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The projection bias corresponds to the human tendency to project current preferences into the future as if present preferences will remain unchanged, omitting a range of external influences over the current preferences. We design a survey experiment to investigate the projection bias relevance on two environmentally friendly initiatives, namely solar panels and eco-friendly transport. We found that beliefs and behavioral intentions are subject to positive change when individuals are solicited a day when the weather is congruent with the proposed changes. We draw several policy and managerial implications for environmental issues.

We analyze whether exposure to a nature documentary increases pro-environmental behavior (PEB). We test this causal link in an experiment where subjects viewed a video featuring either an urban (control treatment) or a nature setting (nature treatment). We consider two types of behavior: a monetary donation to an environmental non-governmental organization (ENGO) that we call an eco-donation, and subsequently, a non-monetary decision (i.e., recycle or not recycle headphone protectors) that we call an eco-action. We find that virtual exposure to nature boosts both eco-donation and eco-action. Interestingly, the increase in PEB only occurs for individuals who express low environmental values. We did not find any negative or positive spillover effects on the eco-action. We finally provide robustness checks and discuss policy implications.

International audience; This paper deals with the role played by incidental emotions on trust decisions. Based on a laboratory experiment with monetary incentives, we explore the way positive and negative emotions impact transfers in a trust game. In addition, we investigate the mechanism through which risk intervenes in the relationship between emotions and trust. Our results suggest that negative emotions influence trust positively, whereas positive emotions decrease trust. This effect disappears once risk is included to the game. Furthermore, we found that transfer in the trust game is driven by otherregarding preferences and by risk preferences.

The conventional wisdom summarized in the adage ‘misery loves company’ suggests that suffering can be made easier to bear if it is also shared by others. Given increasing interest in subjective well-being and happiness as constituents of national wealth and priorities in policy-making and organizational management, we empirically investigate the validity of this phenomenon in order to explore whether it may be possible to mitigate decreases in subjective well-being simply by leveraging social comparison. We implement an experimental survey designed to gauge the suitability of this strategy on a representative sample of approximately 2,000 US residents. Our results indicate that, while this hypothesis is indeed borne out among certain populations within the sample, we find stronger and more widespread support for the opposite phenomenon, suggesting rather that ‘happiness hates company’. These novel findings can inform policy interventions aiming to enhance well-being and point to promising avenues for further work.

A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker’s payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an assurance against getting the sucker’s payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective’ design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals’ contribution to the public good. Some research extensions are suggested., Une des raisons à la faible contribution volontaire aux biens publics est l’aversion au sucker’s payoff (coopération individuelle quand les autres font défection). Afin de distinguer l’effet de cette aversion d’autres causes, nous réalisons une expérience de contribution à un bien public dans laquelle les joueurs ont une assurance contre le risque de sucker’s payoff. Les résultats montrent que l’assurance augmente les contributions de manière directe mais également de manière indirecte à travers les anticipations des individus sur les contributions des autres.

Previous literature found empirical evidence to the scope-severity paradox (SSP), corresponding to situations where the perceived harm of a wrongdoing or crime decreases with the number of victims. We examine this phenomenon for the perpetrators’ side. Using a survey experiment, we examine whether increasing the number of perpetrators of a crime, namely a fraud, decreases its perceived severity (and subsequent punishment) at the individual level. Two scenarios are examined corresponding to two kinds of fraud: a fraud committed by a financial adviser against his/her own employer (scenario 1) and a tax evasion by an executive (scenario 2). Overall, our results do not offer a clear-cut support for the scope-severity paradox for the perpetrators’ side, even if some secondary results can be indicative of a possible SSP in some circumstances. More precisely, in the case of a financial fraud, the stated severity increases when the number of perpetrators is low. We discuss the implications of our results and raise important issues for future research.

International audience; Some experimental and archival studies have found empirical support for the scope-severity paradox (SSP), according to which the perceived harm of the same crime or wrongdoing decreases when the number of victims is greater. In the context of environmental wrongdoing, we investigate whether the SSP applies when the number of perpetrators of a crime or wrongdoing increases. Using a survey experiment with two scenarios and five treatments (variations of the number of perpetrators and the individual and total harms committed), we test whether the perceived severity and punishment recommendation for perpetrators of an environmental wrongdoing decrease as the number of perpetrators increases, independent of the total environmental harm committed. Unlike the studies that look at the SSP phenomenon as regards number of victims, we do not find direct support for the existence of a SSP effect regarding number of perpetrators. We do find, however, that participants evaluating the one-perpetrator treatments are more likely to judge with the highest severity. We also provide some collateral insights such as the insensitiveness of participants to the individual pollution level, once the environmental damage exceeds a certain threshold. Our results extend previous SSP studies in important directions and suggest some policy implications, and avenues for further research.

