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Minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas such as coltan, present in all the technological devices that we use on a daily basis, contribute to the exacerbation and escalation of armed conflicts, as well as to prolonging situations of human rights violations in numerous regions of the world and, specially, in Africa. To put an end to this problem, many states and international organizations, such as the United States, the Organization for Cooperation and Development in Europe or the European Union, have adopted different initiatives, all of them focused on the due diligence that agents that participate in the supply chain of all this series of conflict minerals must carry out. However, the fact that some of these initiatives are not even in force has not prevented the possibility of identifying limits that obstruct the achievement of its main objective: to break the link between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, the illicit trade of these resources, and the perpetuation of armed conflicts. In this way, it is worth asking if there are more effective viable alternatives to the existing initiatives, such as a certification system similar to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.

From the beginning of the Kimberley Process in 2003, the diamond trade entered a new stage of international supervision. The main reason that triggered this initiative was the recurrent political instability that marked countries like Sierra Leone, and Angola, where some armed groups took advantage of the exploitation of this mineral to undermine the sociopolitical stability after trying to come into power by force. Through this enforcement, the process has gradually joined up several actors linked to the exploitation of this gemstone in their attempts to take part in and take control of this marketing chain, thus turning it into a worldwide promoting instrument of peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article recommends the addition of new ethics standards to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), an international certification scheme that regulates trade in the natural jewelry-quality diamond industry. Topics discussed include the origins of the international diamond trade, the efficacy of the KPCS, and synthetic diamonds and the jewelry market. Also mentioned are the De Beers monopoly, the West African civil wars, and ethical sourcing of diamonds.

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Copyright of Canadian Journal of Development Studies is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The purpose of the exploratory case study is to understand the reasons why leaders lack considering ecological validity in the global diamond jewelry production process and high council for Kimberley Process certification improvements. Ecological validity is achieved by how plants and animals contribute to socio-economic improvement from vocational displacement of the diamond cut and polish to India, specifically concerning Namibia and Lesotho quality rough diamond suppliers and crafters. Three primary sources of data comprise of documents, focus group and interviews which triangulate under the Person Environment Fit Theory. Namibia and Lesotho officials represent globalized big data oversaturation as foreign nationals, that stifle decision-making and implementation, while executives and managers as nationals, the mediators, represent United States stabilization. The senior jewelry production agents are the interdependent foreign nationals and nationals. Elements of risk, motor and process skills, and naturalistic action moderate vocational displacement matters. The three highest percentages of a synonymous word and phrase analysis created the sixteen categories from respondent responses and funneled taxonomies through two question instruments, validated in field tests. For specialist generic alternative management, the researcher adds sensitive topic questions that are applicable to other industry delicacies and countries in need seeking aid from the United States, using radial approach. Respondent responses from Namibian officials redirect transfrontier conservation while LeSotho ambassadors diversify to textile and beverage manufacturing as vocational substitutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can different attempts by the international community to improve the human rights (HR) conduct of transnational corporations (TNCs) be characterised as international institutional bypasses (IIBs) of the global HR system? That HR system produced the highly controversial Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (Norms), and the United Nations (UN) Commission on HR lacked the institutional legitimacy to lead such radical reform. With the HR system deadlocked by controversy, pressure to address the negative HR dimensions of globalisation mounted and bypasses emerged for norm experimentation outside the system: the Kimberley Process for Conflict Diamonds (Kimberley Process), the UN Global Compact (UNGC), and the Guiding Principles on Business and HR (Guiding Principles). After UN reform, and after the bypasses had thoroughly explored non-legal means of addressing HR and business, the subject matter returned to the HR system and the HR Council. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2007, Canada was the third-largest producer of diamonds in the world. Marketed as ethical alternatives to "blood diamonds," Canadian gemstones are said to go beyond basic "conflict-free" designations by providing northern Indigenous peoples with high-wage work and training. This article makes two connected points. First, it describes how the ethics of diamond mining are connected to the uneasy management of people groomed to do extractive work. Second, following the development and delivery of job training programs for Indigenous people over the course of the financial crisis of 2008-2009, this article reveals how mandatory "soft skills" courses attempt to adjust would-be worker speech to meet corporate norms in ways that were essential in maintaining the ethical sign value of subarctic stones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Kimberley Process represents a new method of international cooperation between subjects of international law. It was named by its creators as a process, setting it apart from international organizations, and leading too to its consideration as informal international law-making or soft law. In this study we shall analyze the extent to which the Kimberley Process falls into these categories. Our main task, however, is to compare it to formal international organizations, with a view to establishing whether what really has been created is an institutionalization process that is like an international organization, but with a different name. To do this, we will analyze with referenceto the Kimberley Process the various respective fields of international organizations, such as founding agreement, membership, structure, decision-making process and legal order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Review of African Political Economy is the property of Review of Political Economy (ROAPE) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article explores market reactions to regulations that addressed the link between armed conflict and the diamond industry. The results show that several regulatory actions taken by the United Nations and the United States in the early 2000s corresponded with lower stock returns for diamond mining companies. Such effects are inconsistent with predictions made by some critics of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. On the other hand, stock returns for jewelry companies were abnormally negative for events that hurt the reputation of conflict-free production and trade regimes. The expansion of legal diamond markets also coincided with abnormally positive returns for jewelry companies, while new restrictions on market access coincided with abnormally negative returns. The results suggest that i) diamond trade regulations affected businesses in important and measurable ways, and ii) that similar regulations may have broader applicability in related industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the history of the blood diamond trade in three African countries including Angola, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe. Topics discussed include civil wars in countries due to diamonds; the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) of the United Nation aimed to prevent "conflict diamonds" from entering the mainstream rough diamond markets; and implementation of the KPCS in Angola, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe.

