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This study explores the development of English textbooks in North Korea through corpus-based analysis aimed at illuminating the differences between materials produced during the Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un regimes. In the context of educational reforms and changing political ideology, this study investigates BNC/COCA-based lexical coverage and the key lexical features of North Korean middle school English textbooks, highlighting the complexity, vocabulary, and readability of the learning materials. The findings revealed that the Kim Jong-un regime had implemented reforms to improve English language education, with increased lexical diversity, textual complexity, and vocabulary exposure. Although no significant differences were found between the two regimes regarding the lexical coverage of textbooks, the Kim Jong-un regime's textbooks exhibited improvements in diversity, readability, and complexity. This study contributes to a broader understanding of the interplay between political ideology and English language education in North Korea, offering insights that have implications beyond the North Korean context and encouraging reflection on the nation-driven educational reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates two accounts of political propaganda in autocratic regimes. One argues that propaganda's content does not matter substantively and that propaganda is mostly a signal of the regime's overwhelming power over citizens. A second argues that propaganda is substantively meaningful: autocrats may communicate strategically either by attracting attention through highlighting the regime's strengths or by distracting attention away from the regime's malperformance. Using nearly 135,000 North Korean state-generated news articles between 1997 and 2018 we show that North Korea systematically adjusted its communication strategies following the leadership transfer from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose--Scholars note that understanding the political philosophy, interests, and objectives of North Korea's leaders has been extremely difficult and a long list of frustrated attempts by other nations to deal with its regimes is a testimony to that fact. The purpose of this paper is to establish a quantitative baseline of key narrative themes in the political discourse used by North Korea's rulers, track key shifts in these themes through time, and test hypotheses about leader similarities and differences. Design/Methodology/Approach--This study uses a quantitative discourse analysis methodology derived from thematic analysis, discourse analysis, and quantitative content analysis methods applied to 144 speeches and writings of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un to assess the relative importance of issues and cultural themes in a North Korean leader's discourse. Finding--The political narratives of North Korea's leaders are grounded in core themes of Juche political philosophy and this study reinforces the quasi-religious nature of Juche philosophy and the Kim family cult of personality. However, Kim Il-sung and to a lesser extent Kim Jong-un, have exhibited an ability to adapt their narratives to changing circumstances. Themes central to the early Kim regime such as democracy and the fight against Western imperialism decreased through time. Recent narrative shifts by Kim Jong-un closely track his antagonistic relations with U.S. presidents from 2012 to 2018, then exhibit a rapprochement early in 2018, although this fades in both words and deeds by the summer of 2019. Practical Implications--Western policy makers have found understanding North Korean political leaders extremely difficult. Once a leader's worldview is understood, it should be easier to understand the leader's interests and perhaps even anticipate strategic objectives and political actions. Originality, Value--This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the majority of available speeches and writings produced by North Korea's leaders. The quantitative discourse analysis method presented was expressly developed to provide policymakers with guidance and produces quantitative and reproducible results useful for testing hypotheses about the Kim regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A ubiquitous part of everyday life, North Korean calligraphy is an easily overlooked and yet integral element of the country's mass mobilization art. Under the curation of Kim Jong Il (Kim Chŏngil, 1941–2011), calligraphy was mobilized as a mechanism for the articulation of organistic national unity centered on the ruling Kim family and captured through the idea of the "social and political living body" (sahoe chŏngch'i chŏk saengmyŏngch'e), which mediated the familial transition of power. Cultivating penmanship identical to that of his father and expanding the hagiographic project around the revolutionary calligraphy of his parents, Kim Il Sung (Kim Ilsŏng, 1912–94) and Kim Jong Suk (Kim Chŏngsuk, 1917–49), Kim Jong Il worked out an image of charismatic familial embodiment by means of the script. In addition, calligraphy constitutes a disciplinary apparatus that coordinates performances of political intimacy, bodily training, and political interpretation within the space of everyday life. Drawing on the North Korean calligraphy textbooks, art periodicals, and visual archive, this article contextualizes the dichotomy of the idiosyncratic style of the male leaders and the feminized, ubiquitous Ch'ŏngbong style, connected with the figure of Kim Jong Suk. Special attention is given to the body symbolism and somatic discipline of North Korean calligraphy, which underlie its political efficacy as