taken place. A central theme here concerns how to appraise such allegations and make certain that children's accounts are taken seriously. In the current special issue, the focus is on new work on the functioning of children's memory and its relation to trauma or work on children's suggestibility and memory when they are traumatized. Specifically, key experts in the field of children's memory provided contributions on: (1) the impact of interviewer support and rapport building on children's testimonies, (2) the role of parental alienation in children's testimonial accuracy, and (3) different types of false memories in children's memory reports.

We examined whether typical developmental trends in suggestion-induced false memories (i.e., age-related decrease) could be changed. Using theoretical principles from the spontaneous false memory field, we adapted 2 often-used false memory procedures: misinformation (Experiment 1) and memory conformity (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, 7- to 9-year-old children (n = 33) and adults (n = 39) received stories containing associatively related details. They then listened to misinformation in the form of short narratives preserving the meaning of the story. Children and adults were equally susceptible to the misinformation effect. In Experiment 2, younger (7- to 8-year-olds, n = 30) and older (11- to 12-year-olds, n = 30) children and adults (n = 30) viewed pictures containing associatively related details. They viewed these pictures in pairs. Although the pictures differed, participants believed they had viewed the same pictures. Participants had to report what they could recollect during collaborative and individual recall tests. Children and adults were equally susceptible to memory conformity effects. When correcting for response bias, adults' false memory scores were even higher than children's. Our results show that age trends in suggestion-induced false memories are not developmentally invariant. (PsycINFO Database Record

Expert witnesses can play a major role in legal cases concerning the reliability of statements. Abuse cases frequently contain only the memories of eyewitnesses/victims without the presence of physical evidence. Here, it is of the utmost importance that expert witnesses use scientific evidence for their expert opinion. In this case report, a case is described in which 20 children reported being sexually abused by the same teachers at their elementary school. The investigative steps that were taken by the police and school authorities are reviewed, including how they probably affected memory. In order to provide a sound expert opinion regarding the reliability of these statements, three recommendations are proposed. To reduce the effect of confirmation bias and increase objectivity, it is argued that expert witnesses' reports should contain alternative scenarios, be checked by another expert, and focus on the origin and context of the first statement.

In the current experiments, we attempted to elicit nonbelieved memories (NBMs) using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm. Furthermore, by using this approach, we explored the consequences of nonbelieved true and false memories. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants received several DRM wordlists and were presented with a recognition task. After the recognition task, participants' statements were contradicted by giving them feedback about true and false items. In this way, we succeeded in eliciting nonbelieved true and false memories. In Experiment 2, participants were also involved in a modified perceptual closure task after receiving belief-relevant feedback. In this task, participants received degraded visual representations of words (e.g., false and true) that became clearer over time. Participants had to identify them as fast as possible. We also measured dissociation, compliance, and social desirability. We found that undermining belief had contrasting consequences for true and false memories. That is, nonbelieved true memories were identified more slowly whereas nonbelieved false memories were identified more quickly. We did not find any relation between our individual differences measures and the formation of NBMs.

We show that, in contrast to Brewin, Li, Ntarantana, Unsowrth, and McNeilis (2019), large proportions of laypersons believe in the scientifically controversial phenomenon of unconscious repressed memories. We provide new survey data showing that when participants are asked specific questions about what they mean when they report that traumatic memories can be repressed, most provide answers strongly consistent with unconscious repression. Our findings continue to show that researchers, legal professionals, and clinicians should be wary of invoking unconscious repression in their work. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved). ispartof: JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-GENERAL vol:149 issue:10 pages:2005-2006 ispartof: location:United States status: published

One vexing problem that many researchers face when attempting to publish their research in prominent, peer-reviewed scientific journals is that data are more likely to be published when they reveal...