EnglishThe aim of this article is to analyze whether pro-environmental behaviors can be reinforced by simply putting people in a context that recalls nature. To do so, we carried out a laboratory experiment in which we created nature versus urban decision-making frameworks (via video viewing), and we observed two types of behavior: a monetary donation to an environmental non-governmental organization (NGO) (eco-giving) and a recycling effort through a green deed (eco-action). We show that participants placed in a context of nature are more motivated to give, give on average more and recycle more compared to participants who have been put in an urban context. The results also highlight that there is no link between donation behavior and the recycling decision. Our work provides new avenues for designing policies to preserve the environment. JEL Codes: C91, D91, Q50. francaisL’objectif de cet article est d’analyser si les comportements pro-environnementaux peuvent etre renforces par le simple fait de mettre les individus dans un cadre qui rappelle la nature. Pour ce faire, nous avons realise une experience en laboratoire ou nous avons cree des cadres de decision dits de nature vs urbain (a travers le visionnage de videos), et nous avons observe deux types de comportements : une donation monetaire a une organisation non gouvernementale (ONG) environnementale (eco-don) et un effort pour recycler sous la forme d’un geste vert (eco-geste). Nous montrons que les participants mis dans un contexte de nature sont plus incites a donner, donnent en moyenne plus et recyclent en plus grand nombre comparativement aux participants ayant ete mis dans un contexte urbain. Les resultats mettent egalement en avant qu’il n’existe pas de lien entre le comportement de don et la decision de recyclage. Notre travail donne de nouvelles pistes pour concevoir des politiques de preservation de l’environnement.

International audience; This study seeks to investigate the impact of payment procedures on behaviour in a standard Dictator game. Although the Between-subjects Random Incentivized System (BRIS) is increasingly utilized in experimental economics, its use could be contested from a purely theoretical point of view. In the BRIS, all subjects play the Dictator game, but only a percentage of subjects (e.g., 1 out of 10) are paid. The aim of this article is to test whether the results obtained using this system are consistent with those obtained using a conventional full payment system in which every subject receives payment. An additional, hypothetical treatment is also run. Results show a very similar pattern between the BRIS and the full payment treatment, whereas the hypothetical payment mechanism leads to far fewer egoistic players and far more egalitarians. These findings lend support to the use of BRIS as a valid experimental methodology.

WOS:000428571100004; International audience; This article explores whether previous good deeds may license antisocial behaviour, such as appropriating a social surplus for private benefits, in a developing country context, namely Madagascar. We design a two-step framed experiment, with one control treatment (a neutral task) and three test treatments (tasks enabling subjects to earn moral credits in three different ways), followed by a taking game in which subjects are given the opportunity to take an amount from a fund allocated to their University. On average, we find that participants in the three licencing conditions appropriate more than those in the control group and that further differences emerge according to the way the moral credits have been earned.

International audience; Experimental economics is increasingly used in the field of agricultural economics. This article reports the main insights of a summer school organized in 2015 by the INRA SAE2 Department (Social Sciences, Agriculture and Food, Rural Development and Environment) in order to review existing research using experiments and to discuss the relevance of experimental methods in this area. We discuss the main methodological issues like financial incentives and the hypothetical bias, internal and external validity, and deception. We also show the relevance of economic experiments in helping public decision-makers and firms. We argue that economic experiments are a promising method in this field.; L’économie expérimentale est de plus en plus utilisée en économie agricole. Cet article rend compte d’une École Chercheurs organisée en 2015 par le Département SAE2 (Sciences Sociales, Agriculture et Alimentation, Espace et Environnement) de l’INRA afin de faire un état des lieux des travaux employant cette méthode et de discuter de son apport à l’économie agricole. Les auteurs examinent les défis méthodologiques comme les incitations monétaires et le biais hypothétique, les validités interne et externe ainsi que l’utilisation de la tromperie en lien avec les spécificités de la recherche en économie agricole, puis la portée académique et sociétale de travaux expérimentaux. Encore jeune dans ce champ, l’économie expérimentale ouvre la voie à des questions de recherche prometteuses.

Localisation : Centre de documentation P. Bartoli (S WPL 2014-01), UMR LAMETA, Montpellier 2014-01; The explicit assumption underlying Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) is that offering payments that are at least equal to individual’s opportunity cost will establish individuals’ participation. At the same time, that payment should act as a substitution within landowners’ global income, making environmental conservation compatible with economic development goals, and suitable for win-win policy. This partially acts under the more general hypothesis of money fungibility built-in neoclassical economic premise. Meanwhile, behavioural economics demonstrate that individuals track their financial activities using a set of cognitive labels depending to the context in which it was obtained, each of which being associated with a different marginal propensity to consume. Based on a ‘Humans’ vs. ‘Econs’ approach, we test the effect of income’s origin (‘Low effort’ based money vs. ‘High effort’ based money) on spending decisions (Necessity vs. Superior goods) and pro social preferences (Contribution to a public good) within Madagascar rural areas that are potential beneficiaries of PES programs, using a natural field experiment. Our findings support that human’s behavioural responses matter and could, under some circumstances, alter environmental conservation policies.

In light of the growing attention that social norm interventions have garnered as policy tools, we review the current body of evidence on their effectiveness with respect to pro-environmental behaviors. We identify the various conceptualizations of social norms currently in use and inventory the experimental economics and social psychology literature that has examined the impacts of social norm interventions on pro-environmental behavior. For each study included in this inventory, we note several contextual features, the data collection and analytical methods used, and any significant main effects attributed to the social norm intervention. We also review several theoretical models of behavior that incorporate social norms. Based on this empirical and theoretical review, we draw a number of policy implications and identify avenues for future research on the role of social norms with respect to pro-environmental behavior.

The aim of the paper is to study the impact of emotions on monetary donation to pro-environmental causes and more precisely whether emotions could reinforce intrinsic motivations. We design a three-stage laboratory experiment. Firstly, participants have the possibility to get an endowment from an effort game. Secondly, emotions are induced to the participants. Thirdly, participants play a dictator game where the recipient is an environmental Non-Governmental Organization (NGO). In line with the functional theory in psychology, we show that two positive emotions with similar valence but of different sort (“Amusement” and “Awe”) impact significantly pro-environmental behavior in opposite ways regarding individuals’ generosity towards environmental NGOs. Moreover, we show that “Awe” reinforces intrinsic motivations.

