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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to share research data from the Financial Intelligence sector on trade-based money laundering (TBML), as a way to better inform banking risk assessment and the submission of suspicious activity reports (SARs).Design/methodology/approach The research data formed part of a bigger project on TBML banking risk assessment for improving the detection of TBML activity. This paper analysed the data from an online survey carried out among the financial intelligence staff from financial intelligence units (FIUs) and some external financial intelligence agencies. The aim was to determine which areas of banking SARs needed to be improved or enhanced to support FIU investigations.Findings The research found that FIUs do use the data supplied to them, in particular the SARs. The research also found that more data would be appreciated from banks especially in relation to beneficial ownership information and politically exposed persons data. The findings highlighted that contact between banks and FIUs was limited and restricted to a couple of key individuals, whereas the increased requirement for intelligence and more data would suggest that this relationship needs to be expanded and strengthened.Research limitations/implications The main limitation was the restricted scope of the survey (only focussed on TBML) and was broad in depth, and perhaps a local FIU survey would be useful to look at specific country recommendations. Similar research also needs to be conducted on other forms of ML activity. The research identified the need for more information on beneficial ownership information; however, other work needs to be done on how exactly banks can access this data.Practical implications The main outcome from the research was the need for SARs to contain more detailed information on beneficial ownership and politically exposed persons data. This needs to be incorporated into a specific risk assessment tool for TBML that considers not only the client but also relevant business partners and silent partners/shell companies used by the client. This research is part of a bigger research project that has developed a risk matrix tool for TBML and can be linked into this work.Originality/value The paper used original data collected by the researcher from 49 FIU and financial intelligence staff across the globe. The timely presentation of the results and the nature of the sample means that this is relevant and useful data to be presented to the banking sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses international law related to money laundering, with information on the role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in investigative and adjudicative jurisdiction. Topics include the Financial Action Task Force for international investigation of financial crimes, the need for an international statute against money laundering, and criminal provisions by the U.S. PATRIOT Act of 2002, an amendment of the U.S. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986.

Abstract: Criminal analysis is a complex process involving information gathered from different sources, mainly of quantitative character, such as billings or bank account transactions, but also of qualitative character such as eyewitnesses'' testimonies. Due to the massive nature of this information, operational or investigation activities can be vastly improved when supported by dedicated techniques and tools. The system supporting the police analyst in the process of detecting money laundering is presented in this paper. The main parts of the system are data importer and analyzing algorithms, such as transaction mining algorithm and frequent pattern mining algorithms. The results obtained with the use of these algorithms can be visualized, so that they can be easily explored by the police analyst. The transactions found can be treated as suspected operations. The frequent patterns found are mainly used to identify the roles of suspected entities. For the transaction mining algorithm a performance study is also presented. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The article reports on the investigation conducted by the Lok Sabha Parliament in India regarding the emergence of black money in the country in 2011. It says that former Deputy Prime Minister Shri L. K. Advani expressed concerns on the increase of black money deposited in foreign banks following the economic liberalization in the country. Moreover, Advani urged all political candidates to disclose their foreign bank accounts for verification.

This article examines dynamics of financial surveillance and risk-based regulation in the context of ongoing activities to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Close analysis of the situation in the UK reveals entangled forms of co-regulation and ultimately co-production of surveillance that challenge ‘institutional boundaries’ of the state regarding policing and intelligence practices. It is argued that ongoing transformations in the anti-money laundering field reveal a dual movement that combines forms of indirect administration with a process of ‘neoliberal bureaucratization’. The article aims to show how current policies against ‘dirty money’ still paradoxically work on the basis of heterogeneous goals and misapprehensions between ‘professionals of security’ and ‘professionals of finance’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on how judges have been implementing the Santos decision to current money laundering cases and the efforts to use the Court's definition of proceeds in the U.S. It states that Justice Scalia has searched for context in the money-laundering statute and the word proceeds is pelted through 1956. Furthermore, the statute seems to make sense applying either one of the definitions.

The article presents a study which analyzes several issues concerning the money laundering offence of concealing or disguising criminal property that are not yet explored by the courts in Great Britain. The study uses case law from the U.S. to understand the underlying concepts of the disguising or concealing offence. It cites that several issues that have been explored in the U.S. jurisprudence also arises in Great Britain's criminal proceeding.

The article presents a study evaluating the efficiency of national suspicious transaction report (STR) systems of Switzerland. It discusses the questionable reputation of the Swiss STR system due to reports of suspicious transactions. It states that the lack of reliable statistics concerning money laundering limits the national STR systems' evaluation. It also features the possible contribution of STRs in revealing terrorism finances.

