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The ability to interact in a natural language profoundly changes devices' interfaces and potential applications of speaking technologies. Concurrently, this phenomenon challenges our mainstream theories of knowledge, such as how to analyze linguistic outputs of devices under existing anthropocentric theoretical assumptions. In section 1, I present the topic of machines that speak, connecting between Descartes and Generative AI. In section 2, I argue that accepted testimonial theories of knowledge and justification commonly reject the possibility that a speaking technological artifact can give testimony. In section 3, I identify three assumptions underlying the view that rejects conversational AIs – AI-based technologies that converse, as testifiers: conversational AIs (1) lack intentions, (2) cannot be normatively assessed, and (3) cannot constitute an object in trust relations, while humans can. In section 4, I propose the concept 'AI-testimony' for analyzing outputs of conversational AIs, suggesting three conditions for technologies to deliver AI-testimony: (1) content is propositional, (2) generated and delivered with no other human directly involved, (3) the output is perceived as phenomenologically similar to that of a human. I conclude that this concept overcomes the limitations of the anthropocentric concept of testimony, opening future directions of research without associating conversational AIs with human-like agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How are justified belief and rational belief related? Some philosophers think that justified belief and rational belief come to the same thing. Others take it that justification is a matter of how well a particular belief is supported by the evidence, while rational belief is a matter of how well a belief coheres with a person's other beliefs. In this paper, I defend the view that justification is a dimension of rationality, a view that can make sense of both of these conflicting accounts. When it modifies belief, 'rational' is a multidimensional adjective, as there are multiple dimensions along which a belief can be rational. I will argue that one of these dimensions is justification, an account that can not only explain why philosophers give diverging theories of the relationship between justified belief and rational belief, but can also reveal why rational belief and justified belief are closely related despite being distinct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the contemporary epistemology of testimony, it is widely assumed that testimonial scepticism can be dismissed without engaging with possible reasons or arguments supporting the view. This assumption of dismissibility both underlies the debate between reductionist and non-reductionist views of testimony and is responsible for the neglect of testimonial scepticism within contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that even given liberal assumptions about what may constitute valid grounds for the dismissal of a sceptical view, the assumption that testimonial scepticism is dismissible should be rejected. For even if familiar sceptical positions and scepticism about testimonial justification can be dismissed on such grounds, scepticism about testimonial knowledge cannot. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our awareness of the boundedness of the spatial sensory field—a paradigmatic structural feature of visual experience—possesses a distinctive epistemic role. Properly understood, this result undermines a widely assumed picture of how visual experience permits us to learn about the world. This paper defends an alternative picture in which visual experience provides at least two kinds of non-inferential justification for beliefs about the external world. Accommodating this justification in turn requires recognising a new way for visual experience to encode information about the world. Reflection upon the epistemic contribution of sensory experience's structural features thus forces us to revise our understanding of how perception, cognition, and the world fit together. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should we understand validity? A standard way to characterize validity is in terms of the preservation of truth (or truth in a model). But there are several problems facing such characterizations. An alternative approach is to characterize validity epistemically, for instance in terms of the preservation of an epistemic status. In this paper, I raise a problem for such views. First, I argue that if the relevant epistemic status is factive, such as being in a position to know or having conclusive evidence for, then the account runs into trouble if we endorse certain familiar logical principles. Second, I argue that if the relevant epistemic status is non-factive, such as is rationally committed to or has justification for believing, then a similar problem arises if we endorse the logical principles as well as a sufficiently strong epistemic "level-bridging" principle. Finally, I argue that an analogous problem arises for the most natural characterization of validity in terms of rational credence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper lays out the conceptual groundwork for a long-term project examining ethical issues raised when addressing the value of knowledge to a knowledge economy. The project includes a series of papers on specific topics that interrelate to the subjects of knowledge, ethics and organizations. While some of the planned articles for the project will have a practical focus, others, such as this one, will be conceptual in nature. The following outlines selected key concepts for an ethics of knowledge and their relationship with cognate areas of inquiry and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the intersection of morality and mathematics, exploring whether moral realism and mathematical realism are intertwined and examining the comparative justifications for beliefs in these domains. Topics discussed include the challenge of realism, the genealogy of moral and mathematical beliefs, and the proposed solution of pragmatic pluralism, which argues for the truth of divergent theories in mathematics, morality, and other areas.

