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Copyright of Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais is the property of DADOS and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Academic evaluations of the relationship between religion, secularization, and far-right collective actors have grown increasingly complicated. New religious immigrants, seen as invaders importing contradictory values imposed on the populous by EU elites, may threaten Christian and irreligious Europeans. Europe has been secularizing for decades, concurrent with a resurgence in far-right collective action, but this far-right resurgence has also accompanied an increase in religious discourse in politics. In this study, I investigate the relationship between religion, secularization, and far-right collective action utilizing three case studies. I find, with some caveats, that in Hungary, Fidesz motivates Christian voters with religious nationalist appeals, while assertive secularization motivates irreligious voters in the Netherlands. Italy is more complex, where far-right collective actors are less able to monopolize social issues. These findings speak to the critical role religious values and institutions play in shaping voter preferences and present competing options for secularist politics moving forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In France, successive Ministers of the Interior systematically come to the defense of the police. By contrast, their colleagues in Higher Education and Research don't hesitate to join in attacks on academics. This is how Frédérique Vidal ended up in 2021 echoing the polemics launched the year before by the President of the Republic, Emmanuel Macron, and then by the Minister of National Education, Jean-Michel Blanquer. However, the campaign against "Islamo-leftism" was preceded by other offensives against higher education and research: university autonomy was thus challenged ... in the name of autonomy. As the reforms have progressed, higher education and research have been subjected to an authoritarian neoliberal regime, under the leadership of managers rather than colleagues, in a logic of competition that is supposed to guarantee excellence at the service of the economy. Just like a company, isn't the CNRS run by a CEO? Today, the takeover of ESR is inseparably ideological and economic. Thus, the increase in university fees for non-Europeans has used xenophobia to promote a neoliberal conception of studies. The threats to the academic world cannot be understood without articulating these distinct but intertwined logics. How can we tell the story of the attacks we are suffering, without erasing the struggles we are waging? For there is a great risk, in taking power as the object, of underestimating the role of counterpower that academics can still play in a country that is heir to a tradition of the "intellectual" as a figure of commitment. On the one hand, the multiple offensives of successive governments, whether directed at university policy or academics, have met with considerable resistance. Far from being reduced to inaction, the academic world is mobilizing strongly. But it's not just a question of reaction. On the other hand, the governmental campaigns themselves must be understood as forms of reaction against the politicization of academics: far from being passive victims, they play an active role. This is precisely the reason why ministers try to bring them into line: in France, the university is not isolated from society, as a campus can be. Critical knowledge circulates with social movements. In other words, campaigns targeting the academic world are proof that it is not without political importance. It's a form of recognition of the role it plays and can play. Anti-university politics today can be understood as a game of action and dreaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Internasjonal Politikk is the property of Cappelen Damm Akademisk and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Romanian Journal of Comparative Law / Revista Romana de Drept Comparat is the property of Universul Juridic Publishing House and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article presents and empirically substantiates a theoretical account explaining the making and stabilisation of illiberal hegemony in Hungary. It combines a Polanyian institutionalist framework with a neo-Gramscian analysis of right-wing hegemonic strategy and a relational class analysis inspired by the political economy tradition in anthropology. The article identifies the social actors behind the illiberal transformation, showing how 'neoliberal disembedding' fuelled the rightward shift of constituencies who had erstwhile been brought into the fold of liberal hegemony: blue-collar workers, post-peasants and sections of domestic capital. Finally, the article describes the emergence of a new regime of accumulation and Fidesz's strategy of 'authoritarian re-embedding', which relies on 'institutional authoritarianism' and 'authoritarian populism'. This two-pronged approach has so far allowed the ruling party to stabilise illiberal hegemony, even in the face of reforms that have generated discontents and exacerbated social inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]