After more than a decade since its creation, the KPCS is undergoing questioning as to efficiency in combating the irregular trade of diamonds, among the countries with significant production for the global market, mainly Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe. Governments and institutions are considering it to be conducive to serious violations of human rights. In Brazil all activities of the sector have been reduced drastically. It is estimated that there has been a loss in Brazilian production, after implementation of the KPCS rules, in the order of 8.1 million Kts, valued at more than $ 2.0 billion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Natural resources in Africa have increasingly become a cause for concern. Not only do natural resources and the extractive industry need to be wary of conflicts which arise from their production processes, but the need for regulation becomes crucial. As one of the biggest producers of copper in the world, Zambia announced its decision to suspend the renewal of copper mining licences, and so the need for regulation of the industry became more important. Consequently, there is a need to examine the immediate effect of copper mining. Ultimately, the need to examine the possibility of regulating the copper industry which may have lessons in other extractive industries is proactively equally important. Thus, this article discusses the Zambian Copperbelt, copper mining in and its impact for Zambia as a case study to illustrate the need for an international regulatory framework. Finally, the article examines best practices which have been utilised in the diamond industry in the hopes of using these best practices in the copper mining industry. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

International norms around natural resource governance have proliferated in the face of civil wars and feeble state institutions in Africa. These norms have been captured in institutions such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), and the African Mining Vision (AMV). But have these institutions reversed the purported resource curse? This article seeks answers to this key question by challenging the assumptions around the prevailing international regimes of restraint which have privileged transparency and accountability at the expense of participation. Through an analysis of the experiences of these institutions, I suggest that there should be more focus on alternative regimes of responsibility in which natural resource-rich countries combine the process of building institutions of participation with those of transparency and accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the applications of a small unmanned aircraft system (UAS) for mapping informal diamond mining sites in Africa. Topics covered include details of the Kimberley Process (KP), an international initiative that aims to prevent the flow of conflict diamonds, some steps involved in the formalization of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM), and several limitations of satellite imagery like atmospheric constraints, temporal resolutions, and spatial resolutions.

This study addresses compliance and business practices at the local level subsequent to the international adoption of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme by states and the adoption of the voluntary System of Warranties by the diamond industry. This paper also explores the distance between norm creation, norm sustainability and norm expansion. Interests of various stakeholders led to the creation of international norms, and evidence supports widespread compliance at the state level. Data gathered at the local level of retailer suggests, however, that the regulatory system is not leading to the education of consumers that potentially transforms beliefs. Central to understanding the challenge of deepening and broadening new global norms is exploring the distance between compliance within the regulatory regime and the awareness or change of beliefs of stakeholders. Recommendations include steps to make the process of bringing diamonds to market transparent and available to public scrutiny. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

New data from Bunuba country in the southern Kimberley provide more robust dates for point technology in the Kimberley than have been previously available. Direct percussion points have been recovered from three sites in the southern Kimberley associated with radiocarbon dates of ∼5000 cal BP, whereas the earliest pressure-flaked points are consistently associated with dates within the past 1000 years. This suggests that pressure-flaked point technology postdates the earliest occurrence of direct percussion points by ∼4000 years in this region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• This paper empirically examines the impacts of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme on international trade in rough diamonds. • The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme has worked as a catalyst, increasing trade in rough diamonds. • The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme does not affect low-income exporters differently. • The agreement's induced trade effects apply not only to exporter- or importer-hubs but equally to smaller trade partners. • The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme signed unilaterally reduces the trade in rough diamonds originating from belligerent countries. In 2003, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) went into force to stop the trade in those diamonds, directly linked to the fueling of armed conflict and activities of rebel movements, also known as conflict diamonds. This article gives empirical evidence on the impact of the KPCS on international trade in rough diamonds. We find that bilateral KPCS participation facilitates access to international markets for rough diamonds and increases trade values. The bilateral trade impact of the KPCS does not depend on the exporters' economic development or market access. A more detailed analysis of exporters' heterogeneity in trade values shows that unilaterally KPCS intensifies the trade impediments resulting from armed conflicts and, thereby, reduces the international trade in rough diamonds stemming from countries with ongoing internal conflicts. We further offer evidence that the KPCS-induced trade effects apply not only to exporter- or importer-hubs but equally to smaller trade partners. Our analysis gives insights into how agreements setting a particular standard may affect international trade patterns in conflict minerals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the primary objectives of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), created by a United Nations resolution to prevent the entry of conflict diamond into the mainstream rough diamond market and to prevent human rights violations in illegal diamond trade. It focuses on the human rights violations in the Marange diamond mines in Zimbabwe, and the applicability of the KPCS in this case.