International audience; An important part of the debate about self vs state-governance involves a discussion about enforcement mechanisms. While some scholars argue that private enforcement mechanisms work sufficiently well in supporting cooperation, others cite the downfalls of private mechanisms so as to legitimize government enforcement. This paper focuses on the interplay between government and private enforcement mechanisms. Using an experimental approach, we demonstrate two results. First, we show that government enforcement, in the form of a centralized monetary punishment in our experiment, can be useful if aligned with and implemented after a private form of enforcement, namely peer disapproval. However, our second result suggests that the removal of government enforcement leads to a substantial decrease in overall cooperation levels – cooperation levels are higher under private enforcement when subjects had never experienced government enforcement compared to when they had been exposed to government enforcement. Specifically, the removal of government enforcement undermines the power of the remaining private enforcement mechanism to affect the behavior of free-riders.

Firms increasingly develop partnerships with non-profit organizations (NPO) to support a cause and improve their corporate image. This type of Corporate Social Responsibility, called cause-related marketing, commits firms to fund associations that encourage environmental protection, international development, and other causes by donating part of their profits. In this article, we argue that when cause-related marketing is applied to products with a negative externality, these a priori win–win arrangements can generate adverse and unexpected effects. We consider a vertical differentiation model integrating two assumptions. First, consumers may perceive the firm's contribution to be higher than the actual donation. Second, consumers who value highly socially responsible behavior may prefer not to consume rather than consuming products that aren't socially responsible. In this set-up we identify several possible counter-productive effects such as the likelihood of increase of the externality and the crowding out of direct contributions. We also draw policy and managerial implications.

"Gilles Grolleau and Naoufel Mzoughi thank the research programme ‘GESSOL’, sponsored by the French Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy"; The economic literature has devoted relatively strong attention to eco-labelling schemes. Nevertheless, while succeeding in some markets, they often fall short of their promises. We analyse the gap between the academic design of eco-labelling schemes and their real implementation. We contend that providing information is not enough. We then use recent advances in behavioural economics to inform policy makers on the potential of behavioural interventions in order to design better eco-labelling schemes. Policy relevance Many public policies, including eco-labelling schemes, are still based on an inaccurate description of human decision making, mainly borrowed from standard economics. However, numerous psychological and behavioural studies show that people reg-ularly behave in ways that contradict some standard assumptions of economic analysis. Departing from the conventional view that information-based policies such as eco-labelling schemes will quasi-automatically help mitigate issues such as climate change by guiding consumers' and firms decisions, we argue that information provision is necessary but not sufficient. Admitting that consumers' decisions are guided by factors other than price and information, and, taking systematically into account be-havioural biases can offer to policy makers low-cost levers with first-order effects in order to increase the environmental per-formance of eco-labels, or at least decrease the likelihood of counterproductive effects.

Cause-related products are more and more spread in the marketplace. They have the potential to raise substantial funds for not-for-profit organizations and to increase bottom-line profits for businesses. They allow consumers to support a non-for-profit action at a very low cost. This contribution characterizes cause-related products and purchase-triggered donations and identifies the motives of the different partners involved in the process. It also stresses the role of fiscal laws in shaping firms’ strategies as well as several possible undesirable and counter-productive effects caused by these partnerships. Two case studies are presented to support the analysis.; Les produits partage se développent de plus en plus et se positionnent comme un partenariat mutuellement gagnant pour les entreprises, cherchant à augmenter leurs profits, pour les associations, soucieuses de collecter des fonds, et pour les consommateurs désireux de contribuer à faible coût à une cause. Cette contribution caractérise la notion de produits partage et identifie les motivations sous-jacentes à l’implication des différents protagonistes. Elle met également en évidence l’importance du régime fiscal dans les stratégies implémentées par les entreprises et souligne certains risques d’effets pervers ou contre-productifs engendrés par ces initiatives. L’analyse s’appuie sur deux études de cas relatifs à des produits partage.

Industrialists may promote eco-labeling schemes in order to gain the support of environmentalists and ultimately gain market protection. Beyond the environmental effects of such coalitions, these schemes can provide industrialists a legitimate way to disadvantage rivals, frequently foreign rivals, by raising their costs. We consider a Stackelberg model that determines the conditions under which a domestic firm has incentive to impose an eco-label in order to raise the costs of its foreign rivals. The effects of eco-labeling on domestic social welfare are ambiguous. Policy recommendations are drawn. Notably, factors that may help policy makers to identify situations more vulnerable to undesirable outcomes from a welfare viewpoint are developed.

