Linzhi Du, Chin-Kang Jen, Roberto Luna-Arocas, Peter Vlerick, Abdulgawi Salim Alzubaidi, Rosário Correia, Fernando Arias-Galicia, Luigina Canova, Brigitte Charles-Pauvers, Jingqiu Chen, Toto Sutarso, Horia D. Pitariu, Ilya Garber, Mark G. Borg, Ruja Pholsward, Thompson S. H. Teo, Richard T. Mpoyi, Anna Maria Manganelli, Marko Polič, Caroline Urbain, Ali Mahdi Kazem, Éva Málovics, Ningyu Tang, Alice S. Moreira, Petar Skobic, Francisco José Costa Pereira, Mehmet Ferhat Özbek, Allen F. Stembridge, Bor-Shiuan Cheng, Thomas Li-Ping Tang, Aahad M. Osman-Gani, Modupe Fal Adewuyi, Elisaveta Gjorgji Sardžoska, Martina Trontelj, Kilsun Kim, Mahfooz A. Ansari, Johnsto E. Osagie, Anthony Ugochukwu Obiajulu Nnedum, Consuelo García de la Torre, Michael W. Allen, Abdul Hamid Safwat Ibrahim, Bolanle E. Adetoun, Theresa Li-Na Tang, Vivien K. G. Lim, Adebowale Akande, Randy K. Chiu, and Jian Liang
Monetary intelligence theory asserts that individuals apply their money attitude to frame critical concerns in the context and strategically select certain options to achieve financial goals and ultimate happiness. This study explores the dark side of monetary Intelligence and behavioral economics-dishonesty (corruption). Dishonesty, a risky prospect, involves cost-benefit analysis of self-interest. We frame good or bad barrels in the environmental context as a proxy of high or low probability of getting caught for dishonesty, respectively. We theorize: The magnitude and intensity of the relationship between love of money and dishonest prospect (dishonesty) may reveal how individuals frame dishonesty in the context of two levels of subjective norm-perceived corporate ethical values at the micro-level (CEV, Level 1) and Corruption Perceptions Index at the macro-level (CPI, Level 2), collected from multiple sources. Based on 6382 managers in 31 geopolitical entities across six continents, our cross-level three-way interaction effect illustrates: As expected, managers in good barrels (high CEV/high CPI), mixed barrels (low CEV/high CPI or high CEV/low CPI), and bad barrels (low CEV/low CPI) display low, medium, and high magnitude of dishonesty, respectively. With high CEV, the intensity is the same across cultures. With low CEV, the intensity of dishonesty is the highest in high CPI entities (risk seeking of high probability)-the Enron Effect, but the lowest in low CPI entities (risk aversion of low probability). CPI has a strong impact on the magnitude of dishonesty, whereas CEV has a strong impact on the intensity of dishonesty. We demonstrate dishonesty in light of monetary values and two frames of social norm, revealing critical implications to the field of behavioral economics and business ethics. Faculty Research and Creative Activity Committee of Middle Tennessee State University The senior author would like to thank Faculty Research and Creative Activity Committee of Middle Tennessee State University and all co-authors' respective institutions for financial support, late Fr. Wiatt Funk, late Prof. Kuan Ying Tang, and Fang Chen Tang for their inspiration, and pay special tribute to Prof. Horia D. Pitariu who passed away on March 25, 2010. WOS:000428611800013 2-s2.0-84955592605