Search

Draft lottery number assignment during the Vietnam Era provides a natural experiment to examine the effects of military service on crime. Using exact dates of birth for inmates in state and federal prisons in 1979, 1986, and 1991, we find that draft eligibility increases incarceration for violent crimes but decreases incarceration for nonviolent crimes among whites. This is particularly evident in 1979, where two-sample instrumental variable estimates indicate that military service increases the probability of incarceration for a violent crime by 0.34 percentage points and decreases the probability of incarceration for a nonviolent crime by 0.30 percentage points. We conduct two falsification tests, one that applies each of the three binding lotteries to unaffected cohorts and another that considers the effects of lotteries that were not used to draft servicemen. (JEL K42, H56), I. INTRODUCTION 'CRIMINALS ARE MADE, NOT BORN.' --Stenciled sign left behind by Michigan school board member and suicidal mass murderer Andrew Kehoe after killing 45 people, mostly school children. Understanding [...]

A study focusing on syndicate play and using social network perspective to explain the reasons people play the lottery is presented. The lottery tickets due to an institutionalization process do not just symbolize economic assets, but are symbolic carriers of interpersonal ties that convey membership and status position.

A Gibbad-Satterhwaite type theorem is established for examining random decision rules that examine ties. These rules use full information on how individuals rank lotteries and sets of outcomes.

First version received July 1997; final version accepted October 1999 (Eds.) When viewed as taxes, lotteries are routinely criticized as being both inequitable and inefficient. But is this an entirely fair comparison? Frequently lotteries are used in lieu of voluntary contributions by private charities and governments when taxes are not feasible. When heterogeneous individuals with quasi-linear preferences participate in lotteries whose proceeds will be used to fund a public good, we find that, relative to voluntary contributions, wagers in the unique lottery equilibrium (a) increase the provision of the public good, (b) are welfare improving, and (c) provide levels of the public good close to first-best as the lottery prize increases.

First version received July 1997; final version accepted October 1999 (Eds.) Why do individuals participate in charitable gambling activities? We conduct a laboratory investigation of a model that predicts risk-neutral expected utility maximizers will participate in lotteries when they recognize that lotteries are being used to finance public goods. As predicted by the model, we find that public goods provision is higher when financed by lottery proceeds than when financed by voluntary contributions. We also find support for other comparative static predictions of the model. In particular we find that ticket purchases vary with the size of the fixed prize and with the return from the public good: lotteries with large prizes are more effective, and ticket purchases drop dramatically when the public good is not valued by subjects.

Actual trade gains and market exchange volume proved to be smaller than expected market assumptions. Based on two market simulations, actual gains obtained in exchange and trade volumes are less than half of market assumptions. Fewer than expected market tradings were also observed on actual market exchanges as shown by failure to complete by all Pareto-efficient exchanges.

The National Lottery has already had a significant impact on the UK economy. The average person spends 2.10 pounds sterling every week on the National Lottery, and it is believed that the lottery has created 12 million additional shopping trips, although the impact of this on consumer spending is unclear. The amount spent on gambling as a whole rose by 41% between 1994 and 1995, with a large part of this rise being attributable to the National Lottery.

The exchange model of Shapley and Scarf is extended to include lotteries in determining equilibrium allocations in competitive markets. The extended model, which also considers core and competitive results, uses lotteries as probability distribution of indivisible commodities when made possible by viable allocations and blocking coalitions' allocations. Lottery equilibrium allocations are found to be non-empty, incomplete and contained only in the lottery core.

A study explored the credibility of classical general equilibrium theory results in private information economies in which a renegotiation of initial contracts is possible. Competitive equilibria with contracts are found to be existent and optimal in economies with principal-agent problems such as moral hazards and renegotiation-proof contracts. Financial intermediaries are shown to develop in an endogenous manner when financial intermediaries become essential in supporting the private information economy's competitive equilibrium allocations.

The demand for lottery tickets was measured by examining statistics from a survey of consumers in Kentucky. The tobit technique was used since it includes censoring of ticket purchases at zero. A theoretical model of lottery purchases depicting the purchases' utility function was discussed. The empirical findings of the model indicated that higher lottery purchases were seen among those with previous gambling experience, among Catholics and those unemployed. Lower lottery purchases were observed among neo-fundamentalist Protestants, married people and those with higher education.

The lottery industry recorded $20 billion in sales in 1991. The continuing popularity of lotteries can lead to a regressive tax on the poor if states do not return the money to the communities.

The 'details are set' for Pres. Obama's fundraiser in support of Gov. Deval Patrick (D). Obama will arrive 10/23 for a fundraising lunch at the Westin Copley Place. In announcing [...]