The use of economic incentives for biodiversity (mostly Compensation and Reward for Environmental Services including Payment for ES) has been widely supported in the past decades and became the main innovative policy tools for biodiversity conservation worldwide. These policy tools are often based on the insight that rational actors perfectly weigh the costs and benefits of adopting certain behaviors and well-crafted economic incentives and disincentives will lead to socially desirable development scenarios. This rationalist mode of thought has provided interesting insights and results, but it also misestimates the context by which ‘real individuals’ come to decisions, and the multitude of factors influencing development sequences. In this study, our goal is to examine how these policies can take advantage of some unintended behavioral reactions that might in return impact, either positively or negatively, general policy performances. We test the effect of income's origin (‘Low effort’ based money vs. ‘High effort’ based money) on spending decisions (Necessity vs. Superior goods) and subsequent pro social preferences (Future pro-environmental behavior) within Madagascar rural areas, using a natural field experiment. Our results show that money obtained under low effort leads to different consumption patterns than money obtained under high efforts: superior goods are more salient in the case of low effort money. In parallel, money obtained under low effort leads to subsequent higher pro social behavior. Compensation and rewards policies for ecosystem services may mobilize knowledge on behavioral biases to improve their design and foster positive spillovers on their development goals.

CT 2; International audience; L’objet de cet article est d’étudier l’impact des émotions sur les dons que font les individus en faveur d’associations pour l’environnement, et de voir dans quelle mesure les émotions peuvent renforcer (ou non) les motivations intrinsèques des individus. Par l’intermédiaire d’une méthode d’induction d’émotions en laboratoire suivie d’un jeu du dictateur nous montrons, en accord avec la théorie fonctionnelle des émotions développée en psychologie, que des émotions de même valence mais de type différent (e.g., « Emerveillement », « Amusement ») peuvent avoir des effets distincts et opposés sur les comportements pro-environnementaux des agents, soit dans le cas présent sur la générosité des individus. Nous montrons également que l’émotion « Emerveillement » joue un rôle significatif en renforçant le niveau de contribution des individus mus par des motivations intrinsèques.

Recent research argues that a good deed can disinhibit individuals and lead them to achieve undesirable deeds (e.g., choosing a salad which leads to increased snack intake). This so-called licensing effect has been recently documented in several analyzes, but we still lack a stabilized analytical framework. We also mention several contributions in behavioral economics that can explain licensing effects by alternative rationales. We aim at defining and characterizing the licensing effect and emphasize plausible circumstances under which it can lead to unexpected adverse effects. We use examples from several domains such as food consumption or prosocial behaviors. Several policy implications are developed. We identify several research extensions to better understand this licensing effect. We also indicate strategies that can be used to overcome this bias. Classification JEL : Q50, D03, D04

We test experimentally a prediction of the ‘moral credit model’, in which committing a virtuous act creates moral credits that can license immoral behaviour in a succeeding decision. We use a basic cheating experiment that was either preceded by a virtuous deed or not in a developing country context. We found that people who previously achieved a good deed cheat more. Gender and origin are also significant explicative variables for cheating.

In this article, we try to elicit whether an information on food safety is consistent with a more environmental-friendly agriculture. As the policy makers generally intervene to limit negative externalities in agriculture on the supply side, is a labelling policy an efficient way to reduce pollution levels in this sector? The intuitive reason of a food safety label rests on the fact that consumers seem to be more concerned with information on food safety aspects than on environmental ones. In a vertical differentiation model, we analyse the impacts of labels mentioning food safety and environmental aspects, on firms' profits, consumers' surplus and pollution levels. Given our main assumption that food safety and environmental consequences are directly linked, our principal results show that a labelling policy on food safety can be efficient from an environmental point of view, depending on the initial healthy products proportion in the market. Another result is based on the fact that a label policy can reduce consumer's surplus.

Ajout ProdInra_25 Novembre 2013; How do people react to a mix of good deeds to a third party and bad deeds against them? A modified ultimatum game shows that previous good deeds make responders substantially more tolerant to unfair proposals

Based on a simple theoretical framework, we show that when individuals exhibit positional, prosocial or conformist preferences which are endogenous, the end outcomes in terms of private provision of public goods can differ significantly from traditional neo-classical predictions. Indeed, when a given individual selects a specific subset of preferences according to what others do, he/she will contribute positively to the public good provision. We provide anecdotal evidence to support our theoretical analysis by using data from an Internet survey on a sample of French individuals. Analyses of individual responses confirm our theoretical arguments. For instance, we show that relative concerns matter, that is, for several environmental goods, people might prefer polluting more in absolute terms but less than others in society. Moreover, we also test whether people exhibit a social desirability bias and show that they attribute more (less) positional (prosocial) concerns to others in society.

According to the so-called ‘self-licensing effect’, committing to a virtuous act in a preceding choice may lead to behave less virtuously in the succeeding decision. Consequently, well-intentioned policies can lead to overall counter-productive effects by licensing people to behave badly in related behaviors. On the other side, motivational crowding theory argues that constraining people to adopt a desirable behavior can backfire. We use of a classroom experiment to test whether a regulatory framework to incentivize individuals to adopt pro-environmental behavior generate similar spillovers in terms of licensing effect than a non-regulatory framework. We show that the way the good deed is caused doesn’t seem to influence the licensing effect. Nevertheless, we found that business- and environmental-orientated majors react adversely to the regulatory framework. We show that environmental-orientated students exhibit higher intrinsically motivations than business-orientated ones. Accordingly, we suggest that the licensing effect is more likely to arise when the preceding ‘virtuous’ act is freely chosen (respectively regulatory caused) for non-intrinsically (respectively intrinsically) motivated individuals.

A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker’s payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an insurance against getting the sucker’s payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective’ design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.

