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Gienapp's critical move is to shift our attention from semantics to ontology. What is the Constitution? How was it conceived to exist in 1787, and how has that conception changed over time? These questions must be squarely addressed, he insists, before asking what the Constitution means. Does this whole text-focused enterprise rest on a mistake? Drawing on a wealth of primary sources and modern scholarship, Gienapp makes a strong and interesting case that it does. Boiled down, his main argument is that the founders were predominantly natural lawyers, and thus conceived of law quite differently than most originalists typically do.

Located in the mediastinum, pericardial cysts are rare and benign congenital abnormalities commonly identified as incidental findings on imaging. However, some patients with abnormally enlarged cysts present with compressive symptoms, which include recurrent infections, tamponade from cardiac compression and respiratory complications. Our report highlights a challenging case of a patient with recurrent respiratory symptoms secondary to phrenic nerve compression. Misdiagnosis over the past decade resulted in ineffective interventions. After clear identification of the cyst compression of the ipsilateral phrenic nerve, the patient underwent a minimally invasive robotically assisted cyst resection with phrenic nerve preservation that alleviated respiratory symptoms.

Moral nativism is a theory which holds that significant elements of moral psychology are innate. This chapter first summarizes the intuitive turn in moral psychology and explains its significance for moral nativism. Drawing on an analogy to language, the chapter then outlines two principal arguments for moral nativism: the argument for moral grammar and the argument from the poverty of the stimulus. After making some clarifications and correcting some popular misconceptions, the chapter reviews some of the most significant research supporting moral nativism, including studies of compassion, empathy, and altruistic motivation in humans and other primates; the intuitive jurisprudence of young children; the emergence of moral cognition in human infants and toddlers; the neurocognitive foundations of moral judgment; and human moral universals. The chapter concludes by locating moral nativism within a broader historical and scientific context, including ancient philosophy, Enlightenment rationalism, evolutionary theory, and the modern cognitive science of innate knowledge in various domains.

Phillips et al. make a strong case that knowledge representations should play a larger role in cognitive science. Their arguments are reinforced by comparable efforts to place moral knowledge, rather than moral beliefs, at the heart of a naturalistic moral psychology. Conscience, Kant's synthetic a priori, and knowledge attributions in the law all point in a similar direction.

Case series Patients: Male, 36-year-old • Male, 47-year-old • Male, 78-year-old Final Diagnosis: COVID-19 • pneumomediastinum • subcutaneous emphysema Symptoms: Respiratory distress • shortness of breath Medication: — Clinical Procedure: — Specialty: Critical Care Medicine • Pulmonology Objective: Rare co-existance of disease or pathology Background: Novel Coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) has been in the spotlight since the first cases were reported in December 2019. COVID-19 has been found to cause severe acute respiratory distress syndrome and, more uncommonly, subcutaneous emphysema and pneumomediastinum. We present a case series of 3 patients with COVID-19 infection managed in the Intensive Care Unit and found to have subcutaneous emphysema and pneumomediastinum on chest imaging. Case Reports: We present a case series of 3 men, ages 36, 47, and 78 years, diagnosed with COVID-19 via RT-PCR, found to have severe acute respiratory distress syndrome, and managed in the Intensive Care Unit. Two patients described in this case series were mechanically ventilated on low positive end-expiratory pressures and developed subcutaneous emphysema and pneumomediastinum on chest imaging, and 1 patient developed subcutaneous emphysema prior to intubation. Each of these patients had a more eventful hospital course and worse outcomes than most COVID-19 infected patients. Conclusions: Subcutaneous emphysema and pneumomediastinum in COVID-19 patients have been rarely reported and is poorly understood. In our institution, we have found the diagnosis of subcutaneous emphysema and pneumomediastinum in COVID-19 patients is associated with unfavorable outcomes and worse prognosis.

