Moral Intuitions and Moral Nativism

Moral nativism is a theory of moral cognition which holds that significant elements of human moral psychology are innate. In this invited chapter for The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology, I first summarize the intuitive turn in recent moral psychology and explain its significance for moral nativism. Drawing on an analogy to language, I then outline two principal arguments for moral nativism: the argument for moral grammar and the argument from the poverty of the moral stimulus. After making some terminological clarifications and correcting some popular misconceptions, I then review some of the most significant research supporting moral nativism, including empirical studies of compassion, empathy, and altruistic motivation in humans and other primates; the intuitive jurisprudence of young children; the emergence of moral cognition in human infants and toddlers; the neurocognitive foundations of moral judgment; and human moral universals. The chapter concludes by locating moral nativism within a broader historical and scientific context, including ancient philosophy (e.g., Plato’s Meno), Enlightenment rationalism (e.g., Descartes’ Treatise on Man), evolutionary theory (e.g., Darwin’s Descent of Man), and the modern cognitive science of innate knowledge.