Some externalists have recently argued that the unity of theoretical and practical reason implies that epistemic justification is factive. It is argued that arguments for the factivity of epistemic justification either (i) equate two actions that are in fact different, or (ii) make the unwarranted assumption that the by-relation transmits justification. The unity of reason does not imply that epistemic justification is factive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are there epistemic duties to inquire? The idea enjoys intuitive support. However, prominent evidentialists argue that our only epistemic duty is to believe well (i.e. to have doxastically justified beliefs), and doing so does not require inquiry. Against this, I argue that evidentialists are plausibly committed to the idea that if we have epistemic duties to believe well, then we have epistemic duties to inquire. This is because on plausible evidentialist views of evidence possession (i.e. views that result in plausible theories of evidentialist justification), inquiry is sometimes a necessary constitutive means of forming doxastically justified beliefs—beliefs that are proportioned to and based on one's evidence. So, either evidentialist views of evidence possession commit them to epistemic duties to inquire or they lead to independently implausible theories of evidentialist justification. My discussion also has important implications for the zetetic turn in epistemology, since I argue that evidentialists who are staunchly opposed to epistemic norms on inquiry have reason to reconsider. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Qualified immunity is a judge-made doctrine originally created to shield officers from liability only when they could not have been on notice that their actions were wrongful. In the four decades since the Supreme Court first articulated this justification for qualified immunity, the doctrine has become unmoored from its roots and has expanded to protect officers even in the face of clear evidence that the officers should have known better. The test for qualified immunity states that officers are immune from liability in the absence of clearly established law that previously condemned their conduct, but the Supreme Court has not defined exactly what "clearly established law" means. In a set of conflicting cases, the Court has both repudiated the consideration of departmental policies as clearly established law and, subsequently, cited departmental policies as evidence of clearly established law. As a result of this ambiguity, lower courts have been inconsistent--even within circuits--about whether departmental policies count as clearly established law. This Comment addresses this gap in the doctrine by proposing a solution that ameliorates the legal fiction at the heart of the clearly-established-law inquiry. Using Hope v. Pelzer's obviousness exception to the clearly-established-law requirement, this Comment proposes incorporating departmental policies into the qualified immunity doctrine as an objective measure for determining when an officer's rights violation was obvious. This solution shifts the application of qualified immunity to align with the original justification for the doctrine without requiring a change in precedent from the Supreme Court. Ultimately, it closes a loophole in the doctrine by offering a method through which officers can be held accountable for their conduct when they clearly should have known that their actions were wrong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Roland Barthes defines myth as a semiological system with "the task of giving an historical intention a natural justification, and making contingency appear eternal." I link his ideas to Jean-Louis Baudry's apparatus theory, which argues that the mechanisms of filmmaking and exhibition forge "an 'organic' unity" between a film's essentially disparate images. Finally, I examine the ways in which films can deconstruct myth by increasing in Barthes's terms "the abstractness of the concept and the arbitrariness of the sign," a goal toward which Luis Buñuel's 1974 film The Phantom of Liberty admirably strives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When does a group justifiedly believe that p? One answer to this question has been developed first by Schmitt and then by Hakli: when the group members jointly accept a reason for the belief. Call this the joint acceptance account of group justification. Their answer has great explanatory power, providing us with a way to account for cases in which the group's justification can diverge from the justification individual members have. Unfortunately, Jennifer Lackey developed a powerful argument against joint acceptance accounts. She argues that these accounts lead to epistemically arbitrary reasons and therefore justification at will. Group justification loses the necessary connection to the world to be truth‐conducive. In this paper I develop a new form of a joint acceptance account that can deal with Lackey's examples: the anchored joint acceptance account of group justification. I argue that properly understanding the role of epistemic expectations can help us form the best version of a joint acceptance account. While justification is only generated by joint acceptance of evidence, the evidential expectations towards a group are anchored in the group members. This anchoring guarantees that groups cannot manipulate their ultima facie justification illegitimately. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers believe in lesser-evil justifications for doing harm: if the only way to stop a trolley from killing five is to divert it away onto one, then we may divert. But recently, Helen Frowe has argued that we do not only have the option to pursue the lesser evil: in most cases, we are so obligated. After critically assessing Frowe's argument, I develop three mutually compatible accounts of lesser-evil options, which permit, but do not obligate us to minimize harm. These are the Parity Account, the Prerogative Account, and the Permissible Moral Mistakes Account. Considerations of parity and prerogatives have arisen in this debate before, but in inchoate form. The Permissible Moral Mistakes Account introduces something new. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers have long tried to articulate the specific epistemic status of judgements that neither need nor admit of justification by drawing on the metaphor of 'the light of truth'. In contrast, in Brentano's account of intuitive judgement correctness is central: intuitive or immediately evident judgements are 'characterized as correct (right)'. The aim of my paper is to introduce and explore Brentano's correctness-based view. I will conclude by relating it to the work of his students Meinong, Stumpf, and Husserl, who gradually eroded Brentano's insights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research object is the media content of architecture and urban spaces, which is important for designing modern architecture and integrating it into the existing environment. It is established that the ability of an architectural environment to transmit information and be a communication element allows considering it as a language. Media architecture includes the whole complex of elements, the relationship of which translates a specific idea or demonstrates its absence. Analyzing the informative essence of a city as its language has a number of advantages. Firstly, in this study, the language of a city is considered as a model of its ability to be a carrier of information. Secondly, this approach depicts the communicative properties of urban space best. Thirdly, speech has a direct connection with a person's consciousness, cognitive skills, and manifests itself through the interpretation of certain information by a person. Given this, it can be argued that this study is relevant in clarifying the issues of limiting and structuring information in the environment of a modern city. The theory of media in the architectural environment is based on the analysis of existing examples of media formation at three hierarchical levels: urban space, an architectural object, and a finishing element. This study is conducted in the example of the city of Lviv. Material and mental aspects of media, which form the informative essence of an object or space and directly affect its perception by a person, are identified. This leads to the division of the essence of media architecture and urban spaces into material and mental components. A methodology for analyzing architecture and spaces using a media-linguistic approach, which includes six stages of analysis, has been developed. The application of this approach in design will allow moving from a chaotic environment to creating a conceptual anthropocentric space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The active promotion of adult popular fiction in the public library is in need of theoretical justification consistent with that institution's larger political project, a project it is sometimes said to undermine. In this article, the author surveys genre fiction's modern-day discontents in the library field, then proceeds to consider a series of candidate justifications currently on offer in the LIS literature in an effort to resolve the alleged conflict between promoting fiction primarily read for entertainment and advancing democratic ideals. Upon revealing the empirical and theoretical inadequacies of each of these extant justifications, the author develops and defends an alternative in which popular fiction—and, more precisely, genuine aesthetic experience—serves as a resource for the development of dispositions necessary to democratic citizenship. Adopting this justification has far-reaching consequences for the ways in which librarians design and provide recreational reader services to adult patrons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the French Wars of Religion and the Dutch Revolt, German audiences were continually targeted with appeals for support. Due to the empire's fragmented confessional landscape, the warring parties in France and the Netherlands faced the difficult challenge of presenting justifications with cross-confessional appeal. Central to their strategy was the sharp differentiation between religious and political motives. By explaining the actions of their adversaries as the product of hypocrisy and personal ambition, the aristocratic leadership of the warring parties deconfessionalised the two conflicts. These efforts were partly undone by pamphleteers who interpreted the conflicts as manifestations of a larger religious or even eschatological struggle. These two narratives were essentially irreconcilable and therefore caused confusion among German audiences. This article explores the nature and impact of these contradictory explanations. Sensitive to the inconsistencies, the German aristocracy advocated solutions that carefully addressed both the religious and the political dimension of the conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For Zhinkin, a myth is a "worldly attitude" (Zhinkin [17], p. 458), which, although manifested in the expression, is not a formal structure of consciousness, but a "pure content" ( I ibid i .), The article by Nikolai Zhinkin was translated into English by Thomas Nemeth. As part of this activity, Zhinkin prepared a report on the topic "Conceptual Forms in Mythical Thought", which he delivered at a meeting of the Committee on Artistic Form of GAKhN on 21 October 1923 (see GAKhN [6], pp. 21, 103). Indeed, Cassirer himself developed his new philosophy of culture in the direction of a "metaphysics of symbolic forms" (Cassirer [1] and Cassirer [2]), without distinguishing philosophy from metaphysics. [Extracted from the article]