inscriptional and hermeneutic practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kim Jong Il considered the 1971 premiere of the opera Sea of Blood a watershed moment in opera history. He lauded its innovative use of chŏlga ('stanzaic song') rather than aria and recitative. By Western analytical standards, however, chŏlga is simple and predictable, so scholars have thus far glossed over its conventions and their signification. This article instead argues that chŏlga conventions exhibit cultural hybridity and that Kim leveraged such hybridity to advocate a modern, popular, and national sound for North Korea. I begin by outlining hybrid characteristics of colonial-era popular music that chŏlga inherited. I then explore Kim's engagement with such trends in his speeches on chŏlga and demonstrate that cultural hybridity was central to his understanding of sonic modernity. Finally, I analyse a scene from Sea of Blood that pits chŏlga against other music genres, leading to a symbolic victory for the form and for the Korean nation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ascension of Kim Jong-un to the leadership of North Korea signifies the emergence of a unique political entity: a Communist regime led by, what is in effect, a hereditary monarchy. With the transition from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il in 1994, and from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong-un in 2011, the political philosophical outlook of the North Korean state has evolved in response to the leadership's identification of the challenges to its rule of the country. This is reflected in the adoption of Juche by Kim Il Sung, of Songgum as adopted by Kim Jong Il, and of Byungjin as adopted by Kim Jong-un. This paper will examine how these respective political philosophies may be seen as a reflection of the policy priorities of the North Korean state in its efforts to retain power amidst growing isolation and pressure from the international community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the impact of geopolitical events on the stock return behavior of inter-Korean economic cooperation-related firms depending on the North Korean regime. We document empirical evidence showing that cross-sectional stock return tends to react positively to positive geopolitical events under the current regime in North Korea (Kim Jong-un), whereas negative geopolitical events have limited impact. Conversely, we find that negative geopolitical events yielded more pronounced effects on the stock returns of related firms under the former regime (Kim Jong-il). In addition, this study investigates the role of geopolitical shock in the evolution of aggregate economic variables of South Korea using Caldara and Iacoviello's (2018) geopolitical risk index. Geopolitical shock is found to yield no statistically meaningful impact on stock price index, industrial output, employment, or gross trade volume. Furthermore, aggregate stock market variables are found to be immune to geopolitical shock in South Korea. These results indicate that market participants estimate the escalation of geopolitical risk into full-scale war as unlikely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last 70 years, South Korea has gone through countless provocations from North Korea. Provocation is something that must be delicately calculated before the actual action, since it can be extended to a serious conflict. Among the possible factors, this paper focuses on the leader's characteristic, because 1) under North Korean dictatorship, the leader's thoughts are critical influence to policies and 2) personal characteristic, especially if it is the dictator's, hardly changes even when the external circumstances change. The purpose of this paper is in analyzing the correlations between North Korean leader's characteristics and provocation pattern. First, three generations of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un's personal characteristics will be described. Next, particular provocation features in respective leader's period will follow. Lastly, how each leader's characteristic and concerns were reflected on the provocations will be analyzed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the circumstances in which the image and the influence of the USA deteriorated all over the world at the beginning of the 2000s, The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of the USA founded a Bipartisan Commission for Smart-Power, with the purpose of drawing a vision which will develop a set of rules on the basis of which the next president of the USA, regardless of his political view, can implement smart-power policy. Among the arguments that served as a basis for establishing such commission were the opinion polls that indicated the deterioration of the USA image all over the world. President George W. Bush was perceived as a threat for the world through comparison with the President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the one of North Korea Kim Jong Il. In that context, the Commission reckoned that the American leaders had to promote a positive political vision, more powerful than the war against terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes the characteristics of Kim Jong-un's leadership primarily through the analysis of the tone observed in Rodong Sinmun, the official organ of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). It has described five characteristics of the Kim Jong-un administration. The first characteristic is preference for fast-paced action. While there are considerable overlaps with previous studies, it is possible to clearly identify aspects that are different from the Kim Jong-il administration. The second characteristic is Kim Jong-un's