We develop a vertical differentiation model for the setting of standards and labeling in an international economy with two countries, North (N) and South (S) under two regimes: Autarky and International Trade. We assume that a firm in country S has a comparative advantage in producing low quality goods while a firm in country N has comparative advantage in producing high quality goods. Under Autarky each country sets a specific standard and the domestic firm behaves as a monopolist. Under International Trade both countries agree on harmonized standards and firms compete in the unified market. We show that standards harmonization is welfare enhancing compared to the Autarky scenario and that the introduction of a national label in country N does not lead to a Pareto improvement in country S. Consumers in both countries will be worse off with the introduction of the label, for low levels of firm S's comparative advantage.

Success of eco-labeling schemes, broadly defined, varies among products and across countries. Based on a simple theoretical framework, we show that the nature of environmental attributes among products (i.e., private versus public) and the consumer type (i.e., egoist versus altruist) shape the overall performance of such schemes. In addition, we demonstrate that altruistic consumers exhibiting a too high willingness to pay for the eco-labeled product can inadvertently prevent egoistic consumers from purchasing it, leading to a sub-optimal outcome in terms of environmental performance. Several policy and managerial implications are drawn.

Ce texte introduit le numéro spécial consacré aux écolabels. Les articles de ce numéro développent les trois thèmes suivants : l'efficacité des écolabels, la crédibilité des écolabels et l'attitude des consommateurs envers les écolabels.

This paper focus's on the third-party certifiers' strategy when choosing a required label quality, and the consequent market outcome. We consider two different objectives of the certifier: maximizing global demand for the labeled product (wide public policy), or maximizing global quality of the market (global quality policy). In a duopoly set up with firms bearing different costs with respect to quality provision, firms always opt for differentiation strategies: only one adopts the label. However, the labeling firm is not necessarily the most efficient one. In the case of a wide public policy, the efficient firm will produce labeled products only if costs of labeling are sufficiently low. In the case of a global quality policy, the low cost firm will always push the high-cost firm into the labeling program.

A three-stage game of production technology, signal and price competition is developed to study the impact of eco-labeling, in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation. The production technology and the subsequent pollution level are non-observable by consumers. The only way to inform consumers about the environmental quality of the product is to stick an ecolabel on it. However, a polluting firm may also usurp the ecolabel by incurring a certain cost. By assuming that consumers are altruistic and willing to pay for environmental quality, we show that ecolabels can reduce the pollution level. Finally and importantly, under restrictive conditions on labeling cost, ecolabeling can constitute to some extent an environmentally effective and economically efficient policy. However, ecolabeling cannot alone internalize the whole negative externality until the optimum point., On analyse les impacts d'un écolabel dans un modèle de différenciation verticale en duopole. Nous considérons un jeu à trois étapes où deux entreprises choisissent simultanément la technologie de production, le signal et le prix du produit. La technologie de production n'est pas observable par les consommateurs. La seule moyen pour l'entreprise d'informer les consommateurs sur la qualité environnementale du produit est d'apposer un écolabel sur le produit. Toutefois, une entreprise polluante a la possibilité d'usurper l'écolabel à un certain coût. En supposant que les consommateurs ont des préférences altruistes et sont donc disposés à payer pour la qualité environnementale, on montre que l'écolabel peut réduire les pollutions. Sous certaines conditions de coûts d'écolabelisation, l'écolabel peut constituer une politique efficace à la fois au niveau environnemental et économique. En revanche, un écolabel ne permet pas de réduire totalement les externalités environnementales.

The purpose of ecocertification in the forest sector is to guarantee a sustainable management of the forest resources by the producers (forest owners) and define production rules for the transformation industry. We propose an analysis of the ex-post impact of ecocertification, when it is, on the one hand, a way for retailers to differentiate their products, that may lead, on the other hand, to a reinforcement of producers' market power. We build a model of vertical relationships where two supply chains are in competition, one sells ecocertified wood products, whereas the other sells standard wood products. We show that certification is always profitable for the ecocertified retailer and welfare enhancing. However, if ecocertification works as a catalyst for coordination among producers, the ecocertified retailer can be at a disadvantage if the differentiation between ecocertified and standard wood products is not clear enough in the eyes of the consumer. Interestingly, in this case, only the producers and the retailer of standard wood products benefit from the ecocertification initiated by the ecocertified retailer.

The Laboratory of Forestry economics (LEF) was created in 2000 as a joint research unit of the French Institute of Forestry, Agricultural and Environmental Engineering (ENGREF) and the National Institute of Agronomic research (INRA). The mission of the LEF is to conceive, develop, and transfer methods and tools of economic analysis to improve the management of the goods, services and products of the forest and the forestry sector. The aim of this issue of the “Cahiers du LEF” is to present the results of the researchs of the forest economics laobratory between 2003 and 2007.

The aim of the paper is to analyse the consequences of Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) on the forest sector and social welfare. In a context where buyers are free to choose an outside option (alternative material), we analyse the optimal management behaviour of foresters. A vertical differentiation set-up a la Mussa-Rosen makes it possible to examine the European forest context: a large number of foresters facing a heterogeneous demand. Management decisions depend on related costs. Whatever management costs, product differentiation always increases the profits of wood suppliers as well as social welfare. However, the impact of SFM on consumer surplus is uncertain: SFM results in more diversification but also entails a smaller quantity of wood marketed at the equilibrium. Associating a fixed certification cost to SFM reduces the number of wood suppliers turning to sustainable management. For a high certification cost, profits made by wood suppliers might turn out to be inferior to those made when only standard wood is marketed.