Can purely psychological trauma lead to a complete blockage of autobiographical memories? This long-standing question about the existence of repressed memories has been at the heart of one of the most heated debates in modern psychology. These so-called memory wars originated in the 1990s, and many scholars have assumed that they are over. We demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect and that the controversial issue of repressed memories is alive and well and may even be on the rise. We review converging research and data from legal cases indicating that the topic of repressed memories remains active in clinical, legal, and academic settings. We show that the belief in repressed memories occurs on a nontrivial scale (58%) and appears to have increased among clinical psychologists since the 1990s. We also demonstrate that the scientifically controversial concept of dissociative amnesia, which we argue is a substitute term for memory repression, has gained in popularity. Finally, we review work on the adverse side effects of certain psychotherapeutic techniques, some of which may be linked to the recovery of repressed memories. The memory wars have not vanished. They have continued to endure and contribute to potentially damaging consequences in clinical, legal, and academic contexts. ispartof: PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE vol:14 issue:6 pages:1072-1095 ispartof: location:United States status: published

In two experiments we investigated whether older adult controls (OACs) and people with mild and moderate Alzheimer's disease (AD) benefit from false memory priming effects in subsequent problem-solving tasks. In addition, and unlike in previous false memory priming studies with older adults, we examined latency measures in the recognition phase. In Experiment 1 participants were asked to solve compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems, half of which had been preceded by the presentation of Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists whose critical lures (CLs) were also the solutions to those problems. In Experiment 2, we used a similar paradigm but investigated whether CLs could prime solutions to subsequent analogical reasoning problems. In this latter experiment, we also examined whether these priming effects were stronger when the activation of the CL term occurred during the memory task (was presented as part of the list; i.e., true memories) or when these items were not presented but arose during encoding due to spreading activation (i.e., false memories). We found that all three groups' performance on these tasks was facilitated only by false memories spontaneously generated from the prior presentation of DRM lists. That is, performance on CRATs and analogical reasoning tasks was better (greater accuracy and faster speed) when those problems were preceded by DRM lists whose CLs also served as the solution to those problems. These findings are consistent with previous results from studies with children, young adults, and older adults and extends them to people with more moderate AD.

Memory frequently provides key evidence in the courtroom. Whether children or adults are providing this evidence, all memory reports contain details of past experiences—ones that have usually happe...

We recently made the case that associative activation is a viable mechanism underlying false memory formation and hence also false memory formation in psychopathology. In a recent issue of Clinical Psychological Science, Tryon argued that our description of associative activation did not meet the criteria of causation and explanatory value in order to qualify as a mechanism. In this commentary, we explain why we disagree with Tryon. Many studies focused on associative activation and false memory creation. We believe that these studies provide good arguments for associative activation as a likely causal antecedent in the production of false memories.

We examined whether memories for personally chosen brands could be altered by retroactive exposure to less-liked competitor brands embedded in manipulated photographs. In addition, we investigated whether memory errors would lead to preference change for falsely remembered brands. Fifty participants were asked to compile their personal 'brand lifestyle basket', which was then captured in a photo showing the basket and participant. After 1week, participants were exposed to the photograph in which some of the originally chosen brands were replaced by different brands of the same category. Results of a memory test revealed a robust misinformation effect. The analysis of premanipulation and postmanipulation preference ratings indicated a positive shift in attitude and behaviour towards falsely accepted misinformation brands. Our findings contribute to what we know about the behavioural consequences of false memories and extend the generalizability of false memory effects to what might be considered a futuristic advertising measure.

Research has shown that false-memory production is enhanced for material that is emotionally congruent with the mood of the participant at the time of encoding. So far this research has only been conducted to examine the influence of generic negative affective mood states and generic negative stimuli on false-memory production. In addition, much of the research is limited as it focuses on valence and arousal dimensions, and fails to take into account the more comprehensive nature of emotions. The current study demonstrates that this effect goes beyond general negative or positive moods and acts at a more discrete emotional level. Participants underwent a standard emotion-induction procedure before listening to negative emotional or neutral associative word lists. The emotions induced, negative word lists, and associated nonpresented critical lures, were related to either fear or anger, 2 negative valence emotions that are also both high in arousal. Results showed that when valence and arousal are controlled for, false memories are more likely to be produced for discrete emotionally congruent compared with incongruent materials. These results support spreading activation theories of false remembering and add to our understanding of the adaptive nature of false-memory production. (PsycINFO Database Record