tendency toward pragmatism. He has repeatedly criticized "formalism" during his field inspections. Third, a new tendency to place greater importance on the policy-making process has become apparent. In addition to the plenary sessions of the Central Committee, meetings of the WPK Politburo Presidium, and Central Military Commission of the WPK are now convened, albeit irregularly. Fourth, obsession with certain specific issues is also characteristic of Kim Jong-un. His areas of concern are apparent from his works and from reports on his activities. These include science and technology, education, children, households, and families, the ilkun [executive staffs], buildings, vehicles, the air force, physical education, the Internet, and diversification of foreign trade. Lastly, the shift away from Songun is evident. The Kim Jong-un has increasingly distanced itself from the army-first Songun politics that symbolized the Kim Jong-il period. Kim Jong-un no longer mentions Songun. The National Defence Commission, which was the command center for the Songun system, was disbanded by an amendment to the Constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Letters to the editor comment on the articles "North Korea's Nuclear Neurosis" by Jacques Hymans, from the May/June, 2007 issue, "Sweating the Small Stuff" by Matthew Schroeder, from the September/October, 2007 issue, and "Conventional Wisdom" from the March/April, 2007 issue of this magazine.

This article aims to investigate the shift in a policy frame related to recent economic and social changes in North Korea. Most of the reforms in the Kim Jong-il era, including the "July 1, 2002 Economic Management Improvement Measure (EMIM)", failed. In comparison, its policy reforms have been reinstituted since the "June 28 Measure of 2012" in the Kim Jong-un era, and the policy frame in North Korea has been changed with more focus on civilian economic growth. Drawing on the policy framing approach, this article explores policy changes in the Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un eras and analyzes the features of a policy frame in each era in three aspects: framing contention, processes, and tasks. The findings imply that a new policy frame, formed on the Kangsong Taeguk doctrine, has been applied to recent policy changes since 2012 in North Korea in order for reforms to be stably instituted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose—While many scholars have studied how the Kim regimes have absorbed the Korean War into North Korea’s national narrative, no one has conducted a systematic study of how the Kims wield that history as part their policy toolbox. The purpose of this paper is to compare how and how often Kim Jong- Il and Kim Jong- Un reference the Korean War between 1998 and 2018 to advance their policy objectives. Design, Methodology, Approach—Drawing from the literature on availability and representative heuristics, this paper argues that Kim Jong- Un will reference the Korean War more often than Kim Jong- Il. To test that theory, this paper applies quantitative content analysis to KCNA articles between 1998 and 2018 to determine how often KCNA under both Kim Jong- Il and Kim Jong- Un cite the Korean War. Then, this paper applies Yuen Foon Khong’s analytical framework (2009) to assess how the two Kims used the Korean War for diagnosis, advocacy, and justification in policy decisions. Findings—The results confirm the author’s theory on who uses the Korean War more often: KCNA under Kim Jong- Un highlights the Korean War 1.8 times more frequently than it does under Kim Jong- Il. In addition, the Kims wield the Korean War most often to advocate policy positions. Practical Implications—This study confirms the utility of the availability and representative heuristics in understanding how Kim Jong- Un and Kim Jong- Il perceive their environment. The study also provides support that the heuristics are useful for predicting how individuals might behave in the presence of certain conditions. Based on these findings, the study observes there are both troubling and useful implications for policymakers to leverage awareness of these operating heuristics in the mind of North Korean leaders. Originality, Value—This paper makes an original contribution to the understanding of the frequency and use of the Korean War by North Korean leaders. Using a quantitative and qualitative approach, this paper provides a framework which can be applied to extract new insights into North Korea across wider periods and different topics. This paper also contributes to the literature of how policymakers use history as a tool to advance their objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in December 2011, Kim Jong Un assumed power and gradually transformed the policymaking environment in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). While some analysts expected the young and inexperienced leader to face greater hardship than his father in managing the country, in this article I argue that Kim Jong Un faced an easier transition. Kim Jong Un inherited an economy, inter-Korean relationship, and strategic landscape in foreign affairs in a relatively favorable position relative to his father's formal succession. From this position of strength, Kim Jong Un has centralized governance in the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) and his personal leadership. Drawing on internal documents and media, I show that inter-institutional debate previously observable between the party, military, and government has largely vanished under Kim Jong Un and the political roles of the military and government have receded from a comprehensive set of national policy questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The foreign