The article presents a study which examines the extent to which the financial measures contained in the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002 and the Serious and Organised Crime and Policing Act 2005 are actually used against the threat of anti-money laundering in Great Britain. According to the results, the POCA powers were used against the alleged threat only on a small minority and number of occassions. The study found that the financial measures contained in the pre- and post-POCA anti-money laundering and assets recovery regime have had an effect on individual criminals and individual organized crime groups in the years they have been operational.

The article presents a study which examines the compliance officers' practices and challenges and the effectiveness of their input in the anti-money laundering (AML) chain in Belgium. The actual results of the fight against money laundering are also discussed. The study found that the function of compliance officer implies a number of challenges or growing pains such as problematic access to information, lack of feedback from the authorities and limited investigative means. According to the research, the outcome of the AML chain seems modest although the investments of private organizations in AML have been substantial.

This article responds to criticism of the author's work on the problem of money laundering by the scholar Ian Roberge in the article "Bringing the United States Back in: A Response to Rainer Hülsse's 'Creating Demand for Global Governance." The author disagrees with Roberg's account of constructivism and the role of the U.S. in the development of money laundering investigation mechanisms by the Financial Action Task Force. The role of persuasion and the development of an intellectual account of the damage that money laundering causes in international economic relations is emphasised.

This article, which is a response to the article "Creating Demand for Global Governance: The Making of a Global Money Laundering Problem" by Rainer Hülsse, presents the establishment of the Financial Action Task Force as The author questions Hülsse's argument that the development of the FATF preceded the establishment of the fact that money laundering was an issue requiring multilateral changes to governance. The author presents the case that money laundering is an issue faced by the U.S. that can only be dealt with multilaterally.

Efforts to prevent and preempt further terrorist attacks in the United States and other developed countries have intruded into many spheres of public and private life. This article provides a short assessment of the redeployment of anti-money laundering regimes to combat the financing of terrorism. This expansion of financial surveillance is directed by international organizations and domestic legislation in the belief that terrorists and their financiers may be found, identified and detained. After providing background to the anti-money laundering regime, the article looks at the domestic and extraterritorial application of the USA PATRIOT Act. One conclusion of this analysis finds that a financial panopticon has coalesced out of the wide range of financial and non-financial businesses now required to report “suspicious financial activity.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the issue related to the regulatory scheme of check cashers in the U.S. It is said that the problem was brought by the financial safe haven for several individuals that are legally convicted of money laundering without detection of the Federal government. For such reasons, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the Department of Treasury has adopted three regulations that include the created Geographic Targeting Order, the amendment of Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) requirements and amend Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements.

The article outlines the requirements and exceptions in complying with the present filing system of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), shows the failures of the system, and gives suggestions in order to solve these concerns. The BSA aims to seek information on the investigation of money laundering by requiring financial institutions to submit Currency Transaction Reports and Suspicious Activity Reports to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Due to the fact that FinCEN and the Government Accountability Office have seen that a large percentage of filings are of little relevance to the detection of financial crime, financial institutions suggest a regulatory relief through a revised exemption process in order for banks to exempt business customers more easily.

The article features the financial-intelligent unit (FIU) in Australia and India. FIU is a central agency established by the government to receive, analyze and disseminate financial information to combat money laundering. It is an agency responsible for receiving and giving critical information concerning suspected proceeds of crime and potential financing of terrorism or required by national legislation or regulation. In June 2006, it has 101 members but after the 9/11 attacks, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a multi-disciplinary body that brings together legal, financial and law-enforcement experts organized by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), required countries to establish a FIU.

The article discusses the risk-related deconstruction of anti-money laundering (AML) in European Union's 3rd directive. It notes that risk is a common factor in any system and AML is no exception and issues surrounding risk and risk-based approach in the AML domain were exaggerated when Basel II elaborated the prevalent notions of credit, market and operational risk but the qualitative nature of operational risk tends to confuse quantifiable credit and market risk. The 3rd AML Directive states that member states that can focus its monitoring activities to natural and legal persons that are exposed to a relatively high-risk of money laundering or terrorist financing in accordance with the principle of risk-based supervision.