Dans le cadre de la vente en regie, les bois sont repartis en classes de qualite et de diametre dont le croisement definit une categorie de produit. Cette information a ete utilisee pour modeliser le prix du bois de Chene. Le modele propose est compose de trois parties. La premiere partie estime la valeur des differentes categories au sein du lot. La seconde partie est une correction liee a l'heterogeneite mettant en evidence qu'un lot regroupant plusieurs categories ne peut etre considere comme la simple reunion de lots homogenes de ces categories. Enfin, la derniere partie permet une estimation de la variance, donc de la precision de l'estimation du prix a l'echelle du lot. La necessite de prendre en compte l'heterogeneite des lots nous amene a analyser les consequences de celle-ci sur les prix et a proposer une reflexion sur la constitution ideale des lots.

Après une tempête, le stockage des bois joue un rôle essentiel pour soutenir à la fois les prix durant la première année et les approvisionnements des industries les années suivantes. Le stockage par voie humide et plus particulièrement par aspersion est la principale méthode utilisée. Le stockage des bois est une opération coûteuse dont la rentabilité doit être regardée avec la plus grande attention. La création d'une base de données des coûts de stockage (recueillie auprès de 76 aires de stockage, échantillon représentatif équivalent à plus de 20% de toutes les sites recensés) a permis de déterminer les principaux facteurs de variabilité de coûts et de rentabilité du stockage. Dans un premier temps, les coûts (variables et fixes) sont étudiés. Il en ressort des économies d'échelle pour les coûts d'investissement. En moyenne, le bois a été stocké pour une durée de 3 ans et demi coûtant 17,2 euros par m3. Dans un second temps est exposée une méthode de calcul de rentabilité. Malgré les aides publiques (s'élevant à plus de 1,5 million d'euros), le bilan global du stockage s'avère assez négatif. Plus de 85% des aires de stockage ont subi des pertes. L'évolution des prix des bois, qui n'ont pas retrouvé leur cours d'avant tempête, explique en grande partie ces résultats.

Depuis le debut des annees 1990 et notamment en reaction a la deforestation en cours dans les zones tropicales, une attention particuliere a ete portee a l’exploitation des forets dans le monde. Le concept de gestion forestiere durable a emerge au “Sommet de la Terre”, a Rio, en 1992 (Barthod, 1993). Il implique que « les ressources forestieres et les terrains boises devraient etre geres sur une base durable, afin de repondre aux besoins sociaux, economiques, ecologiques, culturels et spirituels des generations actuelles et futures » (1). Il a ete decline a Helsinki, en 1993, lors de la Seconde Conference ministerielle pour la protection des forets en Europe (Barthod et Touzet, 1994). La suspicion de non-conformite a ces principes etait des lors susceptible de representer un risque pour le marche des produits forestiers, mais offrait aussi l’occasion de promouvoir une meilleure gestion des forets, voire l’utilisation du bois en tant que materiau “ecologique”. C’est pourquoi de grands groupes de distribution, des usagers de la foret ou encore des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) ont commence a solliciter, de la part des producteurs forestiers, la fourniture de produits certifies comme etant issus d’une gestion durable.

Le travail envisagé dans le projet de recherche NORMES a deux objectifs. Premièrement, nous essaierons de mettre en évidence et de caractériser les motivations internes des agents économiques en matière environnementale en termes de comportements individuels. La question centrale sera ici celle de la manière dont les motivations internes conduit les individus à réduire leur pollution par exemple ou à accroître leur contribution à la protection de l'environnement; et, de voir leur application au domaine des Déchets Ménagers et Assimilés (DMAs). Deuxièmement, nous essaierons de voir comment il est possible de traduire ces résultats en termes institutionnels et décisionnels, et d’envisager comment de nouvelles normes sociales peuvent potentiellement apparaître. Ces normes sont les seules garantes d’une orientation durable des comportements.Ce projet qui vise à mieux comprendre les motivations des individus dans leurs comportements vis-à-vis des déchets, a permis de donner un certain nombre d'éléments de réponse aux questions suivantes.Quel type d’information peut pousser les individus à changer de comportements dans les domaines de la prévention et du tri des déchets? Quels sont les effets induits par ce type de communication? Quelle articulation prévoir entre motivations interne et externe?Comment peut on mettre en place une norme sociale, étant donné que celle de la prévention et celle du tri sont inégalement installées?Dans le cadre du projet nous avons organisé deux manifestations; une à vocation scientifique afin de réunir certains spécialistes sur les questions de l'économie de la gestion des déchets; et une autre à vocation plus opérationnelle qui a permis des discussions sur comment traduire les résultats de recherches en politiques efficaces.