The presumption of innocence is not only a bedrock principle of American law, but also a fundamental human right. The psychological underpinnings of this presumption, however, are not well understood. To make progress, one important task is to explain how adults and children infer the goals and intentional structure of complex actions, especially when a single action has more than one salient effect. Many theories of moral judgment have either ignored this intention inference problem or have simply assumed a particular solution without empirical support. We propose that this problem may be solved by appealing to domain-specific prior knowledge that is either built-up over the probability of prior intentions or built-in as part of core cognition. We further propose a specific solution to this problem in the moral domain: a good intention prior, which entails a rebuttable presumption that if an action has both good and bad effects, the actor intends the good effects and not the bad effects. Finally, in a series of novel experiments we provide the first empirical support - from both adults and preschool children - for the existence of this good intention prior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Moral nativism is a theory of moral cognition which holds that significant elements of human moral psychology are innate. In this invited chapter for The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology, I first summarize the intuitive turn in recent moral psychology and explain its significance for moral nativism. Drawing on an analogy to language, I then outline two principal arguments for moral nativism: the argument for moral grammar and the argument from the poverty of the moral stimulus. After making some terminological clarifications and correcting some popular misconceptions, I then review some of the most significant research supporting moral nativism, including empirical studies of compassion, empathy, and altruistic motivation in humans and other primates; the intuitive jurisprudence of young children; the emergence of moral cognition in human infants and toddlers; the neurocognitive foundations of moral judgment; and human moral universals. The chapter concludes by locating moral nativism within a broader historical and scientific context, including ancient philosophy (e.g., Plato’s Meno), Enlightenment rationalism (e.g., Descartes’ Treatise on Man), evolutionary theory (e.g., Darwin’s Descent of Man), and the modern cognitive science of innate knowledge.

Modern textualist and originalist theories increasingly center interpretation around the “ordinary” or “public” meaning of legal texts. This approach is premised on the promotion of values like publicity, fair notice, and democratic legitimacy. As such, ordinary meaning is typically understood as a question about how members of the general public understand the text — an empirical question with an “objective” answer. This Essay explores the role of empirical methods, particularly experimental survey methods, in these ordinary meaning inquiries. The Essay expresses cautious optimism about new insight that empirical methods can bring, but it also warns against assuming that these methods will deliver uncontroversial, objective solutions in legal interpretation. As a concrete illustration, the Essay analyzes the main statutory question presented in Bostock v. Clayton County (2020). Both Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion and the dissents by Justices Alito and Kavanaugh offer avowedly textualist analyses of Title VII’s “ordinary meaning,” yet their reasoning and conclusions diverge. To help explain these differences, the Essay proposes a distinction between two types of empirical textualism, which we call the “ordinary criteria” and “legal criteria” versions. The former conceptualizes ordinary meaning as closely connected to empirical facts about how ordinary people understand statutory language; in effect, it equates ordinary meaning with ordinary understanding. The latter conceptualizes ordinary meaning differently, combining the common understanding of statutory terms with both their previously-established legal meanings and their legal entailments. Bostock exemplifies the difference between these approaches, with Justices Alito and Kavanaugh relying on the former and Justice Gorsuch on the latter. The Essay also presents a new experimental study of the key linguistic dispute in Bostock — public judgments about discrimination “because of” sex — that illustrates differences between these two approaches to empirical textualism.

Background A BRCA mutation is a mutation in either of the BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes, which are tumor suppressor genes. Hundreds of different types of mutations in these genes have been identified, some of which have been determined to be harmful, whereas others have no proven impact. BRCA mutations are well known to be associated with breast, uterine, and ovarian cancers along with some nongynecological malignancies involving the peritoneum, prostate, pancreas, skin, stomach, and rectum. However, there are no reported cases to date of an association between carcinoid tumors and a BRCA mutation. Case presentation Our patient was a 33-year-old White woman with BRCA2 mutation who presented to her primary care physician for evaluation of abdominal pain. She underwent computed tomography of her abdomen and pelvis, which showed an incidental finding of infrahilar mass along with renal stones. Further workup with bronchoscopy and biopsy of the mass confirmed it to be a carcinoid tumor of the lung. Conclusions No literature thus far exists describing a connection between BRCA mutations and carcinoid tumors. Early diagnosis and prompt treatment of carcinoid tumors are proven to have impact on survival and prognosis of these patients.

We have successfully synthesized an ABA tri-block co-polymer of poly(methacrylic acid)-block-poly(2-hydroxyethyl methacrylate)-block-poly(methacrylic acid), having Mw = 100k and 272k where we were able to insert RDG or RGD peptide sequences using thiol-acrylate Michael addition. A soft silicone stamp was then used to imprint a 0.4-micron wide grating of the copolymer with a period of 10 microns. The samples were then examined with atomic force microscopy after application of an external electric field and the pattern was observed to stretch by a factor of five. Cells plated onto these substrates showed clear preference for the striped patterns formed under the influence of the external field, and no preferential attachment to the patterns formed in the absence of the field. Cell migration experiments, using the agarose droplet method, performed on spun cast copolymer films showed minimal migration and adhesion on the substrates without peptides or those with only with the RDG peptide, while good adhesion and significant outward migration was observed for cells plated on the copolymers with the RGD sequence. Taken together these results confirmed our hypothesis that a smart biomimetic polymer substrate could be constructed where functional domains could be revealed selectively allowing us to mimic the natural design of engineered tissue constructs.