According to moral encroachment facts about epistemic justification can vary with moral factors that are unrelated to the truth of the belief. Most of the literature on this topic has focused on how beliefs can wrong, and whether the data that moral encroachers offer in support of their view can be explained within a purist framework. A largely neglected question has been what kind of consequences moral encroachment would have for epistemic justification if the thesis were true. Here I remedy this shortcoming by examining what kind of structural implications moral encroachment has for epistemic justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is about the similarity between the appreciation of a piece of art, such as a cherished music album, and the loving appreciation of a person whom one knows well. In philosophical discussion about the rationality of love, the Qualities View (QV) says that love can be justified by reference to the qualities of the beloved. I argue that the oft-rehearsed trading-up objection fails to undermine the QV. The problems typically identified by the objection arise from the idea that love-worthy qualities could be coarse-grained, when in fact they must be fine-grained. The analogy with appreciation of aesthetic qualities helps to draw out this point. Once the fine-grained nature of love-worthy qualities is properly understood, it is clear that critics of the QV cannot rely on the trading-up objection to motivate its rejection. Moreover, the paper's core argument helps to illuminate the persistently aesthetic nature of interpersonal affections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article delves into the logic of obligations and necessities, highlighting the relationship between them. It discusses how the logic of necessity, as well as the standard theory of deontic modals, can be used to analyze obligations in natural language. The article also addresses challenges related to expressing the onus to act in 'ought'-statements and raises questions about how the standard theory captures the nuances of obligations.

The article explores the concept of paternalism and the commonly held notion that it involves an assumption of superiority on the part of the paternalizing agent. This assumption is questioned, and the author argues that not all cases of paternalism necessarily entail an assumption of superiority. The article provides counterexamples and discusses the implications of this perspective on the understanding of paternalism and its justification.

Perceptual beliefs that categorize objects can be justified by demonstrating basic properties (eg shapes) of the objects. In these justifications, perceptual justifiers have different contents to the beliefs they justify. I argue that the justifications are not inferential. Subjects are unlikely to have bodies of beliefs adequate to inferentially justify the beliefs they actually form on the strength of their object recognition abilities, especially when recognition depends on stimulus-dependent retrieval of visual memories. Instead, I argue, the justifications exploit a partial awareness that subjects have of states and processes involved in object recognition. As such, they show that subjects have a degree of internal access to the principles of externalistic perceptual warrant, and to the features of perceptual states that give them justificatory force on externalistic accounts. The justifications themselves are evidential, but in order for them to have any justificatory force, they have to be placed in an externalistic framework for perceptual justification. I conclude that this form of justification shows that subjects have a degree of insight into why their perceptual experiences justify their beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today, consumers expect companies to be socially responsible. However, the literature is undecided about the effects of communicating one's corporate social responsibility activities to consumers. This raises the question of how sustainability‐driven companies can best advertise their products to stimulate ethical consumption: using self‐benefit frames, where the main beneficiary is the consumer, or using other‐benefit frames, where the main beneficiary is a third party. Using three experiments, this study examines the effect of other‐benefit (vs. self‐benefit) advertising frames on consumers' impulse purchases from sustainability‐driven companies. Increasing impulse purchases can help such companies to strengthen their competitive positions. Additionally, it is studied to what extent two types of justification (moral versus deservingness) explain the proposed effect of advertising frames. The results show that only other‐benefit frames affect impulse buying behavior, both directly, as mediated by moral justification. This study's insights may help sustainability‐driven companies to decide on their advertising strategies by providing evidence that other‐benefit‐framed advertisements are more effective in enhancing impulse purchases than self‐benefit‐framed advertisements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the limitations and omissions in the reasoning of the "Quartet" of 2021–2022 Supreme Court decisions related to the major questions doctrine and federal government agencies' actions. The topics discussed include the Court's failure to provide adequate theoretical justification for the major questions doctrine, the alignment of the Quartet decisions with the Roberts Court's trend of structural incrementalism in separation of powers cases.

