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This study explains why defense reform efforts in South Korea have failed to achieve substantial progress. The outcome would seem all the more unexpected because the Blue House has ostensibly wanted comprehensive defense reform, while the Korean military is also highly motivated to upgrade itself to be able to fight and defend itself against North Korea, which has continuously threatened to use nuclear weapons preemptively. How should we account for this puzzle? This study focuses on three factors to explain the absence of reform: the role of the president, the opposition from the armed forces leadership, and lapses in the civilian control of the military. This study concludes that South Korea needs to revitalize the reform process in order to successfully confront the security challenges of the twenty-first century. Defense reform has long been dominated by the military leaders. It has resulted in the unwanted situation where civilian leaders have been alienated. Ironically, lack of interest among civilian leaders leads to the lack of support from outside. In order to achieve successful defense reform, assistance from the outside must be guaranteed. South Korea needs to readjust goals and prepare for building robust armed forces to play a decisive role in achieving the mission to meet the requirements of changing strategic environments. The Park administration also needs to take timely steps to overcome its own vulnerabilities, such as modifying its doctrine, equipment, training, and culture. Elimination of its vulnerabilities may involve changes in philosophy, tactics and possibly even modifications to the concepts of operations. All can entail substantial costs. However, the cost of not dealing with the threats is likely to be much higher. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article compares Korean and European military drilling techniques, with a particular focus on evidence drawn from 17th- and 18th-century military manuals. According to the authors, the similarities between these drilling regimes call into question the historical concept of a distinctly European method of conducting wars. Details on Korean musketry units and techniques are presented. The development of military technologies and strategies in China is also discussed.

This paper is designed to analyze why Baekje, one of the Three Kingdoms in Korea that existed up to the latter part of the seventh century, became the first victim in diplomatic and military struggles among the Three Kingdom, including Goguryeo and Silla. The Samguk sagi (Historical Records of the Three Kingdoms) gives the impression that Baekje, by dint of its geographical location, had pursued the most active and shrewd diplomacy. Located in the southwest of the peninsula, Baekje enjoyed not only easy communication and transactions with China and Japan, but also could put pressure on relatively weak Silla and move to the north when Goguryeo engaged in struggles with Chinese dynasties over the Liao river. However, this paper concludes, from an international relations perspective, that Baekje became the first kingdom to lose its independence due to its clumsy management of alliances, lack of understanding of the foreign policy priority of Chinese dynasties, as well as inconsistent and self-centered diplomacy vis-à-vis China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper systematically analyzes the causes of the escalation of violence during the initial stages of the Jeju Island Rebellion and the failure of South Korean counterinsurgency operations. It is argued that four interrelated factors provided the conditions for armed insurgency in the small island of Jeju: inter-agency tension between the Korean National Police (KNP) and the Korean Constabulary; the mainlanders' misinterpretation of the insurgency; the effect of systematic police brutality; and the role of youth groups. Consequently, two counterinsurgency lessons will be drawn from this study: that inter-agency cooperation and coordination at the tactical level between security branches and the incorporation of local population at the micro-level is essential in conducting efficient and effective counterinsurgency operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details the role of armistice negotiations in the Korean War in 1951. Mental and physical hardship experienced by prisoners of war; Dismissal of U.S. negotiators for single-minded application of a psychological template at the negotiations.

The article offers various reports in connection with the Korean civil war. The author presents reflections and insights relating to the civil war between the North and South Korea, including reports on the preliminary negotiations at Kaesong that aims to settle the civil dispute. The section also reports regarding the participation of the United Nations between the conflict.