Every great philosopher has important things to say about moral philosophy. Chomsky is no exception. Chomsky’s remarks on this topic, however, are not systematic. Instead, they consist mainly of brief and occasional asides. Although often provocative, they tend to come across as digressions from his central focus on linguistics and related disciplines, such as epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. Perhaps as a result, moral philosophers have paid relatively little attention to Chomsky over the past sixty years.This neglect is unfortunate. Chomsky’s insights into the nature and origin of human morality are fundamental and penetrating. They address deep philosophical problems that have shaped the aims of moral philosophy for centuries. They also reinforce many of the lessons Chomsky has taught about the nature and origins of human language. Elaborating upon these themes, this chapter begins by recounting two of Chomsky’s most extensive discussions of moral philosophy, each of which draws attention to the fact that, like linguistic knowledge, moral knowledge is an example of Plato’s problem: a complex mental competence characterized by a profound poverty of the stimulus. The chapter then places these remarks in a broader context by providing a brief discussion of mentalist, modular, and nativist theories of moral cognition from Plato to the present. Finally, the chapter responds to one prominent criticism of Chomsky’s naturalistic approach to moral philosophy, that of the late philosopher, Bernard Williams. I argue that Williams’ “Wittgensteinian” skepticism about moral rules is no more convincing than a similar skepticism about grammatical rules in the context of linguistic theory.

This article argues that the key elements of the prima facie case of harmful battery may form critical building blocks of moral cognition in both humans and nonhuman animals. By contrast, at least some of the rules and representations presupposed by familiar justifications to battery appear to be uniquely human. The article also argues that many famous thought experiments in ethics and many influential experiments in moral psychology rely on harmful battery scenarios without acknowledging this fact or considering its theoretical or empirical implications. The unifying factor in all these studies is goal-directed harmful contact, inflicted without consent or justification.

In its motion to dismiss in CREW et al. v. Trump, the Department of Justice (DOJ) defines the word “emolument” as “profit arising from office or employ.” DOJ claims that this “original understanding” of “emolument” is both grounded in “contemporaneous dictionary definitions” and justifies an “office-and-employment-specific construction” of that term. On this basis, it argues that the Emoluments Clauses of the Constitution “do not prohibit any company in which the President has any financial interest from doing business with any foreign, federal, or state instrumentality.” Unfortunately, DOJ’s historical definition of “emolument” is inaccurate, unrepresentative, and misleading. Particularly because the government may seek to utilize its flawed definition in subsequent court filings, this Article seeks to correct the historical record. It does so based on a comprehensive study of how “emolument” is defined in English language dictionaries published from 1604 to 1806, as well as in common law dictionaries published between 1523 and 1792. Among other things, the Article demonstrates that every English dictionary definition of “emolument” from 1604 to 1806 relies on one or more of the elements of the broad definition DOJ rejects in its brief: “profit,” “advantage,” “gain,” or “benefit.” Furthermore, over 92% of these dictionaries define “emolument” exclusively in these terms, with no reference to “office” or “employment.” By contrast, DOJ’s preferred definition — “profit arising from office or employ” — appears in less than 8% of these dictionaries. Moreover, even these outlier dictionaries always include “gain, or advantage” in their definitions, a fact obscured by DOJ’s selective quotation of only one part of its favored definition from Barclay (1774). The impression DOJ creates in its brief by contrasting four historical definitions of “emolument” — two broad and two narrow — is, therefore, highly misleading. The suggestion that “emolument” was a legal term of art at the founding, with a sharply circumscribed “office-and-employment-specific” meaning, is also inconsistent with the historical record. A vast quantity of evidence already available in the public domain suggests that the founding generation used the word “emolument” in broad variety of contexts, including private commercial transactions. This Article adds to that emerging historical consensus by documenting that none of the most significant common law dictionaries published from 1523 to 1792 even includes “emolument” in its list of defined terms. In fact, this term is mainly used in these legal dictionaries to define other, less familiar words and concepts. These findings reinforce the conclusion that “emolument” was not a term of art at the founding with a highly restricted meaning. Finally, the Article calls attention to the fact that the government’s dictionary-based argument is flawed in another, more fundamental respect. Little or no evidence indicates that the two historical dictionaries — Barclay (1774) and Trusler (1766) — on which DOJ relies in its brief to defend its “office-and-employment-specific” definition of “emolument” were owned, possessed, or used by the founders, let alone had any impact on them or on the American people who debated and ratified the Constitution. For example, neither of these dictionaries is mentioned in the more than 178,000 searchable documents in the Founders Online database, which makes publicly available the papers of the six most prominent founders. Nor do these volumes appear in other pertinent databases, such as the Journals of the Continental Congress, Letters of Delegates to Congress, Farrand’s Records, Elliot’s Debates, or the Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution. By contrast, all of the dictionaries that the founding generation did possess and use regularly — e.g., Johnson, Bailey, Dyche & Pardon, Ash, and Entick — define “emolument” in the broad manner favoring the plaintiffs: “profit,” “gain,” “advantage,” or “benefit.” To document its primary claims, the Article includes over 100 original images of English language and legal dictionaries from 1523 to 1806, as well as complete transcripts and easy-to-read tables of the definitions contained therein. A second study is currently underway of dictionaries from 1806 to the present, which seeks to determine how and why definitions of “emolument” may have changed over time. Collectively, these inquiries are designed to accomplish more than simply aiding judges and holding lawyers’ feet to the fire in the emoluments cases now pending in three federal courts. They also provide a basis for educating members of Congress, government officials, journalists, and the broader public about the historical meaning of this important yet obscure constitutional term.