The article focuses on the creation of an international framework to remove resource curse and promote human rights in mineral extraction industries in Africa, and expands on the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and other such frameworks for the same. It further discusses China's rise in Africa and its involvement in the cobalt and copper industries in Africa. It also elaborates on the problematic record of the Chinese extractive industry in Africa, and compares with that of Australia.

The article discusses corrupt practices in the international diamond industry in relation to the 2003 international agreement Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). Topics include a Belgian tax evasion case against the diamond firm Omega Diamonds, the role of the Dubai Multi-Commodities Center (DMCC) in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE) in corruption, and efforts to separate diamond mining in Africa from the promotion of violent conflicts.

This article analyses the role of the EU in the negotiations of the Kimberley Process (KP) regarding the Marange diamonds from Zimbabwe. As these gems did not comply with the requirements of the KP, they were banned from trading in 2009. The subsequent discussions between proponents of a hard line towards Zimbabwe and advocates of a rapid readmission of these diamonds brought the KP on the brink of collapse and it was not before the end of 2011 that an EU-brokered compromise ended this crisis. At the same time these diamonds remained on the EU-sanctions list until 2013.The article explains how the EU tried to find a balance between its normative policies regarding human rights violations and being a 'force for good', and aimed to preserve the KP as a tool of 'effective multilateralism'. It argues that these two objectives are sometimes hard to reconcile in a multipolar world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the central challenges for scholars of global governance is that the published charters, guidelines, rules, and final documents of global governance frameworks provide an incomplete understanding of how decisions are actually made within such international forums. Much of what is considered global governance occurs behind closed doors during teleconferences, official meetings, and informal side-meetings. This challenge is magnified in global governance frameworks that are driven by consensus-based decision-making. This article tackles this challenge by providing insights into the consensus-based decision-making processes of the Kimberley Process on conflict diamonds. In so doing, the article advances the debates on global governance in two ways. First, it draws upon participant observations, interviews with state and non-state actors, and privileged access to key documents in order to illustrate and assess how governance ‘crises’ concerning two Kimberley Process Participants – Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe – are addressed by this global governance framework. Second, the article discusses future governance challenges for the Kimberley Process as well as highlights the promise and limitations of consensus-based decision-making within global governance frameworks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Oversight of the multi-billion dollar global diamond trade involves state actors, multinational corporations, and sophisticated civil society groups operating under the umbrella of the Kimberley Process. This unique tripartite governance structure created an opportunity for the parties to develop a system in which conflict diamonds could not enter the stream of commerce, transparency would be institutionalized, and governments and industry participants would be held to account. Yet, the successes of the Kimberley Process are increasingly jeopardized by an overly statist approach that has led to subjugation of the participating nongovernmental organizations. This note argues that for the Kimberley Process to regain its legitimacy, it must reform by recommitting to civil society's central role, increasing transparency within the diamond industry, and refusing to shield governments from enforcement of its rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global governance frameworks are innovative initiatives that respond to international norms and incorporate state and non-state actors in efforts to address particular governance challenges. The Kimberley Process is an important global governance framework that has evolved in concert with the anti-conflict diamond norm and seeks to prevent the trade of conflict diamonds. The article examines the evolution of this global governance framework and anti-conflict diamond norm and emphasises the role of two middle powers – South Africa and Canada – in the Kimberley Process. It also analyses the cases of Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, and Zimbabwe in order to illustrate the type of governance challenges faced by the Kimberley Process. The article concludes with a policy-relevant discussion of the promise and limitations of global governance frameworks as well as cooperative and collaborative behaviour among middle powers. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Kimberley Process is a system of international soft law intended to regulate the trade in conflict diamonds. It has been in operation since 2003, and involves states, industry bodies and civil society. States undertake to certify diamonds in trade as conflict-free and to have adequate internal controls over the production and trade in diamonds. While the Kimberley Process has been effective in reducing the trade in diamonds to fund armed rebellion against governments, it seems unable to meet recent challenges. Some states in the Process, notably Côte d'Ivoire, Venezuela and Zimbabwe, have not been compliant with their undertakings, yet the Process has been unable to achieve consensus for decisions to sanction non-compliant members. Consensus has also proved elusive in the effort to expand the definition of conflict diamonds to address the wide range of human rights abuses that may be associated with diamond mining. As new international regimes to address the problem of conflict minerals have been developed in recent years, it is now time to question whether the Kimberley Process has a future role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]