A growing body of empirical evidence demonstrates that decision-making is embedded within complex personal, cognitive, and social contexts that call for a richer understanding of behavior than that described by traditional neoclassical economic theory. Contrary to the conventional selfishness assumption advanced by standard theory, it has now been established that people systematically behave in prosocial ways and furthermore, that the propensity to do so is sensitive to a variety of elements of decision context that have historically been considered irrelevant. We examine the assumptions that social preferences are outcome-regarding and consistent, and the extent to which social norms may be implicated in the divergences from these assumptions. This work has a strong applied focus. In an environment of limited public budgets and increasingly pressing social and environmental challenges, interventions based on behavioral insights can be appealing policy instruments, as they are often more economical than traditional command-and-control or incentive-based tools, and have the potential to generate reliable and immediate behavior change. Given that social norms can be an important determinant of aggregate societal outcomes in a diverse range of contexts, we investigate several aspects of the optimal design of behavioral interventions that leverage normative considerations, as well as the dynamics between social norms and formal institutional measures. These works are complemented by a review of the literature regarding the impact of social norm interventions on proenvironmental behaviors and of several theoretical accounts of the role that social norms play in the decision-making process. Through the use of both laboratory and online experiments (via Amazon Mechanical Turk and the NSF-funded Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences), the experimental studies that comprise the thesis examine the impact of valence framing on the effectiveness of a normative intervention, the capacity for a single normative intervention to generate heterogeneous behavioral impacts, and the effectiveness of certain informal norm-enforcement mechanisms and their interaction with formal institutional sanctions. From these studies, we draw a number of policy-relevant implications and identify the need for future work on a number of specific issues related to the role of social norms in behavior and accordingly, to the design of effective behavioral interventions that leverage social norms.; Un nombre croissant d’éléments empiriques souligne que la prise de décision est encastrée dans des contextes personnels, cognitifs et sociaux complexes. La prise en compte de ces facteurs permet une analyse plus fine du comportement que celle permise par la théorie économique traditionnelle néoclassique. Contrairement à l'hypothèse conventionnelle d'égoïsme avancée par la théorie standard, il est largement reconnu que les gens se comportent systématiquement de manière prosociale et, en outre, que la propension à le faire est sensible à à plusieurs éléments du contexte décisionnel, qui autrefois étaient systématiquement relégués au second plan. Notre thèse s’intéresse particulièrement au fait que les préférences sociales constituent des éléments contextuels décisifs et examine la mesure dans laquelle les normes sociales peuvent expliquer des déviations comportementales qui autrement pourraient sembler irrationnelles du point de vue standard. Ce travail a une dimension appliquée. Dans un contexte où les budgets publics sont limités et ou les défis sociaux et environnementaux sont de plus en plus pressants, les interventions basées sur des approches comportementales peuvent constituer des instruments politiques attrayants, notamment du fait de leur moindre coût en comparaison des mesures basées sur des contraintes réglementaires et/ou sur des incitations économiques. En outre ces interventions sont susceptibles de générer des changements comportementaux pertinents et ce à relativement court-terme. Étant donné que les normes sociales peuvent être un déterminant important des performances globales d’une société dans des domaines très variés, nous étudions plusieurs aspects liés à la conception optimale de ces interventions comportementales qui exploitent les considérations normatives, ainsi que de la dynamique entre les normes sociales et les mesures institutionnelles formelles. Nous réalisons également une revue de la littérature relative à l'impact des interventions basées sur les normes sociales sur les comportements environnementaux ainsi qu’aux mécanismes théoriques sous-jacents permettant d’expliciter le le rôle de ces normes dans le processus décisionnel. Grâce à l'utilisation d'expériences en laboratoire et en ligne (via Amazon Mechanical Turk et les quasi-expériences financées par la NSF pour les sciences sociales), les études expérimentales qui composent la thèse examinent l'impact de valence sur l'efficacité d'une intervention normative, la capacité d'une seule intervention normative à générer des impacts comportementaux hétérogènes et l'efficacité de certains mécanismes informels d'application de la norme et leur interaction avec des sanctions institutionnelles formelles. À partir de ces études, nous élaborons un certain nombre d'implications pertinentes pour les politiques et identifions la nécessité de travaux futurs sur des zones d’ombres et sur questions spécifiques permettant d’affiner et d’optimiser encore plus l’efficacité des interventions basées sur les normes sociales.

The PhD dissertation explores some behavioural biases for improved policy design and contributes to a better understanding of the moral self--‐licensing phenomenon through the effect of potential mediators (voluntary vs. mandatory policies, interaction with financial incentives), the extent to which licensing might lead to behavioural change (from less cooperative behaviour to moral transgression), and the robustness of results (from classroom experiments to field experiments in developing countries). The PhD dissertation also includes laboratory experiments and the study of intertwined biases through complementary researches (mental accounting, hyperbolic discounting, risk aversion) for an increased openness and understanding of the behavioural approach as well as potential interactions among biases, Cette thèse de doctorat vise à explorer certains biais comportementaux pouvant conduire a une meilleure conception des politiques. La thèse contribue notamment a améliorer notre compréhension du phénomène de compensation morale (‘Moral self--‐licensing effect’) par l'étude de médiateurs potentiels (politiques volontaires vs. obligatoires, interaction avec les incitations financières), la mesure dans laquelle la compensation morale pourrait conduire a une altération des comportements (allant des comportements moins coopératifs jusqu’a la transgression de la morale), et la robustesse des résultats (via la réalisation d’expériences conventionnelles auprès d’étudiants mais aussi d’expériences de terrain dans des pays en voie de développement). Cette thèse inclut également des expériences en laboratoire ainsi que l’étude d’autres biais étroitement imbriques et complémentaires (‘mental accounting’a, ‘hyperbolic discounting’b--‐, aversion au risque) pour une plus grande ouverture et une meilleure compréhension de l'approche comportementale ainsi que la prise en compte des potentielles interactions entre biais