Chlorthalidone's safety and efficacy in the management of hypertension has been demonstrated in landmark trials. Despite understanding the effects of thiazides on urinary sodium excretion and intravascular volume, the exact mechanism of their antihypertensive effects is not clearly understood. Common compensatory mechanisms for decreases in circulating plasma volume include increased adrenergic tone and systemic vascular resistance, as well as increases in the renin-angiotensin-aldosterone system. Chlorthalidone has been shown to decrease platelet aggregation and vascular permeability and promote angiogenesis in vitro, which is thought to be, in part, the result of reductions in carbonic anhydrase-dependent pathways, including catecholamine-mediated platelet aggregation and downregulation of VEGF-C gene expression. This article reviews the comparative clinical data between chlorthalidone and hydrochlorothiazide, the pharmacologic properties that might explain some of their differences regarding half-life and efficacy, and what is known about the effect of chlorthalidone on intermediate endpoints.

In Orientalism, Edward Said’s seminal critique of Western discourse on the Arab and Islamic world, Said begins with an epigram from Karl Marx: ’They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented‘ (Said, 1979, p. xiii, quoting Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte). Said then argues that Marx’s statement captures a basic reality about Western representations of ’Oriental‘ societies, which is that they often rest on a pattern of cultural hegemony. The dominance of European colonial powers, primarily Great Britain and France, over their subjugated populations is what allowed the latter to be depicted in a way that reinforced ‘the idea of European [superiority] in comparison with. . .non-European peoples and cultures’ (p. 7). For example, in Gustave Flaubert’s popular novels, ‘Flaubert’s encounter with an Egyptian courtesan produced a. . .model of the Oriental woman. . .[who] never spoke of herself. . .[and] never represented her emotions, presence or history. He spoke for and represented her. . .telling his readers in what way she was typically Oriental’ (p. 6, emphasis original). Moreover, Flaubert’s superiority in relation to her ‘was not an isolated instance. It fairly stands for the pattern of relative strength between East and West, and the discourse about the Orient that it enabled’ (p. 6).

One overriding concern I have with Susanna Blumenthal's insightful and stimulating article, “The Mind of a Moral Agent: Scottish Common Sense and the Problem of Responsibility in Nineteenth-Century American Law,” is whether there is anything sufficiently distinctive about Scottish Common Sense philosophy that justifies the role Blumenthal ascribes to it. In a representative passage, she writes:Common Sense philosophy left would-be “moral managers” with a puzzle. If rational and moral faculties were innate and universal, what explained the great conflicts among men concerning matters of belief, manners, and morals … leading some to commit acts that were … patently irrational or downright evil? And to the extent that therewasa common sense about the dictates of reason, propriety, and moral sense, why did some individuals act in defiance of them?