The article cites a study that analyses the factors supporting the pervasiveness of money laundering. It is noted that the study was conducted on 88 developed and developing countries for the year 2004-2005. The study showed that the pervasiveness of money laundering activities can be lowered through efficient legal framework with good corporate governance. It was also found that the pervasiveness of money laundering activities can be controlled to some extent through a high-innovative capacity. It is noted that the study lacked the quality data measuring pervasiveness of money laundering patterns over a long period of time.

Money laundering is now criminalized under Article 216 dealing with "Legislation of money or property acquired in a criminal way". There is a common characteristic of money laundering reviewed in this article also problems of fight against this crime are brought to light. Money laundering is analyzed from the point of view of criminal law. The laws of Republic of Lithuania which set a penal amenability are discussed. They are compared with corresponding laws of foreign countries. The greatest importance is attached to the legal regulation of fight against money laundering in our Republic and in the world. Money laundering prevention measures and international cooperation when solving this matter is reviewed. The author presented the legal crime construction of money laundering, which must be proved in court. Also the author analyzed the main objective and subjective features of the money laundering, such as financial operations with money or property acquired in criminal way; concludes the agreements, uses them in economic or commercial activity or makes a fraudulent declaration that they are derived from legal activity, for the purposes of concealing or legitimizing these proceeds. The author also explained that article 216 was subsequently amended in 2004 with the new wording knowing that money or property acquired in a criminal way. In the article author presented the conception of the delimitation legislation of money or property acquired in a criminal way and acquirement or realization of property obtained from criminal activity. Also the author shows that the money laundering in Lithuania is criminalized in line with the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the Vienna Convention), and the United Nations Convention against transnational organized crime (the Palermo Convention). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes the UK’s anti-money laundering and asset recovery laws and the aims and objectives behind the regime since the introduction of the Proceeds of Crime Act in 2002. It then evaluates the regime in terms of the amount of criminal assets recovered, its application against organised crime and its impact upon the price of illegal drugs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a study in domestic and international measures against money laundering in Great Britain. It investigates anti-money laundering measures and the activities of regulatory and professional bodies. Results show that money laundering and terrorist financing remain as threatening issues despite of the efforts and cooperation of the governments, law enforcement agencies, professional bodies and private financial institutions.

Purpose - The aim of this paper Is to outline some key features of China's new rules on anti-money laundering. Design/methodology/approach - This paper describes the expanded definition of "anti-money laundering"; the application of the rules to a broader group of financial institutions; the three required anti-money laundering systems (client identity recognition, retention of client identity documents and trading records, and reporting of large-sum transactions and suspicious transactions); the expected manner of anti-money laundering investigations by the Peopled Bank of China; liabilities for breach; and anti-money laundering regulations in the insurance and securities sectors. Findings - The paper finds that new anti-money laundering rules expand the definition of "anti-money laundering" broaden the scope of institutions to which anti-money laundering regulations apply, and establish more stringent requirements for the three key internal anti-money laundering systems that financial institutions and certain non-financial institutions must have: client identity recognition, retention of client identity documents and trading records, and reporting of large-sum transactions and suspscious transactions. Compared to the old rules, the new anti-money laundering rules impose more serious punishment on violations. Originality/value - The paper provides a detailed and readable reference on the new Chinese anti-money laundering regulations for those working in the China market and those who wish to compare these Chinese regulations with similar ones in other countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist finance (AML/CTF) legislation in Great Britain. It briefly describes the AML/CTF policies and investigates its alleged negative impact on individuals, groups or sectors within the country. It assesses the credibility of claims that AML/CTF has increased financial exclusion that caused difficulty for people to send remittances abroad and damaged Islamic charities and civil society generally as part of a neo-colonial/neo-liberal plan.

Presents information on anti-money laundering laws and regulations as of 2004. Stages in the process of money laundering; Money laundering offences pursuant to the British 2002 Proceeds of Crime Act; List of terrorist-related money laundering offences.

Examines the anti-money laundering legislation in Mexico. Provisions of the legislation; Problems with the legislation; Information on a system of suspicious transaction monitoring.

Analyzes the various means available to United States authorities for obtaining foreign evidence and other types of international assistance in money laundering cases. Types of assistance available under mutual legal assistance treaties; Compulsory measures to obtain foreign evidence; Way to obtain foreign information for money laundering matters from the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and International Criminal Police Organization.

Examines the features of money-laundering sting operations carried out in the U.S. and Great Britain. Types of money laundering sting; Objectives that may be accomplished with the use of money-laundering stings; Categories of British money-laundering offenses; Factors that can be considered by a trial judge in determining whether the evidence of the undercover operation should be excluded.