policy behavior of North Korea remains puzzling to many observers to date. This article aims to explain Pyongyang's foreign behavior between 1995 and 2011 with a concept called the balance of dependence. Although it stood on the brink of collapse in the 1990s, the North Korean regime defied the odds and survived with the help of neighboring countries, namely South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States. This article intends to explain Pyongyang's foreign policy under Kim Jong Il by focusing on how it deliberately built a portfolio of dependence on its neighbors. I argue that North Korea's foreign behavior had been attuned to the rise and fall of assistance from other nations. It sought to disperse its dependence among a host of potential sponsors in order not to be exclusively reliant on a single donor state, fearing restrictions on its political autonomy. As long as its neighbors are willing to help out, Pyongyang will continue to play one sponsor off the others while making progress with its nuclear and missile programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At first glance, the "potato revolution" initiated personally by Kim Jong II in 1998 followed the usual DPRK propaganda campaign strategy in moments of crisis. However, a closer look reveals that the potato revolution represented a novel type of political campaign. The unique combination of complex social goals, which were behind the potato revolution, and the novel methods by which this revolution was promoted, reflect the exceptional changes experienced by the DPRK from the 1990s. These changes amounted to the introduction of market logic and rival viewpoints into North Korean society, which had obstinately striven to protect the purity of its official ideology. The potato revolution became a novel type of political campaign, aimed at both producer and consumer; in addition to the familiar methods of Juche propaganda, it employed some popular Western marketing techniques. This paper aims to investigate the potato promotion campaign as a comprehensive cultural phenomenon manifested in a wide range of North Korean cultural practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Kim Jong-un’s assumption of power following Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011, some changing trends have been noted when compared to the Kim Jong-il period. Kim Jong-un has enforced a power shift from the military to the party and subsequent reduction of the military’s political influence. Additionally, he has emphasized the general enhancement of the navy and air force. Acutely aware that North Korea’s military policy is closely related to the regime’s subsistence, some has expected that these new situations orchestrated by the supreme leader would be influential to North Korea’s military policy. With particular focus on the regime’s development of nuclear weapons and asymmetric capabilities, this article is to explore Kim Jong-un’s military policy. The process of nuclearization has been buttressed by the absolute attention of the North Korean leadership notwithstanding the growing interest in improving people’s economy. Also, the development of asymmetric capabilities has been sustained by Kim Jong-un’s explicit intention to use such capabilities. Therefore, North Korea’s military policy under Kim Jong-un’s rule is not exceedingly different from the legacy of his father’s leadership but rather steps it up further. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study is to analyse the changing economic policies of the North Korean government with focus on public markets (Gongseol Sijang) and it covers 20 years from the Kim Jong-il period to the current Kim Jong-un regime. First, as of 2015, public markets in Pyongyang occupy 26 areas from farming districts to vacant lots in the city centre. Second, the North Korean government began to establish farmer’s markets (Nongmin Sijang) in the suburbs of Pyongyang in the 1960s. Songshin Market was the representative farmer’s market. The North Korean government transformed a Songshin Market into a public market in the early 1990s, as a demonstrative case of a public market programme. During the same decade, in the midst of North Korean famine, Songshin Market was expanded and applied to the central area of Pyongyang. Notably, the designs and facilities of the public markets in the central areas have been more modernized and enlarged than in suburban areas because they were built relatively later than those in the suburbs. Third, the central area in Pyongyang was marked as a residential district for high-ranking officers and the rich. Accordingly, the public markets stationed here appeared to be more modernized with a wide variety of products including an abundance of high-end products, due to concentrated buyers with high economic standards. This means that a layering process by economic standards had been proceeding in North Korea. Fourth, government authorities have implemented the policy to expand the city outwards into the suburbs for the expansion of Pyongyang. As a critical means to expand the city, it has also established the public markets near newly constructed apartment complexes in the suburbs of the city. Namely, the construction of the public markets has catalysed the proceeding reconstruction of the city. Regarding the development of these markets, it can be summarized that the North Korean government has conducted gradual economic policies to increase the reform by utilizing the succession of markets in a way with stepwise expansion from dot, line to face in the process of repetitive control and relaxation polices rather than the repetitive or short execution of repression or control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]