Scientists from various disciplines have begun to focus attention on the psychology and biology of human morality. One research program that has recently gained attention is universal moral grammar (UMG). UMG seeks to describe the nature and origin of moral knowledge by using concepts and models similar to those used in Chomsky's program in linguistics. This approach is thought to provide a fruitful perspective from which to investigate moral competence from computational, ontogenetic, behavioral, physiological and phylogenetic perspectives. In this article, I outline a framework for UMG and describe some of the evidence that supports it. I also propose a novel computational analysis of moral intuitions and argue that future research on this topic should draw more directly on legal theory.

To what extent do moral judgments depend on conscious reasoning from explicitly understood principles? We address this question by investigating one particular moral principle, the principle of the double effect. Using web-based technology, we collected a large data set on individuals ' responses to a series of moral dilemmas, asking when harm to innocent others is permissible. Each moral dilemma presented a choice between action and inaction, both resulting in lives saved and lives lost. Results showed that: (1) patterns of moral judgments were consistent with the principle of double effect and showed little variation across differences in gender, age, educational level, ethnicity, religion or national affi liation (within the limited range of our sample population) and (2) a majority of subjects failed to provide justifi cations that could account for their judgments. These results indicate that the principle of the double effect may be operative in our moral judgments but not open to conscious introspection. We discuss these results in light of current psychological theories of moral cognition, emphasizing the need to consider the unconscious appraisal system that mentally represents the causal and intentional properties of human action.

Darwin’s (1871/1981) observation that evolution has produced in us certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct that lack any obvious basis in individual utility is a useful springboard from which to clarify the role of emotion in moral judgment. The problem is whether a certain class of moral judgment is “constituted” or “driven by” emotion (Greene, 2008, p. 108) or merely correlated with emotion while being generated by unconscious computations (e.g., Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2008). With one exception, all of the “personal” vignettes devised by Greene and colleagues (2001, 2004) and subsequently used by other researchers (e.g., Koenigs et al., 2007), in their fMRI and behavioral studies of emotional engagement in moral judgment, involve violent crimes or torts. These studies thus do much more than highlight the role of emotion in moral judgment; they also support the classical rationalist thesis that moral rules are engraved in the mind.

The effect of tool design on microstructure and properties of friction stir processed study aluminium alloy AA 5005-H34 (Al-Mg) was investigated using three different FSP tools with different pin designs. The application of FSP resulted in fine, fully recrystallised microstructures and the processed zone was defect-free for some of the pin designs. Significant grain refinement from an initial pancake-like microstructure with a grain size of about 192 μm in the base material to 10- 20 μm in the processed regions was achieved.

Is the science of moral cognition usefully modelled on aspects of Universal Grammar? Are human beings born with an innate 'moral grammar' that causes them to analyse human action in terms of its moral structure, with just as little awareness as they analyse human speech in terms of its grammatical structure? Questions like these have been at the forefront of moral psychology ever since John Mikhail revived them in his influential work on the linguistic analogy and its implications for jurisprudence and moral theory. In this seminal book, Mikhail offers a careful and sustained analysis of the moral grammar hypothesis, showing how some of John Rawls' original ideas about the linguistic analogy, together with famous thought experiments like the trolley problem, can be used to improve our understanding of moral and legal judgement.

I fully subscribe to the judgment of those writers who maintain that of all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the most important. This sense, as Mackintosh remarks, “has a rightful supremacy over every other principle of human action”; it is summed up in that short but imperious word ought , so full of high significance. It is the most noble of all the attributes of man, leading him without a moment's hesitation to risk his life for that of a fellow-creature; or, after due deliberation, impelled simply by the deep feeling of right or duty, to sacrifice it in some great cause. Immanuel Kant exclaims, “Duty! Wondrous thought, that workest neither by fond insinuation, flattery, nor by any threat, but merely by holding up thy naked law in the soul, and so extorting for thyself always reverence, if not always obedience; before whom all appetites are dumb, however secretly they rebel; whence thy original?” – Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man In Part One, I introduced Rawls' linguistic analogy and drew on the work of both Rawls and Chomsky to formulate a new analytic framework for the theory of moral cognition, modeled on aspects of Universal Grammar. In Part Two, I sought to clarify the empirical significance of the linguistic analogy by formulating, and stating a provisional solution to, the problem of descriptive adequacy with respect to a class of considered moral judgments, including the original trolley problems devised by Foot and Thomson.