There is an ever-growing literature on what exactly the condition or criterion is that enables some (but not all) debunking arguments to undermine our beliefs. In this paper, I develop a novel schema for debunking argumentation, arguing that debunking arguments generally have a simple and valid form, but that whether or not they are sound depends on the particular aetiological explanation which the debunker provides in order to motivate acceptance of the individual premises. The schema has three unique features: (1) it satisfies important desiderata for what any acceptable account of debunking would have to look like; (2) it is consistent with the inductively supported claim that there is no special debunking principle; and (3) it coheres with the plausible claim that what makes debunking arguments unique is that they rely on so-called genealogies for the justification of their premises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author presents replies to critics that reviewed her book "Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge." Topics discussed include the possible avoidance of scepticism by an infallibilist through sufficiency of knowledge for self-support (SKSS), the evidentialist view on the justification to believe one's evidence, and the arguments raised about the alleged epistemic link of testimony to facts.

The article provides a summary of the book "The Epistemic Role of Consciousness" by Smithies (2019), which develops a theory of epistemic justification that emphasizes the importance of phenomenal consciousness. The article presents a condensed version of the theory, discussing steps such as evidentialism, probabilism, higher-order probabilities, accessibilism, and the motivation behind these concepts.

The article by Ines M. Breinbauer deals with the places of problematizing the use of reason in Jörg Ruhloff's work. Ruhloff was an important figure in scientific pedagogy, whose work may not be known to many young colleagues. The article examines the characteristic places of problematizing the use of reason and raises the question of the usefulness of such a topic. It also discusses whether a "topology" or a "topography" of argumentation is more appropriate. The text also deals with the transcendental-critical skeptical approach in educational and pedagogical philosophy, especially in the works of Wolfgang Fischer and Jörg Ruhloff. It emphasizes that pedagogical knowledge and practices should be critically examined to question hidden or openly proclaimed claims of ultimate justification. The text also discusses the use of transcendental-critical and skeptical thinking in pedagogy and emphasizes the importance of conflict and plurality in pedagogy. Jörg Ruhloff's contribution deals with the problematic use of reason in antiquity and the Renaissance. Ruhloff shows that conflict is a historical constant and that there is a dividing line between educational research and considerations of educational authority. The text also describes various contributions of the pedagogue Jörg Ruhloff to various educational topics and honors him as a role model in problematizing the use of reason. The given list contains a collection of publications by the author Jörg Ruhloff on various topics in educational and pedagogical philosophy. [Extracted from the article]

It's one thing to do the right thing. It's another to be creditable for doing the right thing. Being creditable for doing the right thing requires that one does the right thing out of a morally laudable motive and that there is a non‐accidental fit between those two elements. This paper argues that the two main views of morally creditable action – the Right‐Making Features View and the Rightness Itself View – fail to capture that non‐accidentality constraint: the first because it morally credits agents who make heavy‐duty moral mistakes; the second because it fails to generalise and is too conservative – a point which this paper gives renewed defence. The paper then goes on to defend and develop an alternative according to which moral worth is mediated by the agent's knowing how to respond to the reasons of the type which make acting in that way right. It's argued that this view avoids the problems for the alternatives, and it's shown that in order for the view to avoid collapsing into a problematic form of Reliabilism we'll have to think of states of knowing how as essentially successful in character. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The New Evil Demon Problem presents a serious challenge to externalist theories of epistemic justification. In recent years, externalists have developed a number of strategies for responding to the problem. A popular line of response involves distinguishing between a belief's being epistemically justified and a subject's being epistemically blameless for holding it. The apparently problematic intuitions the New Evil Demon Problem elicits, proponents of this response claim, track the fact that the deceived subject is epistemically blameless for believing as she does, not that she is justified for so believing. This general strategy—which I call the "unjustified-but-blameless maneuver"—is motivated, in part, by the assumption that the distinction between epistemic justification and blamelessness is merely an extension of the familiar distinction between moral justification and blamelessness. In this paper, I consider three ways of drawing the distinction between justification and blamelessness familiar from the moral domain: the first in terms of a connection with reactive attitudes, the second in terms of the distinction between wrongness and wronging, and the third in terms of reasons-responsiveness. All three ways of drawing the distinction, I argue, make it difficult to see how an analogous distinction in the epistemic domain could help externalists explain away the intuitions which underwrite the New Evil Demon Problem. Motivating the unjustified-but-blameless maneuver, I conclude, is a much less straightforward task than its proponents tend to assume. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deliberative and agonistic democrats have conceived of political reconciliation and its pursuit in different forms. In this article, I explore how insight can be derived from key tenets of both strands of democratic theory in the struggle to achieve political reconciliation in war-torn or divided contexts. Rather than subsume disagreement or straitjacket it in processes of "rational" deliberation, I propose contingent, open-ended, but inclusive contestation to achieve political reconciliation. This article explores how the deliberative "right to justification," set out by critical theorist Rainer Forst, can be put to work in an agonistic politics of reconciliation. I want to show that deliberation over the right to justification and the corollary duty to justify constitute conjoined means of consensus-seeking that can be contingent and fluid and can account for entrenched relations of power and inequality—two dynamics that deliberative theorists have been accused of deflecting or obscuring. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this regard, 'Sri Har a criticizes the Nyaya, in what Mills suggests to be yet another expression of skepticism about philosophy - this time, of the mystical sort. Ethan Mills, Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India: Nagarjuna, Jayara'si, and 'Sri Har a. Ethan Mills, Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India: Nagarjuna, Jayara'si, and 'Sri Har a. [Extracted from the article]

This paper challenges the moral justificatory significance of the notion of basic desert. The notion of basic desert is commonly used in the literature to distinguish a specific sense of moral responsibility that depends on free will. In this sense, a person is morally responsible for an action if this action belongs to her in such a way that she would deserve to be blamed if she understood that it was morally wrong, and she would deserve to be praised if she understood that it was morally exemplary. The central question of the paper concerns the role of the notion of basic desert in moral justifications of social practices including responsibility practices. I argue that the significance sometimes attributed to the notion of basic desert is largely a byproduct of its isolation from a larger context of other moral reasons and moral justifications. First, I introduce the concepts of special and general moral justifications and defend the central assumption behind these concepts. Next, I present a three-case argument that challenges the justificatory moral significance of the notion of basic desert by considering various logical roles that it might play in the general moral justification of various social practices. Finally, I apply this argument to Derk Pereboom's theory of hard incompatibilism in order to show that moral justification of the revisionary part of his project does not depend on the belief in free will necessary for moral responsibility in the sense of basic desert. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theorists with strongly communal understandings of the common good frequently criticize the modern liberal state for failing to provide for the common good and for interfering with local communities. These critics, however, are less clear about what role, if any, the state should play in modern life. In order to trace a middle ground between liberal attempts to justify the state and too hasty communitarian condemnations of it, I develop a two‐tiered theory of political justification. All political justification is to be seen in relationship to the common good of a community. While only local communities have a common good and a direct claim to political authority, the state can still have an indirect and derivative authority. After examining how this theory applies to thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, and Charles Taylor, I propose an appropriate model for the relationship between local communities and the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are plenty of classic paradoxes about conditional obligations, like the duty to be gentle if one is to murder, and about "supererogatory" deeds beyond the call of duty. But little has been said about the intersection of these topics. We develop the first general account of conditional supererogation, with the power to solve familiar puzzles as well as several that we introduce. Our account, moreover, flows from two familiar ideas: that conditionals restrict quantification and that supererogation emerges from a clash between justifying and requiring reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay displays the central factors which animate the cyclical attempts to renew Marxism, which also had in Latin America noteworthy representatives. These attempts generally follow the way started by Georg Lukács. He separated the methodological core of Marxism from the concreteresults of Marxist analyses. The core rests always valid and true, while the specific results may contain errors which do not affect the essential quality of Marxism. The danger lies in legitimizingthe intellectuals who master the Marxist method and thus can build a political and technocratic elite, which would be armoured against any critique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to an influential recent view, S is propositionally justified in believing p iff S is in no position to know that S is in no position to know p. I argue that this view faces compelling counterexamples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]