Diplôme : Dr. d'Université; This study analyses the international timber trade between Malaysia and Europe with respect to the importance of environmental issues on trade and the role of Malaysia as a major timber exporter to Europe. It also evaluates the comparative advantage of Malaysian wood products and the willingness of French consumers (to represent European communities) to pay for sustainable forest management. The first part gives an overview the clashes of perception between developed and developing countries on the environmental concerns over trade. It was observed that environmental standards may act as non-tariff barriers to exporting countries. In addition, the stringent requirements posed by importing countries on technical, marking and labelling to some extent provide unnecessary barriers to trade. The second part deals with the role of Malaysia as a key player in the tropical timber trade. This part evaluates the main export market for Malaysian wood products to the world. For the purpose of this thesis, the analysis focuses on the European market. From the observations, it was found that the export of wooden furniture surpassed major timber exports in 2004. However, to penetrate the European market, Malaysia has to compete with the Chinese with their lower cost tropical wood products, and Brazil with their advantage in certification and labelling of tropical wood products. In tandem with that, the commitment towards sustainable forest management at national level causes shortage of raw materials in Malaysia. To a certain extent, the internal and external factors create necessary challenges to enter the European market. In the third part, the Balassa approach was used to classify the comparative advantage of Malaysia’s twenty one types of wood products in Europe. It was estimated that Malaysia had high comparative advantage only in five products which were mechanized and intermediary industrial products. The products identified were sawn wood, wooden mouldings, plywood, veneer and builders’ joinery and carpentry. The remaining products had lower comparative advantage and disadvantage to export to the European market based on the Balassa index. In the last part, the estimation on the willingness to pay for sustainable forest management attributes was conducted. Besides that, additional attributes such as fair trade and wood origin were included. A questionnaire was set up using all the attributes reflected in the hypothetical wood flooring product in the market. Based on the result, consumers were willing to pay the highest for the presence of fair trade and wood origin (in this study referring to French origin); nevertheless they were still willing to pay for sustainable aspects of forest. However, the willingness to pay for all the attributes was altered depending on the respondents’ knowledge of forest labelling, their attitudes towards environmental preservation, living area, education level, type of job and income level. In the overall finding of the thesis, all the results from each part were synthesized in a systemic approach simultaneously deliberating on the macro and microeconomic perspectives as well as the dimensions on demand and supply. Overall, the findings suggest that the challenges and constraints facing the Malaysian timber industry indirectly shaped the export of Malaysian wooden products. Malaysia has adapted by going into value-added products to lessen the impact of environment-related trade barriers and to circumvent the shortage of raw materials supply. Malaysia has successfully customized the wooden products to the sustainability and legality requirements of the European market by pursuing the national certification (Malaysian Timber Certification) and being committed to sustainable forest management objectives.; Ce travail étudie l’influence des questions environnementales sur le commerce international à partir des échanges de bois tropicaux Malaisie – Europe, la Malaisie étant un important exportateur de bois. Les avantages comparatifs des produits forestiers Malaisiens sont évalués, ainsi que la propension à payer le bois issu de gestion forestière durable par les consommateurs français (en tant qu’Européens). La première partie envisage les différences de perception entre pays développés et pays en développement pour le lien entre commerce et environnement. Il apparaît que les normes environnementales agissent comme des barrières non-tarifaires. Ces barrières sont accentuées par les critères de marquage, d’étiquetage, et de technologie imposés par les pays importateurs. La seconde partie analyse le rôle clé de la Malaisie dans le commerce des bois tropicaux. Les principaux marchés d’exportation des bois Malaisiens sont évalués. Le marché Européen est étudié plus en détail. Il apparaît que les ventes de meuble ont dépassé en 2004 celles des autres principaux produits forestiers. Sur le marché Européen la Malaisie fait face à la concurrence de produits tropicaux à bas prix venant de Chine, et à celle de produits forestiers éco-certifiés venant du Brésil. Concomitamment, l’engagement de la Malaisie dans une dynamique de gestion plus durable y crée une pénurie relative de matériau brut. La troisième partie calcule l’index de Balassa d’avantage comparatif, pour 21 produits forestiers Malaisiens sur le marché Européen. Seuls 5 produits industriels intermédiaires ou à transformation fortement mécanisée, ont un avantage comparatif marqué. Il s’agit des sciages, moulures, contreplaqués, placages, charpente et menuiserie industrielle. Les autres produits présentent des avantages comparatifs faibles ou même négatifs. La quatrième partie estime la propension à payer pour différents attributs environnementaux, ainsi que d’autres tels le commerce équitable et l’origine géographique. Un questionnaire reprenant ces attributs pour du parquet bois hypothétique a été utilisé. Il semble que les consommateurs soient prêts à rémunérer le plus les critères de commerce équitable et d’origine Française, la gestion durable étant recherchée dans une moindre mesure. La propension à payer les tous les attributs varie en fonction des notions et attitudes qu’ont les consommateurs sur l’éco-certification, l’environnement, ainsi qu’en fonction de leur lieu d’habitation, niveau d’éducation et de revenu, et type de profession. Enfin les résultats des 4 parties sont synthétisés en reliant les échelles micro et macroéconomiques, avec les dimensions de demande et d’approvisionnement. D’une façon générale, les résultats suggèrent que les opportunités et contraintes propres à la l’industrie du bois de Malaisie façonnent les exports de produits. La Malaisie s’adapte en se tournant vers des produits à plus haute valeur ajoutée et à moindre impact environnemental, pour pallier aux barrières commerciales et à la pénurie relative de matériau. La Malaisie s’est dotée d’une certification nationale (Malaysian Timber Certification) propre à remplir les critères de durabilité et de légalité de l’Europe, et s’est engagée la gestion durable des forêts.